# Handbook for Transition Assistance

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Japan International Cooperation Agency

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JICA would be grateful to receive any comments on this Handbook.

For further information, please contact:
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Planning and Coordination Department

Shinjuku Maynds Tower Bldg., 10F, 2-1-1, Yoyogi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
151-8558 JAPAN

email: jicagap-opinion@jica.go.jp

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# Glossary of Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| **ALNAP** | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action |
| **CAP/CHAP** | Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)/Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) (short-term) |
| **CAS** | Country Assistance Strategy |
| **CCA** | Common Country Assessment |
| **CIDA** | Canadian International Development Agency |
| **CPDC** | Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation |
| **CPR** | Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network |
| **CSO** | Civil Society Organizations |
| **DAC** | Development Assistance Committee |
| **DDR** | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| **DFID** | Department for International Development |
| **DRC** | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| **ECHO** | European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office |
| **EPAU** | (UNHCR) Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit |
| **ERW** | Explosive remnant of war |
| **EUPM** | European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| **GTZ** | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit |
| **HIPC** | Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative |
| **ICRC** | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| **IDP** | Internally Displaced Persons |
| **IFRC** | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| **IGAD** | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| **IMF** | International Monetary Fund |
| **IRSS** | Institute for Resource and Security Studies |
| **ISN** | Interim Strategy Note |
| **JAM** | Joint Assessment Mission |
| **JICA** | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| **M&E** | Monitoring and Evaluations |
| **MDG** | Millennium Development Goals |
| **NGO** | Non Governmental Organizations |
| **OECD** | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| **OSCE** | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| **OTI** | USAID Office of Transition Initiatives |

| | |
|---|---|
| **PCIA** | Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment |
| **PCNA** | Post-Conflict Needs Assessment |
| **PNA** | Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment |
| **PRSP & I-PRSP** | Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers |
| **QiP** | Quick Impact Projects |
| **RTE** | Real-Time Evaluation |
| **SCA** | Strategic Conflict Assessment |
| **SDC** | Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation |
| **SIDA** | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| **TRM** | Transitional Results Matrix |
| **TSS** | Transitional Support Strategy |
| **UNAMA** | United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan |
| **UNDAF** | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| **UNDG/ECHA** | United Nations Development Group |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNHCR** | United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
| **UNICEF** | United Nations Children's Fund |
| **UNMIK** | United Nations Mission in Kosovo |
| **UNOPS** | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| **USAID** | United States Agency for International Development |
| **UXO** | Unexploded ordnances |
| **WFP** | World Food Programme |

# Glossary of Terms

This glossary provides the definitions of key terms used in this handbook. However, the glossary is not intended to be exhaustive. The definitions supplied here are chosen to fit the way that the terms are used in this handbook while recognizing that some terms may have multiple uses and definitions.

**Anti-personnel Mine**

Anti-personnel Mine: A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person that, are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention).

**Basic human needs**

Basic human needs are required by human beings for survival with dignity, such as food security and nutrition, water and sanitation, primary health care, family planning and reproductive health, shelter, and education. All of these basic human needs are enshrined in international legal instruments and can also be understood as human rights.

**Benchmarks**

Benchmarks are used to determine whether a country presents real opportunities to consolidate peace. See chapter 1, box 1.8 for an enumeration of these benchmarks as suggested by the UN Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance.

**Cantonment sites**

The terms “cantonment sites”, “encampment sites”, “assembly areas” and “quartering areas” have been used interchangeably in various DDR operations.

*Source:* Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 14 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide* (GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15.

**Civil society**

Civil society refers to “…voluntary associations, organizations, movements and networks that live and work in the social space outside the state and the private sector….”[1] Often civil society is used to mean non-governmental organizations.

Civil society includes such groups as religious groups, labor unions, neighborhood associations, and women’s groups.

*Any* group that is non-governmental, and not in the private sector is part of civil society.

**Combatant**

Combatant denotes not only an individual conscripted in the armed forces or movements carrying a gun, but also members of these groups working in logistics and administration, as well as individuals – especially women and children – who have been abducted and sexually or otherwise abused and

[1] International Institute of Sustainable Development, http://www.iisd.org/didigest/glossary.htm

who have subsequently stayed within these groups.

*Source: Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament*, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a *Peacekeeping* Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 14 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide *(GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15.*

**Conflict Analysis**

Conflict analysis is a means of developing a multi-dimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict as well as the capacities for peace.

**Conflict sensitivity**

Conflict-sensitivity is defined as the ability of an organization or program to:

- Understand the **context** in which it operates;
- Understand the interaction between its **intervention** and the context; and
- Act upon the understanding of this **interaction**, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.

The **context** is defined as one's operational environment from the macro (national/international) to the micro (community/village) level, including the history and root causes of the conflict and other determining social factors.

An **intervention** can be large or small and planned for at different levels.

The **interaction** between the two is a two-way relationship between context and intervention. Each influences the other.

*Source: FEWER, INTERNATIONAL ALERT AND SAFER WORLD, Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Resource Pack, http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html*

**Constitution**

- Embody the basic law of a state;
- Establish the means of governance;
- Define the rights, duties, and relationships between the state and citizens; and
- Create the identity of a state.

*Source: HART, Vivien, "Democratic Constitution Making", Special Report, No. 107, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, July 2003. p. 2*

**Coordination**

Coordination is a process through which actors work together to ensure that:

- Resources are delivered as efficiently and effectively as local conditions allow; and
- Their contribution is complementary and allocated in line with indigenous priorities and policies.

Coordination is voluntary and therefore also consensual. It is fundamentally different from the concept of "management", which implies substantial control. Coordination should not be understood as forcing all activities into a single mould. Rapid responses and innovation by individual actors should be encouraged.

**Country**

The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is the central vehicle for Board

**Assistance Strategy (CAS)**

review of the Bank Group's assistance strategy for IDA and IBRD borrowers. The CAS document (a) describes the Bank Group's strategy based on an assessment of priorities in the country, and (b) indicates the level and composition of assistance to be provided based on the strategy and the country's portfolio performance. The CAS is prepared with the government in a participatory way; its key elements are discussed with the government prior to Board consideration. However, it is not a negotiated document. Any differences between the country's own agenda and the strategy advocated by the Bank are highlighted in the CAS document.

*Source: Adapted from WORLD BANK, The World Bank Operational Manual, "Country Assistance Strategies", BP 2.11, January 1995 and "Development Cooperation and Conflict", OP 2.30, January 2001*.

**Cross-cutting Issues**

Cross-cutting issues are areas of concern which for institutional or societal reasons need to be tackled across sectors in a coherent and integrated manner to achieve objectives that go beyond those of a single endeavor.

**Demobilization**

Demobilization is the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition, factional or irregular forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life.

*Source: Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 14 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide *(GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15.*

**Democratic Governance**

[…] democratic governance primarily seeks to promote power and influence of poor people in society through a democratic political process, which is characterized by participation, equality in dignity and rights, transparency and accountability. The state's will and capacity to live up to its responsibility, and to the best of its ability, for guaranteeing the human rights and freedoms for all women, men, girls and boys, is central*. (SIDA, Digging Deeper – Four Reports on Democratic Governance in International Development Cooperation – Summary, August 2003)*

**Detailed assessment**

A detailed assessment is an information collection process to determine needs, set priorities for action and provide data for program planning.

**Disarmament**

Disarmament is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programs.

*Source: Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 14 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide *(GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15.*

**Economic recovery**

In times of transition, economic recovery aims to:

- Meet immediate needs;
- Prevent a relapse into conflict and support conflict resolution and peacebuilding;
- Jump-start the economy;
- Initiate macro-economic stabilization and restore state capacity for macro-economic management; and

Set the groundwork for long-term economic stability, growth and poverty reduction.

**Encampment sites**

The terms “cantonment sites”, “encampment sites”, “assembly areas” and “quartering areas” have been used interchangeably in various DDR operations.

*Source: Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 14 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide *(GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15.*

**Entrance strategy**

An effective entrance strategy in transitions depends on rapid and informed decision-making about the most appropriate place, time and operational approach to jump-starting transitional assistance.

**Evaluation**

Evaluation is the process of determining the worth or significance of a development activity, policy or program. It is a systematic and impartial examination which is intended to improve policy and practice. It determines the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partners and donor.

*Source: Adapted from OECD-DAC, Glossary of Key Management Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, 2002, page 22.*

**Exit strategy**

An exit strategy is a sound approach towards the termination or substantial reduction of transition assistance, with the gradual hand-over of responsibilities to governments and other authorities, and paving the way for more traditional development cooperation.

**Explosive Remnant of War (ERW)**

Explosive Remnant of War (ERW): unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance (Article 2, paragraph 4 of Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).

**Fiscal policy**

Fiscal policy refers to government’s management of public revenue and spending. In addition to its direct government functions, fiscal policy also plays an important part in how government can influence economic activities, stability, growth and poverty reduction.

**Gender**

Gender refers to the differences between women and men that are socially and culturally constructed and change over time. These differences are reflected in: roles, responsibilities, access to resources, constraints, opportunities, needs, perceptions, views, etc. held by both women and men. Thus, gender is not a synonym for women, but considers both women and men and their interdependent relationships.

The most important gender issue in the refugee context, for example, is a change in roles. Refugee women who lost their husbands have to take up additional responsibility as the head of the family. Men who lost their jobs and social status may also feel as if they have lost their dignity.

**Gender mainstreaming**

"Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality."

*Source:* UN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC). *Economic and Social Council Resolution (1996/310: Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programs of the UN system.* Substantive Session for 30 June-25 July 1997. Report on-line (posted 1997and cited 7 November 2000) available at un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/ecosoc.

**Governance**

Governance concerns the state's ability to serve the citizens. It refers to the rules, processes, and behaviors by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is the major issue to be addressed in this context. *(The European Commission, Communication on Governance and Development, October 2003, COM(03)615)*

**Human rights**

Human rights are those basic standards without which people cannot live in dignity. To violate someone's human rights is to treat that person as though she or he were not a human being. To advocate human rights is to demand that the human dignity of all people be respected.

Within particular societies, "human rights" refers to standards of behavior as accepted within their respective legal systems regarding 1) the well being of individuals, 2) the freedom and autonomy of individuals, and 3) the representation of the human interest in government. These rights commonly include the right to life, the right to an adequate standard of living, the prohibition of genocide, freedom from torture and other mistreatment, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, the right to self-determination, the right to education, and the right to participation in cultural and political life. These norms are based on the legal and political traditions of United Nations member states and are incorporated into international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

*Source: Adapted from WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights.*

**Human security**

Human Security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf.

*Source : Adapted from OECD/DAC, "Security Issues and Development Co-operation : A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence", in Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers, Off-Print of the DAC Journal 2001, Volume 2, No. 3, , II-35, The DAC Guidelines Helping*

*Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001): 37-44; Security System Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2004): 16 and COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, Human Security Now (New York: UN, 2003): 1-19*.

**Impact Evaluation**

Impact evaluation is the systematic identification of the effects, positive or negative, intended or not on individual households, institutions and the environment caused by a given project or program.

**Information Gathering**

**Information gathering** includes the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crisis for the purpose of:

- Anticipating the termination of violent conflict;
- Collecting information using specific indicators;
- Analyzing information – attaching meaning to indicators, setting it into context, recognizing an opportunity for intervention;
- Formulating best and worst-case scenarios and response options; and
- Communicating to policy-makers for the purposes of decision-making and action.

**Interim Strategy Note (ISN)**

The Interim Strategy Note (ISN), formerly known as Transitional Support Strategy (TSS), is a short to medium-term plan for Bank involvement in a country in transition from conflict that does not have a CAS, or whose CAS, because of the effects of conflict, no longer represents a responsive strategy. The Bank may become involved incrementally during this phase -- that is, if certain areas within the country concerned have become peaceful, it may provide assistance in those areas (if other conditions are acceptable). Priorities for assistance under a ISN may differ from those under a CAS.

*Source: Adapted from WORLD BANK, The World Bank Operational Manual, "Country Assistance Strategies", BP 2.11, January 1995 and "Development Cooperation and Conflict", OP 2.30, January 2001.*

**Landmine**

Landmine (or simply "mine"): A munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

*Source: Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on Their Destruction, also referred to as "Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention".*

**Lawmaking**

Lawmaking refers to the process of drafting and enacting laws for the country. It requires specialized skills, notably the ability to blend technical and legal competence with useful political knowledge.

*Source: Adapted from USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000,, pp. 7-8*.

**Legislature**

A legislature provides representation, lawmaking and oversight. A legislature must be competent, accountable, transparent and responsive.

*Source: Adapted from USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000,, pp. 7-8.*

**Macro-Economic Recovery**

Macro-economic recovery aims to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace and to support economic and social development. This requires that a peacetime economy be built as soon as possible and that state-society relations be restored at all levels.

**Mainstreaming** Mainstreaming refers to the integration of cross-cutting issues into core institutional or societal thinking and subsequently into a coordinated and harmonized approach to the implementation of activities. It is therefore a tool for making a cross-cutting issue an integral part of an assistance program/project in a given sector.

**Micro credit** Micro-credit and microfinance (hereafter referred to as simply micro-credit) refers to programs that provide small to medium sized loans to individuals and businesses. In transition situations, these services help conflict-affected families rebuild household and business assets as well as act as a catalyst for economic activities and markets.

**Mine action** Mine Action: activities that aim to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impacts of mines and unexploded ordnance (International Mine Action Standards Glossary)

**Monetary policy** Monetary policy refers to actions by the central bank and government to control the availability of money to companies and consumers, and in particular to focus efforts on fighting inflation or otherwise control or stimulate the economy.

**Monitoring** Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds. Monitoring helps to verify the output, activities, input and important assumptions of the logistical framework planning tool. In essence, monitoring is the tool that tells field practitioners if they are on the right track.

*Source:* Adapted from OECD-DAC, *Evaluation Feedback for Effective Learning and Accountability, Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness*, No.5 Paris. OECD Development Assistance Committee-Working Party on Aid Evaluation. 2001.

**Objectives** Objectives are clear, concise, measurable statements of desired performance, conditions under which performance is to occur, and the standard or level of performance that will be considered acceptable. The objectives describe the desired result or impact of the program activity and not the process.

**Operational Flexibility** Operational flexibility can be defined as suppleness and agility in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation without sacrificing on the quality of transition assistance. Operational flexibility presupposes capacity to:

1. Seize windows of opportunity rapidly;
2. Readjust to meet rapidly changing local needs; and
3. Readjust to unexpected circumstances.

**Outcomes Evaluation** Outcomes evaluation examines changes in the short, medium and long terms regarding impacts and benefits to the targeted people. It focuses on changes in behaviors, relationships, actions and activities of people, groups with whom a transition program works directly.

**Oversight** Oversight includes the process of ensuring that the approved laws are implemented appropriately and as intended. Oversight implies keeping an eye on other parts of government.

*Source: Adapted from USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 7-8.*

**Participatory evaluation**

A participatory evaluation is one in which those entrusted with the design and delivery of a transition intervention evaluate the program. This would include stakeholders such as internal actors and local groups as well as the project managers.

**Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)**

The PCIA is a set of tools to analyze the causes of tensions and conflict, the effects of peace and conflict on the sector where an intervention is planned, and the potential outcomes and impacts. It projects whether the project will strengthen or weaken peace, interprets the direct and indirect effects on different parts of society, and develops a plan to increase future outcomes and impacts.

**Post-Conflict Needs Assessment**

Post-conflict Needs Assessment is a complex analytical process led by national authorities and supported by the international community and carried out by multilateral agencies on their behalf, with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders and civil society. The needs assessment aims to overcome consequences of conflict or war, prevent renewed outbreak and shape the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities as well as articulate their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision or goal.

*Source: UNDP, WORLD BANK and UNDG, Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations, August 2004, p. 1.*

**Preparedness**

Preparedness means putting into place plans, management system, trained staff, and access to funds and administrative arrangements to maximize the potential value of an early intervention to reinforce peacebuilding and stabilizing communities. These plans ensure timely, appropriate and effective organization and delivery of assistance.

**PRSPs and I-PRSPs**

PRSPs describe the country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing.

I-PRSPs summarize the current knowledge and analysis of a country's poverty situation, describe the existing poverty reduction strategy, and lay out the process for producing a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion.

The poverty reduction strategy is intended to be country-driven, results-oriented, comprehensive, partnership-based, and with a long-term perspective on development and poverty reduction.

*Source: IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp.*

**Public Administration**

- The aggregate machinery (policies, rules, procedures, systems, organizational structures, personnel, etc.) funded by the state budget and in charge of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the state, society and external environment; and
- The management and implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of laws, regulations, decisions of the government and the management related to the provision of public services.

*Source: UNDP, Public Administration Reform. - Practice Note (undated), p. 1*.

**Real-Time Evaluation**

The real-time evaluation (RTE) is a timely, rapid and interactive peer review of a fast evolving intervention which is usually undertaken in the early stages.

**Reintegration**

Reintegration is the process by which combatants gain access to civilian forms of work and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.

*Source: Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 14 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others,* Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide *(GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15*.

**Representation**

Representation refers to the acting on behalf of or in the name of constituents. It involves legislators listening to, communicating with, and representing the needs and aspirations of citizens in policymaking.

*Source:* Adapted from USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000,, pp. 7-8.

**Security**

Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the governance of their countries; enjoy the protection of fundamental human rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security.

*Source : Adapted from OECD/DAC, "Security Issues and Development Co-operation : A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence", in Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers, Off-Print of the DAC Journal 2001, Volume 2, No. 3, , II-35, The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001): 37-44; Security System Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2004): 16 and COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, Human Security Now (New York: UN, 2003): 1-19.*

**Security System**

Security System includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies, judicial and penal institutions); and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.).

*Source : Adapted from OECD/DAC, "Security Issues and Development Co-operation : A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence", in Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers, Off-Print of the DAC Journal 2001, Volume 2, No. 3, , II-35, The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001): 37-44; Security System Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2004): 16 and COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, Human Security Now (New York: UN, 2003): 1-19.*

**Security Sector Reform or Restructuring**

Security Sector Reform or Restructuring is the transformation of the security system – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities, and actions – working together to manage and operate in a manner that is more

consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. The term should not be understood to pertain only to the armed forces, but to the whole system of actors working in security-related issues.

*Source : Adapted from OECD/DAC, "Security Issues and Development Co-operation : A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence", in Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers, Off-Print of the DAC Journal 2001, Volume 2, No. 3, , II-35, The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001): 37-44; Security System Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2004): 16 and COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, Human Security Now (New York: UN, 2003): 1-19.*

**Situation analysis**

Situation analysis (also known as initial reconnaissance) is the immediate estimate of the impact of a conflict. A situation analysis, often including a conflict analysis (see chapter 1, section 1.3)is normally carried out at the earliest opportunity to determine the extent and nature of the conflict's effects, locations of critical need, and the operating status of lifelines and critical facilities. It is also needed to evaluate which sectors are priorities and in what sequence activities need to be undertaken.

**Strategic planning**

Strategic planning is a dynamic and continuous process that results in a strategy outlining the vision and broad objectives of assistance agencies in a transition situation. This strategy also establishes the parameters for the program plan, proposes a time frame for intervention, lays out the assumptions and describes the methods for reaching the objectives. The written strategy should be a working document that is concise, specific and produces action.

**Transition**

"For the UN, transition refers to the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity."

*Source: UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, Report, February 2004, p.6.*

**Transition Assistance**

Is the concern of the political, security and development parts of the United Nations and their member States; requires a comprehensive, concerted and holistic approach. Poorly coordinated, *ad hoc*, short-term engagements will not yield the desired results; must address the root causes of conflicts; is multidimensional; has to be carried out in full partnership with internal actors; and s ultimately defined by its context and purpose, rather than through a set of pre-defined activities.

**Transitional Results Matrix (TRM)**

The Transitional Results Matrix (TRM), also referred to as a Transitional Calendar or Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), is a planning, coordination and management tool that national stakeholders and donors can use to better prioritize actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile States.

*Source: UNDG/WORLD BANK, An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices – Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States, January 2005, p. 1.*

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|---|---|
| **Unexploded Ordinance (UXO)** | Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use in an armed conflict. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so (Article 2, paragraph 2 of Protocol V to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects also referred to as “Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”). |

# Introduction

The nature of violent conflict in the world has changed dramatically in recent decades in terms of its causes, targets of violence and consequences. Internal conflicts fought between different "identity-based" groups within a state not only destroy buildings and bridges, but also deliberately victimize civilians and leave deep scars in communities which are frequently challenged by a weak or malfunctioning government structures.

Helping to rebuild war-torn societies has become one of the priorities of international development agencies. Within the past decade, the international community has learned important lessons about assisting societies in the transitional phase from war to peace. We have learned that we must be mindful of the particular challenges, needs and affected beneficiary groups as well as of the need to implement specific methods in our transition-related aid. A speedy commencement of assistance, involving a carefully established strategy is necessary in transition situations. Transition assistance must be programmed in a manner which is sensitive to the root causes of conflict. It should aim to ensure human security by reaching victims promptly. This assistance should also serve to enhance the capacities of legitimate governing structures to help their own citizens. The external aid input has political implications in the post-conflict transition phase.

In reality, however, transition assistance still suffers from many gaps occasioned by the varying external factors, approaches to aid used by humanitarian agencies and development workers. Many humanitarian agencies remain operational during violent conflict to address immediate humanitarian needs to reach individual victims and to assist their communities in the aftermath of violence. Their mandates often do not cover longer-term recovery efforts and their aid methods normally do not target the establishment of governance capacities. Unlike the consistency of many humanitarian agencies, development actors often suffer from disrupted aid operations during conflict. They return to areas of conflict once relative stability has been secured on the ground. Their mandates can cover a wide range of issues related to recovery and reconstruction for a period which exceeds the tenure of humanitarian agencies. The aid methods of development actors usually target creating or strengthening government capacities crucial to maintaining a peaceful society. However, this often means that necessary recovery aid may not reach individual victims, especially where governance capacities are still weak. Many donors may be rushing to assist in high profile sectors or geographical areas, leaving others unaddressed. Donors may also inadvertently address sector needs in a compartmentalized manner which compromises the necessary linkages between sectors.

Transition assistance can create dangerous gaps, compromising the impact of external assistance, or the recovery process itself. Many practitioners agree that appropriate interventions during the immediate post-conflict period are essential to the success of any recovery and rebuilding process. Potential 'gaps' will be mitigated in this period by prompt, well-programmed assistance which links together various assistance sectors.

### The aims of this Handbook

This handbook is designed primarily for development agency practitioners who operate in transitional situations from war to peace. Given that each transition situation is different, rather than offering pre-made, generic strategies for transition assistance, this handbook strives:

- To help practitioners understand the dynamics of transition assistance, such that they might better analyze the complexities of transition situations and be able to operate within them.
- To provide practitioners a useful reference guide of conflict analysis tools, assistance sectors and transition assistance strategies.

- To familiarize both humanitarian and development practitioners with each other's operational principles, approaches and main challenges, such that they themselves might avoid creating or enlarging any existing assistance gaps during the transition period.

This handbook's overall aim is to help development actors formulate and implement effective transition assistance programmes which contribute to security on the ground. This handbook is meant to improve the programming of humanitarian assistance and development work where societies are transitioning from war to peace.

**How to use this handbook**

Given that transition challenges are immense this handbook contains voluminous information which can be analysed in greater depth elsewhere. Each chapter references sources for further information. The handbook includes three parts:

- *Part I* Chapters 1 to 4 define the dynamics of conflict and how these dynamics might be analyzed. This section also provides an overview of various types of external interventions during the transition phase, including their operational principles and approaches as well as cross-cutting issues to be addressed across the board in any assistance sector programme.
- *Part II* Chapters 5 to 9 outline the scope of clusters or sectors of assistance which are important in the transitional phase. These chapters focus on "what" needs to be targeted in assistance programmes, in other words, which areas need assistance in transitions. This section highlights key issues with the aim of creating a "sufficient minimum" necessary for the implementation of useful projects and programs in most transition situations.
- *Part III* Chapters 10 to 12 address key issues related to program design, planning and implementation monitoring and evaluation. This section highlights special operational considerations in transition situations. Building on a practitioner's understanding of "what" to target in assistance programme, these chapters focus on "how" to assist in transitions.

# Executive Summary

This handbook was written to provide primarily field practitioners from development aid agencies with a comprehensive overview of issues, approaches, and operational considerations that are particular to the transition from war to peace. Operating in the often confusing complexity of transitions, practitioners require a guide that helps them better understand the challenges, overcome gaps, and work more effectively towards the overarching goal of bringing about improved human security for all. The book was thus conceived of as a practical guide explaining issues by way of summary statements, tables and illustrations, and referencing information and tools.

As the title suggests, the handbook promotes a perspective that has become increasingly convincing in recent years. Human security looks at assistance efforts from the vital perspective of the individual, thus allowing an assessment of a situation in a more comprehensive manner and with integrative policies that not only protect people from severe threats but also empower them to take control over their own lives.

The information is organized in three parts: (1) perspective-taking, (2) sectoral knowledge acquisition in five sectors, and (3) operational application. The book is thus divided into three volumes.

## I. Perspective-Taking

Taking a perspective on transitions from war to peace and taking account of the complexity and chaos of transition situations, the spotty attempts of external response, the useful coming together of assistance efforts in a human security approach and the need for mainstreaming pertinent cross-cutting issues are the subject of the first part of this handbook. Gaining this perspective helps the practitioner situate him or herself squarely in the field and gives important insights on the context, the gaps, the values and resulting approach for action and the lateral connections any activity will need to make. This is an important foundation for going forward in actually providing assistance in the various sectors, discussed in part II and their operational application, discussed in part III.

### 1. Understanding Transitions and Their Underlying Conflict Dynamics

- A widely accepted definition of what the transition period constitutes has been advanced by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transitions, which posits that transition refers to the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity. Assistance agencies have in the main followed this definition, even though they have also come up with their own versions.
- Transition processes are not only multi-linear and multi-directional, they often also need to accommodate multiple contradictory pulls and pushes. However, amidst this chaos and perhaps because of it, windows of opportunity for the pursuit of peace might arise.
- Indeed, the chaos permeates all spheres of human life and state functioning: from the security, to the political, to the social, and to the economic sphere. Human security is at risk, as people are particularly vulnerable with resources severely depleted. Environmental resources are damaged, and coping systems and capacities are strained. Confusion is palpable, and any activity becomes highly politicized. A multitude of actors is active in the pursuit of different agendas. As standards and values are being reinvented, people and their relationships take on extraordinary importance.
- As internal actors struggle to deal with the enormity of the rebuilding tasks, they need and want the support of external actors. Internal and external actors stand to gain from a well-functioning relationship: Internal actors have a harder time building peace without the support

of external actors, and external actors cannot build peace in fragmented societies without the legitimacy that only internal actors can confer upon their actions.

- External actors have been at pains to define their approach to transitions. They have learned that transition situations can neither be fully responded to by the tools of humanitarian relief operations nor by the instruments of traditional development cooperation alone. Filling this gap requires planned coordination of both humanitarian and development activities into a special development approach, which is purposely tailored to transition situations. The OECD-DAC Principles of 2001 provide guidance.
- Transition assistance thus exhibits the following features:
  - Is the concern of the political, security and development parts of the United Nations and their member States;
  - Requires a comprehensive, concerted and holistic approach. While quick and visible impact has to be generated, poorly coordinated, *ad hoc*, short-term engagements will not yield the desired results;
  - Must address the root causes of conflicts;
  - Is multidimensional;
  - Has to be carried out in full partnership with internal actors; and
  - Is ultimately defined by its context and purpose, rather than through a set of pre-defined activities.
- A wide range of external actors are involved in transition assistance, including both bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and developmental actors, international financial institutions, NGOs, regional organizations, and neighboring governments. Typical activities in the transition phase target all areas of state functioning, according to sectors. When to get involved is an area of careful study, often determined by “benchmarks”, such as a ceasefire, peace accord, successful returnee movement and the like.
- Even when benchmarks indicate that an intervention is desirable, a prerequisite for all interventions is to carry out a thorough analysis. Conflict analysis is a means of developing a multi-dimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict, the various actors on the scene, as well as the capacities for peace. Several organizations have developed conflict analysis tools.
- Which tool to use for which purpose must be within the purview of each field practitioner, and his or her choice will be informed to a large extent by pragmatic considerations, such as adaptability of methodology, cost, and availability of resources, time, and staff.

## 2. Transition Interventions, Gaps and Tools

- Transition interventions are much more complex and difficult to support than situations requiring humanitarian relief or development assistance alone. They tend to be heavily politicized and militarized, as well as increasingly encompass peace-building activities.
- Transition situations are invariably shaped by multiple, concurrent and related interventions. Such interventions are undertaken through a range of activities: political, military, humanitarian and developmental.
- Levels of intervention also vary from one transition to another. These interventions are contingent on the degree of internal capacity found in a given situation. In other words, higher levels of intervention will occur in situations where there are weaker degrees of capacity, and vice-versa.
- The multidimensional character of transitions often leads to the involvement of several external actors (bilateral and multilateral agencies, international non-governmental organizations and the private sector). External actors typically organize themselves through various leadership arrangements, depending on the context, history and specificities that characterize each transition situation. These arrangements include: United Nations

leadership, shared leadership, leadership through a coalition of states, or, alternatively, the absence of any organized international presence.

- Despite the experience external actors have gained and efforts they have undertaken to improve their operational efficiency and effectiveness, a number of gaps continue to hamper programmatic coherence during transition interventions. These gaps can be found at the institutional, strategic and financial levels both within and across agencies.
- The institutional gaps within agencies often lead to the following problems, which are manifested in various degrees depending on the agency concerned:
  - A lack of professionalism in the handling of transition issues;
  - Weak institutional support from headquarters to field teams working in transitions;
  - A frequent lack of coordination among the several agencies/ministries involved in peacebuilding/transition assistance (foreign affairs, defence, development cooperation);
  - Little cooperation with non-governmental organizations and the private sector.
- Strategic gaps occur because not all agencies have devised specific strategies and/or policies to better respond to transition situations. Some continue to work either under humanitarian or development modalities, which are often ill-adapted to respond efficiently and effectively to transition challenges.
- Financial gaps also constitute major stumbling blocks to effective transition interventions. Not all agencies have earmarked or adapted funding procedures to respond to transition interventions.
- Gaps across agencies exist as follows:
  - Absence of an international mechanism that decides who does what and where, to avoid some transition countries receiving too much assistance and others too few assistance (even though the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 will hopefully help overcome this shortcoming);
  - Absence of a single, well-defined, comprehensive and coherent peace-building/transition strategic framework at the country level;
  - In spite of harmonization efforts and coordination networks such as the OECD-DAC/CPDC and the CPR, operational constraints may continue to hamper the operational flexibility usually required in transition situations;
  - External actors have their own agendas (offer-driven rather than demand-driven assistance; and
  - Competition among external actors for visibility and political control of coordination mechanisms is not uncommon.
- Transitional needs assessment, planning tools and funding mechanisms have been designed specifically to help overcome some of the gaps in transition assistance.
- These tools should be designed early on in ways that will promote national ownership, facilitate and foster longer-term development and ensure the most efficient and effective employment of human and financial resources. These goals are, however, often difficult to meet in practice.
- Post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) and Transitional Results Matrices (TRMs) have become important tools to identify transitional needs and prepare common recovery appeals and strategies.
- Whereas transitional tools constitute common planning frameworks prepared jointly by several internal and external actors, other short-term humanitarian and longer-term development tools have been developed and are often used by a single actor (bilateral, national or multilateral). This may result in each institution having its own country appeal, strategy or framework.
- Such confusion would make it particularly important that an external agency explain to internal actors its agency's mandate and limitations, the scope of its strategy/program/project

and how it relates to the larger recovery effort in order to prevent misunderstandings and avoid false expectations.

- Other humanitarian and development tools relevant to transitions include: a National Development Plan; bilateral planning tools such as the JICA Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment; the UN's Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)/Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) (short-term), the Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (long-term), and the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
- It is in any case important to avoid developing parallel systems in order not to undermine national capacity, even when it is weak.
- Achieving the Millennium Development Goals by the target date of 2015 is a much greater challenge for transition countries, which are characterized by deteriorating economic and social conditions, weak governance and low levels of trust between external and internal actors.

## 3. Human Security in Transition Situations

- Trans-border and global phenomena that threaten the life or well-being of people have given rise to the concept of human security, which focuses on the individual and his or her security first. With this focus on each and every person, the human security approach thus brings to the forefront the very reason for why assistance is carried out in the first place: to improve the lives of fellow citizens of this world.
- As a result of this approach, the people helped will eventually be in a far better position to actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities, when they do occur.
- This approach makes sense because chronic poverty, massive population movements, organized trans-border crime, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation and deadly infectious diseases cannot be adequately dealt with by conventional state-level approaches and the traditional framework of national security.
- Rather than provide either protection or assistance in a top-down manner, the human security concept contains elements of both, encompassing top-down and bottom-up approaches. All of these activities are guided by the overarching goal of building on people's strengths and aspirations.
- Making use of this concept has meant for humanitarian organizations to go beyond the mere provision of aid and to take into account the need to empower individual victims of the violent conflict and their communities. Similarly, development organizations have learned that development policies need to include protection of individuals in times of insecurity and crisis. They have thus begun to move away from their previous approach of working strictly with the central government, and to start conducting empowerment and capacity-building support at the community level.
- Considering in more depth what elements a useful human security approach should contain, it is suggested that such an approach be (1) integrated and holistic, (2) empower people at community level, (3) avoid disparities and (4) provide a long-term perspective.
- When employing this approach, elements of the desired change should be identified, clarified and recorded at the outset of any program, by both the assistance agency and the target communities, so that one does not work at cross-purposes from the other. In addition, the assistance agency should have staff that is familiar with the concepts of social change, community development, self reliance, sustainability and empowerment, and have the willingness, skills and organization necessary for it to be transformed to meet changing needs.
- Key activity areas for improving the level of human security from the point of view of "freedom from want" are (1) food security, (2) water and sanitation security, (3) health security, (4) habitat security and (5) basic knowledge security.

- These areas are chosen in line with the Sphere project's minimum standards for action responding to urgent human needs. These areas thus lend themselves well to plan for assistance in relation to the human security dictum of "freedom from want", as follows:
    - Access to *food* and the maintenance of adequate nutritional status are critical determinants of people's survival and as such of key concern to human security.
    - An adequate amount of safe *water* is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, and personal and domestic hygienic requirements. The main objective of water supply and sanitation assistance is to promote good personal and environmental hygiene in order to protect health. As such water and sanitation security is a key aspect in the provision of human security.
    - *Health care* is the critical determinant for survival when urgent human needs exist. During transitions when mortality rates are frequently elevated or could soon become so, priority interventions must focus on urgent survival needs, including basic medical care. Therefore, basic health care is a key human security concern.
    - *Shelter* is a critical determinant for survival, and it is necessary to provide security and personal safety, protection from the climate and enhanced resistance to ill health and disease. Providing habitat security is thus a key element of the human security paradigm.
    - Basic *education* can save lives by disseminating key survival messages, and by protecting against exploitation and harm. It sustains life by providing structure, stability and hope for the future in times of crisis, particularly for children and adolescents. Education can also help heal the pain of bad experiences, build skills, support conflict resolution and peace building. Basic education and public information that provide knowledge, life skills and respect for diversity are therefore particularly important for human security.

## 4. Mainstreaming Cross-Cutting Issues

- Cross-cutting issues are areas of concern which for institutional or societal reasons need to be tackled across sectors in a coherent and integrated manner to achieve objectives that go beyond those of a single endeavor.
- Mainstreaming refers to the integration of cross-cutting issues into core institutional or societal thinking and subsequently into a coordinated and harmonized approach to the implementation of activities. It is therefore a tool for making a cross-cutting issue an integral part of an assistance program/project in a given sector.
- Mainstreaming is particularly important in transition societies, because many activities have to be carried out simultaneously by a multitude of actors and in a coordinated fashion. In fact, the multi-directional and multi-dimensional processes in operation in a transition society call for attention to lateral connections. Progress in one sector is dependent on progress in another, and progress in that sector is dependent on progress in a third. Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues is like spinning the web that helps make these lateral connections in practice.
- Since field practitioners work most often at the program/project level and split up according to sectors, these actors are particularly interested in how to mainstream a cross-cutting issue into an existing or planned for program/project.
- Four cross-cutting issues in the program/project cycle require particular attention: (1) conflict-sensitivity, (2) gender equality, (3) a human rights perspective, and (4) environmental concerns.
- Any field practitioner has to be highly sensitive to the dynamic between the intervention and the context into which the intervention is being inserted. If not, harm could be done or a program designed that is either ineffectual or inadvertently promotes forces that support the conflict. The perspective that helps avoid these traps is called conflict-sensitivity.

- Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.
- Mainstreaming a human rights approach in transition initiatives means integrating human rights thinking and standards into program/project activities. Many believe that the protection of human rights is essential to the sustainable achievement of the three agreed global priorities of peace, development and democracy. Thus each assistance program/project should explicitly address issues of equality, non-discrimination, participation, inclusion, accountability and rule of law that arise in connection with program delivery.
- In transition societies the environment is likely to be heavily affected by the legacy of violent conflict: access to clean water might be restricted, natural ecosystems destroyed, food security a problem, landmines scattered on agricultural fields or natural habitats, and toxins might be found in the ground. The environment is an important resource for sustaining livelihoods and great care must be taken to protect this resource. Inserting environmental concerns into programs and projects can produce much stronger results for economic growth and environmental sustainability than responding to individual environmental concerns in a piecemeal fashion.
- Mainstreaming is not sufficient at the program/project level, unless there is also follow-up and support for mainstreaming at the strategic and capacity-building levels within an organization, including training, skills development and reform.
- In addition the larger context is important: most often a cross-cutting issue is mainstreamed into a program/project, because a national or sectoral policy says so, or because international standards exist that one wishes to abide by. Mainstreaming in a chaotic transition society requires considered, pro-active and positive action to ensure outcomes and improved results. Agencies need to be committed to and promote mainstreaming efforts within their own remits, with the government and with civil society.
- A proactive approach means also that without partners/a holistic push for the issue across organizations and institutions the impact of the efforts of individual organizations is likely to be limited.

## II. Sectoral Knowledge-Acquisition in Five Sectors

While part I takes perspective on the issue of transition, part II provides the overview of all notable sectors of transition assistance: the security and governance sectors, as well as the social and legal, physical and economic sectors. Knowledge acquired in this part of the handbook allows the practitioner to be up to date on key issues, approaches, and tools and thus to fine tune his or her skills in providing effective assistance.

### 5. A Secure Environment

- Since the demise of the Cold War, the concept of security has broadened. It encompasses threats that are not strictly military: they are also political (internal instability, terrorism, human rights abuses), economic (poverty, illegal trade, financial crimes), social (human trafficking; HIV/AIDS and other epidemics, mass displacement of people), and environmental (natural disaster, nuclear disaster). The concept now most frequently used, responding to these different threats, is called human security. It is discussed in chapter 3.
- Common “freedom from fear” threats, which are the focus of chapter 5 summarized here, include (1) continued or sporadic war-related violence (e.g. gunfire, bombing, ambush), (2) high rates of criminality and violence (e.g. theft, murder, kidnapping, rape), (3) widespread

violation of human rights (e.g. torture, arbitrary arrest) and (4) landmine and unexploded ordnance casualties.

- Establishing a secure environment from the perspective of "freedom from fear" requires ending the insecurity resulting from violent conflict, addressing the criminal insecurity typical of transitions and transforming the security system.
- There are several key actors involved in responding to these threats and in creating and sustaining a secure environment: national parliaments, domestic security institutions, the military, civil society groups, the media, international peace operations and other external actors, such as development aid agencies.
- International peace operations try to temporarily fill the security vacuum that is often characteristic of transition situations. This vacuum exists mainly because domestic security organizations are frequently still under military control, and are largely unaccountable.
- Still, the goal must be to support domestic security organizations to gradually take on the functions of the international peace operations, which is a process that can be strengthened by the resourcefulness of civilian actors, including civil society organizations and the local media. In addition, an appropriate role for the military has to be found. Support to any of these actors is a highly sensitive matter, and external actors can therefore only play the role of facilitators of change.
- Facilitating change can mean that insecurity inherited from violent conflict is addressed through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and mine action programs; that criminal insecurity typical of transitions is tackled through police reform, civilian disarmament and small arms control; and that the transformation of the security system is promoted through democratic governance and reform.
- Regarding DDR, the failure to disarm and demobilize combatants and to effectively support their reintegration into civil society may lead to an immediate relapse into war. DDR programs thus form an integral part of transition processes and require a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach by internal and external actors.
- Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) pose a serious threat for the civilian population and obstruct social and economic development. Left behind after the armed conflicts come to a formal end, they result in loss of life and limb, limit the freedom of movement and prevent large areas of land from being cultivated. Mine action is therefore a key element to establishing a secure environment during transitions. External actors have a crucial role to play in implementing mine action programs, providing training and advice.
- An important component of the security *system reform* in transition countries is the restructuring of security organizations. Such restructuring seeks to increase the transition country's ability to meet the wide range of security needs within their societies in accordance with democratic norms and sound governance principles. Main activities include:
    - *Armed forces*: reform is carried out by creating new unified armed forces, merging two existing ones or integrating former combatants into the national armed forces.
    - *Civilian police forces*: restructuring requires efforts to create an institution responsible for internal security which is distinct and independent from the military.
    - *Criminal justice systems*: police reform is not sustainable unless it is supported through judicial and corrections systems reforms as well covering independence of the judiciary and an appropriate legal framework, such as a criminal code. Corrections system reform implies building capacity to provide humane treatment to prisoners.
    - *Intelligence services and paramilitary forces* (national guards, border control, coast guard, civilian defense corps, gendarmerie): reform requires turning them into effective, politically neutral and professional institutions.
- Linkages should be promoted between and among DDR, mine action, police reform, civilian disarmament and small arms control. These actors should also be coherently linked to wider reintegration and reconstruction efforts through joint programming and integration into other

frameworks (UNDAF, PRSPs). These activities also need to be integrated into the overall security system reform.

- Taking this one step further, it is important to ensure coherence between security-related assistance and other transition/development activities.

## 6. Democratic Governance

- Democratic governance primarily seeks to promote power and influence of the people in society through a democratic political process that is characterized by participation, equality in dignity and rights, transparency and accountability.
- In order for democratic governance to function, governments must be perceived of as politically legitimate and able to respond to the demands of citizens. Such legitimacy and capacity are in turn dependent on a number of inter-related issues, which essentially restrain state power: the separation and balance of powers, and the presence of the rule of law, efficient and effective public institutions, a vibrant civil society and independent media.
- Thus, genuine political will and a strong commitment of the ruling elite and society at large are important elements of well-functioning democratic governance. Such commitment by the state also presupposes efforts to address the underlying distribution of power, corruption and nepotism.
- It is no surprise, therefore, that building democratic governance is often a long and difficult process that can go through periods of restricted, illiberal and fragile forms. In fact, depending on the context, democratic governance can take many shapes and forms, thus imposing implicitly or explicitly that a particular understanding of democratic governance should be avoided. Moreover, traditional forms of governance can be compatible with democracy.
- It is well documented, however, that democratic governance is better than authoritarian regimes at mitigating internal conflicts. Its institutions and rules provide the necessary space for opponents to compete, resolve conflicts non-violently and hope for changes without destroying the system.
- Transition situations constitute windows of opportunity for building democratic governance. The move towards democratic governance constitutes both an important means and a promise for the reconciliation of opposing parties and the healing of fractured societies. External actors are often invited to support the building of democratic governance and have a unique opportunity to provide direct assistance in this domain. However, the efforts of external actors should never compete with or dwarf progress in building and strengthening the capacity of national and local governing structures to fulfill their roles.
- Concretely, external assistance in building democratic governance presupposes developing governing structures, promoting constitutional and electoral processes and encouraging civil society and an independent media.
- Regarding governing structures, the main areas for assistance are in developing public administration capacity, the government machinery, the civil service and the revenue and expenditure system.
- Legislatures provide an important arena for peaceful and constructive debate and consensus. They can also help to reduce the likelihood of groups returning to violent conflict as a means of resolving their differences. External actors can help internal actors strengthen legislatures during transitions by providing technical assistance, training and capital expenditure.
- Developing domestic justice systems is a critically important component of rebuilding transition countries. In situations, where there is no justice or where there is only unequal access to justice, violent conflict is likely to re-emerge. External actors can assist internal actors to enhance the justice system in four main areas: reorganization, recruitment and training, infrastructure and access to justice.

- Constitution-making may be specified in the peace process, or may simply pick up on the issues of power sharing and institution building spelled out in peace agreements. Invariably, the constitution in some way reflects the tension, values and issues raised in the peace process. External actors can provide policy or technical advice and encourage public consultation.
- Elections represent a key step in a broader process of building legitimate governance. Areas of international electoral assistance include: support for first time elections, assistance for constitutional and legal reforms, assistance to electoral management bodies, voter registration, civic and voter education programs, international monitoring and observation, and strengthening of political parties.
- Building the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) is an integral part of democratic governance. Emerging governments can engage in dialogue with groups of citizens. Governments can also tap into established organizations in the delivery of assistance to the local population. Yet, those opportunities are often missing in transition situations, because civil society is only nascent. External actors can collaborate with local/national CSOs to help build capacity; provide grants and other support in order that indigenous CSOs thrive, while remaining mindful of the risk of imposing external models of governance even in the management of these organizations.
- The final key player involved in the development of democratic governance is the media. In a transition environment media can also play a role of helping to stabilize the situation. Members of the news media can report on ceasefire violations, human rights violations, other emerging threats to peace and stability, progress in the peace process, and progress in emerging democratic institutions. External actors can assist in developing the capacity of the media by rebuilding the physical infrastructure, helping define a legal basis for media rights, and train in how to gather and report news.
- In spite of any or all of these above efforts, democratic governance does not automatically secure equitable social and economic development. But it does help create an enabling environment for sustainable and human development to take place.

## 7. Social Fabrics

- In the first years of transition from war to peace, societies are grappling with the challenges of rebuilding social cohesion, trust, and confidence in each other, in fellow groups and in the state. The intangible but crucial social fabrics that allow a society to function need to be restored, and the immediate psychosocial needs of a society that has been devastated by violence must be met.
- The path towards social rebuilding is unfortunately neither linear nor short, because dealing constructively with the past means engaging in a process that will always be conflict-ridden. This is because the definition of the historic “truth” is at stake. There is no and will never be a generally accepted definition of the historic truth. On the contrary, different expectations and interests are at play in presenting the truth as it is perceived.
- Quite obviously, victims and perpetrators, for example, have a different view of the historic truth. Victims not only require that their suffering is duly taken note of, but they also demand justice and liberation from the shadows of the past. Perpetrators mostly try to justify or deny their individual responsibility. Displaced persons will want compensation and “go home”, but their homes might be destroyed or inhabited by new communities.
- Tension resides in how best to address these different demands, because the desire for justice and accountability can be contradictory to the call for reconciliation and forgiveness. An acknowledgement of the pain and anger of victims might rather be the first goal. Contradictions can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
- In addition, a large percentage of the population suffers from trauma. These persons often exhibit clinical symptoms, such as emotional disturbances, and negative cognitive, physical and behavioral responses. Societal trauma exacerbates these feelings and might lead to

psychosocial degeneration, during which large fractions of the society lose their basic trust, and feelings of rage alternate with feelings of helplessness, humiliation and victimization.

- The need for addressing the past constructively has given rise to a number of mechanisms that can be divided into those that are transitional justice instruments and those that result in a range of social projects. The former mechanisms approach the rebuilding of the social fabric from the point of view of accountability and responsibility (and possibly complement it with truth-telling); the latter projects aim to rebuild the community, provide psycho-social support, or focus on reconciliation and coexistence. None is exclusive of the other, and in practice a mix of different mechanisms is used.
- Under the transitional justice heading, the following mechanisms can be found: (1) forms retributive justice, (2) mechanisms complementing retributive justice, (3) community justice or traditional forms of justice, (4) forms of restorative justice including truth commissions and (5) ombudsperson offices.
- External actors can support these mechanisms by (1) providing specific legal and technical advice, (2) training of judges, attorneys and police officers, (3) supporting structures that help make the justice system more accessible, (4) monitoring processes through independent experts and undertaking independent research, (5) counseling and supporting NGOs and interest groups, (6) publicizing results of truth commission and (7) providing funding for the establishment of tribunals or other offices.
- Under the heading of “social mechanisms”, assistance may come in the form of psychosocial support, direct community building measures, social reconciliation, coexistence, social reintegration, dialogue and trust building.
- Assistance in these areas has to be highly sensitive, because inappropriate external intervention may result in reconciliation seen as imposed, too early or simply impossible by victims and their families.
- In addition, particular attention must be paid to the needs of large numbers of displaced or otherwise disadvantaged groups, such as returnees, ex-combatants and ex-prisoners, as well as to the needs of the communities into which they are returning.
- Since support in these social areas is more difficult than support in the legal field, many external actors have opted to support truth commissions and other prominent instruments associated with reconciliation. However, external actors can provide through a human security approach the necessary framework, in which the tender process of reconciliation and healing can take place. In addition, the steady and serious support of building communities and transforming parts of the social system (e.g. educational reform, reform of political institutions) might be of higher value in the long-run than support to prominent but more punctual instruments. Both forms of assistance (social and legal) are important.
- Essentially, the healing that results from rebuilding social fabrics is a process that must be taken on by each individual human being, but at the same time it necessitates deep societal and political change. It is thus both an individual and societal process that takes a long time.

## 8. Infrastructure Rebuilding

- Infrastructure is required for human survival and livelihood: it enables people to live in safety and good health, and helps them achieve a basic level of human security. It provides the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.
- Transition societies suffer from damaged infrastructure, and are in urgent need of repairing transportation and communication facilities, public buildings, waterworks, electricity, and oil and gas pipelines; in short all physical structures that form the foundation for development or the systems that are considered essential for enabling productivity. They most likely also require the restoration of public institutions (such as schools, health facilities, post offices, and libraries) – and of the agricultural infrastructure needed for ensuring food security.

- Given the level of physical and structural damage, rebuilding the infrastructure of a transition society is quite obviously important. In addition, it is important, because infrastructure is the artery of the economy, and it is therefore vital for the social, economic, physical and even political cohesion of a society. As economic growth takes hold, sustaining livelihoods and developing production become easier with dramatic effects on the population. Once people have shelter and a minimum of economic security, they are also better able to take action on behalf of themselves.
- If not attended to, the deficiencies of the infrastructure become a major constraint on other areas of rebuilding as well. For example, returnee reintegration and environmental protection programs do not run efficiently without properly functioning infrastructure.
- Yet, the investment required to bring the infrastructure to a semblance of normality is enormous compared to the available resources of a country just emerging from war. This is why the assistance of external actors in this field is crucial.
- It is also an obvious area of attention for external actors. Rebuilding the physical infrastructure amounts to visible changes, from a look of "war-ravaged" to "peaceful and functioning"; and it provides measurable success stories. Moreover, infrastructural rebuilding projects are typically employment-intensive, generate income and hence yield tangible and relatively quick results.
- Actors that bear responsibility for building, managing and maintaining infrastructure are primarily government, parastatal and private utilities and some private companies. Agencies that provide transition assistance to infrastructure reconstruction range from small, local NGOs to the largest donors in the world. Smaller scale projects, such as rural road and irrigation canal repair, are often supported by UN organizations, NGOs, and bilateral agencies. Major projects, including inter-city road and bridge building, rehabilitation of urban water and sewer systems, are frequently supported by the World Bank, regional banks such as the Asian Development Bank and major multilateral and bilateral agencies.
- These actors are best served by using an assistance approach that exhibits the following characteristics. It is (1) early, (2) long-term, (3) sequential, (4) holistic, (5) focused, (6) strategic, (7) participatory, (8) appropriate, (9) sustainable and (10) coordinated.
- Assistance activities are most likely found in the following five domains: 1) food supply, 2) roads/transportation systems, 3) water/sewer, electricity and telecommunications, 4) education, and 5) health care.
- An important consideration in infrastructure rebuilding is community ownership. Infrastructure generally is not maintained unless communities own and have skills and knowledge to manage the infrastructure once it is built.
- As well as construction, infrastructural rebuilding typically includes aspects of management and operation. Hence assistance to build capacity in these aspects is just as important as the technical and financial assistance more commonly associated with infrastructure rebuilding.

## 9. Economic Recovery

- Achieving a basic level of economic stability and starting economic activities are crucial for sustainable peace. The economic situation of a country determines to some extent how secure people feel and how much of a positive outlook they can have for the future.
- As a result of war, transition societies often show signs of (1) decreased production, consumption and wealth; (2) diminished human capacity due to "brain drain", suspension of education and population displacement; (3) dependency on war-related livelihoods; (4) broken infrastructure; (5) damaged or inaccessible natural resources; (6) unstable currency, high inflation, and a weak banking system; (6) low revenue, distorted tax system and spending policies; and (7) reduced markets, investment and external indebtedness.

- In addition, the lack of macro-economic institutions and sound policy often predate the war – such that recovery is not re-establishing the former system, but developing new institutions and policy.
- The tasks of rebuilding economic structures and revitalizing the national economy are thus enormous and assistance is important. This even more so, because without economic recovery many transition societies are likely to remain exceedingly handicapped. A failure to achieve broad improvements in living standards can aggravate tensions and increase the risk of renewed violence. Without equitable economic development, sustainable peace cannot be achieved.
- Economic recovery thus aims to:
    - Meet immediate needs (provide a basic level of economic security);
    - Prevent a relapse into conflict and support conflict resolution and peacebuilding;
    - Jump-start the economy;
    - Initiate macro-economic stabilization and restore state capacity for macro-economic management; and
    - Set the groundwork for long-term economic stability, growth and poverty reduction.
- At the outset of any economic intervention it is of utmost importance to conduct or have access to thorough analyses. Assessing thus the economic state-of-affairs requires understanding as much as possible various parts of the affected country's economy: (1) livelihoods, including immediate needs, vulnerabilities (e.g. inflation), capacities, motives and access to resources; (2) the state of macro-economic policies and institutions, government needs and resources; (3) industries, investment, trade and markets (includes analysis of uncertainty, ownership, access to resources); (4) the legacy of war-related economies; and (5) the potential impact of external actors on local economies.
- Assistance to economic recovery concentrates on (1) support to the government's monetary, fiscal and trade policy, and (2) support to private sector investments and industry. The former type of assistance is more likely being carried out by the International Financial Institutions; the latter type of assistance provides scope for development aid agency involvement as well.
- The first step to encouraging consistent investment is creating a semblance of economic stability. Government actions including establishing relevant laws (property, commercial) and monetary stability are preconditions to increasing domestic and foreign investment. Reducing barriers to investment such as high taxes and other obstacles to market entry are also pivotal.
- Development aid agencies can play a role in both policy advice and technical assistance to the government to meet these aims. They can also provide:
    - Incentive programs, where risks to investments are shared by the agency;
    - Market research, facilitation and support to foreign companies willing to invest; and
    - Macro-credit assistance to firms or micro-credit assistance to individuals.
- When development aid agencies support key industries, it will serve to spur economic growth and investment. Supporting industrial development promotes industrial diversity, job creation and investment.
- Aid dependency can be avoided by planning ahead, and using and building local capacities. Aid dependency should be considered during initial planning stages and an exit strategy developed accordingly.

## III. Operational Application

While part II of this handbook described what to do, part III proposes how to do it. Principles of planning and implementing projects and programs in the messy environment of transitions are

described, and how operational flexibility must be a key component in any transition intervention. This is followed by a discussion of monitoring and evaluation as particularly important elements of responsible implementation. Special consideration in designing transition assistance deserves operational coordination and safety & security, which constitute the final chapter of this handbook.

## 10. Planning and Implementation

- Planning and implementing transition assistance is a dynamic process that begins with the initial awareness of the potential for an end to a violent conflict.
- Initial awareness is important in taking advantage of the earliest opportunity of intervention in a post-conflict situation in order to accelerate the process of stabilizing a society and building confidence in peacebuilding initiatives. Although some risk lies in this proactive approach, there is potentially more risk in maintaining a watch-and-see attitude. However, there is seldom enough available information for making decisions with full confidence that they are the right decisions.
- Thus, in this fluid situation the need to be creative, fast, and flexible is paramount, even though operational flexibility alone cannot be the only guiding principle for an intervention either, as accountability, strategic coherence, local ownership, capacity building and sustainability might otherwise be compromised. Bi- and multilateral agencies must look for opportunities and innovations to address swiftly the unique and unanticipated circumstances specific to the transition environment.
- Fortunately there are many aids to decision-making and designing assistance programs/projects. They can be described as components of a management approach. However, planning and implementing transition assistance is not a rigid process of fixed steps that must be followed in a certain sequence. Rather, it is a collection of activities, each with certain benefits and value. Neglecting any of the activities is likely to result in a less successful approach to transition assistance, but in some circumstances may be justified and even necessary.
- Organizations that have project management systems and structures designed to meet the needs of development or humanitarian work may need to adapt their systems and modify their structures, if they are to be effective at transition assistance. The system may include the following components and activities:
    - Development and humanitarian agencies need to continuously *gather information* about the situation, develop lines of communication and networks with other organizations involved in the situation and initiate preparedness plans to facilitate rapid engagement when circumstances allow.
    - Agencies that support transition assistance must ensure that the information gleaned from the analyses is conveyed to the *preparedness planning process*. As analyses indicate that peace is anticipated, the benchmarks for intervention have been reached and an opportunity exists to begin transition assistance, the resources devoted to preparedness activities should increase.
    - In designing transition assistance, there are two critical stages for undertaking *assessments*. The first stage is the earliest opportunity where it appears an intervention might be possible with positive outcomes. This is the *situation analysis*, or a fully-fledged conflict analysis, including the mapping of the situation, an actor analysis and a capacities-for-peace analysis. The second critical stage occurs after an analysis has indicated an intervention is needed and the decision is made to launch assistance projects. At this stage, more information is needed in order to better define the scope and nature of the assistance. This is the *detailed assessment.*
    - Even in the earliest stages of transition assistance, organizations should develop a coherent set of specific, easily understood strategic objectives and prepare a *strategic plan.* This is a dynamic and continuous process that results in a strategy outlining the vision and broad objectives of assistance agencies. This strategy also establishes the

parameters for the program plan, proposes a time frame for intervention, lays out the assumptions and describes the methods for reaching the objectives. The written strategy should be a working document that is concise, specific and produces action.

- Planning a concrete *entrance strategy* will be preceded by the above considerations, ranging from whether the intervention will be strategic in terms of place, time and resources, whether it can be carried out in partnership, what benefits it will essentially bring to stakeholders and whether the intended program or project is ultimately feasible.
- When bilateral agencies *select an implementing partner*, they need to be confident they are working with qualified agencies that are competent and trustworthy. An analysis of organizational capacity and competence may therefore be appropriate.
- It is also particularly important that *implementation and assistance management* assure robust linkages between the assistance and the rebuilding of local institutions. The core challenge is to balance immediate reconstruction priorities with long-term institutional development.
- An *exit strategy* is a sound approach towards the termination or substantial reduction of transition assistance, with the gradual hand-over of responsibilities to governments and other authorities, and paving the way for more traditional development cooperation.

- *Operational flexibility* is a key element of good transition assistance implementation. Agencies have to operate with much greater agility in transitions than their internal policies and procedures usually permit. Aid agencies should ensure or establish:
  - Early field presence or assessment missions to seize those windows of opportunity that open right after transition triggers take place;
  - More decentralized decision making and financing or delegation of authority to the field to accelerate transition assistance approval;
  - Transition-tailored design of assistance, i.e. planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation procedures and practices that are well-suited to respond to transitions;
  - Procedures that allow for the periodic adjustment of programs and projects to fast moving transition contexts;
  - Special budgetary reserves, financial mechanisms or funds for quick response and procurement; and
  - Mechanisms for rapid deployment and staffing, such as personnel rosters, stand-by arrangements accompanied with specific training.
- In short, all elements of project management systems present opportunities to enable speedy and flexible transition assistance programming. Yet, speed and flexibility should not compromise on the quality of the assistance.

## 11. Monitoring and Evaluation

- Without monitoring and evaluation (M&E) the project cycle would not be complete. This is true for any assistance project. In transition situations, M&E are particularly important for (1) providing feedback for project management in a rapidly changing environment, (2) promoting learning in a situation that is in need of absorbing lessons fast and (3) reinforcing accountability, which has often critically been lacking.
- As yet there is no common understanding among field practitioners on how to conduct M&E in transitions, even though there is no specific art or science to M&E in transitions. It may reflect the general confusion that exists in relation to approaches to peacebuilding and transitions. Transition M&E borrows from both humanitarian and development tools and approaches.
- These traditional tools and approaches must, however, be modified given the transition challenges. The important methodological and strategic differences are the need to enhance speed of data analysis and incorporation into project design, vary data collection methods and mechanisms and establish new baselines and foundations.

- Field practitioners in transition environments experience considerable pressures to implement programs quickly and flexibly. These pressures, however, do not diminish the need to implement high-quality M&E; rather, they indicate that M&E is particularly critical.
- Therefore, field practitioners should take responsibility to attain the highest standards in M&E and ensure that the activities are consistently planned, implemented, documented and shared. In this way, they can make valuable contributions, not only to their own program impacts, but to the global understanding of transitions.
- Monitoring must be a daily concern for all field practitioners and monitoring activities must be integrated into everyday programming. Monitoring tends to receive less attention than evaluation and this may be due to a lack of clarity about what monitoring is to achieve. Monitoring activities are required for making day-to-day management decisions and communicating with stakeholders, for recording lessons and ensuring that these lessons are factored back into the workings of the organization and are taken account of in adjusted programming. Monitoring also accumulates information that is highly pertinent to evaluations.
- Frequent and routine monitoring should signal worsening as well as improving situations that changes vulnerabilities. It should note the long term effects of the past crisis as well as the progress made through transitional assistance.
- Evaluation is the process of determining the worth or significance of a program activity, policy or program. It is a systematic and impartial examination which is intended to improve policy and practice. It determines the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partners and donor.
- There are several evaluation tools and approaches relevant in transition environments. These approaches can be used interactively and are often more effective when blended together as appropriate for the situation and timing. For example, evaluations which test outcome may use techniques employed in participatory or real-time evaluations and may be conducted as a terminal evaluation. Some of these evaluations can be managed by field practitioners themselves, without external evaluators. These tools include:
    - *Participatory evaluation* gives a voice to local groups, improves collaboration with and between implementing partners, provides staff with learning opportunities, and provides information, analysis and recommendations that can be put to immediate use.
    - *Impact evaluation* gives a better understanding of the extent to which activities reach the target groups and the magnitude of their effects on people's welfare.
    - *Outcomes evaluation* supplements other forms of evaluation by focusing specifically on related behavioral change. It aims to provide critical context important for interpreting quantitative data and whether numbers represent meaningful changes in the lives of people.
    - A *real time evaluation* is a form of dynamic monitoring that provides swift feedback for interventions. It gauges effectiveness and impact and ensures that findings are used as an immediate catalyst for organizational and operational changes. It is motivated by the idea that conventional evaluation does not provide timely enough feedback to the planning process.
    - A *peace and conflict impact assessment* (PCIA) enables users to make concrete suggestions, both in terms of outcome and impact, on how to reduce the potential negative effects of interventions on conflict dynamics and how to enhance the positive effects on peacebuilding and transition to a well functioning society.
- The planning process for M&E should factor in – (1) accountability towards stakeholders, (2) appropriate skills, (3) selection of evaluation criteria and questions, (4) development of evaluation TOR and monitoring plans, (5) determination of indicators, (6) selection of data collection methods, (7) utilization of results, and (8) evaluating M&E.

- Measuring progress in transition societies is a particularly sensitive and yet critical element of M&E. Indicators of progress must have the following characteristics:
  - Show clear conceptual design (not mix predictive and descriptive elements)
  - Be able to measure intangible outcomes
  - Are dependent on structures that generate data that is useful for periodic assessment
  - Are linked to overall program/project goals
  - Are tied to a coherent strategy
  - Clearly spell out their relationship to certain developmental needs
  - Take unanticipated impact or negative impact into account.
- Part of the success of evaluations depends on whether they were factored into the project cycle right from the beginning or not. Field practitioners have admitted that the quality of their work would increase if evaluation were incorporated when planning the intervention. The evaluation process would be less onerous and overwhelming for stakeholders, and data could be collected at the outset of the work, thereby providing a baseline for comparing mid-project and final results.

## 12. Special Considerations in Designing Transition Assistance: Coordination and Staff Safety & Security

- Operational considerations of how to make transition assistance work well must include two important and special issues: coordination and staff safety and security. Curiously, there might be a connection between the two, as better coordinated and effective assistance will mitigate the pervasive confusion concerning why and by whom assistance is carried out that has sometimes given rise to threats against staff.
- Coordination is a process through which actors work together to ensure that resources are delivered as efficiently and effectively as local conditions allow; and their contribution is complementary and allocated in line with national priorities and policies.
- Coordination is required to address institutional, strategic, and financial gaps within the assistance community in responding to transition situations (addressed above), and it is required for operational practice on the ground.
- Coordination is voluntary and therefore also consensual. It is fundamentally different from the concept of “management”, which implies substantial control. Coordination should not be understood as forcing all activities into a single mould. Rapid responses and innovation by individual actors should be encouraged.
- In practical terms, effective field coordination takes place through the following tools:
  - *Mechanisms for operational consultation:* UN agencies are usually called upon to assume coordination and leadership responsibilities, based on the recognition that coordination of external assistance is best exercised by a body perceived as legitimate to represent a wide range of actors.
  - *Joint assessment of transition needs and requirements:* coordination is more effective when based on a broad consensus as to the needs and requirements in transitions, which can sometimes be achieved through joint assessments.
  - *Common strategic framework for transition assistance:* coordination requires external actors to agree on a common strategic framework that sets the transition priorities and operational roles of different actors based on their comparative advantages.
  - *Common funding mechanisms* can also contribute to coordination, such as trust funds to support a specific country, region or sector and pooled funding, where the managing agent is chosen jointly by participating organizations in consultation with the national counterpart.
- Coordination arrangements are usually established by agencies designated to take the lead in transitions at the national, provincial, district or community levels. These are: government-

led mechanisms (e.g., multi-donor consultative mechanisms on transition issues); multilateral coordination mechanisms (e.g., through the United Nations Country Team and under the overall coordination of the Resident Coordinator); broad strategic planning (e.g., to devise a transition strategy and monitor its implementation); and sectoral coordinating mechanisms (e.g., to devise sector strategies on DDR, health, education, repatriation as well as monitor their implementation).

- Integrated information systems are one way to better coordinate information. Another dimension of coordination is agencies implementing their programs through partners. The needs of countries in transition far outweigh the resources of single agencies and organizations. Genuine commitment to working closely together with other actors, both internal and external, is crucial. These partnerships are instrumental in forging transition strategies and in maximizing often scarce resources and expertise.
- Regarding the issue of staff safety and security, such security is necessary in order for agencies to work at all in transition situations. While some security measures might be resource-intensive, staff are the most important asset an organization has and it is thus well advised to do its utmost to ensure their protection.
- Yet, ensuring their protection has been a growing concern for bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. Safety concerns have become particularly prevalent as hard-to-reach conflict protagonists carry on the legacy of the war and often remain outside legal reach. In addition, assistance is sometimes identified with Western values or even a specific ideology and is thus being manipulated, resisted or simply disregarded.
- The UN identifies certain levels of security risks for all countries, and all external actors usually adopt safety and security procedures in accordance with these levels.
- On a practical level security measures are necessary to ensure that agencies can enter and remain in transition situations during the required time to fulfill their mandates. The loss of staff and assets makes it difficult for any agency to deliver assistance in accordance with plans.
- The security triangle concept provides important elements for devising security strategies in transitions. Each one of its elements – acceptance, protection and deterrence – offers advantages and disadvantages. These must be flexibly considered in light of the transition environment in which the organization works.
- A certain model of safety and security procedures usually delineates authorities and responsibilities, and lines of communication and decision-making, so that safety and security management can be effective.
- Decisions as to whether or not staff will be placed in jeopardy, despite known security risks, are fundamental. It is crucial that agencies recognize the psychological burden this places on managers, and devise adequate support systems.
- Procedures for safety and security are of limited use if staff do not possess the good judgment and experience to make them work. Training staff is thus vital.
- Establishing relations with other agencies and organizations also operating in the field during transitions can help enhance safety and security. These relations can help furthering:
    - Information sharing on safety and security matters;
    - The adoption of common positions on matters of principle and practice;
    - Joint safety and security training; and
    - Agreement on sharing assets, such as radio networks and the services of a security advisor.
- It is advisable to caution that certain efforts in the name of peace rather reinforce the sense of local communities that force is the only option. Implicit messages that overly-cautious safety and security measures will send are to be considered.
- In addition, policies complementary to straightforward protection measures can also go a long way towards supporting staff safety and security. For example, working towards a strong

local base, through local partners, and diversifying networks of contacts to increase the acceptability of assistance are helpful. It is also crucial that the assistance agency devise a positive image of what it represents and develops messages and a communication policy that will not be perceived as patronizing.

# Chapter 1
# Understanding Transitions and Their Underlying Conflict Dynamics

## Chapter Objectives

- Provide an overview of transition situations (what transition means, typical scenarios, common features and key internal actors).
- Show how transition assistance unfolds (key external actors, the relationship between internal and external actors, transition activities, suggested benchmarks).
- Suggest the use of conflict analysis tools as a first step to better understand specific transition situations.

## Introduction

Transition situations are complex, multi-dimensional, and highly politicized. They require the attention and assistance of the international community. Transition situations cannot be fully responded to, however, by either the tools of humanitarian relief operations or by the instruments of traditional development cooperation. Filling this gap requires planned coordination of both humanitarian and development activities into a special development approach, which is purposely tailored to transition situations. Activities are wide-reaching and normally comprise the humanitarian, security, political, legal, social, and economic arenas. A comprehensive conflict analysis is also important to undertake before taking action and during implementation.

## 1.1 Overview of Transition Situations

In transition situations contradictions abound. Weakened state structures compete with dynamic parastatal activity; reconciliation attempts co-exist with fledgling justice commissions; and regulatory financial institutions struggle vis-à-vis a large shadow economy, to name but a few. Different approaches pursued by different actors at different levels interact and influence each other in often paradoxical ways. While conflict might have subsided (or been reduced to a few small territories), positive peace has not yet been won and violence can re-occur quite easily. In fact, as diagram 1.1 shows, 44 percent of post-conflict countries slip back into conflict within five years of peace settlements.[2]

***Diagram 1.1: Peace is Difficult to Maintain***




[2] World Bank, *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), p. 8.

## 1.1.1 Transition Processes

### Terminology

The terms "transition," "post-conflict situations", "recovery," "rehabilitation" and even "peacebuilding" are sometimes used interchangeably. No agreed universal definitions for most of these terms are available. This is obviously confusing and makes comparison between them difficult.

The term "transition" is often used in the literature without explaining its meaning. Sometimes the term "transition" refers to the shift from relief to development, sometimes to the evolution from dictatorship to democracy, sometimes to the move from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy. Most often, however, it refers to the complex process that accompanies the change from violent conflict to peace, which is how it is defined by the Working Group of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) (see box below).[3] This definition is now widely accepted.

**Defining Transition**

"For the UN, transition refers to the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity."[4]

*Source:* UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, *Report,* February 2004, p.6.

Supporting this definition are also the views of some bilateral actors, as follows:

**The UK Government**

"We distinguish between an immediate post conflict situation (when outside involvement is likely to be needed to maintain security) and longer term needs (which relate to developing indigenous structures which maintain stability) and use the term *[post–conflict]* to describe the situation immediately after conflict, where there is a need for recovery and stabilisation to restore essentials and do the groundwork for long term stability."

*Source*: http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/definitions/, (words in italics added)

**The Government of Sweden –SIDA**

*"Post-conflict situations:* This refers to the situation following open confrontation. A post-conflict situation does not need to be the end of the violent conflict, as it can entail the beginning of a new conflict if trends do not move in a favourable direction."

*Source*:http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/download.jsp?f=Conflict+management+support+2004+20050425.pdf&a=5170

**The Government of the USA- USAID- describing their Office for Transition Initiative's (OTI) engagement:**

"Recognizing circumstances where quick and targeted aid can make a significant difference, and being prepared to respond in a timely fashion, are among OTI's core duties. […] This may be in countries where initial political advances require immediate support to continue, for instance, following a democratic election or a peace agreement, or in situations where ethnic, political or economic divisions imminently threaten to unravel into a large-scale crisis."

*Source:* http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/aboutoti3.html

[3] The working group brought together a wide range of UN agencies, funds, programs and departments, as well as NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and engaged in deliberations with Deputy SRSGs and RC/HCs of UN Country teams to undertake case studies and identify key lessons. A wide range of views was thus consolidated into a common perspective.

[4] This definition was criticized for "… putting too much emphasis on external assistance without adequate acknowledgement of the role of national and local structures and capacity" in a Background Note for the Joint Meeting of the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP, January 2005, p. 2 (www.undp.org/execbrd/word/jtmtg_prep.doc).

## Multi-Linear and Multi-Directional Processes

While the definition above describes the general meaning of the term, each transition situation is actually unique. Many interrelated factors that originally gave rise to the conflict explain why a particular country is in transition. Because these dynamics are at play simultaneously in a transition situation, the evolution from war to peace is certainly not "uni-linear" or "uni-directional."[5] Instead transitions are better described as multi-linear and multi-directional as explained in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.2.

**Box 1.1: Neither Uni-Linear Nor Uni-Directional**

"We need to be especially careful not to make a rigid distinction between three stages – pre-conflict, the conflict itself and post-conflict. These stages can and do occur simultaneously, and not in sequence, one after the other. Transition is not a linear process. Many of the countries in constant crisis dwell in a grey area between war and peace, where things can change very rapidly. These countries often have a territorial divide – between a conflict area and an area that is relatively peaceful."

*Source*: Excerpt of the speech entitled "Humanitarian aid: the challenge is to look over the fence," delivered by Rob de Vos, Deputy Director General for Regional Policy and Consular Affair on behalf of Minister Van Ardenne, Groningen, The Netherlands, 16 September 2002, http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460007.

***Diagram 1.2: The Multi-Linear and Multi-Directional Character of Transitions Situations***




[5] UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, *Report*, (New York: UNDG/ECHA, Feb 2004), p. 14.

## Contradictions and Blank Spaces

Transition situations are not only multi-linear and multi-directional; they are also often caught between multiple contradictory pulls and pushes. A blank space, which might give rise to a small opening for transition assistance action, can be the result. The following blank spaces should be noted:

- The blank space **between conflict and peace** (when conflict is not yet over, but positive peace has not yet taken root).

  The threat to survival may even increase when conflict dies down. In the years between 1988 and 1994, deaths by intentional murder in El Salvador exceeded the annual average of 6,000 deaths during the civil war.[6] A similar pattern also occurred in Guatemala and Nicaragua.[7] Similarly, in war-affected areas of Yugoslavia, crimes against ethnic groups continued after the Dayton Peace Accords, for example in Mostar, where Croats opened fire on Muslims attempting to visit a graveyard in February 1997.[8]

- The blank space between the **need for quick impact and the need for long-term engagement.** While all rebuilding is urgent, the holistic rebuilding of a functioning state takes decades rather than years as illustrated in Box 1.2.

**Box 1.2: The Government of the United Kingdom's Needs Assessment in Rwanda**

**"Nine years** […after the genocide], Rwanda's needs remain acute. The violent legacy of genocide, civil war and of an authoritarian state has been compounded by continuing regional instability, a highly vulnerable rural majority, political and social fragility, extreme environmental degradation, the highest population density in Africa, high levels of inequality, an emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic, severe skills shortages and severely limited market and trade links. Sixty percent of Rwandans currently live below the national poverty line, 40 percent in extreme poverty. The United Nations Development Program's 2003 Human Development Report ranks Rwanda 158th (out of 175) on its Human Development Index."

*Source:* The Government of the United Kingdom; Department for International Development (DFID), *Country Assistance Plan - Rwanda,* (London: DFID), 2004, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/caprwanda.pdf (emphasis added).

- The blank space **between competing operational and institutional cultures of assistance.** Humanitarian and development assistance actors traditionally work toward different objectives with different methods and have thus developed different implementation styles and timeframes (see also chapter 2, section 2.2). In transition societies, all actors are present and need to work together harmoniously. Often, the context forces actors to adapt to unforeseen roles, as Box 1.3 exemplifies, but ideally the gap is bridged by agreeing on a holistic approach to transition assistance, building on the strengths of all those involved.

[6] Pearce, Jenny, 'From Civil War to 'Civil Society', Has the End of the Cold War Brought Peace to Central America?', *International Affairs*, vol.74, no.3, 1998, p.590.

[7] Louise, Christopher, 'MINUGUA's Peacebuilding Mandate in Western Guatemala', *International Peacekeeping,* vol.4, no.2, summer 1997, p.69.

[8] Assembly of Western European Union, *WEU police forces – reply to the annual report of the Council*, Defence Committee, doc.1609, 44th session, 13 May 1998, p.15.

**Box 1.3: Danish Save the Children in Bosnia**

"Not knowing which role to take, in practice, many humanitarian organizations have no hard and fast rule about the place of their activities but adopt a pragmatic, flexible approach, navigating their projects through the shoals of available funding. For example, Danish Save the Children began during the conflict in Bosnia by distributing food and clothing to refugees, then set up playrooms, and in the post-Dayton situation cooperated closely with municipalities in providing kindergartens as part of the education system."

*Source*: PUGH, Michael, *Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: The Humanitarian Dimension*, (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN)), Oct 1998, p.11, http://www.casin.ch/web/studies/rehabilitatpapers.html.

Despite these blank spaces amidst the chaos, and perhaps because of them, there might be windows of opportunity to pursue peace. These are the moments to seize for both internal and external actors to create a positive dynamic of change and the constructive building of a more stable and just society.

### Transition Scenarios

As each transition situation is unique, external actors will find themselves operating in a wide variety of contexts. Taking the level of violence and the state of political settlement as criteria following the end of armed conflict, Box 1.4 describes the different scenarios that can be distinguished:

**Box 1.4: Typical Transition Scenarios**

- Continued violence in most parts of the country and no political settlement (Afghanistan 2003-2004, Cambodia 1992-1993, Iraq 2003-2005). Internal turmoil or external invasion has ousted the previous government, while an internationally recognized new government is still being formed. Meanwhile violence continues.
- Sporadic violence throughout the country or limited to certain regions (Angola 1995-1997, Sierra Leone 2001-2002). Government and rebel forces have come to some agreement, but insecurity continues. Often external actors, such as UN peacekeepers, have been called upon. There is often a long process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Free and fair elections are not yet possible.
- Relatively stable situation (Eritrea 1993-1996, Mozambique 1992-1994, Sudan 2004). A well-established government and/or parties to the conflict have committed themselves to peace and to ensuring relative stability and security in the country. There is often a formal truce, while official peace negotiations are under way or have been successfully completed.
- No official state structures (Somalia until 2000). The entire state apparatus may have been eroded over the years leaving little capacity on which to build. This situation is typical after a protracted conflict including multiple conflict parties and regional fragmentation.

## 1.1.2 Key Features

A good understanding of the key features of a transition situation is paramount to planning and implementing any intervention in a transition context. Human security is at risk, as people are particularly vulnerable with resources severely depleted. Environmental resources are damaged, and coping systems and capacities are strained. Confusion is palpable, and any activity becomes highly politicized. As standards and values are being reinvented, people and their relationships take on extraordinary importance. Thus any of the features mentioned below are colored by politics. Each of these is explained in more detail in chapters 5 to 9.

## In the Security Sphere

- **General break-down of law and order.** The state is unable to provide security to its citizens. Irregular militias and criminal groups pose security problems for both the local population and field practitioners.
- **Flow of small arms is unregulated** and poses a large threat to the security of the population. Soldiers, militias and civilians all have easy access to weapons.
- **Former military without a proper job or role.** The number of governmental and hired or irregular military personnel that need to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated is often overwhelming.
- **Landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs)**. Landmines and UXOs maim and kill. They also constitute a significant impediment to agricultural development.
- **The security institutions** are unable to function properly.

## In the Political/Governance Sphere

- **War- but not peace-experienced central leadership.** In most transition situations the new political leaders are the winners of the preceding war and might thus continue to pursue the war objectives, only without (much) violence and possibly tempered by power-sharing arrangements with former opponents. Clientelism, corruption, arbitrariness and the abuse of power are modes of behavior that have paid off in the past and are hard to change.
- **Weak central state as a legacy of the war.** Central governing structures have lost control over significant parts of the state territory; the armed forces are (overly) powerful; and huge population movements have to be managed.
- **Weak central state** for fear that former political leaders become too powerful once more, or as a result of power-sharing arrangements. Box 1.5 illustrates this point.

**Box 1.5: Weak Central State in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, drafted by international experts and negotiated with strong international pressure on the parties, created a state which is unusually weak. Power is dispersed widely across two entities, 10 Federation cantons, and 149 municipalities. The state is granted authority only for external affairs and a limited number of inter-entity matters.[9] While the Agreement calls for a major international aid effort for post-war reconstruction, the weak state as a partner has posed difficult problems for the rebuilding process.

- **Institutional instability.** Governance institutions and local administrative organs are weak. The state apparatus does not have adequate financial and human resources. Depending on the length of the war, a new administration of civil servants will need to be trained, not only in terms of knowledge and skills, but also in terms of attitudes and behaviors.
- **Inadequate public services.** Education, health and community services are damaged. No national standards on health and education exist. Public funds for these activities are low or non-existent. A new generation of public service employees needs training.
- **Populations might be more demanding,** with higher expectations and less patience for the bare minimum life support they were able to obtain during the conflict.
- **Warlords.** Even after a peace agreement is signed there might still be parties who are unwilling to give up the benefits, both political and economic, they enjoyed in the chaos

[9] The state has authority for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs policy, monetary policy, immigration and asylum, international and inter-entity criminal law, communications, inter-entity transportation and air traffic control. The remaining powers are those of the Entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska) and their sub-units. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4, Article III, The General Framework Agreement (known as the Dayton Agreement), 1995, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372.

of the war. Supported through global arms and monetary flows these warlords pose a major threat to peace, as box 1.6 exemplifies.

**Box 1.6: Internal Threats to State Sovereignty**

"Closely associated with the free cross border flow of arms is the reduction in state sovereignty, which is under threat both internally and externally by the globalization of markets and information. Internally, local warlords occupy certain regions (Somalia) or large segments of the country (Afghanistan); readily linked to external financing from the diaspora. They often connect with a willing profit-motivated private sector; and have off-shore accounts to carry out financial transactions and porous borders to move the tradables. The effect is an accumulation of wealth and power equivalent to mini-states within the state. Some even manage their own foreign affairs and trade relations."
*Source:* Colletta, Nat and Taies Nezam*, From Reconstruction to Reconciliation*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute), Fall 1999, http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/fall99/article.asp?id=19.

- **Spoilers.** Some individuals may have benefited from the war, and thus have a vested interested in continuing the violence. Profits gained in the chaos of an uncontrolled economy can be an incentive to "spoil" efforts for peace. For example, informal groups, such as paramilitary forces (Colombia) and private security firms (Sierra Leone) may partner with governments and business interests to continue violence for their own benefit, but with tragic consequences for others.

## In the Social/Humanitarian Sphere

- **Self-administered justice replaces formal justice**. For example**,** "ordinary citizens" might commit violence, such as the revenge attacks by returning Kosovar Albanians or the hate crimes in Aceh, Indonesia.
- **Victims and perpetrators**. Victims demand justice while perpetrators claim that others were responsible. Victims live in fear of further incidents, as perpetrators remain unaccountable for their crimes.
- **Inadequate legal mechanisms to address past atrocities.** Justice instruments might be inadequate or overwhelmed with the enormity of the task of prosecution.
- **Demographic disturbances/large numbers of returnees.** Communities are torn apart and people displaced as a consequence of war. Certain groups might be persecuted and it is not yet safe for them to return home. Return and reintegration into receiving communities are difficult processes, as they place a new burden onto fragile community dynamics. In addition, population demographics have often shifted and become imbalanced as a result of the war, for example, widows and orphans are particularly numerous.
- **Social fragility/damaged communities.** During the war, hostility between people escalated and death destroyed many families with the result that mistrust has become the norm in the communities. Returning populations such as refugees, internally displaced persons and ex-combatants are required to restart their lives in such fragile communities. Reconciliation is not yet a concept to pursue.
- **Coping systems and capacities are strained,** partly due to population displacement, poor law and order, crime, and the breakdown of public services.
- **Prison and detention camps are full.** Once released, prisoners have difficulties reintegrating into communities.
- **Societal trauma.** The legacy of violence has created psychological wounds that need time and extra attention, particularly among vulnerable groups such as women and children. Rape has occurred, families have been torn apart and a hostile mode of operation has damaged trust in fellow human beings. Societal trauma can lead to psychosocial degeneration of society, including new maladaptive patterns such as crime, domestic violence, prostitution, and alcohol and drug abuse.

- **Polarization of society.** Over-identification with one's own group to the detriment of other associations. Dehumanization of the former enemy.
- **A functioning civil society is only emerging.** Organized non-governmental activity is low, as funding, mandates and structures have to be prepared. There might be an uneven balance between internal civil society and pressures from either the diaspora or external actors on some non-governmental organizations.

### In the Economic Sphere

- **Damaged infrastructure and production facilities.** Clinics, schools, power plants, ports and airports, roads, railways, telecommunications networks, and factories are destroyed or damaged. Remaining facilities are outdated. Economic production has decreased in most sectors as have consumption and wealth. Environmental damage exacerbates the destruction of infrastructure.
- **Social and community infrastructure** is likely to be destroyed or malfunctioning.
- **Damaged environmental resources** (for example, destroyed ecosystems, toxic agents on agricultural lands) may threaten livelihoods**.**
- **Unstable monetary and fiscal situation.** High inflation, a weak and poorly managed banking system and unstable currency combined with low revenue, limited funds and a malfunctioning tax system threaten economic stability.
- **Racket economy/low investment.** A shadow economy has likely operated for years, without fiscal control by the state. Criminal practices have proliferated without prosecution, such as drugs or arms trade. Investments into fixed productive assets, such as factories, are low for fear of renewed violence or continued instability. Markets are distorted from war.
- **Exploitation of natural resources.** Natural resources, such as diamonds and oil, are diverted by groups with vested interests in continuing the violence.
- **Few formal employment options.** Formal professional positions are non-existent or scarce. Paradoxically, a key income generating activity (the warfare itself) ceased after the war. The large influx of returning populations also upsets the labor market.
- **The local economy might be overwhelmed by external intervention,** as external actors might usurp competent staff, divert local economies to cater to their own needs and become responsible for exponential price increases in areas such as housing, commodities etc.

## 1.1.3 Principal Internal Actors

Different groups play different roles in a transition society. Each actor has its own objectives and agenda, its own motivations for action, and its own position in terms of the resources it can attract and the influence and leverage it is able to have. It is important to understand "who is who" in order to optimally harness each group's potential contribution to positive peace. Table 1.1 shows principal internal actors and the roles of each in the transition context.

**Table 1.1: Principal Internal Actors and their Roles**

| Actors/Groups | Roles and Responsibilities | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| **States and national governments** | States and national governments are key actors in transitions. They bear primary responsibility for the protection of the people living on their territories. This responsibility is derived from legal obligations under international human rights law, international humanitarian law and national law. | To meet their obligations, states may request external assistance. If a state is unwilling or unable to protect its population, an international responsibility to ensure protection may arise. |
| **Opposition, insurgent or rebel groups** | These militarized groups can become a formidable political force during transitions. Their positive role can be to trigger the structural transformations that enable the state to protect all population groups equitably within the state's territory. | These groups might appeal to violence again if peace agreements are not implemented *bona fide* or if a sudden power imbalance arises between the main actors. Temporary power-sharing arrangements might be a necessary step towards political stability, even if disliked by both the state and opposition actors. |
| **Community leaders** | Traditional elders or clan/tribe leaders often wield considerable political influence, especially when official state authorities are not functioning. | These leaders' political influence can be peace-furthering or peace-obstructing. |
| **Civil society actors** | Civil society refers to the totality of civic and social organizations or institutions which form the basis of a functioning democracy. Civil society groups advocate and take action primarily for social development and public interest.<br>As non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are usually formed to further the political and/or social goals of their members, they are well-connected and keenly motivated. This means that they can wield considerable political influence. | Some NGOs are formed primarily for the purpose of taking advantage of resources available through assistance donations. They are donor-driven and unable to sustain themselves in the long run. |
| **Special civil society: the media** | Being in the powerful position of information broker to the public/electorate about issues regarding government and corporate entities, the media can be a major force for peace, but it can also be easily diverted by forces interested in fuelling conflict. | International media is often "hooked" on the most dire and distressing news, perhaps guided by local gatekeepers who are dependent on the flow of assistance. |
| **The private sector** | Private sector actors, such as local merchants and business agents, are among the most dynamic forces in a transition society. They can contribute in important ways to rebuilding economic activity through the development of formal and informal sector activities. They may also play a direct role in forming or influencing post-conflict political structures. | Usually only governed by profit, private sector actors will seek peace only when it suits them. Many private sector actors will profit from the criminalization of the economy and, depending on opportunity and gain, might paradoxically be involved in both war and peace activities at the same time. |

**Table 1.1: Principal Internal Actors and their Roles**

| Actors/Groups | Roles and Responsibilities | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| **Population groups: refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees** | Refugees and IDPs require special attention either because they are still far away from their homes or because they are trying to restart their lives in a war-damaged environment. Returnees may need protection, especially when they belong to a minority group trying to return home to a context where ethnic conflict forced them to flee. Yet, returnees play a vital role in the reconstruction of their home communities. | Tensions can be created between returnees and the local community if attention is only paid to the needs of the returnees at the expense of the local community. |
| **Population groups: ex-combatants** | Ex-combatants give up a large part of their identity and role when handing in their arms after war. At the same time they constitute a large resource for labor that will be needed for peacetime pursuits. Given their professional disorientation and need for psycho-social healing after the experience of the war, they require special assistance to successfully reintegrate back into a local community. The special needs of reintegrating child soldiers require particular attention. | Similar to the reintegration of returnees, unless care is taken to consider the needs of the local community as well as those of the ex-combatants in the design and implementation of assistance programs, unwelcome tensions can be created. |
| **Population groups: women** | The role of women in a transition society is special. Women are both one of the most vulnerable targets of war and also one of the biggest stakeholders in building and safeguarding peace. As women experience the brunt of attacks on civilians, they are best placed to highlight what is needed for the survival of their families and to minimize hardships. | Once peace returns, traditional social structures and gender divisions often return as well. Men take over their traditional roles as negotiators and become the prime interlocutors with assistance agencies. To date, women lack direct influence in the design and implementation of assistance programs.<br>Yet women do, in fact, very often actively contribute to peace-building. One example, is the Somali women in Mogadishu who have formed NGOs which, among other activities, organize peace education programs is one example. |

**Table 1.1: Principal Internal Actors and their Roles**

| Actors/Groups | Roles and Responsibilities | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| **Extremists** | Most interest groups have supporters who take an extreme view of the conflict and tend to favor violent tactics. These individuals, who hold positions that are more radical than those of most of the people involved in a conflict, can be called "extremists" or "hardliners" by more moderate participants. Those who are sympathetic to this extreme view, however, may refer to the same people in more positively by using a term such as "freedom fighters." | There are no clear or easy answers about how to deal with extremists or spoilers. Some people suggest they should be marginalized, and negotiation carried on with more moderate parties. Others suggest that extremists should be included in the discussions, so as to prevent them from becoming spoilers. |

## *1.2 Transition Assistance*

As transition societies struggle with the many challenges of rebuilding, they ask the international assistance community for help. External actors respond by efforts aimed at better understanding violent conflict and its links with development (see "conflict analysis" below), by planning more comprehensive and coherent interventions (see chapter 2), and by designing concrete programs and projects of assistance (see chapters 4 to 9). Because transition assistance does not fit neatly into traditional forms of aid, however, an initial problem for assistance organizations has been to adapt existing development concepts, tools and programs to the special needs of a transition situation. The term "transition assistance" is an attempt to make reality more comprehensible, but does not do justice to the particulars of the situation. In particular, transition assistance is not a sequential process, even though many like to view it as a phase in between humanitarian and development assistance. In order to provide some clarity, transition assistance can be described as follows:

**Transition Assistance**

- Is the concern of the political, security and development parts of the United Nations and their member States
- Requires a comprehensive, concerted and holistic approach. While quick and visible impact has to be generated, poorly coordinated, *ad hoc*, short-term engagements will not yield the desired results
- Must address the root causes of conflicts
- Is multidimensional
- Has to be carried out in full partnership with internal actors
- Is ultimately defined by its context and purpose, rather than through a set of pre-defined activities.

### 1.2.1 The Guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

A starting point for practical transition assistance is policies on the same subject. Milestones in policy coordination are the 1997 OECD DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the 2001 OECD DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. They are an expression of the DAC members to recognize good governance and the strengthening of civil

society as the foundations for transition assistance.[10] The principles of action as agreed in the guidelines are summarized in box 1.7.

The guidelines highlight specific operational priorities for post-conflict recovery (such as demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants), and stress the importance of international and in-country coordination, as well as the need for regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding mechanisms. They are considered seminal works at the policy level, but in practice they are not as effectively applied as one might wish.

**Box 1.7: OECD DAC Principles**

- Recognize the potential—and limits—of the international community to take actions that favor peace and discourage violence.
- Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace.
- Act on the costly lessons learned on the importance of consistent, coherent policies and comprehensive tools in order to do maximum good and avoid unintended harm.
- Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.
- Actively engage women, men and youth in peace-building and policy-making processes. All actors need to take better account of the pervasive linkages between gender differences and violent conflicts and their prevention and resolution.
- Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by long-term perspectives and political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations, even for short-term actions.
- Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion.

*Source:* Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, (Paris: OECD, 2001), p.17.

## 1.2.2 Principal External Actors

Internal actors need and want the support of external actors as they struggle to deal with the enormity of the rebuilding tasks. Table 1.2 lists the main groups of external actors present in a transition society, their mandates and roles and a special commentary.

**Table 1.2: Principal External Actors and their Mandates/Roles**

| Actors | Mandates/Roles | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| **Donor governments** | The majority of international assistance is provided by donor governments, either through bilateral aid programs (either implemented directly or through NGOs) or through multilateral assistance programs (through the UN or regional bodies such as the European Union).<br>Because recipients are crucially dependent on this assistance, donor governments potentially wield strong political influence. | There is an unfortunate tendency on the part of many donors to tackle issues according to their own domestic agendas, which can skew priorities in recipient countries in unhelpful ways.<br>It is also important to consider the perceptions of particular donor governments based on their historical relationships with the country in transition. |

[10] The 23 DAC members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and the Commission of the European Community. Observers are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank.

**Table 1.2: Principal External Actors and their Mandates/Roles**

| Actors | Mandates/Roles | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| **United Nations system** | The UN's key goals are the promotion of international peace and security, sustainable social and economic development and universal human rights. It can therefore act as a key stabilizing force in transition situations. Often, the Secretary General requests one of the UN organs or agencies to take on a coordinating role in response to a crisis, encompassing both humanitarian and development activities.<br>The UN is bound by mandates; therefore not all transition needs may be covered by the UN or there may be overlaps in assistance. Coordination and coherence must be sought, not only among the various UN agencies, but also with other actors, including the donor community. | The UN provides legitimacy and credibility to many transition operations. However, the UN is also dependent on its membership for political legitimacy, personnel and operating funds. There is often a lack of agreement on what the UN should do in situations where violence has begun to threaten peace and development efforts.<br>To what extent UN activities replace too many of the functions that a state should normally play with detrimental effect on local capacities is also a matter of debate. |
| **International financial institutions** | Given their ability to provide substantial loans and credits, international financial institutions have often taken a prominent role in planning ways out of a transition situation. | The economic viewpoint might prevail in rebuilding efforts to the detriment of political and social concerns. |
| **International NGOs** | International NGOs come in all shapes and sizes. NGOs operating in transitions situations can usefully be divided into relief and development NGOs, peace and justice NGOs, and advocacy NGOs, but nothing *per se* prohibits a different focus.<br>International NGOs work by invitation and agreement with host governments. International NGOs are an important force in rebuilding – by themselves and increasingly as implementers of programs funded by larger, often UN, organizations. | International NGOs often compete for resources from donors and might operate in competition with local organizations, and possibly without any input from the host government. Being resource-driven may also jeopardize their accountability to the beneficiaries of their programs. Being interested in their own survival, they may under-invest in local capacity-building. |
| **The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement** | The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the world's largest group of humanitarian non-governmental organizations, often known simply as the Red Cross, after its original symbol. The Movement is composed of, but must be distinguished from:<br>▪ the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a committee of Swiss nationals based in Geneva, Switzerland, which leads the international movement and which has special responsibilities under international humanitarian law<br>▪ the International Federation of Red | The Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement operates under strict principles of international Humanitarian Law as codified by the Geneva Conventions. Impartiality and neutrality are key, which make the movement less amenable to partnership or concerted action with other actors. |

**Table 1.2: Principal External Actors and their Mandates/Roles**

| Actors | Mandates/Roles | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| | Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which is the composed body of all national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies which was established to coordinate international relief actions following natural disasters and to promote humanitarian activities<br>▪ the 178 individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies | |
| **Regional organizations** | Regional organizations may play an important role in furthering the stabilization of a country through peaceful means. Regional intergovernmental organizations, which are supported by member state governments, generally aim to strengthen peace and security, promote democracy, resolve disputes and ensure the peaceful settlement of differences among member states. | Regional bodies can provide important political support or adopt sanctions to member governments. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s role, for example, vis-à-vis the peace processes in Sudan and Somalia is noticeable in this regard.<br>Other examples include the West African Peacekeeping Force's (known by its acronym ECOMOG) missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia (despite its role having been controversial at times) and the involvement of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (which with 55 participating states is the world's largest regional security organization) in democratization processes in former Yugoslavia. |
| **Neighboring states/ governments** | Neighboring states and their governments can have an important influence on transition situations. They might provide the political impetus to adopt certain policies, or provide support to peacekeeping operations through the UN. | The situation in neighboring states can also contribute to instability, as exemplified by the continuing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and strife in neighboring Burundi which is posing serious constraints to Rwanda's efforts at nation building and improving the lives of its citizens.<br>Some governments or private sector companies might be present in the transition society for purely economic reasons, and are a group of actors not to be ignored. |

### 1.2.3 The Relationship between Internal and External Actors

Internal and external actors can both benefit from a well-functioning relationship: Internal actors have a harder time building peace without the support of external actors, and external actors cannot build peace in fragmented societies without the legitimacy that only internal actors can confer upon their actions. The relationship is often characterized, however, by mistrust. Major stumbling blocks to a fruitful relationship are as follows:[11]

- The difference between the political and economic resources of external actors and those of internal actors is enormous. As a result, internal actors are dependent on external funding. Low levels of assertiveness on the part of the internal actors are a side effect.
- External actors expect rapid project delivery and measurable results without adequate concern for the realities of the situation and the constraints faced by local actors. Internal actors are vulnerable to being overwhelmed by external actors and their time constraints.
- External actors may experience great difficulty in identifying credible internal actors to consult and support.
- Internal actors might "play" the external actors against each other, in their attempt to gain maximum benefit from the international community's assistance.
- External actors are stakeholders with very substantive interests. Their intervention necessarily modifies the balance of power between the various national actors. In this sense, all external interventions are political.
- Problems of harmonization and integration are frequently exacerbated by turf battles among external actors.
- The relationship is often fraught with misunderstandings, awkward attitudes and uncooperative behavior, because appropriate partnership skills and attitudes have not been developed.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Create dialogue opportunities with all key actors present, **commit to understanding the position, role and context of internal actors as best as possible**. Include all relevant actors in decision-making. Develop stable and trusting relationships. They are vital for the success of your project.*
- ✓ ***Ensure that local actors become owners of proposed programs/projects.** Transition assistance will only be effective, if local actors have become owners of the externally-initiated project or program. If they are not committed to the initiatives proposed, they will not support them, use them, and invest in them.*
- ✓ *Be committed to **local capacity building** from the earliest stages, even if that appears to slow you down at the beginning. This is vital for sustainability.*
- ✓ ***Clarify agendas and motivations from the outset.** External actors come to transition societies with multiple agendas and motivations—which are not necessarily compatible with or driven by the political realities on the ground. Provide assistance in a spirit of humility.*
- ✓ *Recognize the **complexity and interdependence of the wider system** in which institutions operate, and recognize the different organizational cultures of humanitarian, developmental, security and peacebuilding actors.*

[11] For a full description of the problems associated with the relationship between internal and external actors see WSP International/International Peace Academy, *Conference Document* presented at the Peacebuilding Forum Conference on "Building Effective Partnerships: Improving the Relationship between Internal and External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries," New York, 7 October 2004, (revised version November 2004).

### 1.2.4 Transition Activities

In most cases, the tasks of transition assistance involve a complex combination of activities in response to needs in all areas of state functioning: humanitarian, security, political, legal, social and economic. The assistance has to be specially adapted from traditional development aid tools. In particular, it has to be targeted, but not overly determined. It has to be effective, but not disrespectful. It has to be efficient, but not overwhelming. A human security approach, presented in chapter 3, might best serve these objectives.

Table 1.3 provides an overview of typical transition activities and compares them with development activities. The activities listed in this table are by no means exhaustive but they serve to highlight the different types of activities that occur in the transition phase compared to the development phase. Chapters 4 to 9 explain these activities in further detail and discusses additional considerations.

**Table 1.3: Overview of Typical Activities in the Transition and Development Phases**

| Sector | Challenges | Transition Phase | Development Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Security (see ch. 5)** | **Insecurity resulting from violent conflict** | ▪ Assist DDR of former combatants. | |
| | **Landmines and UXOs** | ▪ Support large-scale clearance of landmines and UXOs, so that large parts of the population are protected from accidents and can re-engage in agricultural production. | ▪ Continued clearance of landmines and UXOs (as the process is time-consuming). |
| | **Criminal insecurity** | ▪ Support police reform/training and the establishment of a functioning legal system.<br>▪ Support disarmament of civilians.<br>▪ Support bans on arms proliferation and other measures aimed at small arms control. | ▪ Promote individual and collective security through a range of activities in the security, democratic governance and economic recovery sectors. |
| | **Security sector** | ▪ Promote security sector reform.<br>▪ Help define new role for military in democratic post-war society.<br>▪ Help restructure security sector organizations. | ▪ Promote democratic governance of the security sector.<br>▪ Support further training for relevant staff. |
| **Democratic Governance (see ch. 6)** | **Legitimate government** | ▪ At the peace agreement stage, negotiate solutions that are implementable while keeping in mind the long-term consequences.<br>▪ Strengthen legislative, executive and judiciary bodies through technical assistance and policy advice.<br>▪ Provide election assistance. | ▪ Support democratic processes.<br>▪ Strengthen efficiency and accountability of public institutions.<br>▪ Promote political reform and stability in a balanced way. |
| | **Democratic principles/pluralistic governance system/good governance** | ▪ Strengthen civil control of political process.<br>▪ Build the capacity of civil society for conflict resolution, reconciliation, and political participation.<br>▪ Encourage the development of free and responsible media. | ▪ Promote popular participation in the political process.<br>▪ Encourage protection of minority groups.<br>▪ Protect freedom of information.<br>▪ Empower civil society. |
| | **Inability of state to perform public services fast enough** | ▪ Provide training, technical advice and financial resources. | ▪ Support further training. |

**Table 1.3: Overview of Typical Activities in the Transition and Development Phases**

| Sector | Challenges | Transition Phase | Development Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Social Fabrics (see ch. 7)** | **Justice** | ▪ Support judicial and legal reform.<br>▪ Promote transitional justice systems at local and national levels.<br>▪ Promote justice for victims of war and violence.<br>▪ Assist reconciliation initiatives.<br>▪ Promote a culture of accountability and respect for human rights. | ▪ Encourage an impartial and accessible justice system.<br>▪ Strengthen rule of law and respect for human rights. |
| | **Legacy of violence** | ▪ Help heal the wounds of war through psycho-social support.<br>▪ Help provide incentives for supporting positive peace. | ▪ Support social dialogue. |
| | **Political exploitation of ethnic differences** | ▪ Promote a culture of peace and reconciliation. | ▪ Promote culture of stability. |
| | **Reintegration of Refugees/IDPs** | ▪ Assist sensitively with the reintegration of refugees and IDPs into local communities without alienating the communities. | |
| **Infrastructure (se ch 8)** | **Damaged facilities** | ▪ Provide credits and financial schemes to help rebuild damaged infrastructure.<br>▪ Support larger stabilization goals with infrastructure projects, that is have a holistic approach. | ▪ Help construct the necessary developmental infrastructure. |
| | **Social and community infrastructure** | ▪ Help rebuild facilities and nurture the growth of these facilities | |
| **Economic Recovery (see ch. 9)** | **Widening socioeconomic disparities/competition over natural resources** | ▪ Ensure equal participation in the "peace dividend."<br>▪ Assist with the conversion of the war economy; provide technical assistance in economic recovery.<br>▪ Promote agreement on sustainable resource management systems as a central part of the peace process.<br>▪ Support environmental rehabilitation. | ▪ Promote equitable economic development.<br>▪ Reduce social exclusion.<br>▪ Enhance environmental security.<br>▪ Help create sustainable resource management systems. |

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Respect the **complexity of the transition context.** Take time to map your environment as best as possible, before you start acting. Be careful not to become stationary because of the contradictory pulls and pushes of a transition society which can make you indecisive. Act equipped with information, tact, consideration, transparency and honesty.*
- ✓ *While being sensitive to local rhythms, be aware that everything is urgent. Thus **quicker outcomes are needed** than in stable development situations. The results of activities need to be clearly visible to the beneficiaries.*
- ✓ *Know that transition assistance is **inherently political and is implemented in highly politicized** environments. Program selection, design and implementation cannot be approached from a purely technical or sectoral perspective or without consideration of the political situation.*
- ✓ ***Do no harm.**[12] Recognize the potentially negative impacts assistance can have and think through how alternative systems can be established to deal with the legacy of conflict.*
- ✓ *Understand the "logic of war" and be able to **support a "logic of peace."***
- ✓ *Because transition activities are complex, they require a **multi-level response**. Engage in mutually-supportive initiatives at the grass-roots, regional, inter-regional and international levels.*
- ✓ *Be able to deal with uncertainty as there is **no "one size fits all."***
- ✓ *Recognize the extent or limit of the impact of the intervention.*

## 1.2.5. Suggested Benchmarks for Transition Assistance

When planning transition assistance, it is important to consider *who* might act and *what* this actor might do as well as to consider *when* such action should take place. Box 1.8 describes suggested benchmarks to determine whether a country truly initiates opportunities for transition. Use of these benchmarks is generally based on triggers such as cease-fires, successful peace negotiations and/or UN Security Council resolutions. Some of the benchmarks resemble prerequisite conditions for action by the UN while others seem to be rather descriptions of assistance. Yet, these benchmarks are initial points of reference used by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group to decide on when transition assistance could most usefully be provided. A UNDG/ECHA process is underway to further refine these benchmarks.

**Box 1.8: Suggested Benchmarks for Jump-Starting Transition Assistance**

- A peace agreement has been signed or the peace process is very advanced.
- The Government is agreeable to embarking on a transition process.
- Major donors accept the need for, and are willing to support, transition programs for the country.
- The situation is conducive, including politically, for the return and reintegration of refugee and/or internally displaced populations.
- The Government has the capacity or is being supported to build its capacity to work in partnership with the UN on transitional planning, coordination and program implementation.
- Support is available, or can be quickly obtained, in the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator's office to coordinate planning for the transition.
- Coordination mechanisms are in place or can be adapted quickly to plan and implement a transition program.
- Coordination mechanisms include active participation by key transition stakeholders, including the Government.

*Source*: UNDG/ECHA*, Report of the Working Group on Transition Issues*, February 2004, p. 14.

[12] Anderson, Mary. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999)

The United Nations has usually played a leadership role in jump-starting transition assistance, setting the pace for other external actors to follow suit. Disregard for these benchmarks, however, may lead to premature assumptions that a country is ready to transition from conflict to peace. For example, humanitarian actors pulled out of Tajikistan in 1995, which was too early as a political settlement had not yet been achieved. At the same time, development actors found it particularly difficult to make progress in the country because resources were scarce so long as fighting continued. As a consequence, the humanitarian actors had to return when the humanitarian situation worsened.

## *1.3 Conflict Analysis*

How external actors intervene is a particular focus of chapter 2, section 2.1. However, before beginning the planning phase of an intervention a thorough analysis is called for to better understand the root causes of conflict, recurrent dynamics, key protagonists and actors trying to promote peace and what capacities for peace exist. Such an analysis has become known under the umbrella term "conflict analysis", even though it is much broader in practice.

It should also be noted that a conflict analysis is different from and prerequisite to a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), which is a complex analytical tool for priority setting in recovery and is led by national authorities, supported by the international community (see chapter 2, section 2.3.2). While conflict analysis might need to be a part of such a comprehensive assessment,[13] it is here discussed as an analysis in its own right to be carried out at a stage when the decision to intervene has not yet been finally determined.

**Conflict Analysis**

Conflict analysis is a means of developing a multi-dimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict as well as the capacities for peace.

### Key considerations when carrying out a conflict analysis:

- Contemporary conflicts are complex and multi-leveled. Often several conflicts have become entwined with one another and may be part of a regionalized conflict system. Analysis therefore needs to include the international/regional, national and local dimensions of conflict.
- The notion that the "beginning" and "end" of a conflict can be identified is inappropriate in contemporary conflicts. Conflict is a dynamic social process in which the original structural tensions are themselves profoundly reshaped by the massive disruptions of war. Therefore "root causes" may become decreasingly relevant in protracted conflicts.
- Conflict analysis is useful at all levels of an intervention (project, program or sector), and it pertains to the various stages of the intervention (planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.) Conflict analysis needs to be updated regularly, and indicators should be employed to monitor and measure the changes to the context and the interaction between the context and the intervention. (See also chapter 11, section 11.4.5 for more detail on indicators.)

Many organizations have developed conflict analysis tools. Therefore, an overview of the most important tools is included in annex 1.1 of this chapter. It should be noted that all of these tools have been developed by external actors and thus provide an external perspective on conflict. It is hoped that local efforts to analyze conflict can be added to the resource list soon. Which tool to use for which purpose will be the judgment of each field practitioner. His or her choice will be informed, to a large extent, by pragmatic considerations such as adaptability of

[13] This is the case with JICA. JICA has developed its own Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (PNA) (described in chapter 2, table 2.4 and diagram 2.4) which includes conflict analysis. The conflict analysis part of JICA's PNA is based on a thorough situation analysis which contains an analysis of some elements that potentially contributed to the conflict. These analyses contribute to the needs assessment, i.e. are carried out in order to determine what role JICA could usefully play in the recovery period. For further info please consult also JICA, *Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment Manual*, (Tokyo: JICA, November 2003).

methodology; cost; and availability of resources, time, and staff. Even though a host of tools is available (see annex 1.1), two recommended tools are discussed below.

## 1.3.1 The UNDG's Interagency Framework for Conflict, Actor and Capacity Analysis in Crisis Situations

A comprehensive approach to conflict analysis has been proposed by the United Nations in November 2004. This framework spans a three-fold analysis (conflict analysis, actor analysis and an analysis of the capacities for peace) as well as continued mapping and assessments while the activities have already gotten underway. Despite its comprehensiveness, the approach should not deter from a speedy involvement in a transition situation, if so required. Described in detail in the UN Development Group's Inter-agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Crisis Situations,[14] the tools comprise: (1) a conflict analysis, (2) an actor analysis, (3) an analysis of the capacities for peace, (4) a mapping of ongoing responses and (5) an assessment of ongoing responses and conflict, as follows:

### *Tool 1.1: Conflict Analysis*

This tool is focused on the proximate and structural conflict factors and is carried out along as follows.

| **Tool 1.1: Conflict analysis** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Matrix of Proximate Conflict Factors** | | | | |
| | **Security** | **Political/ Governance** | **Economic** | **Social** |
| **Local** | | | | |
| **Sub-national** | | | | |
| **National** | | | | |
| **Regional** | | | | |
| **International** | | | | |
| **Matrix of Structural Conflict Factors** | | | | |
| **Local** | | | | |
| **Sub-national** | | | | |
| **National** | | | | |
| **Regional** | | | | |
| **International** | | | | |

### *Tool 1.2: Actor Analysis*

Tool 1.2 "Actor Analysis" helps analyze who the key actors are (both internal and external), what their roles and mandates are, what their political leverage is and how they relate to key conflict issues.

[14] United Nations Development Group, *Inter-agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Crisis Situations* (New York: UNDG, Nov 2004), http://www.undg.org/documents/5329-Common_Inter-Agency_Framework_for_Conflict_Analysis_in_Transition.doc. See also annex 1 for a copy of the document.

| Tool 1.2: Actor Analysis | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Actors** | **Stated Interests** | **Hidden Agendas** | **Connects with/ Contradicts with** | **Resources they have** | **Resources they need** |
| **Local** | | | | | |
| **Sub-national** | | | | | |
| **National** | | | | | |
| **Regional** | | | | | |
| **International** | | | | | |

### *Tool 1.3: Analysis of Capacities for Peace*

Taken from Mary Anderson's work on "Do No Harm",[15] tool 1.3 "Analysis of Capacities for Peace" builds on the actor analysis and maps the actual and potential capacities for peace. This analysis is important in determining key allies and entry points for action.

| Tool 1.3: Analysis of Capacities for Peace | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Capacities for Peace** | **Stated Interests** | **Hidden Agendas** | **Connects with/ Contradicts with** | **Resources they have** | **Resources they need** |
| **Local** | | | | | |
| **Sub-national** | | | | | |
| **National** | | | | | |
| **Regional** | | | | | |
| **International** | | | | | |

### *Tool 1.4: Mapping of Ongoing Responses*

As programs and projects begin, it is important to map out other responses to perceived needs and to determine how one own activity fits in. Tool 1.4 "Mapping of Ongoing Responses" helps understand issues of coherence and complementarity.

[15] Anderson, Mary. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

| Tool 1.4: Mapping of Ongoing Responses | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Ongoing Responses** | **Security** | **Political/ Governance** | **Economic** | **Social** |
| **International** | | | | |
| **Regional** | | | | |
| **National** | | | | |
| **Sub-national** | | | | |
| **Local** | | | | |

### *Tool 1.5: Assessing Ongoing Responses and Conflict*

Taking the previous mapping one step further, tool 1.5 "Assessing Ongoing Responses and Conflict" helps to understand whether and how the various programs and projects address conflict and its causes, take potential spoilers into account and build on potential capacities for peace.

| Tool 1.5: Assessing Ongoing Responses and Conflict | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Priority proximate & structural conflict factors** | **Peace spoilers** | **Capacities for peace** | **Working in/on/around conflict** |
| **Program 1** | | | | |
| **Program 2** | | | | |
| **etc** | | | | |

Obvious results of this framework for conflict analysis are the identification of strategies and options for conflict reduction and for ensuring that current assistance approaches are conflict sensitive (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1 for further details on "conflict-sensitivity").

***Good Practices***

- ✓ Make **conflict analysis a requirement** before engaging in program activity;
- ✓ Conducting a conflict analysis is no guarantee that the program/project is actually informed by its results. Be proactive in **translating the results of your analysis into program/project design** and implementation.
- ✓ Be aware that conflict analysis is **more than understanding the context**: it is an intervention in itself. It thus needs to be carried out with care and sensitivity and be linked to subsequent programming.

An illustration of how one bilateral agency addressed conflict analysis and what good practices it distilled in this regard, can be found in box 1.9. Box 1.10 describes the same from the viewpoint of a multilateral agency.

### Box 1.9: The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID)'s Recommended Good Practices on Conflict Analysis

DFID has applied conflict analysis (termed "strategic conflict assessment (SCA)") to a range of country studies, including Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Sri Lanka and the Caucasus. Selected good practices include:

- ✓ There is a need to be clear about why and when to conduct SCAs; in particular, they should be timed to coincide with a natural pause or turning point in the program cycle, or before launching a new program.
- ✓ Composition of the team is a crucial element in its success; it is important to encompass expertise from a number of different areas in order to widen and deepen the quality of the analysis. It is also good to have a combination of external and local consultants.
- ✓ There is a need to achieve the right balance between contextual analysis and program design. In this sense, it is important to have as wide an analysis as possible so that the complexity of the conflict could be properly understood before converting it into program ideas.
- ✓ Precise recommendations on what action to take next bring added value to SCAs. They also help overcome the feeling that the process could be an extra burden, eg describing exactly what response needs to be taken, who should be responsible for taking it, which NGO to work with, and how much funding would be required.
- ✓ It is essential to have active participation of in-country staff to inform the purpose and approach and a staff member dedicated to the follow-up and implementation of recommendations.
- ✓ SCAs should be conducted in a timeframe of about six weeks up to two months, depending on the depth and scope of the study. A minimum of two weeks for field research and two weeks for the writing-up process is recommended. Reports should be published immediately after the assessment to guarantee timely relevance.
- ✓ The practical application of the SCA depends on the conflict expertise of the users and whether or not they 'ask the right questions.' Less experienced staff may require induction, training and support.

*Source:* FEWER, International Alert and SAFERWORLD, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Resource Pack*, http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack/strategic_conflict_impact_assessment_309.html

### Box 1.10: Recommended Good Practices Distilled from UNDP's Approach to Conflict Assessment

As part of UNDP's mainstreaming strategy, UNDP/BCPR piloted an approach to conflict assessment and development programming. The aim of the pilot project was to explore how conflict analysis might best support country offices improve the effectiveness of development strategies and programming. From October 2001 until the end of 2002, a number of country assessments were thus carried out in Guatemala, Nepal, Nigeria (Niger Delta Region), Tajikistan and Guinea-Bissau, in close collaboration with the Country Offices.

Selected good practices include:

- Do not conduct conflict assessment as a one-off exercise, but a long-term process aimed at integrating conflict prevention into existing mechanisms, procedures and planning tools;
- Do not conceptually or practically separate conflict assessment from strategy and program development, one needs to inform the other;
- Keep in mind that capacity-building targeting UNDP and partner organisations (government, civil society, other UN agencies and donor organisations) is an essential component of conflict assessment processes; and
- Develop clearly participation and coordination aspects of conflict assessment processes.

*Source:* Adapted from UNDP, *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Mainstreaming within UNDP: The Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA),* http://www.undp.org/bcpr/conflict_prevention/ca_note%20_2_.pdf

## General Lessons on Transitions and Their Underlying Conflict Dynamics

- ✓ Transitions are living processes, not stable realities.
- ✓ Transitions are multi-directional and multi-linear processes which include contradictions and blank spaces.
- ✓ Transition situations are inherently political and thus a special development approach encompassing both humanitarian and development activities has to be used.
- ✓ All members of society, from those in leadership positions, to those at community level, have a role to play in building lasting peace.
- ✓ Rebuilding post-conflict societies must address the root causes of conflict. An integral part of rebuilding is therefore geared toward transforming structures and dynamics that gave rise to the violent conflict in the first place. This systemic change typically involves policy or institutional adjustments, as well as the creation of new institutions to meet basic political and socioeconomic needs. This is a huge process, which requires the continued political will and commitment of all actors.
- ✓ Bringing about sustainable peace goes beyond problem solving or symptom management, it involves deep-seated change. This is a difficult process, which is often judged (however short-sighted) by those in power to be too costly to pursue. Transition assistance must address the core problems that underlie the conflict and help to change the patterns of interaction of the involved parties in order to be successful.
- ✓ In line with a human security approach, transition assistance must aim to move a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well being.
- ✓ Internal and external actors stand to gain from a well-functioning relationship: the enormity of the rebuilding tasks requires external help, but this help can only be effective if it is guided by internal priority-setting.
- ✓ External actors can be quite effective because their efforts carry the legitimacy of the international community.
- ✓ Conflict analysis is a prerequisite of any external intervention as it helps understand the conflict process, its causes and the capacities for peace.
- ✓ A longer-term perspective is crucial to building sustainable peace. Practically, this means articulating future goals which describe the desirable structural, sectoral, and relationship dynamics.

## Resources

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World Bank. *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda*. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit), 2004).

## Annex 1.1: Overview of Conflict Analysis Tools

**Table 1.6: Overview of Conflict Analysis Tools**[16]

| Tool | Purpose | Level | Potential users | Assumptions | Methodology | Resources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***1. Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA)—DFID—DEV**** | Country/regional strategic planning, can also be applied to projects/ programs | Regional, national, local | DFID and partner bilateral / multilateral agencies desk officers | Combine political and economic dimensions; greed/grievance; structures and actors | Combination of desk study and field consultations | Assessment team (5 people). Consultation meetings in-country |
| ***2. Benefits / harms handbook—CARE—DEV/HA*** | Analysis, impact assessment and project (re)design | Local – mainly project level | NGO project managers, field staff | Focus on rights-based approach | Desk-based and field research and possible workshop consultations | Varies – few hours in emergencies to more detailed workshops / consultations |
| ***3. Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)—World Bank—DEV*** | Country strategic planning | National, can also be adapted to (sub) regional | Multilateral organization desk staff / planners | Focus on socio-economic dimensions of conflict | Checklist; Desk studies, workshops, stakeholder consultations, consultants | Full CAF analysis resource intensive (workshops, consultations, consultants); but can be simplified |
| ***4. Conflict analysis and response definition—FEWER—PB*** | Early warning, country strategic planning | National, local | Diplomats, donor desk officers, NGOs | Focus on conflict dynamics | Ongoing analysis by local civil society organizations | Modest for desk study; more for training or workshops |
| ***5. EC Checklist for root causes of conflict European Commission—DEV*** | Early warning, strategic and program planning | National, regional | Multi- and bilateral donor desk officers, diplomatic actors | Focus on structural root causes of conflict | Checklist; external research capacity | Limited as mainly desk-based |

[16] A checklist for considering which analysis tool to use has also been developed by International Alert. See:FEWER, International Alert AND SAFERWORLD, *Conflict Sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: Resource Pack*, http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html

| Tool | Purpose | Level | Potential users | Assumptions | Methodology | Resources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***6. Working with conflict: skills and strategies for action – Responding to conflict—PB*** | Conflict analysis, program planning | Local, national | Local and INGO staff, field and headquarters | Focus on understanding conflicts | Collection of tools for participatory conflict analysis | Limited depending on format (workshop, consultation meetings etc) |
| ***7. Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC): Analysis tools for humanitarian actors—World Vision—DEV / HA*** | Conflict analysis, project planning | National, regional | NGO emergency response, development and advocacy staff | Focus on chronic political instability, dovetails with Do No Harm | Collection of tools, flexible application | Variable, depending on use of tools, desk study or consultations |
| ***8. Do No Harm / Local capacities for peace project*** | Conflict analysis, project monitoring and impact assessment | Local | Donor, NGO (international and local) staff | Focus on dividers and connectors in conflict | Workshop, integration into standard procedures | Limited, for workshop |
| ***9. Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF)—Clingendael Institute—DEV / F*** | Conflict analysis, country strategic planning | National, sectoral | Donor and embassy staff | Focus on indicators of internal conflict and state failure | External research capacity, workshops | Costs of preparing for and holding workshops, can include external consultant involvement |
| ***10. Early Warning and Preventive Measures—UN Staff College—ALL*** | Early warning, conflict analysis, design | National | UN staff (HQ and field), other donor agencies or NGOs | Focus on human security and human rights framework | Training/workshop setting | Training materials, facilitation, workshop / training costs |
| ***11. Conflict assessment framework—USAID—DEV*** | Conflict analysis, country and project planning | National | Donor desk officers, implementing partners, other US government officials | Broad scope, synthesis of other tools | Desk study, workshop, follow up integration into programming strategy | For desk study, in country visit and follow-up work. |

| Tool | Purpose | Level | Potential users | Assumptions | Methodology | Resources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***12. Conflict analysis for project planning and implementation—GTZ— DEV*** | Conflict analysis, country and project planning | National, project | Donor, NGO desk officers, project managers | Broad scope, synthesis of other tools | Combination of desk study and empirical research, tools for participatory conflict analysis | Costs of organizing workshops and consultation meetings |
| ***13. FAST methodology—Swiss Peace—DEV / FP*** | Early warning, risk assessments | National, can be sub-regional | Government ministries, development agencies, NGOs, international organizations | Event data analysis (quantitative and qualitative) | Field information collection, desk-based analysis | Resource intensive for maintaining local information networks and specialist analysis network |
| ***14. Conflict diagnostic handbook—CPR / CIDA—PB / DEV*** | Conflict and stakeholder assessment | Country, regional | Development practitioners | Devising evidence-based peacebuilding strategies | Mainly workshop setting analysis | Costs of organizing and presenting workshop |
| ***15. Better Programming Initiative—IFRC—HA*** | Conflict assessment, training | Program; local, national, regional | Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies, delegation and other staff | Focus on aid fostering long-term reconciliation and recovery | Analysis and training | Depending on scope of assessment or length of training |
| ***16. Peace and Needs Impact Assessment—JICA—PB (see Diagram 2.4 page 48)*** | Conflict analysis and planning mechanism | Program; local, national | Development practitioners, NGOs | Focus on programming to support peacebuilding efforts | Field information collection, desk-based analysis, project design | Variable, depending on use of tools, desk study or consultations |

**Field of activity : DEV Development, HA Humanitarian Assistance, PB Peacebuilding, FP Foreign Policy*

*Source: FEWER, International Alert and SAFERWORLD, Conflict Sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: Resource Pack, http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html)*

Notes:

# Chapter 2
# Transition Interventions, Gaps and Tools

## *Chapter Objectives*

- Introduce the various types and levels of intervention, as well as leadership arrangements.
- Identify and discuss the most important gaps in transition assistance.
- Introduce existing needs assessment and planning tools designed specifically for transition situations.
- Briefly highlight key aspects of other short-term humanitarian and longer-term development planning tools relevant for transitions.

## *Introduction*

Transition interventions are much more complex and difficult to support than situations requiring humanitarian relief or development assistance alone. They tend to be heavily politicized and militarized, and increasingly encompass peace-building and state-building activities.

The multidimensional character of transitions often leads to the involvement of several external actors (bilateral and multilateral agencies, international non-governmental organizations and the private sector). Gaps in transition assistance are therefore much more likely to occur than in normal development situations. Therefore, common needs assessments, strategies and plans specifically designed to respond to transition challenges are of utmost importance.

These should be designed from the start in ways that will promote national ownership, facilitate and foster longer-term development and ensure the most efficient and effective employment of human and financial resources. These goals are, however, often difficult to meet in practice.

## *2.1 Understanding Interventions*

### 2.1.1 Types of Interventions

Transition situations are invariably shaped by multiple, concurrent and related interventions. Such interventions are undertaken through a range of activities: political, military, humanitarian and developmental. Each type of intervention has its own objective, rationale and means as shown in table 2.1 below.

**Table 2.1: Types of Interventions in Transitions**

| | Aims to … | Why it is needed | How it is undertaken |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Political** | • Promote peaceful settlement of disputes<br>• Support the implementation of peace agreements | Peaceful settlements are preferred to violent means to avoid loss of life and property. Peaceful solutions are also more sustainable. | Good offices, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, national dialogue and reconciliation. |
| **Military** (cont. next page) | • Restore law and order<br>• Maintain peace and security<br>• Prevent mass violations of human | International military actions displace domestic authority and aim to address directly the threat. Their legality is contingent on the UN | Deployment of UN and regional peacekeeping forces or coalition of states' military forces. |

**Table 2.1: Types of Interventions in Transitions**

| | Aims to … | Why it is needed | How it is undertaken |
|---|---|---|---|
| | rights and humanitarian law<br>• Monitor cease fires | Security Council's authorization, particularly when they do not have the consent of the parties to the conflict. | |
| **Humanitarian** | Provide relief to the civilian victims of conflict and natural disasters in accordance with the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. | Human suffering should be addressed particularly when the government or authorities default on their responsibilities. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. | UN-coordinated humanitarian appeals and emergency/relief field operations. |
| **Developmental** | Create an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive lives according to their needs and interests. | Development today is much more than economic growth; it is about expanding the choices people have to lead lives they value; it is *human* development. | Development cooperation strategies, programs and projects. |

These types of intervention whether combined or not:

- Cannot always be organized to logically follow one another
- Have no clear boundaries and therefore may overlap significantly
- Have no defined mandates, which often leads to duplication of roles and activities
- Are based on different cultures and work processes, which may generate frictions, misunderstandings and conflicting responses.

Peace-building approaches integrate these different types of intervention in order to provide a more comprehensive response to the multidimensional challenges that characterize transitions. However, peace-building approaches continue to find it difficult to:

- Achieve programmatic coherence among different components: humanitarian activities are undertaken in ways that are not sustainable for development work; military means do not necessarily complement and reinforce political efforts and so on
- Respond to the real needs of beneficiaries in a way that reinforces national and local efforts and initiatives.

To better understand interventions, field practitioners also need to know that interventions are based upon different leadership arrangements and varying levels of external involvement.

## 2.1.2 Levels of Interventions

Diagram 2.1 below shows how levels of intervention vary from one transition to another. These interventions are contingent on the degree of internal capacity found in a given situation. In other words, higher levels of intervention will occur in situations where there are weaker degrees of capacity, and vice-versa.

### *Diagram 2.1: Increasing Levels of Intervention and Characteristics*




| | **Transitional Assistance** For example, ONUSAL, UNOMOZ, MINUGUA, ONUC, UNAMA, Sri Lanka | **Delegated Transitional Authority** For example, Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNTAC | **International Transitional Authority** For example, UNMIK, UNTAET, Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Mandate** | Assist in the restoration of law and order, provide assistance for the organization of elections; assist in the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons; organize and conduct disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support economic recovery. | Make binding decisions over all measures necessary to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, which includes appointing, suspending or removing government officials from office and enacting or amending domestic laws, in addition to functions described under the previous category. | Perform civilian administrative functions, ensure the functioning of public services and promote the establishment of self-government in addition to functions described under the other categories. |

The implications of these varying levels of intervention for multilateral and bilateral transition assistance are multiple and will demand tact and discernment of transition practitioners in relating to internal actors:

- External counterparts in the absence of internal counterparts. When higher levels of intervention exist, the main counterparts of transition practitioners will be leading external actors instead of national authorities. This should not prevent, however, the design of strategies, programs and projects in consultation with their direct beneficiaries.
- Differing perceptions of the degree of internal capacity. Internal and external actors do not always agree upon the existing degree of internal capacity. (Internal actors tend to overestimate internal capacity, whereas external actors tend to underestimate internal capacity.)
- Difficulty achieving optimum levels of intervention. Levels of intervention are not always well adjusted to the existing degree of internal capacity at the mission, program or project level. This may lead to false expectations, frustrations and resentment on the part of both internal and external actors.

## 2.1.3 Leadership Arrangements

External actors respond to transition situations through various leadership arrangements, depending on the context, history and specificities that characterize each transition situation. Table 2.2 below shows the most common leadership arrangements found in transitions.

**Table 2.2: Possible Leadership Arrangements in Transitions**

| | Description | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| **United Nations leadership** | The United Nations deploys a multidimensional peace operation (military and civilian components under the authority of the Security Council and command of the Secretary-General) or a peace-building mission (civilian with the consent of the state concerned only). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General is the head of the operation or mission and head of the UN presence. Organizations of the UN system may or may not be an integral part of the mission or operation depending on its design. | United Nations Operations in El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, East Timor, Kosovo |
| **Shared leadership** | Key external actors share leadership of the overall operation. NATO usually assumes responsibility for the military component. Civilian components are usually under the responsibility of the UN and regional organizations, such as the OSCE, EU, OAS and the AU, depending on the geographic location of the operation. Authorization of the UN Security Council is necessary particularly where there is not the consent of all parties to the conflict. | NATO-UN Operation in Afghanistan; EU-NATO-UN-OSCE Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; UN-OAS mission in Haiti. |
| **Coalition of states** | This type of arrangement is based on the perceived need of a few powerful states to forcefully secure the stability of those that pose a threat to their peace and security. Although based on the same peace-building agenda of the 1990s, this new leadership arrangement is mainly driven by the national security interests of dominant external actors. | US-led coalition in Iraq |
| **Absence of organized international presence** | International transition assistance is jump-started without the establishment of a formal peace-support or peace-building operation. This usually takes place when national capacities are strong and there is certain stability ensured by a lasting cease-fire agreement followed by a major international pledging conference. | Sri Lanka |

The possible leadership arrangements outlined above:

- Represent the main and most common types of arrangements found in transitions – new types of arrangements may also arise to respond to increasingly complex transition situations.
- May evolve from one type into another depending on the particular dynamics of each transition situation (for example, the US-led intervention in Afghanistan which overthrew the Taliban regime evolved into a shared-leadership arrangement between the UN and NATO and the UN-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was replaced by a shared-leadership arrangement during the post-Dayton peace agreement phase).

Understanding these leadership arrangements is important because they tend to shape the dynamics of the relationships:

- Among external actors (for example, how transition practitioners and other external actors will associate with and support the efforts of leading actors)
- Between external and internal actors (for example, how internal actors will perceive external actors – interventions by a coalition of states may be mistakenly associated with those of the UN, the ICRC, or even with the work of a bilateral aid agency).

Becoming aware of the leadership arrangement prevailing in a transition situation will help bilateral aid agencies choose the most appropriate assistance strategy or a combination of strategies in support of transitions. Options include:

- Contributing financial and material resources to the initiatives and programs designed by leading external actors (for example, by providing additional contributions to peacekeeping operations and/or members of the UN country team supporting peacebuilding/transition efforts)
- Providing human resources and technical expertise to initiatives and programs designed by leading external actors
- Implementing programs and projects through national and local governments, international and local NGOs in support of peacebuilding/transition efforts led by prominent external actors
- Implementing programs and projects directly in support of peacebuilding/transition efforts led by prominent external actors.

See chapter 10, section 10.1.1 for more detailed information on operational approaches to jump-starting transition assistance.

## *2.2 Common Gaps*

Despite the experience external actors have gained and efforts they have undertaken to improve their operational efficiency and effectiveness, a number of gaps continue to hamper programmatic coherence during transition interventions. These gaps can be found at the institutional, strategic and financial levels both within and across agencies.

### 2.2.1 Gaps within Agencies

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of policies, structures and funding mechanisms specifically designed to address the institutional, strategic and financial void between humanitarian aid and development assistance. For example, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) established the Office of Transition Initiatives in 1994 to support transitions to democracy, market economies and peace.

Canada followed this trend by launching the Peacebuilding Initiative in 1996, creating peacebuilding units within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (reorganized into the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2004) and setting up a Peacebuilding Fund jointly managed by the two institutions.

Within the United Nations system, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established its Emergency Response Division in 1995, later upgraded to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Reconstruction (BCPR), and created a special funding mechanism known as TRAC 1.1.3. The World Bank established its Post-Conflict Unit in 1997 (which was renamed the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit), created a Post-Conflict Fund and issued later a Development Cooperation and Conflict policy.

In spite of the above-mentioned developments, institutional, strategic/policy and funding gaps continue to exist within several bilateral and multilateral aid agencies operating in transitions.

#### Institutional Gaps

Not all agencies have established specialized units, while others are still struggling to create them. Where these specialized units have been created, they may not have succeeded in gaining credibility within their agencies. Some are still fairly marginalized and have little influence and low impact on mainstreaming the concern for transition assistance within their respective agencies. These institutional gaps often lead to the following problems, which are manifested in various degrees depending on the agency concerned:

- A lack of professionalism in the handling of peacebuilding/transition issues

- Weak institutional support from headquarters to field teams working in transitions
- A frequent lack of coordination among the several agencies/ministries involved in peacebuilding/transition assistance (foreign affairs, defence, development cooperation)
- Little cooperation with non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

## Strategic/Policy Gaps

Not all agencies have devised specific strategies and/or policies to better respond to transition situations. Some continue to work either under humanitarian or development modalities, which are often ill-adapted to respond efficiently and effectively to transition challenges.

When agencies have devised transition strategies and/or policies, they often find it difficult to translate them into on-the-ground practice due to inappropriate operational systems and resources. For example, these strategic/policy gaps often hamper efforts to ensure timely and flexible transition interventions (see chapter 10, section 10.2.1 on entrance strategies/jump-starting transition assistance).

Box 2.1 shows donors attempts to devise specific policies and strategies.

**Box 2.1: Country Findings – Utstein Joint Study of Peacebuilding**

**Germany:** Launched a Comprehensive Concept on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in 2000. It is not a strategy, as such, but highlights a wide definition of security and multiple instruments and methodologies to address peacebuilding. A National Action Plan on Crisis Prevention is currently being drafted.

**Netherlands**: Does not have a single strategy on peacebuilding but has regional strategy papers on Southeast Asia (1999), Great Lakes (2001) and western Balkans (2001/2002). Dutch White Paper (2001) aims for a well-coordinated international approach to conflict prevention and seeks a Dutch role within that, rather than a specific national policy. Developed a Strategic Assessment Framework (SAF) to assist the development and management of such strategies.

**Norway:** Has a peacebuilding strategy, which addresses the question of long-term causes of armed conflict. Emphasizes the need to find a common international platform for peacebuilding and the desirability that donors should develop a division of labor based on comparative advantage.

**UK:** No peacebuilding strategy as such. Until 1999, peacebuilding was regarded as a post-conflict activity but now comes under the rubric of Conflict Prevention, covering pre, during and post-conflict initiatives. From 2001, thematic and geographical conflict prevention strategies have been developed, including peacebuilding elements.

*Source:* Lawry-White, Simon, "Review of the UK Government Approach to Peacebuilding and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from UK Government Funded Peacebuilding Projects 1997-2001 – Contribution to the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding", DFID EVSUM EV646, p. 2.

## Financial Gaps

Financial gaps also constitute major stumbling blocks to effective transition interventions since not all agencies have earmarked or adapted funding procedures to respond to transition interventions. Funding is often available either for humanitarian or development interventions. When used to address transitions, however, these funds are often ill-adapted. As a result, field practitioners find it difficult to jump-start transition interventions that are both suitable and timely. Box 2.2 shows some of the different models that are used to fund transitions.

**Box 2.2: Three Different Models to Fund Transitions**

Donor approaches to funding transitions can be categorized according to three models:

(1) transition funds, (2) integrated programming approaches and (3) hybrid models(which combine the first two).

***Example of the transition fund model***

**Norway** – The "Transition Budget Line" established in 2002 is intended to address gaps in transition situations in which neither humanitarian assistance nor long-term development co-operation measures are in place. Its main objective is to contribute to development and peacebuilding in countries that are seeking to resolve violent and deep-seated conflicts. An important subsidiary objective is to strengthen the capacity and competence of the international community to contribute to such efforts. The Minister of International Development has constitutional responsibility for the Transition Budget Line, which in 2004 amounted to NOK 450 million (about USD 65 million).

***Example of the integrated programming model***

**Germany** – In an effort to mainstream peace building and crisis prevention, the German Federal Foreign Office launched the Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation Program together with the technical co-operation agency GTZ. The primary goal of this program is to raise awareness about the interrelation between development cooperation and conflict and to enhance the potential for development cooperation in this sphere. The second line action was to make peace development and conflict transformation a priority area of the bilateral co-operation program. In 2003 nearly 20% of planned projects belonged to this category.

***Example of the hybrid model***

**Japan** – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) addresses transition issues as part of its grant aid programs such as *Emergency Grant Aid*, focusing mainly on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; *Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects* which focuses on providing assistance through NGOs and local governments and *Grant AID for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*. In addition, Japan can respond to transition needs through technical cooperation delivered by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

*Source:* Adapted from Aide-Mémoire on Donor Models to Funding Transition prepared for the Second International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship held from 21 to 22 October 2004.

The UN has also grappled with the absence of a peace-building/transition coordinating mechanism for several years. Efforts to address this gap appear to have finally come to fruition with the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body by the UN General Assembly and Security Council following a decision taken during the World Summit 2005 (UN General Assembly Resolution 60/180 of 20 December 2005). At the same occasion, the Secretary-General was requested to establish within the Secretariat a small peace-building support office to support the UN Peacebuilding Commission and a multi-year standing peace-building fund with voluntary contributions.

## 2.2.2 Gaps across Agencies

External actors meet regularly within the framework of the OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) and the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR) to achieve common understanding and improve coherence among their policies, strategies and funding mechanisms. Table 2.3 at the end of this section provides an overview of the CPDC and the CPR networks and chapter 12 includes more detailed information about coordination at the field level. In spite of these coordination efforts, several gaps continue to exist, such as:

- Absence of an international mechanism that decides who does what and where to avoid some transition countries receiving too much assistance and others too little (examples of the latter include the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo which are known as “donor orphan countries”) – the establishment of the UN

Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 will hopefully help overcome this shortcoming.

- Absence of a single, well-defined, comprehensive and coherent peace-building/transition strategic framework at the country level, which results in assistance being delivered through short-term and uncoordinated projects.
- In spite of harmonization efforts (see Box 2.3 below), operational constraints may continue to hamper the operational flexibility that is usually required in transition situations.
- External actors have their own agendas (offer-driven rather than demand-driven assistance): this problem is generally referred to as the lack of alignment with national priorities and often works against fulfilling the needs found in transition situations (see also Box 2.3 below).
- Competition among external actors for visibility and political control of coordination mechanisms is not uncommon.

**Box 2.3: The Harmonization and Alignment Initiative**

Leaders of major bilateral and multilateral aid agencies adopted the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in February 2003 and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in February 2005 in an attempt to move towards greater harmonization and alignment in development assistance.

The challenge for bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as recipient countries, is to harmonize their operational policies, procedures and practices to align their support with country-owned poverty reduction strategies or other development frameworks. The work involves:

- Group efforts to identify those elements that all agree are good practices.
- Individual efforts by each institution or country to align their policies and procedures as close to those good practices as they can.

Harmonization and alignment is even more important in transition situations to avoid the negative consequences of donor fragmentation and uncoordinated policies on already weak national capacities. Further work on harmonization and alignment in transitions is being developed by the OECD/DAC, UNDP, the World Bank and the European Commission following the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States held in January 2005.

*Source:* Adapted from the Aid Harmonization & Alignment for Greater Development Effectiveness website, http://www.aidharmonization.org/.

**Table 2.3: Overview of the OECD/DAC CPDC and CPR Networks**

| | CPDC | CPR |
|---|---|---|
| **Character** | Official and with a **policy focus** | Informal and with an **operational focus** |
| **Mandate** | ▪ Share knowledge, experience and practice<br>▪ Find ways to improve aid effectiveness and policy coherence<br>▪ Disseminate expertise to other DAC and OECD bodies, policy makers and state and non-state actors outside the DAC membership | ▪ Operational collaboration (joint engagement and common programs)<br>▪ Share practical information, knowledge, and experience<br>▪ Improve effectiveness and innovation in programming<br>▪ Develop practical tools and lessons<br>▪ Coordinate training initiatives |

**Table 2.3: Overview of the OECD/DAC CPDC and CPR Networks**

| | CPDC | CPR |
|---|---|---|
| **Means** | ▪ Policy dialogue / consultations<br>▪ Information exchange<br>▪ Workshops[17] | ▪ Periodic meetings<br>▪ Working groups |
| **Materials** | ▪ Policy papers<br>▪ Statements / recommendations<br>▪ Best practices and lessons learned documents | ▪ Reports<br>▪ Compendium of operational tools for peacebuilding |
| **Participants** | Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European Commission, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, The World Bank Group | AusAID, BMFA, BMZ, CIDA, Canada DFA, Denmark MFA, DFID, Netherlands MFA, EU Commission/European Commission, France MFA, GTZ, IDRC, ILO, IMF, Ireland DFA, JICA, NORAD, Norway MFA, OCHA, OECD/DAC/CPDC, SDC, SIDA, UNDESA, UNDP, UNDPA, UNDPKO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, USAID, The World Bank/Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit |

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Work toward harmonizing transition assistance*** *by establishing and using procedures that are common to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved.*
- ✓ *Ensure programs and projects are* ***based on the country strategy*** *of your agency.*
- ✓ ***Build programs and projects on the broader transition strategy*** *jointly adopted by external and internal actors/ensure programs and projects are aligned with the transition countries' own strategies, priorities and delivery systems.*
- ✓ *Keep in mind the* ***different agendas, institutional weaknesses and operational constraints*** *of other external actors working in transitions.*

## *2.3 Transitional Needs Assessment and Planning Tools*

Transitional needs assessment, planning tools and funding mechanisms have been designed specifically to help overcome some of the gaps highlighted in the previous section.

### 2.3.1 Overview of Transitional Tools

Post-conflict needs assessments, transitional strategies and appeals and transition results matrices are some of the tools that have been developed specifically for joint planning in transition situations. These tools often co-exist with a range of humanitarian and development tools (Box 2.4 illustrates this point in Sierra Leone), depending on the country context. See also chapter 12 on designing transition assistance. Diagram 2.2 shows the relationship of transitional tools to humanitarian and development tools.

[17] CPDC Network has increasingly used regional workshops, workshops organized in donor agencies and country case workshops to encourage further debate and the mainstreaming of the results of its work.

### *Diagram 2.2: Transitional Tools in Relation to Humanitarian and Development Tools*




*Source:* Adapted from UNDP, World Bank and UNDG, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*, August 2004, p. 5.

CAP – Consolidated Appeal Process
CAF – Conflict Analysis Framework
CAS – Country Assistance Strategy
CCA – Common Country Assessment
ISN – Interim Strategy Note
I-PRSP – Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PCNA – Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PNA – Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
UNDAF – UN Development Assistance Framework

**Box 2.4: Short-, Medium- and Long-Term Strategies in Sierra Leone**

Following the national elections held in May 2002 and trying to capitalize on the opportunities in the early transition phase in Sierra Leone, internal and external actors produced a series of short, medium and long-term strategies and appeals, which included:

- Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2001-2002 (June 2001)
- UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Rebuilding 2003-2007 (October 2002)
- National Recovery Strategy 2002-2003 (November 2002)
- Inter-Agency Appeal for Relief and Recovery (March 2003)
- UNDAF "Peace, Recovery and Development" 2004-2007 (March 2003)
- Sierra Leone Vision 2025: "Sweet Salone"(August 2003)

The UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Rebuilding claims to be guided by national policies and priorities established through the National Recovery Strategy and the Interim Poverty

Reduction Strategy Paper. The UNDAF "Peace, Recovery and Development" aimed to translate the key dimensions of the UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Rebuilding into a common operational framework for development activities. Links between these medium-term strategies and the short-term 2003 Inter-Agency Appeal for Relief and Recovery on the one hand and the long-term Sierra Leone Vision 2025 on the other are not very clear.

## 2.3.2 Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA)

**Post-Conflict Needs Assessment**

Post-Conflict Needs Assessment shapes the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities as well as articulates their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision or goal. The process is led by national authorities, supported by the international community and carried out by multilateral agencies on their behalf, with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders and civil society.

*Source:* Adapted from UNDP, World Bank and UNDG, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*, August 2004, p. 1.

Post-conflict needs assessments have become an important tool to identify transitional needs and prepare common recovery appeals and strategies. PCNAs are supposed to:

- Create spaces for dialogue on common priorities and mobilize resources to address common key problems.
- Take place in the early transition phase from violent conflict to peace and cover a short time horizon of 12-24 months but should nevertheless take into consideration medium (24-60 months) to long-term (5-10 years) planning.
- Estimate resource requirements to address needs and thus inform and guide the commitments and pledges at the donor conferences.
- Are compiled in a coherent planning document outlining goals, outcomes, necessary interventions, planning assumptions and risks (compiled in a results-based planning framework – see section 2.3.4 below).

The Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessment in Post-Conflict Situations offers guidance on how to conduct such assessments. The key steps in the management of PCNA processes are shown in box 2.5.

**Box 2.5: Key Steps in PCNA Management**

Step 1: Initiative for PCNA
Step 2: Political consensus on objectives and scope of the PCNA
Step 3: Interagency coordination
Step 4: Establishment of the PCNA Coordination Unit
Step 5: Defining time requirements
Step 6: Conflict analysis
Step 7: Vision for post-conflict recovery
Step 8: Selecting priority sectors and cross-cutting issues
Step 9: Defining the concept note
Step 10: Team composition
Step 11: Logistics
Step 12: Team management and communication
Step 13: Conflict-sensitive sectoral needs assessment
Step 14: Validation workshops

Step 15: Planning recovery and reconstruction
Step 16: Costing recovery
Step 17: Sectoral reporting and planning
Step 18: Consolidation workshop for PCNA mission
Step 19: Validation with national authorities/conflict parties
Step 20: Donor/NGO/civil society validation meetings
Step 21: Final report
Step 22: Evaluation and lessons learned

*Source:* UNDP, World Bank and UNDG, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*, August 2004, 18-36 p.

The Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) presented in diagram 2.3 illustrates how a PCNA can be organized. This organizational structure shows in particular how a PCNA brings together national and international counterparts as well as:

- The membership and terms of reference of the Core Coordinating Group
- The terms of reference of team leaders
- The lead counterparts to the regional coordinators
- The substantive areas team members need to cover.

***Diagram 2.3: Organizational Structure of the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission***




## 2.3.3 Transitional Appeals and Strategies

Transitional appeals and strategies are elaborated when existing humanitarian and development tools are judged insufficient for planning and fund raising. This was the case in Afghanistan (January 2002), Sierra Leone (October 2002) and Kosovo (December 2002). Box 2.6 below describes the Afghanistan case.

**Box 2.6: The Transition Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002**

The Immediate and Transition Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002 (ITAP) prepared by the UN Country Team for Afghanistan presented for the first time a comprehensive approach for relief, recovery and reconstruction, as well as for addressing the reintegration needs of the Afghan people, including the needs of Afghans in neighbouring countries.

Covering the period October 2001 to December 2002, the ITAP incorporated previous donor alerts and initial recovery activities outlined in needs assessment exercises carried out by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and UNDP.

Cross-cutting themes: governance; community empowerment and participation; return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced populations; gender; drug control; peacebuilding; and human rights.

Sectoral strategies and activities: food assistance; food security, agriculture and environment; nutrition; health; water and sanitation; protection and promotion of human rights; gender; mine action; education; refugees, returnees and reintegration; governance; employment; infrastructure; and coordination and common services.

ITAP financial requirements for 2002: US$1.33 bn.

*Source:* UN Country Team for Afghanistan, *Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002* (January 2002), 1-64.

The following are common shortcomings of transition appeals and strategies:

- Lack of consultation, involvement and ownership of national and international stakeholders. Transition appeals and strategies are often desk-produced by external actors and then simply endorsed by national and international actors.
- Poor needs assessment. Transition appeals and strategies risk being based on flawed needs assessment exercises due to the urgent need to prepare such documents in time for donor conferences.
- Lack of clear objectives and monitoring mechanisms. Transitional appeals and strategies often fail to establish mechanisms to monitor the achievement of objectives.
- Absence of linkages with previous short-term and long-term strategies. Transition appeals and strategies do not build on previous short-term strategies and appeals and are not linked to existing longer-term strategies.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *The planning process used to devise the transitional appeal should include local populations, governments and their peace partners as well as a wide range of international stakeholders.*
- ✓ *A fully consultative assessment and analysis exercise should underpin the transitional strategy and appeal. The assessment should take into account a range of needs of a population, including re-absorption requirements of the displaced population (for example, relief, capacity building, social services, peacebuilding, and human rights).*
- ✓ *This strategy should identify remaining humanitarian priorities as well as rehabilitation, recovery, reconstruction and return/reintegration priorities by sector and by geographic area and not on the basis of agency-specific mandates.*
- ✓ *It is helpful to define a country-specific understanding of terminology such as relief, transition and recovery.*
- ✓ *The strategy should have clear objectives and monitoring mechanisms to measure progress against these objectives and to revalidate their utility.*
- ✓ *The strategy should link to longer term strategies, such as the UNDAF or PRSP as well as those of large international financial institutions/regional banks.*

*Source:* UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, *Proposed Interim Guidance on Transitional Appeals for 2004,* August 2003, 4 p.

## 2.3.4 Transitional Results Matrices (TRM)

**The Transitional Results Matrix (TRM)**

The Transitional Results Matrix (TRM), also referred to as a Transitional Calendar or Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), is a planning, coordination and management tool that national stakeholders and donors can use to better prioritize actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile States.

*Source:* UNDG/World Bank, *An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices – Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States*, January 2005, p. 1.

The TRM helps internal and external actors to:

- Organize key actions, outputs and results for political, security, economic and social priorities in a calendar framework
- Clarify and manage their expectations by adopting realistic timetables and forcing prioritization
- Identify in advance sectoral linkages and overburdened periods
- Highlight and address actions lagging behind
- Provide a basis for dialogue on resource mobilization and allocation among sectors.

TRMs must be simple so that information becomes accessible to a wide range of stakeholders. They must also be selective and focus on the crucial areas where lack of progress would pose a threat to the transition process. The TRM is usually structured as shown in box 2.7 below.

**Box 2.7: How to Structure a Transitional Results Matrix**

**Strategic objective or goal** – A longer-term, more strategic objective is identified for each cluster or sector. This helps in the process of refining and streamlining the Results Matrix. If the matrix is just a list of actions, it is hard to refine or prioritize, but with a unifying objective, actions are tied to the strategic "big picture". It is especially useful to anchor these strategic objectives, when appropriate, to the relevant Millennium Development Goal(s); clear linkages to nation-building or peace-making milestones are also appropriate.

**Baseline** – Although reliable data may be difficult to find across all sectors, it is important to present the current situation – the baseline. If exact figures are not available, it can be a description of "where we are now".

**Intervals** – Actions and priority outputs should be defined by time interval. These go beyond "immediate" or "medium-term" and fix specific dates. Selected time intervals are also customized to country-specific timing (date for elections, removal of peacekeepers, etc.)

**Targets and monitoring indicators** – For each action, there should be an observable target, objectively verifiable and useful as a monitoring indicator. It may not necessarily be quantitative; for example, "law passed" is as useful as "15% of veterans registered", depending upon the action in question.

**Responsibility** – The Results Matrix should identify the agency or unit responsible for implementation of each action, both for management purposes and to nurture a sense of "buy-in" so national stakeholders "see themselves" in the process.

*Source:* Adapted from UNDG/World Bank, *An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices – Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States*, January 2005, p. 9.

Table 2.4 provides examples of how TRMs were used in Liberia and Haiti.

## Table 2.4: Examples of Transitional Results Matrices

### *LIBERIA RESULTS-FOCUSED TRANSITION FRAMEWORK, 2004*

| | CLUSTER and Sector | Priority Outcome | Results June 2004 | Results Dec 2004 | Results June 2005 | Results Dec 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***VISION:*** A secure and enabling environment leading to democratic elections, recovery, and reconstruction through the scrupulous implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement under a cohesive, accountable, and adequately resources Transitional Government at the service of the Liberian people. | | | | | | |
| **1** | **SECURITY** | | | | | |
| 1.1 | UNMIL Deployment | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** |
| 1.2 | Armed Forces Re-Structuring | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** |
| **6** | **BASIC SERVICES** | | | | | |
| 6.1 | Health and Nutrition | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** | *Description*<br>**Cost:** |
| 6.2 | Education | | | | | |

### *HAITI INTERIM COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, 2004*

| AXIS 1: Strengthen Political Governance and Promote National Dialogue | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Themes / Sectors** | **Priority Objectives** | **Baseline** | **Targets and Monitoring Indicators** | | | | |
| | | | Sept 2004 | March 2005 | Sept 2005 | March 2006 | Sept 2006 |
| 1.1 Security, Police, and DDR<br>**Costs:**<br>FY03-04: $ million<br>FY04-05: $ million<br>FY05-06: $ million<br>**Total: $___ million** | Strengthen the organization, operational capacity, and professionalism of the Haiti National Police (PNH) | Presence of numerous armed groups, proliferation of weapons, weak police force (equipment destroyed, loss of credibility, and loss of motivation) | | | | | |
| **AXIS 4: Improve access to basic services** | | | | | | | |
| 4.1 Urgent Humanitarian Aid<br>**Costs:**<br>**Total: $___ million** | Improve nutritional conditions of target groups. | 23% of children under five years are malnourished, 5% acute malnutrition, and 2/3 of rural households are food-insecure. | | | | | |

**NOTES:** *There are four strategic axes in the Haiti ICF.*

*Source:* UNDG/World Bank, *An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices – Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States*, January 2005, Annex.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Build TRMs on solid analytical ground*** *(this is done usually through PCNAs).*
- ✓ ***Encourage national ownership of TRMs*** *through an inclusive and broad-based preparation process.*
- ✓ ***Ensure donor buy-in*** *through their genuine participation early on in discussions.*
- ✓ *Ensure TRMs take into account* ***country-specific factors*** *(windows of opportunity, priorities and capacities).*
- ✓ *Build TRMs around* ***adequate sequencing of actions*** *(for example, ensure quick successes first to create confidence for more political and technical reforms later).*

## *2.4 Humanitarian and Development Tools Relevant for Transitions*

Whereas transitional tools constitute common planning frameworks prepared jointly by several internal and external actors, other short-term humanitarian and longer-term development tools have been developed and used by single actors (bilateral, national or multilateral). This results in each institution having its own country appeal, strategy or framework.

### 2.4.1 National Planning Tools

The traditional planning tool of national governments is the National Development Plan (5-10 year timeframe), which can also take the shape of a National Recovery Plan (2-5 years) in countries in transition. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (see section 2.4.4 below) and the Millennium Development Goals (see section 2.4.5 below) have also often been used as the main references to establish goals and measure development and recovery achievements. In low-income countries, National Development Plans are sometimes supplanted by or coincide with PRSPs. Box 2.8 provides an example of the national planning tool adopted during the transition in Sierra Leone.

**Box 2.8: Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy (2002-2003)**

The end of eleven years of conflict in Sierra Leone prompted the government to launch a two-year National Recovery Strategy based on needs assessments conducted in every district of the country.

**Four priority areas were selected**: restoration of state authority; rebuilding communities; peace-building and human rights; and restoration of the economy.

**Vital cross-cutting issues were identified**: HIV/AIDS and preventive health; youth; gender and the environment.

The Strategy also included a **monitoring and coordination mechanism** composed of a National Recovery Committee, a Technical Committee and District Recovery Committees. District recovery plans were also prepared. Progress was to be measured against the sectoral benchmarks set up in the strategy.

*Source:* Government of Sierra Leone, *National Recovery Strategy 2002-2003*, 1-99.

### 2.4.2 Bilateral Planning Tools

Some bilateral donor agencies have also designed assessment and planning tools to improve the implementation of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance in conflict-prone regions. These tools help field practitioners:

- Carry out needs and impact assessments

- Develop pre, during and post-conflict strategies, thus including transition strategies.

Table 2.5 provides an overview of the following tools:

- JICA: Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (2003) – see diagram 2.4
- Netherlands: Stability Assessment Framework (2005)

**Table 2.5: Overview of Key Bilateral Planning Tools**

| | JICA's Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment | Netherlands's Stability Assessment Framework |
|---|---|---|
| **Context** | ▪ Carry out peacebuilding needs and impact assessment | ▪ Design integrated responses for security, governance and development |
| **Objectives** | ▪ Designed to help JICA staff and consultants to formulate peacebuilding country programmes and projects | ▪ Provide practitioners and decision-makers to design an integrated strategy for sustainable stability |
| **Levels** | ▪ Country and project levels | ▪ Strategic level |
| **Focus** | ▪ Preventing negative impact of aid on conflict and peace | ▪ Process-oriented approach to bridge the strategy development gap |
| **Key elements** | ▪ Conflict analysis at the country level<br>▪ Impact assessment of development assistance at the project level | ▪ Trend, institutional political actor and policy interventions mapping and analysis<br>▪ Workshop discussion to develop a joint, final strategy document |

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Use conflict analysis/needs and impact assessments for a given transition country or sector prepared by other multilateral and bilateral aid agencies.*
- ✓ *Carry out conflict analysis/needs and impact assessment exercises jointly with other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.*
- ✓ *Avoid planning and implementing ad hoc, fragmented, too-little or too-late interventions.*
- ✓ *Avoid overly optimistic strategies and flexibly adapt to changing environments.*

***Diagram 2.4: JICA's Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (PNA)***



## 2.4.3 Multilateral Planning Tools

### UN Planning Tools

The UN's major planning tools can be categorized as either short- or long-term. The UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) are useful to address basic human needs in early transitions. The Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) are longer-term planning tools and can help ensure coherent linkages with longer-term development efforts. These planning tools are described in table 2.6 below.

**Table 2.6: UN Planning Tools**

| | Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)/Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) (short-term) | Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (long-term) |
|---|---|---|
| **Description** | The CAP is an inclusive and coordinated strategic planning leading to:<br>▪ A Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)<br>▪ Resource mobilization (leading to a Consolidated Appeal or a Flash Appeal)<br>▪ Coordinated program implementation<br>▪ Joint monitoring and evaluation.<br><br>The CHAP is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region and includes the following elements:<br>▪ A common analysis of the context in which humanitarian action takes place<br>▪ An assessment of needs<br>▪ Best, worst, and most likely scenarios<br>▪ Stakeholder analysis, that is, who does what and where<br>▪ A clear statement of longer-term objectives and goals<br>▪ Prioritized response plans<br>▪ A framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary. | The CCA is the common instrument of the United Nations system to:<br>▪ Analyze the national development situation<br>▪ Identify key development issues with a focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other international commitments.<br><br>The UNDAF is the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the UN system at the country level.<br>▪ It provides a collective, coherent and integrated UN system response to national priorities and needs, including PRSPs and equivalent national strategies.<br>▪ It has a focus on the MDGs and the commitments, goals and targets of the Millennium Declaration and international conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments of the UN system.<br>▪ It emerges from the analyses of the CCA and is the next step in the preparation of United Nations system country programmes and projects of cooperation. |
| **Relevance for transitions** | ▪ Allows agencies to quickly mobilize resources using existing legal frameworks without having to seek approval of governing bodies of participating agencies.<br>▪ Can be prepared on a yearly basis over a number of years as long as the humanitarian situation persists and until a transitional strategy or a CCA/UNDAF can be prepared. | ▪ Can integrate the MDGs and other international commitments.<br>▪ Promote national ownership by engaging national authorities.<br>▪ Allows for a common analysis and common sets of indicators.<br>▪ Establishes "thematic" groups to forge programmatic coherence.<br>▪ Promotes harmonization and simplification of procedures, including |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | ▪ Includes several key issues that constitute basic human needs, such as agriculture, education, health and water and sanitation.<br>▪ Mine action and protection, human rights and rule of law activities, including institution building for justice, police and national human rights groups also find their place in CAPS. | for joint programming and resource transfer modalities.<br>▪ Can integrate crisis/conflict prevention and peacebuilding into development cooperation.<br>However, many of CCA/UNDAF features may not be sufficiently speedy to be used in transitions. |

*Source:* OCHA, *Technical Guidelines for the Consolidated Appeals 2005*, vi; and UN, *Common Country Assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework – Guidelines for UN Country Teams*, 2004, p. 11 and 16.

## World Bank Planning Tools

The World Bank uses an Interim Strategy Note to develop short- to medium-term plans in transition countries and the Country Assistance Strategy for other developing countries. In low-income countries, the Bank uses the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach to derive the Country Assistance Strategy. The goals described in these plans guide the priorities of the Bank's assistance.

### *Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)/Interim Strategy Note (ISN)*

**CAS and ISN**

The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is the central vehicle for Board review of the World Bank Group's assistance strategy for borrowers. The CAS document (a) describes the Bank Group's strategy based on an assessment of priorities in the country, and (b) indicates the level and composition of assistance to be provided based on the strategy and the country's portfolio performance.

The Interim Strategy Note (ISN), formerly known as Transitional Support Strategy (TSS), is a short- to medium-term plan for Bank involvement in a country in transition from conflict that does not have a CAS, or whose CAS, because of the effects of conflict, no longer represents a responsive strategy. The Bank may become involved incrementally during this phase – that is, if certain areas within the country concerned have become peaceful, it may provide assistance in those areas (if other conditions are acceptable). Priorities for assistance under an ISN may differ from those under a CAS.

*Source:* Adapted from World Bank, *The World Bank Operational Manual*, "Country Assistance Strategies", BP 2.11, January 1995 and "Development Cooperation and Conflict", OP 2.30, January 2001.

For the World Bank, a country is in the Watching Brief phase when conflict is still ongoing and prevents continued Bank assistance. Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia are examples of countries which were followed through the Watching Brief.

The World Bank has also developed a Conflict Analysis Framework to help design conflict-sensitive strategies, policies and programs. This Framework is used to systematically identify key factors affecting conflict, provide an analysis of each factor and highlight priority problems areas and opportunities.

The ISN may be put in place for a period of up to 24 months, with the possibility of being renewed for additional periods. The ISN should also be closely aligned with the objectives and sequencing of priorities of peace accords and transitional strategies. Where regional activities are necessary, the ISN can incorporate activities in countries beyond those directly affected by violent conflict (for example, to address the needs of conflict-affected populations outside the borders of the country in conflict).

***Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)***

The World Bank and the IMF jointly endorsed an approach based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) at the end of 1999. PRSPs provide the operational basis for the World Bank and the IMF concessional lending and for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

The poverty reduction strategy process is continuous – countries are expected to review and update their PRSPs every two to five years and to prepare progress reports on implementation on an annual basis. As of August 2005, 49 countries were implementing PRSPs and an additional 11 countries had prepared Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (I-PRSPs).

**PRSPs and I-PRSPs**

PRSPs describe the country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing.

I-PRSPs summarize the current knowledge and analysis of a country's poverty situation, describe the existing poverty reduction strategy, and lay out the process for producing a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion.

The poverty reduction strategy is intended to be country-driven, results-oriented, comprehensive, partnership-based, and with a long-term perspective on development and poverty reduction.

*Source:* IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp.

Several transition countries have embarked on elaborating PRSPs, such as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Empirical evidence shows that transition countries tend to display high levels of poverty. Since conflict and poverty are closely interrelated, PRSPs can help address the causes and consequences of violent conflict. PRSPs in transition countries have to grapple with the following challenges:

- Extending internal actors' participation beyond the national level, that is, strengthening local government and community participation.
- Developing an in-depth understanding of conflict-induced poverty, in addition to assessing traditional structural-based poverty. (This is also referred to as conflict-sensitive poverty diagnostic.)
- Overcoming weak internal capacity, the absence of a comprehensive conflict analysis and the lack of recent and comprehensive socioeconomic data.
- Selecting and prioritizing policy actions through a conflict lens.
- Designing institutional arrangements that are cognizant of conflict factors and reflect broad-based and inclusive formations.

***Good Practices on Supporting Conflict-Sensitive PRSPs***

- ✓ *Align transition assistance to PRSPs by designing projects and programs that build on and contributes to longer-term poverty reduction and development. (There is growing consensus among donor agencies about the need to integrate transition strategies with poverty reduction in the context of PRSP.)*
- ✓ *Recognize and act on conflict-related issues, such as the conversion from a conflict-based to a peacetime society and economy, the need to support the retraining and reintegration of combatants, and resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDPs.*
- ✓ *Support the inclusion of war-affected and marginalized groups in socio-economic and policy dialogue taking place within the framework of PRSPs.*
- ✓ *Make available conflict analysis, socio-economic data and other transition-specific information collected in PRSP efforts.*

## 2.5 The Millennium Development Goals

Achieving the Millennium Development Goals by the target date of 2015 is a much greater challenge for transition countries, which are characterized by deteriorating economic and social conditions, weak governance and low levels of trust between external and internal actors.

**Box 2.9: The Millennium Development Goals (MDG)**

The Millennium Development Goals were agreed to by 198 Heads of State and Government at the Millennium Summit held in New York in 2000 and have since guided transitional and development planning. The MDG as compiled in the Millennium Declaration consist of eight goals and 18 targets.

The eight goals are:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

To monitor progress toward these goals and targets, the United Nations Development Group, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, have jointly agreed on 48 quantitative indicators.

*Source:* UN, "Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration", Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 6 September 2001, UN Doc. A/56/326 and UNDG, *Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals – Definitions, Rationale, Concepts and Sources* (New York: United Nations, 2003), 106 p.

Even if none of the MDGs responds directly to violent conflict, violent conflict is closely related to all of the goals. Transitions interventions need to be sensitive to strategies aimed at reducing human poverty. They need to address the problems that gave rise to conflict in the first place and that continue to persist during the transition from conflict to peace. The challenges to achieving the MDGs in transition countries are enormous:

- Achieving the MDGs in transition countries requires more rapid progress over the next ten years than in other developing countries.
- Weak government institutions and skill shortages make it even more difficult to achieve the MDGs in transition countries (especially as meeting the MDGs implies better delivery of basic services to the poor).
- The rights-oriented approach implicit in the MDGs implies relations between the government and the poor that are often incompatible with the militarized relationships and forms of government that persist in transitions.

However, the large political, social and economic investments made during transitions turn them into windows of opportunity to achieve the MDGs. Opening these windows will depend on how well the MDGs are integrated in transition interventions.

***Good Practices to Achieve the MDGs in Transition Countries***

- ✓ ***Priorities and needs identified*** *in transition strategies should be aligned with the MDGs. Transition strategies should not push the MDGs off the agenda in transition countries.*
- ✓ *Transition strategies should have* ***targets sufficiently ambitious*** *to place the country on track to meet the MDGs.*
- ✓ *The identification of* ***appropriate strategies for meeting MDGs/transition priorities*** *should be developed through consultative processes in-country.*
- ✓ ***Civil societies*** *should be empowered to launch the MDG debate among their constituents.*
- ✓ *More* ***effective communication strategies*** *should be developed to inform government officials at national, regional and local levels and the populations about the MDGs and the fact that their countries have also endorsed the MDGs.*

The handbook Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals provides guidance on the definitions, rationale and concepts and sources of data for each of the indicators that are being used to monitor the goals and targets.

## *General Lessons on Transition Interventions, Gaps and Tools*

The following is a summary of the most relevant lessons related to this chapter:

- ✓ Programs and projects should be flexibly adapted to the types and levels of intervention that prevail in each specific transition context.
- ✓ It is crucial to ensure that strategies/programs/projects contribute to the larger recovery effort.
- ✓ Explaining to internal actors your agency's mandate and limitations, the scope of your strategy/program/project and how it relates to the larger recovery effort will prevent misunderstandings and avoid false expectations.
- ✓ Involving direct beneficiaries in transition assistance, even if your main counterparts are external actors, improves accountability.
- ✓ Opportunities for ownership and management by national and local authorities should increase progressively to match absorption capacities.
- ✓ It is important to avoid developing parallel systems even when national capacity is weak so as to not further undermine it.

## Resources

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United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*, August 2004, 41 p and Annex.

World Bank, *Toward a Conflict-Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy: Lessons from a Retrospective Analysis*, June 2005, Report no. 32587 (First year's product of a three-year program financed by the World Bank and DFID that assesses PRSPs in conflict-affected countries).

# Chapter 3
# Human Security in Transition Situations

## *Chapter Objectives*

- Establish why the unique environment of a transition society requires special attention to the concept of human security.
- Establish a clear understanding of the various human security needs in transitions.
- Outline a useful approach to helping achieve human security through transition assistance.

## *Introduction*

The concept of human security emerged in the 1990s as a new framework for addressing the well-being of individual citizens. The nature of internal conflicts in the 1990s revealed the great need to ensure the protection of vulnerable populations. If these populations were not protected, the dynamics that led to and perpetuated conflict would be affected which would ultimately have an effect on the security of the state.

The human security concept also addresses the critical importance of social safety networks and the empowerment of individuals. It has added a new and important human development dimension to international co-operation policies, which were formerly dominated by state-driven structural reform issues.

Transitions from war to peace provide a critical opportunity for the achievement of human security in a society. It is a phase when protection needs still exist widely, deprivations of basic human needs are serious, and state institutions remain weak to meet these serious and wide-ranging needs. Because of these complexities, only a multi-sector, multi-actor approach will be able to respond to these needs.

It is therefore important that external support is planned and organized in such a way that it effectively combines top-down measures with bottom-up empowerment. A clear understanding of the transformations that are taking place in post-conflict communities, the variety of needs at different levels of the society, and the comparative advantages and resources of various external aid agencies (both humanitarian and development) as well as possible partnerships among them, are all important elements in ensuring human security in transitions. Applying a human security framework in transition situations presents challenges but if it is done successfully, the framework will provide a useful tool for ensuring so-called “seamless assistance” from the immediate post-conflict to the sustainable development phase.

## *3.1 Overview*

According to the Commission on Human Security, the concept of human security means protecting the freedom of people. Civilians have a right to be protected from deliberate violence or the deprivations of violence such as hunger, disease and exhaustion. Protection alone, however, does not enable people to develop their own strengths and formulate their own hopes.

Thus two strategies are needed: protection and empowerment. Protection is afforded by strengthening and more effectively implementing the norms and principles of international humanitarian law, by building the capacity of institutions to address insecurities and by more generally helping the state live up to its responsibility to protect its citizens. Empowerment puts the needs of the individual or his/her community at center stage and enables people to take ownership of the larger decision-making processes determining their future.

## Top-Down and Bottom-Up

Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing. One is provided through a top-down approach, the other through a bottom-up style. Both are needed in most transition situations.

The top-down element of the approach finds expression by building a protective infrastructure that shields all people from the dual horrors of "want" engendered by poverty and "fear" brought on by conflict, disaster and other severe threats. The protective role of the state is thus vital and its efficient and effective administrative capacity is crucial in advancing human security. The protective role of the state also aims at strengthening the institutional framework that links people and the state. In policy formulation and implementation, protection means improving law and order and strengthening judicial institutions so that state systems and authorities can better serve the people. Strengthening the protection of people does not only imply respecting their civil and political rights but equally their economic, social and cultural rights. Securing access to their basic human needs is the responsibility of the state.

The second element of the human security perspective, the bottom-up element, is to regard people as active contributors who can determine their own fate and that of their community rather than to view them as passive recipients of assistance or protection. By empowering people, through education, social mobilization and participation in public life, they will be better equipped to deal with threats confronting them in their daily lives. Even more than ensuring people access to water, schools and health facilities, what is essential is for the communities to build the capacity for self-reliance. Self-reliance is a stronger shield for people and communities even during times of sudden economic downturns or eruption of conflict.

The core value of the human security approach, holistic and comprehensive in itself, lies in linking the top-down approach that expands state capacity with the bottom-up approach that empowers people. The desired net effect is that the people helped will eventually be in a far better position to actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities when they do occur. Hence, peace will be less elusive.

The human security concept should be developed and fully utilized as an operational tool for practical action on the ground. It should serve as a guide to public policy formation and administration within transition governments and societies and external actor agencies.

## The Special Significance for Transition Societies

In a transition situation the concept of human security has special significance. In a society where fragile peace has just been achieved and state institutions are still weak, the *protection* of citizens, which is normally a responsibility of a state, is not fully achieved, leaving parts of the individual population in vulnerable conditions. The basic human needs are often not met, especially in the early phase of the transition, posing continuous threats to the life and well-being of citizens. The annex to this chapter provides useful ideas for options to meet minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security from the point of view of responding to basic human needs for survival. Chapter 5 discusses how external actors might focus their assistance in order to achieve a secure environment, which is a fundamental requirement for achieving the protection of citizens in transition situations.

While reinforcement of a top-down protection mechanism is often necessary in transition situations in order to ensure minimal safety, the *empowerment* of individuals and communities in order to overcome a wide range of deprivations is also crucial. Assistance focused on establishing or enhancing the ability of a community to act on its own behalf is also central to the concept of human security and to the self-sustained development phase of a post-conflict society. These bottom-up capacity building approaches, in combination with state-building and governance reform assistance (as discussed in chapter 6, sections 6.1.2, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4.1 and in chapter 7, sections 7.1 and 7.3), should be used in transitions. For example, a grassroots participatory project for community development can also be a useful bottom-up democratic capacity building or co-existence promotion project.

### 3.1.1 Meeting Human Security Challenges

From a human security perspective, the following particular challenges must be met:

- The basic services that help empower citizens, such as basic education, information, and health care, are often destroyed and weak. The restoration of these services is the crucial first step toward rebuilding governance institutions and toward the full participation of citizens in social and political processes to act on their own behalf. Without this crucial step, assistance might not reach its desired goals. External actors can crucially support the restoration of these services, by providing infrastructural support, expert advice and capacity building assistance. The annex to this chapter provides some useful options for meeting basic human needs in the areas of food, water and sanitation, health, shelter, and education, both from the protection and empowerment points of view.
- Population displacement may create additional strain on the coping systems of individuals and communities and on the resources and capacities of host populations. By providing key services at an early stage, people can be helped to become independent of humanitarian relief and turn more actively toward self-reliance. Providing protection to displaced populations according to the norms of international humanitarian law and providing life-sustaining assistance to them, while also providing benefits to the host communities, is the first crucial step for an external response.
- In transitions, particular individuals or groups may not benefit from coping systems or services because of their ethnic or political affiliation. The most vulnerable groups may suffer particularly because the provision of basic protection and assistance may not be carried out by state institutions due to their weak capacities or lack of political will. External actors, such as the UN humanitarian community or human rights organizations, often intervene on behalf of these groups, setting standards in the protection and assistance to the most vulnerable people.

### 3.1.2 Human Security as a Core Principle of International Response

The approaches to international transition assistance have moved away from the “continuum” model, which attempted to address the post-conflict needs of populations in sequence from immediate humanitarian needs to longer-term development needs. Today a more integrated approach is applied to address needs more holistically as transition needs cannot be characterized as strictly “humanitarian” or “developmental.” Human security is a concept that addresses the needs of an individual from a more integrated perspective, beyond a certain timeframe or sector.

This conceptual development that occurred in post-conflict peace building assistance in the 1990s has enabled humanitarian organizations to go beyond the mere provision of aid and to take into account the need to empower individual victims of the violent conflict and their communities. Similarly, development organizations have begun to move away from their previous approach of working mainly with the central government toward conducting empowerment and capacity building support at the community level, starting at an early stage. If human security is placed at the center of transition assistance as a core principle of intervention by various actors and if full coordination of activities can take place around it, the so-called “assistance gap” can be alleviated greatly.

## *3.2. Bringing about Human Security*

A useful form of assistance to transition situations should be defined from the perspective of achieving human security. For development aid agencies, this may require adjustment of their traditional approaches.

A top-down approach of responding to government needs and building government capacities *remains* important. However, a bottom-up approach of community development programs through which individual citizens can be empowered is also crucial. Strengthening

bottom-up empowerment assistance will also contribute to the development of democratic political processes in the longer-term, which is a vital element in making peace sustainable.

Focusing international support through the human security lens is also a useful approach for promoting peacebuilding in transition situations. The human security framework brings focus to the well-being of individuals, without which peacebuilding cannot take place and state security cannot be ensured in today's world. It is also a holistic approach, as it allows program planners to make linkages between various sectors and addresses a variety of concerns that exist in a post-conflict society, many of which were part of the structural causes of the conflict.

Operationalizing the human security concept in transition situations presents challenges. Not only is it a relatively new concept, it also cuts across the traditional roles and mandates of the actors in international cooperation. This handbook is a first step toward more comprehensive adjustments of assistance approaches in accordance with the human security framework. Therefore the following sections (3.2.1-3.2.4) suggest some key elements.

## 3.2.1 Enhancing State Capacity to Respond to Human Security Concerns

Governments and state institutions carry the responsibility to protect their citizens from harm. Many transition governments, however, are unable to provide proper protection. The government machinery is weakened from previous conflict, power vacuums, poor law and order as well as global economic downturns. This situation has essentially given rise to the need for external assistance. The scope of the problem is exemplified in box 3.1.

**Box 3.1: Building State Capacity in Zambia: Difficult task?**

It was evident from fieldwork carried out in Mansa and Samfya that often a serious gap exists between the lofty policy pronouncements by the central government in Lusaka and the implementation realities as one moves farther away from the capital. Resource constraints include lack of funding for approved programmes, a weak human resource base and poor logistics. In short, state capacities at local level are too weak to effectively implement government policies. The situation was most acute in Samfya district, where several public officials were serving in acting positions. Nearly all departments were understaffed. High turnover of personnel was common in most government departments as officers left in search of the proverbial greener pastures because of low salaries and poor conditions of service.

*Source*: Mutesa, Fredrick and Wilma Nchito, **"**Human Security and Poverty Reduction in Zambia", *The Many Faces of Human Security – Case Studies of Seven Countries in Southern Africa*, edited by Keith Muloongo, Roger Kibasomba and Jemima Njeri Kariri (Pretoria: International Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2005).

Development assistance agencies have a responsibility to support building the capacity of the state and its institutions. Assistance that can be given to make the government machinery and its social agencies, legal and security institutions work more effectively once more, is crucial (see also chapter 5 and 6).

## 3.2.2 Empowering Communities

Protecting people at risk and providing them with essential services for survival, livelihood and dignity is not enough by itself. Equally important is empowering people and local communities to act on their own behalf and to become self-reliant in a sustainable way as this will naturally increase the impact of assistance.

Regardless of the urgency, it is possible to address human security needs with the full participation of those affected, which will build local capacities and contribute to sustainability. It also leads naturally into developmental programming.

This approach means, however, that development aid agencies must look at the needs of transition societies differently. Agencies have to be strategic and comprehensive in their approach, but also have to establish solid partnerships at the community level. Working through the central government alone will not be sufficient. Box 3.2 illustrates the use of this approach.

**Box 3.2: Chargas' Disease Program in Guatemala Supported by JICA**

Guatemala suffered 36 years of conflict, which finally ended in 1996. Chronic poverty, economic disparity and injustices and discrimination against the poor indigenous population were among the root causes of the violent internal conflict. Since the Peace Accord a number of measures were taken to increase political participation in the country in order to promote democratic processes but participation and empowerment remain a challenge especially among the poor indigenous people.

Chargas' disease is a serious threat to human security, particularly among the poor population of Guatemala. JICA started its program addressing this problem in 2000. The Ministry of Health manages the Chargas' disease program and JICA provides support to central and local levels through JICA experts. The program involves a comprehensive array of local actors: schools and academic faculty; health volunteers, program supervisors, and promoters; and the most important participants, the villagers themselves. Constituting a vital link to the villagers, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers actively support the program from within the communities. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) for its part shares its wealth of regional wisdom and experience, and carries out monitoring and evaluations. NGOs, community-based organizations and academia are also active contributors.

The program has a clear empowerment strategy, which enhances the capacity of people and communities to assume responsibility for their own health and enables them to pursue self-help strategies. Participating communities gained an awareness of the problem and its solution, and the villagers themselves learned how to find and identify the parasites, and how to report their findings. The program also inspired the establishment of a number of systems the communities run themselves, such as community-based surveillance, insecticide spraying, and housing improvements. Empowered people and communities become agents of change. They can now propose solutions and take charge of their own lives. Thus sustainability of the program is ensured, which illustrates the importance of the bottom-up approach.

*Source:* JICA, unpublished source.

### 3.2.3 Avoiding Disparities

The human security approach focuses on the most vulnerable or those at risk of becoming vulnerable because they are the most in need. Sometimes the very protection and assistance that is meant to help can legitimize some people and de-legitimize others. In transitions, however, a key principle is avoiding disparities between groups, which can be the source of tensions and potentially reignite conflict. Thus an assistance agency may find itself assessing the relative needs of groups and attempting to reduce disparities through the provision of assistance to one or several groups.

Minimum standards can be used as assessment categories to evaluate the relative need between groups and thus prioritize on the basis of need. There will often be some element of risk involved; however, the key is to take honorable risks with transparency and accountability. A conflict-sensitive approach, described in chapter 4, section 4.2.1 addresses these concerns as well and is of particular importance when addressing human security concerns.

**Box 3.3: Reintegration Projects for Returning Afghan Refugees**

UNHCR is responsible for the initial reintegration of returning refugees. Their target population is therefore returning refugees, but not Afghan citizens in general. However, it is often the case that people who have never left their home are equally in need or even worse off than returnees. Considering this, UNHCR's repatriation and reintegration program in Afghanistan extended its shelter projects to the poorest families in the community as well as to the vulnerable returnee households. Similarly, reintegration activities are aimed to increase the absorption capacity of communities that receive returnees, rather than assisting individual returnees. In this respect, rehabilitation of community infrastructure such as road and canals were chosen as priority.

*Source:* JICA, unpublished source.

### 3.2.4 Using a Long-Term, Integrative Perspective Early On

Meeting human security needs in transition situations can never be time-bound or mono-sectoral. With people's insecurities mutually interconnected, responses cannot be effective if they are fragmented. All efforts – human rights, security, humanitarian concerns and development – must be integrated in a holistic way. Moreover, addressing a wide range of basic needs of a community and integrating longer-term sustainability principles into the earliest stages of recovery will contribute to the creation of the community's own capacity to cope with the ever-changing situation of transitions. Thus, more viable and less vulnerable communities that are able to cope with changes and events will be created.

A human security approach requires a longer-term timeframe in planning and implementation, even though shorter-term, small-scale and community-based programs to respond to human security concerns should be used initially. The processes and methods used to reduce insecurity should also keep the long term in mind. The tension between immediate needs and longer-term perspectives is described in Save the Children UK's approach to education in Kosovo, described in box 3.4.

**Box 3.4: Education for Returnee Refugee Children in Kosovo**

Between July and September 1999, over 600,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo to find that houses and other buildings – including schools – were burned, vandalized and sometimes laid with mines. Even the limited pre-war education system had disappeared, there was no standard curriculum and schools needed to be built from scratch. During this first post-conflict reconstruction stage, safe spaces of recreation and play were established, as well as general psychosocial support for children and adolescents provided. Longer-term efforts then focused on the rebuilding of the entire education system.

This is an example of how both urgent needs can be met while education is also used to establish normality and promote peace with children and adolescents in the longer-term. Such an approach contributes to creating human security.

*Source*: Nicolai, Susan, *Education in Emergencies: A Toolkit for Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies*, (London: Save the Children UK, 2003).

### 3.2.5 Mainstreaming the Human Security Approach into Assistance Projects

When considering applying the human security approach, it is important that the agency identifies what goals and values it subsumes under the term "human security." An agency may have general and implied developmental goals and values such as poverty reduction, gender and ethnic balance, good governance, democratization, peace, capacity development, self reliance, empowerment, respect for human rights and rule of law and others that are built into its program and project objectives and relate to improvement of human security in a community.

In addition, the assistance agency must become familiar with concepts such as social change, community development, self reliance, sustainability and empowerment, which are values of importance to meet changing needs. Human security cannot be achieved by adding a new component in the existing assistance approach. It needs to be fully integrated into the program objectives and applied holistically.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Be aware that the human security concept means that international action should not only provide technical assistance but be focused on **improving people's lives and livelihood** and helping safeguard their dignity.*
- ✓ *Know that activities under the human security paradigm **require both immediate and longer-term** action.*

- ✓ *As your key priority, **build state capacity** and **empower local communities** so that human security is an attainable goal for all.*
- ✓ *Use **minimum standards as assessment** categories to evaluate the relative need between groups and thus to prioritize on the basis of need.*
- ✓ *Pay attention to **conflict-sensitivity**. Assistance in the early stages should not harm in any way the transition from conflict to peace; other possible negative impacts such as aid dependence must also be anticipated and avoided.*
- ✓ *Employ staff who **are familiar with social change and human security concepts.***
- ✓ *Be aware that **decisions** made in the early stages of assistance **can** help **promote or undermine the longer-term** sustainability of the developmental process and endanger the prospects for better human security.*

## *General Lessons on Human Security in Transition Situations*

- ✓ Human security is a concept which will help avoid gaps in transition assistance. It enables both humanitarian and development organizations to address transition needs in an integrated and holistic manner.
- ✓ A bottom-up approach that includes community development and empowerment programs should be a crucial component of transition assistance. Such programs complement top-down state-building assistance in the pursuit of improved human security.
- ✓ Linkages need to be made between sectoral projects to address human security at the community level. Activities should be coordinated with other development and humanitarian organizations, using human security as a core principle for action.
- ✓ Assistance in the field of human security is used to promote peace; to build local capacities of individuals, communities, civil society organizations, governments and markets; and to contribute to the sustainability of the developmental process.
- ✓ Be aware that agencies will be held accountable not only for the lives they save but also for the ways in which their life-saving activities affect conflicts. Both conflict-sensitivity and longer-term development principles might help improve accountability.

## Resources

Commission on Human Security (CHS), Human Security Now (New York: CHS, 2003), http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/.

Government of Canada, Website on Human Security, http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/.

Government of Japan, Human Security webpages, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/.

_____, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Trust Fund for Human Security*, Blue Book Policy, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-c.pdf.

Human Security Bulletin, http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info/page210.htm, The Human Security Bulletin is the flagship bilingual on-line publication of the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS). The Bulletin is a core part of CCHS efforts to facilitate the exchange of information and analysis on human security issues.

Human Security Centre, http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/, The Human Security Centre's mission is to make human security-related research more accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators and the interested public. The Human Security Centre's flagship publication, the annual *Human Security Report*, is complemented by the Human Security Gateway (an online database of human security resources) and two online bulletins, *Human Security News* and *Human Security Research*. The Human Security Centre also undertakes its own independent research and hosts workshops that bring the research and policy communities together to discuss a range of human security-related issues.

Human Security Network, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/, The Human Security Network (HSN) is a group of like-minded countries from all regions of the world that, at the level of Foreign Ministers, maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security.

Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies, *Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction,* (Paris: INEE c/o UNESCO, 2004).

Muloongo, Keith, Kibasomba Roger and Jemima Njeri Kariri (eds.), *The Many Faces of Human Security – Case Studies of Seven Countries in Southern Africa*, (Pretoria: International Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2005).

The Sphere Project, *The Sphere Project Handbook*, (Geneva: The Sphere Project c/o IFRC, 2004), http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/index.htm.

## *Annex 3.1: Assessing and Planning Assistance*

The following pages contain tables for assessing and planning assistance for improving the level of human security in communities. The activity areas presented are (1) food security, (2) water and sanitation security, (3) health security, (4) habitat security and (5) knowledge security. The areas of activity presented here are only key sectors of most common basic human needs and thus do not represent an exhaustive list. As emphasized in the chapter, the needs in these sectors should be addressed through linkages with other sectors, using a holistic perspective.

The information in these tables is organized in two columns. The first column lists minimum standards[18] which help determine whether urgent human needs exist and how the level of security can be improved. Based on two core beliefs:

(1) that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict and

(2) that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance, these standards lend themselves well to planning for assistance in relation to the human security dictum of "freedom from want."

The standards and requirements can be used as planning benchmarks for the provision of assistance by JICA. The second column provides some suggestions for assistance activities. These are only suggestions, however. The activities to be implemented should be determined in full consultation with the affected population.

[18]Many of the minimum standards in the following tables have been taken from: The Sphere Project, The Sphere Project Handbook, (Geneva: The Sphere Project c/o IFRC, 2004), http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/index.htm. The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. The minimum standards for "knowledge security" are from the *Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction* developed by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies.

## Food Security

Access to food and the maintenance of adequate nutritional status are critical determinants of people's survival and, as such, are of key concern to human security. Malnutrition over the long run can be the most serious public health problem and may be a leading cause of death, directly or indirectly.

Fundamentally, everyone has the right to adequate food. This right is recognized in international legal instruments and includes the right to be free from hunger. Key aspects of this right include the availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances and acceptable within a given culture; and also include the accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights. Table 3.1 shows the minimum standards to achieve food security and options for response from a "freedom from want" perspective.

**Table 3.1: Food Security: Minimum Standards/Requirements for Human Security and Options for Response**

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| 1. People have access to adequate and appropriate food and non-food items in a manner that ensures their survival, prevents erosion of assets and upholds their dignity. Life saving-responses should be prioritized.<br>2. Primary food production mechanisms are protected and supported. External assistance should consider only viable food production strategies<br>3. People's safe access to market goods and services as producers, consumers and traders is protected and promoted. External assistance should be based on a demonstrated understanding of local markets and economic systems.<br>4. The nutritional needs of the population are met. This means, | ▪ Assistance in food security in transition situations is aimed to rebuild and enhance local capacity to increase food security. While making a longer-term development plan, actors can start with smaller scale community-based assistance that yields immediate results.<br>▪ Distribution of seeds, tools and fertilizer to encourage agricultural production as starter packs to returnees or to diversify crops. Often combined with agricultural extension services and possibly technical training.<br>▪ Provision of seed vouchers to potential buyers, and organizing a seed fair to bring together potential sellers. This stimulates local seed procurement systems while allowing buyers access to a wide range of seeds.<br>▪ Local agricultural extension services.<br>▪ Training and education in relevant skills.<br>▪ Livestock interventions such as animal health measures, emergency destocking, restocking of livestock, distribution of livestock fodder and nutritional supplementation, livestock refuges and provision of alternative water sources.<br>▪ Distribution of fish nets and gear or of hunting implements.<br>▪ Promotion of food processing.<br><br>**Options for income and employment assistance include:**<br>▪ Cash-for-work provides food-insecure households with opportunities for paid work.<br>▪ Food-for-work provides food-insecure households with opportunities for paid work that at the same time produces outputs of benefit to the households and the community.<br>▪ Income generating schemes allow people to diversify their sources of income in small-scale, self-employment business schemes. These include the support of people in the management, supervision and implementation of |

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| that at a minimum the population has access to a range of foods (cereals, tubers, pulses, animal products and fat sources) that meet nutritional requirements. An initial planning figure is 2100 Kcal per person per day. Also, this means that: the nutritional and support needs of identified vulnerable or at-risk groups are met; moderate and severe malnutrition in the population is addressed; and finally, micronutrient deficiencies are addressed.<br>*How can communities become more self-reliant in this area?* | their businesses<br>**Options for increasing access to market goods and services**<br>▪ Market and infrastructure support, including transportation to allow producers to take advantage of distant markets.<br>▪ Destocking to provide herders with a good price for their livestock in times of drought, when there is pressure on water supplies and grazing and market prices of livestock are falling.<br>▪ Fair price shops to control or subsidize the sale of basic items.<br>▪ Food or cash vouchers for exchange in shops for food and other goods.<br>▪ Support and technical assistance to government services including agricultural extension services and veterinary services.<br>▪ Microfinance projects including the provision of credit and methods for saving assets, which may involve grants, loans, cattle banks, cooperative savings accounts, etc.<br><br>***Options for nutritional support assistance***<br>▪ General food distributions. If food aid is required, rations for general distributions should be designed to bridge the gap between the affected population's requirements and their own food resources. The items provided should be appropriate and acceptable to recipients, be able to be used efficiently at the household level, and be fit for human consumption.<br>▪ Targeted (to the most vulnerable) food distributions.<br>▪ Supplementary food distributions.<br>▪ Clinic-based therapeutic feeding for severely malnourished.<br>▪ Community-based therapeutic feeding.<br>▪ Fresh food distributions or vegetable garden schemes.<br><br>***While the above assistance is carried out, the following options for supporting community empowerment must be considered:***<br>▪ Participation of communities in the design, implementation and monitoring of programs and projects.<br>▪ Shift from a centralized to a more decentralized approach over time.<br>▪ Coordination among local institutions that can or should support food insecure groups.<br>▪ Promotion of ownership of programs, which in essence, become community investments for promoting their own nutritional well-being and development. |

## Water and Sanitation Security

An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration; to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, and personal and domestic hygienic requirements. The main objective of water supply and sanitation assistance is to promote good personal and environmental hygiene in order to protect health. As such, water and sanitation security is a key aspect in the provision of human security.

Everyone has the right to water. This right is recognized in international legal instruments and provides for sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. Table 3.2 lists the minimum standards in the area of water and sanitation and provides a menu of options with a "freedom from want" perspective in mind.

**Table 3.2: Water and Sanitation Security: Minimum Standards/Requirements for Human Security and Options for Response**

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| ***Water supply***<br>1. People have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic hygiene.<br>2. Water is palatable and of sufficient quality to be drunk and used for personal and domestic hygiene without causing significant risk to health.<br>3. People have adequate facilities and supplies to collect, store and use sufficient quantities of water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene and to ensure that drinking water remains safe until it is consumed. | ▪ Water distributions (using a planning figure of 15 liters per person per day) in a non-disparate, conflict-sensitive manner.<br>▪ Borehole construction or rehabilitation in order to provide better services to communities yielding significant time savings for the community. Saving time would also provide better educational and productive opportunities for girls and women, who are the main water carriers. They would hence safeguard their privacy in school and save time fetching water.<br>▪ Extraction, treatment, storage and distribution of water from sources such as natural springs, ponds, lakes or rivers – develop capacity-building programs in these areas.<br>▪ Rehabilitation of existing water treatment and distribution systems – develop capacity building programs in these areas.<br>▪ Household or community-level water harvesting, such as rainwater collection from house roofs or surface run off.<br>▪ Distribution of household water storage devises such as barrels and buckets.<br>▪ Improved availability of water in order to start or expand small enterprises and thus increase disposable household income, yielding eventually a large economic return for the community.<br>▪ Training programs in water and health which will eventually result in less mortality from water-related diseases. |

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| ***Sanitation***<br>1. People have adequate numbers of toilets, sufficiently close to their dwellings, to allow them rapid, safe and acceptable access at all times of the day and night. Toilets are sited, designed, constructed and maintained in such a way as to be comfortable, hygienic and safe to use.<br>2. All disaster-affected people have the knowledge and the means to protect themselves from disease and nuisance vectors that are likely to represent a significant risk to health or well-being. The number of disease vectors that pose a risk to people's health and the number of nuisance vectors that pose a risk to people's well-being are kept to an acceptable level.<br>3. People have an environment that is acceptably uncontaminated by solid waste, including medical waste, and have the means to dispose of their domestic waste conveniently and effectively.<br>4. People have an environment in which the health and other risks posed by water erosion and standing water, including stormwater, floodwater, domestic wastewater, and wastewater from medical facilities, are minimized.<br>*How can assistance be provided to increase the level of well-being in the community? How can families/ households, neighborhoods and communities achieve an ever increasing level of self-reliance in the provision and management of water and sanitation?* | ▪ Construction of one culturally appropriate public toilet for every 20 people, with separate facilities for men and women, if possible by engaging local labor and using community- building approaches.<br>▪ Construction of one culturally appropriate toilet per family.<br>▪ Maintenance schemes for public toilets and washing facilities, establishing community sanitation committees.<br>▪ Hygiene and health education and promotion.<br>▪ Provision of impregnated bed nets.<br>▪ Vector (insect and rodent) control programs that reduce the density of vectors, reduce the human-vector contact, and eliminate vector breeding grounds. Note that waste disposal and drainage schemes are as important as chemical spraying.<br>▪ Household and community waste collection and disposal schemes and training programs.<br>▪ Construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of rainwater, wastewater drainage systems and sewage systems in order to improve net health benefits for the community. |

## Health Security

Health care is the critical determinant for survival when urgent human needs exist. During transitions when mortality rates are frequently elevated or could soon become so, priority interventions must focus on urgent survival needs, including basic medical care. Providing health security, starting with the provision of basic health care, is a key human security concern.

Everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health as recognized in a number of international legal instruments. This includes not only the right to equal access to health care, but also to the underlying determinants of health such as access to safe water and adequate sanitation; an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing; education and information; non-discrimination; and human dignity and the affirmation of individual self-worth. Table 3.3 mentions the minimum requirements for providing health security and offers options to consider as responses from a "freedom from want" viewpoint.

**Table 3.3: Health Security: Minimum Standards/Requirements for Human Security and Options for Response**

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| ***Health systems and infrastructure***<br>1. All people have access to health services that are prioritized to address the main causes of excess mortality and morbidity.<br>2. Health services are designed to support existing health systems, structures and providers.<br>3. People have access to health services that are coordinated across agencies and areas of activity to achieve maximum impact.<br>4. Health services are based on relevant primary health care principles. This means that people have access to health information that allows them to protect and promote their own health and well-being, health services are provided at the appropriate level of the health system, a standardized referral system is established, health services and interventions are based on scientifically sound methods and are evidence-based when possible, health services utilize appropriate technology and are socially and culturally acceptable.<br>5. People have access to clinical services that are standardized and follow accepted protocols and guidelines.<br>6. The design and development of health services are guided by the on-going, coordinated collection, analysis and utilization of relevant public health data. A standardized health information system is implemented by all health agencies. | ▪ Community health education and promotion.<br>▪ Vaccination campaigns.<br>▪ Provision of mobile clinic services.<br>▪ Construction or rehabilitation of permanent clinics.<br>▪ Deployment of temporary field hospitals.<br>▪ Provision and training of health system staff.<br>▪ Establishment of a drug management system. |
| ***Control of communicable diseases***<br>1. People have access to information and services that are designed to prevent the communicable diseases that contribute most significantly to excess morbidity and mortality.<br>2. All children aged 6 months to 15 years have immunity against measles. | ▪ Establishment of a standardized health information system including early warning and communicable disease outbreak control system. |

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| 3. People have access to effective diagnosis and treatment for those infectious diseases that contribute most significantly to preventable excess morbidity and mortality.<br>4. Standardized case management protocols for diagnosis and treatment of the most common infectious diseases are consistently used; public health messages encourage people to seek early care for fever, cough, diarrhea etc.<br>5. Measures are taken to prepare for and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases.<br>6. Outbreaks of communicable diseases are detected, investigated and controlled in a timely and effective manner.<br><br>***HIV/AIDS***<br>1. Reduction of HIV transmission by enforcing respect for universal precautions against HIV/AIDS and guaranteeing the availability of free condoms.<br><br>***Control of non-communicable diseases***<br>1. People have access to appropriate services for the management of injuries.<br>2. People have access to social and mental health services to reduce mental health morbidity, disability and social problems.<br>3. People have access to an ongoing, reliable flow of credible information on the evolving situation; normal cultural and religious events are maintained; adults and adolescents are able to participate in concrete purposeful common interest activities such as assistance activities; isolated persons have access to activities that facilitate their inclusion in social networks.<br>4. For populations in which chronic diseases are responsible for a large proportion of mortality, people have access to essential therapies to prevent death.<br><br>*How can social action be mobilized and health-supportive social arrangements be made?* | ▪ Community programs to reduce the stigma of HIV/AIDS and programs to protect people from discrimination.<br>▪ Efficient mechanisms for decentralization of the response to an outbreak of HIV/AIDS so that national responses can be truly effective in communities.<br>▪ Family planning counseling and counseling training for an increasing cadre of health care professionals in the community.<br>▪ Capacity building support to the health system.<br>▪ Coordination of the health system.<br>▪ Development of health policy and strategy. |

## Habitat Security

Shelter is a critical determinant for survival and it is necessary to provide security and personal safety, protection from the climate and enhanced resistance to ill health and disease. The most individual level of shelter is clothing, blankets and bedding. People also require basic goods and supplies to meet their personal hygiene needs, to prepare and eat food and to provide necessary levels of thermal comfort. Providing habitat security is thus a key element of the human security paradigm.

Everyone has the right to adequate housing. This right is recognized in international legal instruments and includes the right to live in security, peace and dignity, and with security of tenure. Table 3. 4 highlights minimum standards for achieving improved habitat security and lists options for response in this area.

**Table 3.4: Habitat Security: Minimum Standards/Requirements for Human Security and Options for Response**

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| ***Shelter and settlement***<br>1. Existing shelter and settlement solutions are prioritized through the return or hosting of disaster-affected households and the security, health, safety and well-being of the affected population are ensured. Affected households return to the site of their original dwellings where possible.<br>2. Local physical planning practices are used where possible, enabling safe and secure access to and use of shelters and essential services and facilities, as well as ensuring appropriate privacy and separation between individual household shelters.<br>3. People have sufficient covered space to provide dignified accommodation. Essential household activities can be satisfactorily undertaken and livelihood support activities can be pursued as required.<br>4. The design of the shelter is acceptable to the affected population and provides sufficient thermal comfort, fresh air and protection from the climate to ensure dignity, health, safety and well-being.<br>5. The construction approach is in accordance with safe local building practices and maximizes local livelihood opportunities. Locally sourced materials and labor are used without adversely affecting the local economy or environment, locally derived standards of workmanship and materials are achieved, procurement of materials and labor is transparent and accountable.<br>6. The adverse impact on the environment is minimized by the settling of the disaster-affected households, the material sourcing and construction techniques used.<br><br>*What are pro-active elements of achieving improved human security in this activity area?* | ▪ Temporary settlement with host families, mass shelters, camps.<br>▪ Support to host families and communities that takes into consideration the extra demands on the community, economy and infrastructure that the additional population will create.<br>▪ Provision of materials and labor for repair of damaged buildings.<br>▪ Establishment of community development schemes for (re)-building housing. |

## Knowledge Security

Basic education and public information that provide knowledge, life skills and respect for diversity are particularly important for human security. Basic education can save lives by disseminating key survival messages and by protecting against exploitation and harm. It sustains life by providing structure, stability and hope for the future in times of crisis, particularly for children and adolescents. Education can also help heal the pain of bad experiences, build skills, support conflict resolution and peace building.

All individuals have a right to education that is not forfeited in times of crisis or transition. This right is articulated in many international legal instruments, including but not limited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Education in transitional environments can be both life-saving and life-sustaining. Table 3.5 lists the minimum standards in achieving improved knowledge security and provides a menu of options for response in this area from the perspective of providing for "freedom from want."

**Table 3.5: Knowledge Security: Minimum Standards/Requirements for Human Security and Options for Response**

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| ***Access and learning environment***<br>1. All individuals have access to quality and relevant educational opportunities.<br>2. Learning environments are secure and promote the protection and mental and emotional well-being of learners.<br>3. Educational facilities are conducive to the physical well-being of learners.<br><br>***Teaching and learning***<br>1. Culturally, socially and linguistically relevant curricula are used to provide formal and non-formal education, appropriate to the context.<br>2. Teachers and other education personnel receive periodic, relevant and structured training according to need and circumstances.<br>3. Instruction is learner-centered, participatory and inclusive.<br>4. Appropriate methods are used to evaluate and validate learning achievements.<br><br>***Teachers and other educational personnel***<br>1. A sufficient number of appropriately qualified teachers and other education personnel is recruited through a participatory and transparent process based on selection criteria that reflect diversity and equity.<br>2. Teachers and other education personnel have clearly defined conditions of work, follow a code of conduct and are appropriately compensated.<br>3. Supervision and support mechanisms are established for teachers and other education personnel, and are used on a regular basis. | ▪ Support to existing education systems, such as: training for teachers, school committees or children themselves in order to increase local capacities; provision of supplies and rehabilitation of infrastructure; development of curriculum or learning materials when content is inadequate.<br>▪ Special measures to return children to school, such as advocacy as a means to increase awareness within a community, influence policies and activities of education authorities.<br>▪ Organizing out-of-school alternatives such as recreation activities.<br>▪ Co-ordination of non-school age programs such as day-care, adult education or vocational training.<br>▪ Management of schools or other education activities when local capacities are removed or have not existed. |

| What are minimum standards and requirements for achieving improved human security? | Options for response |
|---|---|
| ***Education policy***<br>1. Education authorities prioritize free access to schooling for all, and enact flexible policies to promote inclusion and education quality, given the context.<br>*How can assistance in this area best enable people to actively exercise their rights and fulfill their responsibilities?* | |

# Chapter 4
# Mainstreaming Cross-Cutting Issues

## Chapter Objectives

- Explain the meaning of the terms “cross-cutting issue” and “mainstreaming” and their significance for transitions.
- Provide four examples (conflict-sensitivity, gender equality, a human rights perspective and environmental concerns) of how cross-cutting issues could be mainstreamed into a sectoral program/project.
- Provide information on how mainstreaming will be most effective beyond the program/project level.

## Introduction

**Defining Cross-Cutting Issues and Mainstreaming**

Cross-cutting issues are areas of concern which for institutional or societal reasons need to be tackled across sectors in a coherent and integrated manner to achieve objectives that go beyond those of a single endeavor.

Mainstreaming refers to the integration of cross-cutting issues into core institutional or societal thinking and subsequently into a coordinated and harmonized approach to the implementation of activities. It is therefore a tool for making a cross-cutting issue an integral part of an assistance program/project in a given sector.

Mainstreaming is particularly important in transition societies because many activities have to be carried out simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion. While a human security approach (see chapter 3) might ensure a common perspective, mainstreaming guarantees that connections are made between and among projects and programs and the lessons from impacts are applied in projects and programs across organizations. Unless there is follow-up and support for mainstreaming at the strategic and capacity-building levels within an organization, however, mainstreaming at the program/project level will not be sufficient.

In this chapter, we will examine examples of the mainstreaming of the following four cross-cutting issues in the program/project cycle: (1) conflict-sensitivity, (2) gender equality, (3) a human rights perspective, and (4) environmental concerns. Mainstreaming, however, is not limited to these four issues.

## 4.1 Overview

In transition societies, where many activities are urgent and have considerable repercussions on each other, understanding cross-cutting issues and how to ensure their integration into overall programming is crucially important. Incorporating elements that might previously have been considered unrelated is essential for the overall success of a project, as box 4.1 illustrates several examples of how cross-cutting issues need to be integrated into overall programming.

**Box 4.1: Integration of Cross-Cutting Issues into Overall Programming**

A project to enhance food security, for example, needs not only to consider its prime objective of how food production and consumption can be made more reliable, but also, for instance, whether this project will have an impact on gender (for example,. does the project disadvantage subsistence farming mainly carried out by women?) or whether it will have an impact on the environment (for example, does the construction of feeder roads to transport food to market mean the destruction of natural habitat?)

Another example is a housing reconstruction project, whose main objective is to build houses; however, unless attention is paid to the project's possible impact on the conflict (might it ignite tensions because it favors one community over another?) and the project's impact on gender (will the housing project make it more difficult for women to work outside the house?), its success could be readily thwarted.

(Additionally, coordination with other actors is essential to ensure that the cross-cutting issue is indeed mainstreamed – see section 4.3.5 and chapter 2 for a discussion on coordination.)

Only when cross-cutting issues are addressed in tandem with the prime objective of the project, can one be reasonably assured that careful planning has taken place and that the outcome of the project will be generally constructive. By definition, mainstreaming a cross-cutting issue means integration into planned for or existing assistance programs or projects; it is thus never a stand-alone program or project.

Cross-cutting issues are important in any assistance program/project, but even more so in transition situations that are by nature multi-dimensional and complex (see chapter 1, section 1.1.1), and involve many specialized actors. The work environment is chaotic, because everything seems urgent and important. One way external actors have tried to bring some order into the chaos is by dividing up tasks among themselves and specializing. Because of their specializations, however, external actors often find it difficult to see linkages. Yet, unless these linkages are made explicit, activities might at best contradict each other or cancel each other out and at worst have negative implications for the beneficiaries.

While it was posited in chapter 3 that a holistic human security approach must replace a narrow sectoral approach to assistance, mainstreaming cross-cutting issues adds a further necessary dimension to that approach. Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues pursues connections between and among projects and programs that cannot be ignored.

## *4.2 Mainstreaming at the Program or Project Level*

Since field practitioners work most often at the program/project level within sectors, knowing how to mainstream a cross-cutting issue into an existing or planned for program/project is particularly important for them. They also need to consider how to address a cross-cutting issue at other levels (such as macro/national, ministerial/ departmental, civil society/private sector, and program/project) (see section 4.3 below).

Field practitioners need a "roadmap" for how to mainstream cross-cutting issues while pursuing the prime objectives of any assistance project or program. In this chapter, we discuss considerations for mainstreaming four cross cutting issues, namely (1) conflict-sensitivity, (2) gender equality, (3) a human rights perspective and (4) environmental concerns, are provided below. These four examples were chosen because:

- International policies and standards exist for each that call for inclusion of the issue into assistance programs/projects (for example, the Final Document of the Fourth World Conference on Women- Beijing 1995 for gender issues).
- They are often encountered in practice (some experience is available – see case studies).
- They are particularly pertinent to transition situations as opposed to more traditional development situations (for example, conflict-sensitivity).
- They serve as examples and can easily be adapted to other issues (for example, "gender" can easily be adapted to "vulnerable groups").
- They sample very different cross-cutting issues ranging from inclusion of approaches (conflict-sensitivity), to people's concerns (gender), to human rights, to sectors (the environment).

However, there are many other cross-cutting issues which require mainstreaming in transition situations such as land tenure, and water resource management.

### 4.2.1 Mainstreaming Conflict-Sensitivity

Field practitioner must be highly sensitive to the dynamic between the intervention and the context into which the intervention is being inserted. If not, harm could be done or a program designed that is either ineffectual or inadvertently promotes forces that support the conflict. The perspective that helps avoid these traps is called "conflict-sensitivity." Promoting conflict-sensitivity is not an add-on or stand-alone project, nor does it require a lot of extra work to apply. It is a typical cross-cutting issue in transition situations that requires mainstreaming into existing programs or projects.

**Conflict-Sensitivity**

Conflict-sensitivity is defined as the ability of an organization or program to:

- Understand the context in which it operates.
- Understand the interaction between its intervention and the context.
- Act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.

The **context** is defined as one's operational environment from the macro (national/international) to the micro (community/village) level, including the history and root causes of the conflict and other determining social factors.

An **intervention** can be large or small and planned at different levels.

The **interaction** between the context and intervention is a two-way relationship. Each influences the other.

*Source*: FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Resource Pack*, http://www.conflictsensitivity.org.

Tool 4.1 provides suggestions to help field practitioners mainstream conflict-sensitivity into programs and projects.

#### *Tool 4.1: Task List for Mainstreaming Conflict-Sensitivity into Programs/Projects*

- Conduct an analysis of a planned program/project from a conflict-sensitive perspective. Undertake a proper conflict analysis (see chapter 1, section 1.3) and ask yourself repeatedly how your intervention will impact on the context and how the context will influence your program/project. Design your program/project with the necessary flexibility to quickly adjust to changes.
- Assess the possible impact of your planned program/project in terms of the (perceived and real) benefits to the local populations and the costs and wider consequences of failing to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach.
- Practically apply "conflict-sensitivity" in your program/project. Hire appropriate staff. Develop indicators for measuring the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of your program/project (see box on indicators below).
- Check the level of conflict-sensitivity with all your stakeholders and partners. Promote a conflict-sensitive approach across organizations. Develop common guidelines or rules of engagement in this regard.
- Build capacity to be conflict-sensitive with all staff.
- Check periodically whether the program/project exacerbates or minimizes the potential for renewed conflict.
- Monitor carefully the interaction between context and your intervention. Re-adjust your program/project, if necessary.
- Consider whether your program/project contributes to the advancement of the overall goal of a peaceful and stable society. If it does, identify exactly how it does so.

- Collect perception-based and objective information for evaluating the conflict-sensitivity of your program/project.

Box 4.2 discusses the difficult issue of developing indicators that measure the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the program/project. See also chapter 11, section 11.4.5 for further discussion.

**Box 4.2: Indicators for Conflict-Sensitivity**

Finding appropriate indicators to determine whether conflict-sensitivity is practically applied in the program/project is a big challenge. The Resource Pack on Conflict Sensitivity developed by FEWER; International Alert, and Saferworld (see resources section) promotes the use of perception-based indicators in addition to objective indicators to capture the more intangible impacts of programming, for example whether a respondent feels more or less safe (perception-based indicator) compared to the recorded number of incidents of violence (objective indicator).

This approach drew on Oxfam Sri Lanka's ground-breaking work in devising indicators to evaluate their peacebuilding work. Oxfam's relationship-building programme, which seeks to build relationships across communities divided by the conflict, involves inter-community exchange activities. A series of innovative indicators were developed by the beneficiaries and crosschecked by Oxfam, including:

- The existence of communications taking place above and beyond those organized by the project (including inter-group marriages)
- The form of visiting during organized encounters (Do people behave as relatives or strangers? What kinds of gifts do they bring?)
- Actions of those not directly involved in the organized encounters (for example, a Buddhist Monk who was not directly involved in the program activities allowing announcements to be made in Tamil from the Buddhist Temple, when the Tamil language is not normally used by Buddhists).

*Source*: Adapted from Barbolet Adam, Rachel Goldwyn, Hesta Groenewald and Andrew Sherriff, *The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity*, Berghof Handbook Net, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/PCIA_addABetal.pdf.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ Do not treat conflict-sensitivity as a "technical activity" but understand that it has strategic value to your whole organization and partners.
- ✓ Engage all parties when developing operating plans, including seeking their input and feedback on the timing and contents of the plans. Accept that your own agency is one of the actors.
- ✓ Build capacity of staff in conflict-sensitivity as early as possible, even at the loss of some immediate productivity.
- ✓ Directly and proactively involve beneficiaries, as they will need to live with the impact of the program/project and will have important perceptions of its progress in conflict-sensitivity.
- ✓ Make flexibility a key operating principle. Changes in context are likely to necessitate changes in the program/project, if one adheres to a conflict-sensitive approach.
- ✓ Adopt a pragmatic approach when evaluating results, as causality between context and project cannot always be proven.
- ✓ Be aware that the consequences of evaluation interviews with beneficiaries might last well beyond the interviews.
- ✓ As an organization, take responsibility for transforming evaluation results into improved practice.

Box 4.3 shows how one bilateral agency approached mainstreaming conflict sensitivity.

**Box 4.3: The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation's (SDC) Approach to Conflict-Sensitive Programming in Nepal**

"SDC has put the conflict at the core of its strategy and its approaches. … The specific nature of the political conflict has been accepted, with the recognition that every development activity must take into account its potential manipulation by the parties in the conflict as well as its potential influence on their behavior and on their willingness to enter into a constructive dialogue with the political foe. …

[At the project level] key moments of the projects cycle are conducted in a conflict sensitive way, by the introduction of specific analytical tools (conflict mapping, do no harm lenses, identification of potential connectors at the political as well as at the social level). These approaches have forced SDC to reduce the dominance of rigid logical frameworks in planning and monitoring, to increase flexibility in the choice of leading activities and to introduce specific conflict mitigation and conflict transformation measures in the yearly plans of operations.

… Conflict sensitive programme management has the potential to improve the quality of development work. … In order to escape political pressure and partisan manipulation, development work has become more transparent and more accountable to communities. Exclusion mechanisms are identified and corrected. True, these improvements in reaching social objectives require additional investment of time and resources."

*Source*: Frieden, Jörg, SDC Country Director Nepal, *Aid Allocation to Fragile States: Observations from Nepal*, http://www.sdc.admin.ch/ressources/product_52_en_1424.pdf.

## 4.2.2 Mainstreaming Gender Equality

Mainstreaming gender equality is important to pursue in transition situations because:

- In many cases the legacy of the conflict means that a strong gender division of labor has increased: women and men have different access to resources (including power and decision-making) and men and women have experienced conflict differently. This was recognized by the international community and highlighted in the final document of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995).[19]
- In order to achieve real peace and a more stable society, it has to be recognized that women (as well as men) constitute an important societal force and play a major role in rebuilding war-ravaged societies. Women's capacity for peacebuilding has to be harnessed in an optimal way.

In addition, gender mainstreaming is considered to be critical to reach the Millennium Development Goals (see chapter 2, section 2. 5 on these goals). Arguments for promoting gender equality in all programs/projects generally fall into one of the following six categories:[20]

- *Justice and equality*. Democratic principles and basic human rights demand gender equality, a variety of normative documents (for example, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and global conference documents from Beijing, Copenhagen and Cairo) establish gender equality as a fundamental principle.
- *Credibility and accountability*. Because women and men each make up half of the population, any data, policy or recommendation that does not recognize and address both genders equally will be ultimately flawed and thus will not have credibility.
- *Efficiency and sustainability*. This is an argument that addresses "macro" aspects of development – that is, the welfare and prosperity of a nation as a whole. Because gender mainstreaming demands a holistic approach to policy making where coordination and cooperation are key, interventions are more likely to be sustainable.
- *Quality of life*. In a democratic society based on principles of social justice, each individual member has the right to the best quality of life possible. Gender mainstreaming

[19] United Nations, "Women and Armed Conflict", *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*, (1995), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/armed.htm.

[20] UNDP, *Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: A Handbook*, http://www.undp.org/gender/docs/RBEC_GM_manual.pdf, p.23.

initiatives seek to further this objective. Moreover, while it is commonly recognized that women stand to benefit from increased attention to gender equality, quality of life arguments also point out the benefits to be gained by men and families.

- *Alliances*. Alliance arguments highlight gender equality as a prerequisite for forging formal alliances or partnerships with other nations.
- *Chain reaction*. The "chain reaction" argument highlights how sound the investment in gender equality actually is: it will bring not only short-term, localized benefits but medium and long-term benefits that will ripple through society strengthening the nation as a whole.

In transition societies gender equality has particular significance. More often than not, conflict situations entail gender dimensions of negative consequences for women (see table 4.4 in annex 4.1 for a description of how the various stages of a conflict can have gender dimensions.) In many cases, however, women have intervened as peacemakers during the war and have taken on roles of consensus-builders or solution-finders. Perhaps because women have learned over generations to find peaceful solutions to conflicts or perhaps because women have traditionally not been at the forefront of politics, the contribution of women to peace must be encouraged.

**Gender**

Gender refers to the differences between women and men that are socially and culturally constructed and change over time. These differences are reflected in: roles, responsibilities, access to resources, constraints, opportunities, needs, perceptions, views, etc. held by both women and men. Thus, gender is not a synonym for women, but considers both women and men and their interdependent relationships.

The most important gender issue in the refugee context, for example, is a change in roles. Refugee women who lost their husbands have to take up additional responsibility as the head of the family. Men who lost their jobs and social status may also feel as if they have lost their dignity.

**Gender Mainstreaming**

"Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality."

*Source*: UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). *Economic and Social Council Resolution (1996/310: Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programs of the UN system*. Substantive Session for 30 June-25 July 1997. Report on-line (posted 1997and cited 7 November 2000) available at un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/ecosoc.

Tool 4.2 suggests what field practitioners should do in order to mainstream gender equality into programs and projects.

### *Tool 4.2: Task List for Mainstreaming Gender Equality into Programs/Projects*

- Map the situation: what has been done on gender issues in the area where your program/project is supposed to make a difference? Conduct a mapping exercise involving stakeholders, beneficiaries, other agencies, the government and other relevant actors.
- Conduct an analysis of gender issues and their relationship to your intended program/project. If you are not familiar with gender analysis frameworks, use specialized expertise. As a starting point, focus on the following questions:
    - Who are the local/regional peace organizations, especially those involving women? What is their view on the situation of women and men?
    - What are the different conflict experiences between women and men? among different groups of women?

  - What are the different needs, interests and priorities of boys and girls?
  - How is the access to resources, including power and decision-making, different for men and women?
  - Is there evidence of gender-based violence and violations of women's human rights? Do institutions and organizations have the capacity to deal appropriately with these issues?
  - Are women viewed as actors and protagonists, rather than as primarily victims?
- Develop baseline data from this analysis to be used to monitor changes in context later on.
- On the basis of the situation mapping and gender analysis, consider how your proposed project/program will impact on gender. Ask yourself the following questions:
  - How and why is gender equality relevant to the proposed results/impacts of the project?
  - How can the proposed program/project contribute to gender equality?
  - Can women participate in a meaningful fashion in the design of the project?
  - How do local stakeholders (women and men) perceive the program/project in terms of its costs, benefits, acceptability and practicality?
  - What might the wider consequences be of failing to adopt a gender-sensitive approach?
- Decide how to practically apply gender equality in your program/project. Allocate resources in a way that explicitly benefits men and women equally. Actively reduce gender disparities, wherever possible. Motivate those involved in program/project implementation to maintain a gender perspective. (Provide opportunities to update their gender knowledge and skills, and discuss gender issues in a non-judgmental environment.)
- Conduct new analysis periodically. Compare baseline data with new data and determine links between the new data and the program/project. See example of data comparison in box 4.4.
- Ensure assessment of achievements. Evaluate also whether there have been any unexpected or unintentional gendered effects of the project/policy.

**Box 4.4: Comparison of Baseline Data**

**Example: Baseline data are available on the ratio of women/men in decision-making positions related to peace negotiations**

Ask two questions:

***1. Are changes in this baseline category linked to the project?***

Are there more women in decision-making positions?

*Yes*. Why? Use perceptions, differential analysis, triangulation of information to determine possible causal links between the finding and the project activity.

*No*. Develop possible options for why not. Should there be a better advocacy strategy for the project?

If *yes*, broaden the enquiry: Is this project element helping other women and does it help to achieve overall change in society?

***2. Are changes in the project linked to changes in the baseline data?***

Have women who benefited from training in management skills via the project been hired into decision-making positions?

*Yes*. What does that mean for further program/project design?

*No*. Why not? Should the program/project change? How?

Ask the same types of questions for every category of your baseline data.

Table 4.1 shows the indicators that could be used to measure gender equality in relation to governance systems. If data are collected repeatedly, progress can be documented. The extent to which the external intervention contributes to the change, however, needs to be measured separately.

**Table 4.1: Using Indicators for Measuring Gender Dimensions in Governance**

| INDICATOR | Level of measurement | What does it measure? | What does it not measure? | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male:female ratio of members of parliament | National | Gender balance in legislative branch of national government | Whether women in parliament have the capacity and will to represent women's interests and needs. | Parliament |
| Male:female ratio within political parties, including:<br>party leaders and the general membership | National | Gender balance within political parties.<br>This can be an indication of how "attractive" politics are to women.<br>Differences between parties may be a reflection of the extent to which parties promote advancement of women. | Actual attention to gender issues in the party's political platform. | Political parties |
| Male:female ratio of members of government (Cabinet of Ministers) | National | Gender balance in politically appointed executive branch of government. | Whether women in government have the capacity and will to represent women's interests and needs. | Government |
| Male: female ratio in the civil service, including top managerial as well as other positions | National, Ministerial.<br>It is useful to compare differences in gender balance between the two levels. | Gender balance in civil service. | Level of capacity of both men and women to integrate gender issues. | Civil service office |
| Existence of an official policy mandate for gender equality, including a mandate for equal representation and participation | National | Existence of political will to treat gender equity in governance and participation as a significant policy issue | How well and to what degree the given policy is implemented. | Policy review |
| Percent of national government expenditure targeted at gender mainstreaming and gender equality initiatives. | National | Financial commitment to attaining policy goals on gender equality. | It is important to note that some important signs of commitment (such as public affirmation by government officials of the importance of gender) do not require large expenditures. | Local budget review |

*Source*: UNDP, *Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: A Handbook*, http://www.undp.org/gender/docs/RBEC_GM_manual.pdf, p. 56.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Be practical and use a **checklist** of questions in order to determine that no aspect has been overlooked and to determine where limited resources should best be directed.*
- ✓ ***Promote** the importance of gender equality with **donors, stakeholders and other relevant parties**.*
- ✓ ***Involve both women and men in determining the evaluation criteria**. Ensure that the evaluation team has a balance of women and men and that the evaluation design is gender-sensitive.*

Box 4.5 shows possible achievements and pitfalls of supporting gender mainstreaming in external projects.

**Box 4.5: Gender Mainstreaming in East Timor**

A great deal of assistance [was] … extended by international actors in East Timor in the field of gender equality and gender mainstreaming [in 2003]. Ranging from the World Bank's community empowerment programme which sought to set up local governance structures which built in gender equitable representation, to interventions by UN agencies such as UNDP, to financial support of the Office for the Promotion of Equality to international NGOs supporting capacity building initiatives with women's organisations, a huge investment is being made. … [CIIR] has been supporting the East Timorese Women's network in trying to work out new structures and priorities which will best serve women's interests as a whole. Women leaders recognise the needs, but also need assistance working through the structural, political and personal obstacles which get in the way.

[But there have also been a …] number of occasions where UN practice hampered rather than helped East Timorese women. The message sent out when the UN appoints nearly all the key positions in UN administrations to male internationals severely undermines the potency of UN agreements on gender equity. It also sends out a powerful signal to indigenous men. This was overwhelmingly the case with the UNTAET administration. The ET women's organisation Fokupers, also complained about the lack of female personnel available in the UN police force to deal with the huge number of cases of sexual violence. Brahimi recommended fairer gender balance in peace support operations (PSOs), but current figures suggest that women represent only around 6% of military personnel, and 16% of Civpol operations in existing PSOs. So governments […] really must lead by example, and that must presumably start with boosting female military and police recruitment at home. News this week that the new UN police chief in East Timor is to be a woman is a welcome development. We need many more such announcements, however, before the gender equity message begins to be taken seriously.

*Source*: Adapted from Scott, Catherine, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), *Are Women Included or Excluded in Post-Conflict Reconstruction? : A Case Study from East Timor*, (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 30 June 2003), http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Timor-Leste/CIIRWomensPart03.html

## 4.2.3 Mainstreaming a Human Rights Perspective

The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights affirmed the crucial connection between international peace and security and the rule of law and human rights, placing them all within the larger context of democratization and development. Many human rights bodies exist, all of which have the common aim of promoting and protecting internationally agreed human rights, that is, civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. These rights were first agreed upon at the international level in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such they pertain equally to transition situations.

Human rights are also an essential element in the Millennium Declaration, which calls for effective, transparent and accessible mechanisms of accountability. Mainstreaming a human rights approach therefore will help achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Mainstreaming a human rights approach in transition initiatives means integrating human rights thinking and standards into program/project activities. While many programs/projects exist that target human rights protection in concrete ways (for example, human rights observers, advice on the administration of justice and law-enforcement), mainstreaming human rights

thinking in a transition environment is a relatively new concept. There is little experience on which to draw because most international interventions in the human rights field are aimed at preventing gross abuses of human rights (and would thus take place at a different time) or are combined with efforts of promoting a new governance system or new social norms/moral standards (see chapters 6 and 7, respectively).

Perhaps an interesting way to approach "Mainstreaming a Human Rights Perspective" in transition situations is to ask to what extent planned assistance projects provide an incentive or disincentive for the government to promote human rights. For example, providing budget support in order to achieve specified goals in the field of human rights could be an incentive to the government to indeed observe human rights standards.

**Human Rights**

Human rights are those basic standards without which people cannot live in dignity. To violate someone's human rights is to treat that person as though she or he were not a human being. To advocate human rights is to demand that the human dignity of all people be respected.

Within particular societies, "human rights" refers to standards of behavior as accepted within their respective legal systems regarding 1) the well being of individuals, 2) the freedom and autonomy of individuals, and 3) the representation of the human interest in government. These rights commonly include the right to life, the right to an adequate standard of living, the prohibition of genocide, freedom from torture and other mistreatment, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, the right to self-determination, the right to education, and the right to participation in cultural and political life. These norms are based on the legal and political traditions of United Nations member states and are incorporated into international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Having human rights norms in place imposes certain requirements on governments and legitimizes the complaints of individuals in those cases where fundamental rights and freedoms are not respected.

Many conflicts are sparked by a failure to protect human rights, and the trauma that results from severe human rights violations often leads to new human rights violations. As conflict intensifies, hatred accumulates and makes restoration of peace more difficult. In order to stop this cycle of violence, states must institute policies aimed at human rights protection. Many believe that the protection of human rights "is essential to the sustainable achievement of the three agreed global priorities of peace, development and democracy.

*Source*: Adapted from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights; and MAIESE, Michelle, "What Are Human Rights", Beyond Intractability, June 2004, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human_rights_protect/

Tool 4.3 can be used as a checklist for what to do and what to check in order to mainstream a human rights perspective into programs and projects.

### *Tool 4.3: Task List for Mainstreaming a Human Rights (HR) Perspective into Programs/Projects*

- Map the situation from a human rights point of view.
    1. Is there evidence of human rights violations (domestic violence, forced labor, sexual abuse, trafficking, illegal taxation)?
    2. Is there any social group (for example, women/girls, particular ethnic group, returnees, IDPs, local people) whose human rights are systematically abused?
    3. Are there any traditional, national or international human rights laws relating to the identified problems. Use both desk study and participatory methods in conducting your analysis. Ask what local human rights/protection bodies exist and what their view on the situation might be. Look for patterns and try to identify the capacity gap.
- Work with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Consider results of fact-finding missions, Commission reports, and other data available to gain as complete a picture as possible of the current situation.

- Consider your proposed program/project: Does it adhere to human rights standards? Does it promote human rights norms in the country? For example, ask yourself:
  - Does the project involve the equal participation of different groups?
  - Is there any element in the project that might isolate/discriminate one group from the rest?
  - Can your project contribute to educating the general public about human rights? Can part of your budget be spent on increasing knowledge about human rights?
  - Can dialogue groups that involve people from different groups (ethnic, religious, social, etc.) within your project contribute to the understanding that human rights exist for all?
- Actively establish in your program/project an environment in which human rights are respected. Keep as a guiding principle that your program/project should explicitly address the issues of equality, non-discrimination, participation, inclusion, accountability and rule of law that arise in connection with program delivery.
- Work together with other organizations to develop codes of conduct. Build partnerships around operational practices that respect human rights standards.
- Develop staff training and capacity-building to increase their awareness and knowledge on human rights and human rights-based programming.
- The principle of empowerment is a key to human rights programming (see also chapter 3 on human security). Empower people to claim their rights; to increase their capability of making choices, of participation and involvement, and of making rights claims. Ask yourself whether your program/project has an active empowerment element.
- Monitor adherence to standards within your program/project continuously.
- Consider how to provide incentives for the government to become the guarantor of human rights to its population should you work directly with the government.
- Evaluate your achievements periodically.

**Box 4.6: Indicators for mainstreaming a human rights perspective**

Indicators for whether a human rights perspective has been mainstreamed are difficult to determine. One model to use would be to compare the baseline data obtained during the initial analysis with data that were subsequently obtained. In other words, the initial analysis should periodically be carried out again so that progress can be recorded.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *A rights-based approach demands that **all external actors act accountably** and encourage participation by local stakeholders.*
- ✓ *Actively **use human rights concepts and language**, such as "equal access to …", "discrimination against ….", "participation of local beneficiaries …"*
- ✓ *Be careful to **find local terms** with which to express human rights norms, as all norms have a cultural context.*
- ✓ *Be aware that mainstreaming a human rights perspective actually **includes mainstreaming gender equality**, if one accepts that women's rights are contained in a definition of human rights.*

Box 4.7 illustrates how mainstreaming a human rights perspective in an assistance project in Tanzania considerably improved the project results. The case describes in particular the methods that were used to apply the human rights perspective.

**Box 4.7: Mainstreaming Human Rights Concerns in a Water Project in Tanzania**

In the Kileto District, Tanzania, **WaterAid** has been implementing a project to improve water access for residents in the Kileto District. Kileto District is made up of three main ethnic groups: hunter-gatherers, pastoralists and agriculturalists/farmers. Competition between the three different ethnic groups in Kileto over water resources is a source of social and political conflict. The power difference between these groups significantly determines their access to water services.

The hunter-gatherer communities and pastoralist communities in Tanzania are rarely mentioned in national government policies and are often excluded from policy-making. Moreover, their way of life is seriously threatened by changes in land laws, hunting regulations and land use. Both groups, however, are limited in their ability to engage in national and local debates about their rights due to a lack of formal education, cohesion and organisation.

**WaterAid used a rights-based approach to their water project**: The project integrated human rights principles, in particular participation, non-discrimination, equality and empowerment into the programming process[21] and included these as explicit programme goals. Mainstreaming human rights into their project enabled WaterAid to identify the deeper issues that prevented access to water in Kileto; including power imbalances, lack of land rights and exclusion from national policy decisions.

**WaterAid used:**

- *Participatory methodology*: Through involving each ethnic group in the analysis and assessment stage of the project, WaterAid was able to identify each group's different water needs.
- *Understanding the social context*: Participatory assessment and planning methodology enabled WaterAid to develop an understanding of the power relations that existed between the different ethnic groups and the power imbalances that existed within each group: in particular between men and women, and the rich and poor. By bringing all stakeholders in the water project (including local and national authorities responsible for water policies) into the discussion, WaterAid was also able to improve understanding between each group.
- *Advocacy*: In order to influence national policy and practices, WaterAid developed a coherent advocacy strategy in Tanzania, which included working with and training national government staff responsible for water services and policies.
- *Understanding the political and legal context*: Through analysing the political and legal context in which they were working, WaterAid was also able to understand how national policies and legal issues positively and negatively affected the access of these groups. For example, lack of knowledge of land rights and processes for application for land had left villagers powerless to prevent the inequitable distribution of their village land. With the loss of their land to rich farmers or rich pastoralists, villagers were deprived of their traditional water sources.
- *Discussion with all stakeholders*: To explore and understand these issues sufficiently, WaterAid found that considerable time and effort had to be invested in discussions with and between the Kileto partnership management team, field staff, and project communities.
- *Partnership building*: To achieve genuine community management of water services, an important strategy was building partnerships with civil society organisations and training them in the planning and implementation of the programme so that they could achieve autonomy in the future.

*Source*: Filmer-Wilson, Emilie with Michael Anderson, Integrating *Human Rights into Energy and Environment Programming*, (New York: UNDP/HURIST, 2004, http://www.undp.org/governance/docshurist/041017%20Note%20on%20Energy%20and%20Environment%20ver%202.3.doc.

## 4.2.4 Mainstreaming Environmental Concerns

In transition societies the environment is likely to be heavily affected by the legacy of violent conflict. For example access to clean water might be restricted, natural ecosystems may have been destroyed, food security may be a problem, landmines may be scattered on agricultural fields or natural habitats, and toxins might be found in the ground. The environment is an

[21] Some of these human rights principles could also be cited as the principles of a conflict-sensitive approach, such as participation, partnership-building and the search for a thorough understanding of the social, political and legal context. The case could thus also illustrate mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity.

important resource for sustaining livelihoods and great care must be taken to protect this resource.

Environmental protection, therefore, needs to become an important policy objective and requires specifically targeted projects and programs. Chapter 8, section 8.2 and box 8.5 addresses this issue to some extent. In addition, it is important to ensure an environmentally-conscious perspective in all transition initiatives. Inserting environmental concerns into programs and projects can produce much stronger results for economic growth and environmental sustainability than responding to individual environmental concerns in a piecemeal fashion.

Tool 4.4 suggests what to do in order to mainstream environmental concerns into programs and projects.

### *Tool 4.4: Task List for Mainstreaming Environmental Concerns into Programs/Projects*

- Ensure your planned program/project is consistent with the Environmental Sustainability Principles that are likely contained in the National Development Framework developed for the transition country.
- Conduct an analysis of your planned program/project from an environmental perspective:
    - What are the existing environmental conditions, problems, their causes, and consequences and how are they associated with the planned assistance program/project?
    - What environment-related expertise and capacities exists? Where are the gaps?
    - What policies, laws and regulations govern and influence the use and quality of the environment? What potential risks or environmental opportunities are posed by envisaged modifications to policies, laws, and regulations?
    - Are increases in consumption, waste, pollution or health problems to be expected?
    - What are the environmental risks and opportunities associated with the planned program/project?
    - Would a changed physical infrastructure, such as roads, industry, urban development, settlements, etc. affect the environmental concerns of the proposed project?
- Within your program/project and with other agencies promote a mindset that views community engagement in program planning and implementation as making a positive contribution to rebuilding.
- Define the expected environmental benefits of your program/project.
- Prepare regular updates of progress; monitor and evaluate achievements.

Box 4.8 emphasizes the importance the UN Secretary General has given to environmental sustainability and lists MDG indicators in this regard.

**Box 4.8: Goal 7, Target 9 of the Millennium Development Goals**

A framework of 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators to measure progress towards the Millennium Development goals was adopted by a consensus of experts from the United Nations Secretariat and IMF, OECD and the World Bank. One of these goals is to ensure environmental sustainability. Target 9 to achieve this goal has been formulated as follows: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.

Indicators of whether this target has been reached were agreed as follows:

- Proportion of land area covered by forest (FAO)
- Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area (UNEP-WCMC)
- Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per $1,000 GDP (PPP) (IEA, World Bank)
- Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (UNFCCC, UNSD) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tons) (UNEP-Ozone Secretariat)
- Proportion of population using solid fuels (WHO)

Ideally, environmentally-conscious transition assistance programs/projects support these targets, even if their main objective lies in another area of assistance.

*Source*: Adapted from United Nations Statistics Division, *Millennium Development Goal Indicators Database*, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Pay attention to even the **smallest impacts** that one's own agency might have on the environment – it is a fragile resource in need of protection.*
- ✓ ***Coordinate with other agencies** and **with NGOs, community groups, the private sector, media and other actors of civil society**. This is particularly crucial in the area of environmental mainstreaming because the risk of unanticipated negative and cumulative environmental impacts is great.*
- ✓ ***Raise awareness** of this issue **with other donors**; support mainstreaming initiatives among each other in response to environmental threats.*

Box 4.9 describes how the United Nations began mainstreaming environmental concerns into its approach to refugee settlements and flows.

**Box 4.9: Environmental Considerations in Refugee Camps – The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Guinea**

In July 1999, at the request of the Government of Guinea, the United Nations Secretary-General asked UNEP to examine the environmental impacts of the refugee situation in Guinea. Over the years, many people from Sierra Leone and Liberia had been forced to flee their homes. As many as 800,000 people moved into the border area in Guinea. To ascertain the impacts of a large concentration of refugees on the environment in Guinea, UNEP, in close collaboration with UN-Habitat and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), undertook a rapid assessment of the environment. The findings of the assessment outlined the types of damage that was caused by refugees and outlined some immediate measures that the Government could undertake to address the environmental situation.

Subsequently the issue of the impact of refugees on the environment became an area of focus, particularly in Africa where there are large, long-term refugee settlements and flows. UNEP has hence promoted better understanding of the environmental dimension of refugee situations and has formulated appropriate policies to promote the integration of environmental concerns in the planning and implementation of activities related to refugee settlements and flows. It also tries to strengthen governmental capacities to deal with this issue.

*Source*: Adapted from United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Implementation of the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World - The United Nations Environment Programme Activities in Managing Environmental Emergencies.* World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, Jan 2004, http://www.unep.org/DEPI/PDF/Yokohama%20Strategy%20-final.pdf

## 4.3 Mainstreaming Beyond the Program/Project Level

Field practitioners cannot act in isolation at the program/project level only. In order to make mainstreaming a successful strategy, follow-up action has to be taken, leverage points for further action determined, challenges and the larger implications to mainstreaming assessed and support activities envisaged.

### 4.3.1 Program/Project Follow-up

In order to make sure that the identified cross-cutting issue is not forgotten once the program/project is terminated, tool 4.5 lists tips for follow-up.

#### *Tool 4.5: Tips for Follow-up*

- How does the program/project fit into the "big picture", that is, more comprehensive programs and policy frameworks? What entry points for follow-up and complementary activities do they offer?
- Does the program/project evaluation include concrete recommendations for follow-up initiatives? What other entry points can be accessed to ensure this follow-up?
- Does the evaluation point to implications for other stakeholders more broadly? How will these implications be communicated? Can one propose any concrete entry points?
- Are the process and results of the program/project documented in a way that will guarantee institutional memory?
- In general, how and to whom are the results of the program/project communicated?

Another tool to promote the cross-cutting issue further within the organization is the following checklist:

#### *Tool 4.6: Checklist for Leverage Points for Further Mainstreaming*

- Is the external context (in terms of the national or regional situation and in terms of global policy development) conducive to further work on the cross-cutting issue?
- What is the current extent of internal institutional commitment to follow through on the cross cutting issue?
- How deep and how wide is the organizational commitment to the cross-cutting issue? Is the organizational culture enabling?
- Do existing institutional structures support the practice of the cross-cutting issue or how might they need to change?
- What skills are needed in the organization as a whole, by colleagues in different departments and partners so that the cross-cutting issue can be fully mainstreamed?

### 4.3.2 Challenges to Mainstreaming

The challenges of why an issue might not be successfully mainstreamed are manifold. General challenges often have to do with structural or communication impediments within a project, program or organization. Table 4.2 highlights these challenges and outlines possible responses.

**Table 4.2: Challenges to Mainstreaming and Possible Responses**

| Challenges | Possible Responses |
|---|---|
| Linkages with other issues are not perceived | • Formal recognition of the issue by the hierarchy is necessary<br>• Insert the issue into strategic planning exercises |
| Issue is not considered important | • Provide more information on the issue<br>• Lobby<br>• Set up an interest group |
| Advocacy for the issue is weak | • Develop a communications strategy<br>• Set up a working group<br>• Obtain adequate resources |
| Issue is marginalized in terms of funding | • Establish funding criteria |
| Implementation structures are weak | • Train and build the capacity of staff<br>• Monitor progress<br>• Obtain adequate resources |

### 4.3.3 The Larger Implications of Mainstreaming

Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues in programs/projects alone will not be successful unless a more comprehensive approach to mainstreaming is taken. Most often a cross-cutting issue is mainstreamed into a program/project because a national or sectoral policy says this should be done or because of the desire to abide by international standards. In rare cases a cross-cutting issue is identified at the program/project level and lobbied for inclusion at higher levels of societal functioning. Comprehensive mainstreaming involves:

- Having a longer-term and holistic view of an issue and its place in the overall development of a transition society.
- Putting in place certain structures that help the issue move forward in a coherent way.
- Taking cross-cutting issues into consideration as early as possible in the decision-making process of a transition strategy or program/project, so that decisions can best benefit from opportunities and avoid negative impacts.
- Placing the cross-cutting issue on a par with other aspects of decision-making.
- Challenging the status quo.
- Changing policies, administrative practices and institutions so that they actively, systematically and consistently consider and promote the cross-cutting issue in all aspects of their work.
- Adjusting attitudes and behaviors of individuals and organizations.
- Engaging in a pro-active and transformative process that involves rethinking social values, organizational practices and policy and program goals.

### 4.3.4 Mainstreaming Support Activities

Mainstreaming occurs at different levels and involves not only external actors, but key national policy-makers. Table 4.3 shows at what level, through which means, and in what timeframe external actors can support this process and help mainstreaming an issue.

**Table 4.3: Levels, Instruments, Activities and Timing of Mainstreaming**

| Levels | Instruments/ methods | External actors' support activities | Likely timeframe for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues |
|---|---|---|---|
| Macro/national | National strategy | Support the government (most likely a designated coordinating agency) to:<br>• Establish national policies on mainstreaming cross-cutting issues<br>• Ensure that cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed into other national policies<br>• Develop a national plan of action<br>• Establish committees/working groups to oversee the mainstreaming process | 10 years |
| Ministerial/ departmental | Sectoral plans of action and guidelines/ standards | Support ministries/departments to:<br>• Translate the national plan of action into sectoral/local plans/guidelines and standards<br>• Ensure that cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed into sectoral policies and plans<br>• Monitor progress | 5 years |
| Civil society/private sector | Implementation | • Support other national actors in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues<br>• Advocate for including cross-cutting issues into policies, programs and projects<br>• Help build capacity in this respect | Ongoing |
| Program/project | Implementation | • Plan for, implement and monitor progress of including a cross-cutting issue into an existing program/project<br>• Implement policies, plans of action in work practices, outputs and impacts | Program/project duration |

### 4.3.5 Inclusion into Planning Tools

External actors can also ensure that cross-cutting issues are pursued in the following planning tools (see chapter 2, sections 2.3 and 2.4):

- Strategic development frameworks, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs) and national stakeholder consultation processes related to the PRSPs and CDFs
- Country strategies developed by donors, in partnership with the concerned government and in broad consultation with civil society, and through donor/donor consultation processes

- Regional strategies developed by donors, in broad consultation with the governments concerned and civil society and through donor/donor consultation processes
- Strategic donor coordination frameworks and fora, such as UN-led coordination exercises (e.g. the Common Country Assessment Framework (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF))
- Joint conflict analyses that feed into strategy development
- Assessment processes, such as post-conflict needs assessments

## *General Lessons on Mainstreaming Cross-Cutting Issues*

- ✓ Even if the suggestion of mainstreaming raises the concern of an overwhelmed field practitioner, mainstreaming a cross-cutting issue is actually a necessary process for achieving a fundamental objective in the most effective and efficient manner.
- ✓ An assistance project that mainstreams cross-cutting issues is likely to be more effective and have larger impact than one that does not.
- ✓ Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues is of particular importance in tumultuous transition situations where multiple actors pursue specialised tasks and are not naturally attuned to linkages among them.
- ✓ The multi-directional and multi-dimensional processes in operation in a transition society call for attention to connections between and among projects and organizations. Progress in one sector is dependent on progress in another, and progress in that sector is dependent on progress in a third. Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues is like spinning the web that helps make these lateral connections in practice.
- ✓ Mainstreaming in a chaotic transition society requires considered, pro-active and positive action to ensure outcomes and improved results. Agencies need to be committed to and promote mainstreaming efforts within their own programs/projects and with government and civil society.
- ✓ Mainstreaming at the program/project level alone is not sufficient. Mainstreaming requires organizational capacity development that goes beyond developing tools and policies and includes training, skills development and reform of organizational structures.
- ✓ Considering that the development of organizational capacity is slow in transition societies, there is a great temptation to create new organizational functions and procedures to address cross-cutting issues. Experience has shown, however, that mainstreaming a cross-cutting issue is more effective in the long run. Mainstreaming should thus be based on existing organizational structures.
- ✓ Given the low level of attention that a typical cross-cutting issue will have received in a transition society, without a holistic push for the issue, across organizations and institutions, the impact of the efforts of individual organizations is likely to be limited.

# Resources

## Mainstreaming Conflict-Sensitivity

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UNDP-BCPR, Gender Approaches in Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, http://www.undp.org/gender/docs/RBEC_GM_manual.pdf.

## Mainstreaming a Human Rights Perspective

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Maiese, Michelle, “What Are Human Rights”, Beyond Intractability, June 2004, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human_rights_protect/.

## Mainstreaming Environmental Concerns

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNDP Environmental Mainstreaming Strategy - A strategy for enhanced environmental soundness and sustainability in UNDP policies, programmes, and operational processes, (New York: UNDP, May 2004), http://www.undp.org/fssd/docs/envmainstrat.doc.

# *Annex 4.1: Elements of Conflict Situations*

**Table 4.4: Elements of Conflict Situations and Possible Gender Dimensions**

| Elements of Conflict Situations | Possible Gender Dimensions |
|---|---|
| | **Pre-Conflict Situations** |
| Increased mobilization of soldiers | Increased commercial sex trade (including child prostitution) around military bases and army camps. |
| Nationalist propaganda used to increase support for military action | Gender stereotypes and specific definitions of masculinity and femininity are often promoted. There may be increased pressure on men to 'defend the nation.' |
| Mobilization of pro-peace activists and organizations | Women have been active in peace movements - both generally and in women-specific organizations. Women have often drawn moral authority from their role as mothers. It has also been possible for women to protest from their position as mothers when other forms of protest have not been permitted by authorities. |
| Increasing human rights violations | Women's rights are not always recognized as human rights. Gender-based violence may increase. |
| | **During conflict situations** |
| Psychological trauma, physical violence, casualties and death | Men tend to be the primary soldiers/combatants. Yet, in various conflicts, women have made up significant numbers of combatants. Women and girls are often victims of sexual violence (including rape, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation, forced prostitution and forced pregnancy) during times of armed conflict. |
| Social networks disrupted and destroyed – changes in family structures and composition | Gender relations can be subject to stress and change. The traditional division of labor within a family may be under pressure. Survival strategies often necessitate changes in the gender division of labor. Women may become responsible for an increased number of dependents. |
| Mobilization of people for conflict. Everyday life and work disrupted. | The gender division of labor in workplaces can change. With men's mobilization for combat, women have often taken over traditionally male occupations and responsibilities. Women have challenged traditional gender stereotypes and roles by becoming combatants and taking on other non-traditional roles. |
| Material shortages (shortages of food, health care, water, fuel, etc.) | Women's role as provider of the everyday needs of the family may mean increased stress and work as basic goods are more difficult to locate. Girls may also face an increased workload. Non-combatant men may also experience stress related to their domestic gender roles if they are expected, but unable, to provide for their families. |
| Creation of refugees and displaced people | People's ability to respond to an emergency situation is influenced by whether they are male or female. Women and men refugees (as well as boys and girls) often have different needs and priorities. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Dialogue and peace negotiations | Women are often excluded from the formal discussions given their lack of participation and access in pre-conflict decision-making organizations and institutions. |
| **During reconstruction and rehabilitation** | |
| Political negotiations and planning to implement peace accords | Men's and women's participation in these processes tends to vary, with women often playing only minor roles in formal negotiations or policy making. |
| Media used to communicate messages (peace accords, etc.) | Women's unequal access to media may mean that their interests, needs and perspectives are not represented and discussed. |
| Use of outside investigators, peacekeepers, etc. | Officials are not generally trained in gender equality issues (women's rights as human rights, how to recognize and deal with gender-specific violence).<br>Women and girls have been harassed and sexually assaulted by peacekeepers. |
| Holding of elections | Women face specific obstacles in voting, in standing for election and in having gender equality issues discussed as election issues. |
| International investments in employment creation, health care, etc. | Reconstruction programs may not recognize or give priority to supporting women's and girls' health needs, domestic responsibilities or needs for skills training and credit. |
| Demobilization of combatants | Combatants often assumed to be all male. If priority is granted to young men, women do not benefit from land allocations, credit schemes, etc. |
| Measures to increase the capacity of and confidence in civil society. | Women's participation in community organizations and NGOs is generally uneven. These organizations often lack the capacity and interest in granting priority to equality issues. |

*Source*: CIDA, *Gender Equality and Peacebuilding: An Operational Framework*, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf

Notes:

# Chapter 5
# A Secure Environment

## Chapter Objectives

- Provide an overview of the concept of security and the main security actors.
- Familiarize field practitioners with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as well as mine action as a means of ending the insecurity resulting from violent conflict.
- Introduce the most important aspects of civilian police reform, civilian disarmament and small arms control as a means of ending the criminal insecurity typical of transition situations.
- Show the importance of the democratic governance of the security sector and the restructuring of security organizations for transforming the security system.

## Introduction

Establishing a secure environment is one of the crucial issues that need to be addressed during transition situations. It requires ending the insecurity resulting from violent conflict, addressing the criminal insecurity typical of transitions and transforming the security system. Insecurity undermines the legitimacy of state institutions and hampers efforts to promote political, social and economic development.

Transition situations are often characterized by a security vacuum, which international peace operations try to fill. Such intervention, however, is sustainable only on a short-term basis. Domestic security organizations need to be supported to fulfill their functions, a process that can be strengthened by the resourcefulness of civilian actors, including civil society organizations and the local media.

## 5.1 Overview of Security

The end of the Cold War and the escalation of internal conflicts witnessed in the 1990s have led to the broadening of the concept of security. As described in chapter 3, this concept now:

- Encompasses threats that are not strictly military: they are also political (internal instability, terrorism, human rights abuses), economic (poverty, illegal trade, financial crimes), social (human trafficking, HIV/AIDS and other epidemics, mass displacement of people) and environmental (natural disaster, nuclear disaster).
- Embraces not only the responsibility of the state to protect its territory and sovereignty, but also the responsibility of the state to ensure the well being of its people.

External actors can play a key role in strengthening state responsibility during transitions. They can help transition countries recognize their state responsibility; they can help transitions countries build their capacity to achieve human security.

### 5.1.1 Security-Related Definitions and Common Security Threats in Transitions

**Security-Related Definitions**

**Security** is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the governance of their countries; enjoy the protection of fundamental human rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security.

**Security system** includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (for example, the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies, judicial and penal institutions); and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (for example, Parliament, the Executive, the Defense Ministry, etc.)

**Security sector reform or restructuring** is the transformation of the security system – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities, and actions – working together to manage and operate in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. The term should not be understood to pertain only to the armed forces but to the whole system of actors working in security-related issues.

For the definition of human security, see chapter 3, section 3.1.

*Source*: Adapted from OECD/DAC, "Security Issues and Development Co-operation : A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence" in *Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers*, Off-Print of the DAC Journal 2001, Volume 2, No. 3, , II-35, The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris: OECD, 2001): 37-44; and Security System Reform and Governance – Policy and Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2004): 16.

The following security threats are the most common in transitions:

- Continued or sporadic violence: transitions are no war/no peace situations and violence in various forms may continue to exist in most, or some, parts of the country. The most common security threats are gunfire, bombing and ambush (see Box 1.1 in chapter 1).
- High rates of criminality and violence: the security vacuum, widespread circulation of small arms and light weapons, high unemployment rates and other chronic problems usually lead to rising levels of criminality and violence during transitions. Theft, murder, kidnapping, rape and sexual violence are a few examples of such criminal acts.
- Widespread violation of human rights: the civilian police and other law enforcement officials are not familiar and rarely comply with international human rights standards. Common security threats that also constitute human rights abuses are torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention.
- Landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO): landmines and UXOs remain and continue to kill or maim indiscriminately long after violent conflict has ended.

See chapter 10, section 10.5 on safety and security for more detailed information about security threats and levels of security risk.

## 5.1.2 Security-Related Organizations

In transition situations, security-related organizations include not only statutory armed forces, paramilitary and police forces and intelligence services, but also other irregular armed groups, such as opposition, liberation, rebel or insurgent movements.

Statutory security actors operate under centralized government control, which often rules through a de facto state of emergency. This also means that armed forces, party and government functions are not necessarily separate or independent from each other. Table 5.1 shows the functions of these statutory security actors when operating under democratic governance and compares them to the common distortions that they usually inherit from violent conflict situations.

**Table 5.1: Democratic Functions and Common Distortions of Security-Related Organizations in Transitions**

| | Functions under Democratic Control | Common Distortions during Transitions |
|---|---|---|
| **The Armed Forces** | • Protect the country's independence, territorial integrity and population<br>• Provide humanitarian assistance in case of natural or human-made disasters<br>• Participate in international peace-support operations<br>• Assist law enforcement authorities in internal security tasks<br>• Perform social functions, such as nation-building educational opportunities, civil administration in remote areas | • Are powerful and unaccountable<br>• Fight internal security threats posed by opposition, liberation or insurgent movements<br>• Are often formed by conscripted soldiers coming from a single ethnic origin<br>• Are meant to maintain internal law and order in lieu of the police forces<br>• Violate international humanitarian law and international human rights<br>• Consume large portions of the national budget |
| **Paramilitary forces (national guards, border control, coast guard, civilian defense corps, gendarmerie)** | • Control borders, including illegal trafficking of goods and people<br>• Maintain law and order in emergency situations<br>• Guard the head of state and other high-level authorities<br>• Protect vital installations such as nuclear plants | • Apply inappropriately military techniques to civilian policing activities<br>• Participate frequently in internal security operations<br>• Are equipped as a military force<br>• Operate under military authority |
| **Police structures** | • Enjoy the monopoly of legitimate coercion<br>• Respect the rule of law, have operational independence and follow a professional code of ethics<br>• Provide effective security while respecting human rights | • Are militarized or seriously under-funded<br>• Have their capacity to guarantee people's security undermined<br>• Have limited or no training to perform their role<br>• Suffer from corrupt management<br>• Have low literacy levels |
| **Secret and intelligence services** | • Gather and analyze information effectively, in a neutral/non-partisan manner<br>• Aim to strike a balance between appropriate, legal and accountable behavior and the need to preserve secrecy and effectiveness to protect national security<br>• Material is declassified or becomes accessible to the public after a certain period of time | • Are frequently under military control<br>• Are misused for political purposes<br>• Do not abide by a professional ethic and a sense of civic responsibility |

Armed movements remain key security organizations throughout transitions. These groups continue to be in control of large portions of the state population and territory, where they have usually established parallel administrative structures. Integrating these movements and their structures into the state system is therefore crucial to end insecurity in transitions.

To achieve this goal, armed movements are often transformed into political parties. This was the case with the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Resistência National Moçambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic

Party (former Khmer People's National Liberation Front), the Cambodian People's Party (former People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea), and the Revolutionary United Front Party in Sierra Leone (RUF/SL).

Even though national parliaments, civil society and the media are not to be considered as security actors per se, they have also emerged as key stakeholders in ensuring democratic oversight over the security system. Table 5.2 shows some of their potential security-related functions:

**Table 5.2: Key Stakeholders in Ensuring Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector**

| Stakeholder | Functions |
|---|---|
| **National Parliaments** | By passing laws that define and regulate the security sector, oversee:<br>• National security policy<br>• Operational components of the security sector (armed forces, paramilitary forces, police structures and secret and intelligence services)<br>• Military budgets and personnel management<br>• Arms control transfer and procurement |
| **Civil Society Groups**<br>• **Academic institutions**<br>• **Think tanks**<br>• **Human rights NGOs**<br>• **Policy-issue NGOs** | • Disseminate independent analysis and information on security issues<br>• Monitor and promote respect for the rule of law and human rights within the security sector<br>• Ensure that important security issues are added to the political agenda<br>• Provide feedback on national security policy decisions and their implementation<br>• Raise public awareness about important security issues |
| **Independent media** | • Gather and disseminate information on security-related matters that are in the public interest<br>• Promote transparency, public accountability and accessibility of official information on security-related matters<br>• Help governments and parliaments explain their national security decisions and policies to citizens<br>• Raise public awareness about important security issues |

## 5.1.3 Security Roles of Key External Actors

External actors play different roles in the establishment of a secure environment during transition situations. Peace support operations can be mandated to maintain security and perform other related tasks in the whole or part of the territory, but the overall strategy also involves humanitarian and development agencies, financial institutions, donors and non-governmental organizations. The ultimate goal is to build national capacity to establish and maintain a secure environment. Table 5.3 shows the main security roles of external actors.

**Table 5.3: Main Security Roles of External Actors**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Peace-support operations** | • Supervise cease-fires and other military provisions of peace agreements<br>• Maintain temporarily law and order<br>• Provide assistance in humanitarian operations<br>• Ensure environment conducive to the realization of elections<br>• Provide technical assistance to armed forces in military/security matters<br>• Train military and paramilitary personnel in their roles in a democratic society, including respect for human rights and international humanitarian law |

**Table 5.3: Main Security Roles of External Actors**

| | |
|---|---|
| **UN humanitarian and development agencies** | On DDR, mine action, civilian police reform and security system reforms:<br>• Coordinate UN efforts at country level<br>• Provide technical assistance to transition governments<br>• Implement programs in collaboration with governments and other partners |
| **Regional organizations (OAU, OAS, OSCE, EU)** | On DDR, mine action, civilian police reform and security system reforms:<br>• Constitute knowledgeable and resourceful actors and/or partners<br>• Provide technical assistance to transition governments<br>• Coordinate program design, planning and implementation |
| **The World Bank and regional financial institutions** | On DDR, mine action, civilian police reform and security system reforms:<br>• Provide technical assistance to transition governments<br>• Contribute financially to security-related efforts<br>• Help integrate security sector costs into general public financial management in accordance with good governance principles |
| **Donor governments and aid agencies** | On DDR, mine action, civilian police reform and security system reforms:<br>• Contribute financially to security-related efforts<br>• Promote the co-ordination of international efforts<br>• Provide technical assistance to transition governments<br>• Emphasize the civilian aspect and the protection of women, children and disabled<br>• Implement programs in collaboration with governments and other partners |
| **International non-governmental organizations** | • Provide humanitarian assistance during DDR programs<br>• Ensure the protection of vulnerable groups (women combatants, child soldiers, war-disabled soldiers)<br>• Carry out humanitarian demining activities<br>• Assist victims of anti-personnel and land mines |

In providing security-related assistance to transition countries, external actors have to keep in mind that:

- Security is one of the crucial elements of any reconciliation (see chapter 7, section 7.3.2) and long-term development.
- States have legitimate security needs that must be met efficiently and effectively. This requires security forces of the right size, appropriately tasked and cost-effectively equipped.
- The security system of countries is a politically-sensitive matter.
- The role of external actors is that of a facilitator: planning and execution of security-related programs should rest with internal actors and parties to the conflict.
- Successful outcomes depend primarily upon the commitment of internal actors, in particular the parties to the conflict.

Civilian and military actors work side by side in transitions. Box 5.1 describes their interactions and indicates some good practices in relating with the military.

**Box 5.1: Civil-Military Relations in Transitions**

Abbreviations such as CIMIC, CMC and CMCO, which stand for “Civil-Military Cooperation” or “Civil-Military Coordination”, are commonly found in transitions. These terms usually denote the interactions and interface between civilian and military actors and tasks, but they can also have different connotations for military and civilians. Military actors tend to view CIMIC as the planned implementation of civilian tasks by military units for the protection of military personnel.

Civilian and military actors play an important role in transitions, in particular in security-related tasks such as DDR, mine action and security sector reform. While maintaining a cautious approach to their cooperation due to their different institutional cultures and mandates, both groups have increasingly accepted the necessity of working closely together. It is important for both groups to understand each other's roles in order to be able to determine when to work together and when to maintain a healthy distance so as to not undermine the achievement of their respective mandates.

DDR programs, for example, call for high levels of co-ordination between military and civilian actors. Military actors are often responsible for disarmament; demobilization requires the involvement of both military and civilian actors; and reintegration is more the responsibility of civilians. Inherent difficulties in the relationship are further worsened by incompatible timeframes and poor communication. Both groups have to be particularly careful in relating to each other. Some good practices are to continuously try to:

- ✓ Become familiar with the different working styles of one another to diminish misconceptions
- ✓ Heighten each other's awareness about the limits of their roles and mandates
- ✓ Share permissible information on a regular basis (for example, local security conditions and mined areas).

Overall security challenges typical of transitions can be grouped into three main categories:

- Ending insecurity resulting from the violent conflict through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and mine action programs
- Addressing criminal insecurity through the reform of police structures and civilian disarmament and small arms control programs
- Supporting the transformation of the security system through democratic control and security sector reform.

## *5.2 Ending the Insecurity Resulting from Violent Conflict*

### 5.2.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

The failure to disarm and demobilize combatants and to effectively support their reintegration into civil society may lead to an immediate relapse into war. DDR programs thus form an integral part of transition processes and require a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach by internal and external actors. For this reason, DDR programs are often entrenched in peace agreements and in UN and/or other multilateral peace operations, but can also take place following a military defeat. DDR programs are also an integral part of transition strategies and other planning tools.

**DDR Definitions**

**Disarmament** is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.

**Demobilization** is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

**Reinsertion** is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

**Reintegration** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

**Combatant** denotes not only an individual conscripted in the armed forces or movements carrying a gun, but also members of these groups working in logistics and administration, as well as individuals – especially women and children – who have been abducted and sexually or otherwise abused and who have subsequently stayed within these groups.

*Source*: United Nations, *Note by the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005 and DOUGLAS, Ian and others, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide* (GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p.15.

Prerequisites for successful DDR include:

- A lasting cease-fire and/or peace agreement where the parties to the conflict express their consent to the DDR process sometimes accompanied by the deployment of a peace operation mandated to fill in the security vacuum;
- The support from the statutory armed forces and irregular groups' commanders in all regions of the country;
- The establishment of a suitable institutional structure that brings together main stakeholders and encourages beneficiary involvement;
- A single national DDR plan or program that describes: i) guiding principles; ii) phases and procedures; iii) eligibility, target groups and corresponding rights and benefits; iv) institutional and implementation arrangements; v) supervision, monitoring and evaluation.
- The support from donors through the provision of adequate funds; and
- International technical assistance that is neutral and adapted to the needs and competencies of the national institutions responsible for the DDR process.

## The DDR Process

The DDR process consists of a large number of complex and interrelated tasks. Its sustainability depends on ensuring a gradual shift from the initial focus on the individual combatant to a community oriented approach. Diagram 5.1 below illustrates how the DDR process usually unfolds.

### *Diagram 5.1: Essential Steps of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*




**Disarmament:**

- Usually takes place upon quartering/cantonment and constitutes basically a military function;
- In the DDR context, denotes military disarmament; civilian disarmament is not part of a demobilization process and will be examined in more detail in section 5.3.2 below;
- Is also a practical step of demobilization, which requires each individual combatant to surrender his/her weapon (those associated with armed forces and groups who do not possess weapons will enter the program in the demobilization phase).

**Demobilization:**

- Constitutes fundamentally a civilian process, even though the military are ultimately responsible for the discharge of combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups and play an important role on key decisions;
- Takes place under considerable time pressure, particularly during transitions;
- An alternative to demobilization is the incorporation of combatants, irrespective of their former affiliation, into the unified armed forces or into the victorious armed forces (this alternative is one illustration of the potential linkages between DDR processes and security organizations restructuring, which are examined in more detail in section 5.4.2 below).

**Reintegration:**

- Provides information, counseling and referral on reintegration opportunities available to former combatants;
- Supports former combatants, those associated with armed forces and groups as well as their dependants to earn their livelihood by peaceful means and to participate in economic and social life;

- Offers targeted support in disadvantaged regions or to groups in need of special support and not necessarily to all demobilized and their dependents;
- Reinforces the capacities of the receiving communities to integrate the demobilized, their dependants and other returnees.

DDR is not necessarily linear and sequential. It should rather be regarded as a dynamic and integrated process. Reintegration planning should thus take place in conjunction with planning for disarmament and demobilization. Successful disarmament and demobilization will depend on the early availability of social and economic reintegration opportunities.

***Fundamental principles***: DDR programs need to ensure equal rights for all demobilized irrespective of their former affiliation in domestic laws and regulations. Particular attention should also be paid to the rights of special groups, such as child soldiers, youth, women combatants and associated with armed forces and groups, disabled/chronically ill soldiers and their dependants.

The United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) constitute the most comprehensive body of guidance on DDR programming (see box 5.2 below).

**Box 5.2: The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)**

The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards is a document providing direction or guidance to those engaged in the planning and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, operations and support, which has a degree of consensus. This document was prepared by the United Nations Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (14 UN departments, agencies, programs and funds and the International Organization for Migration) on the basis of lessons and feedback from field practitioners and policymakers within and outside the UN system. The IDDRS covers some 32 areas, from concepts, policies and strategies underlying integrated DDR to DDR program design, support, monitoring and evaluation. The IDDRS also consolidates knowledge and good practices on key DDR issues, such as community sensitization and public information, food aid and food security, women and gender, children and youth, health and HIV/AIDS.

*Source*: Adapted from UNITED NATIONS WORKING GROUP ON DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS),* www.unddr.org (forthcoming).

## DDR-related Tasks for Bilateral Aid Agencies and NGOs

While UN peace operations and agencies usually take the lead in supporting national DDR programs, bilateral aid agencies and NGOs can also contribute to efforts particularly when there is a lack of functional government institutions which can effectively conduct demobilization and reintegration. Table 5.4 below gives examples of what bilateral aid agencies and NGOs can do to contribute to demobilization and reintegration, why the activity described is necessary and how it can be supported.

**Table 5.4: Bilateral Aid Agencies and NGOs Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration**

| Activity | Why it is needed | How it can be supported |
|---|---|---|
| **Fulfill basic human needs during encampment** | • To ensure that living conditions during encampment remain satisfactory<br>• Exposing combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups to day-to-day civilian management can also facilitate their adjustment to civilian life | • Provide food, civilian clothing, health, shelter and water and sanitation according to minimum humanitarian standards (see chapter 3 on human security);<br>• Conduct medical screening of chronically ill and disabled combatants as well as provide proper treatment;<br>• Provide health education and trauma counseling. |

**Table 5.4: Bilateral Aid Agencies and NGOs Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration**

| Activity | Why it is needed | How it can be supported |
|---|---|---|
| **Support the registration of combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups** | • To gather information on background and socio-economic profile<br>• To allow advance planning for demobilization and reintegration | • Support in logistics (tents, computer hardware and software);<br>• Train staff to conduct registration;<br>• Assess background and profiles of combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups to prepare discharge, transportation, reinsertion packages and reintegration programs. |
| **Prepare an awareness and information campaign for those to be demobilized and the receiving communities** | • To raise awareness and inform about demobilization procedures, rights, benefits and reintegration programs<br>• To reduce unwarranted prejudices and minimize friction during socio-economic reintegration | • Define messages according to target group (demobilized, child soldiers, youth, war disabled on the one hand, and community authorities, religious groups, families on the other hand);<br>• Identify and train awareness/<br>• information agents, including local NGOs and religious groups;<br>• Select communication means (meetings, media, theatre and other cultural activities) and tools (brochures, posters, radio and television spots). |
| **Provide reinsertion packages for the demobilized** | • To provide combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups with a transitional safety net<br>• To help reduce the burden they may place on receiving families and communities<br>• To bolster the self-esteem during this psychologically difficult period of demobilization | • Plan and implement the following reinsertion assistance, in addition to official discharge payments and pensions:<br>• Family food ration;<br>• Non-food items (household kits, basic tools to build shelter);<br>• Seeds and agricultural tools.<br>• More emphasis should be placed on material assistance than on cash payments. |
| **Plan and implement reintegration programs** | • To support the reintegration of the demobilized into civilian society<br>• To help the demobilized to become financially independent through involvement in productive activities | • Plan and implement the following socio-economic integration activities:<br>• Vocational training;<br>• Micro-enterprise development.<br>• Carry out the following with the involvement of the demobilized:<br>• Infrastructure rehabilitation (see chapter 8 on infrastructure rebuilding);<br>• Agricultural development and reforestation. |
| **Provide assistance to special groups (male and female child soldiers and youth, disabled and chronically ill, women)** | • To ensure that special groups are integrated in the official DDR process<br>• To ensure that special groups are not discriminated<br>• To ensure that needs of special groups are fulfilled | • Ensure gender-sensitiveness in demobilization and reintegration;<br>• Support the creation of a legal framework that will exempt former child soldiers from future military service<br>• Establish family tracing and reunification for child soldiers<br>• Ensure war disabled have access to physical rehabilitation (see section 5.2.2 below on mine action);<br>• Create trauma counseling and psychological support for special groups. |

Tools that help ensuring gender-sensitiveness in DDR processes are: the UNIFEM *Gender-Aware Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration - A Checklist,* www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/ddrenglish.pdf, and the OECD/DAC *Tipsheet – Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR),* www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/26/1896536.pdf.

A tool useful for DDR of child soldiers is the Cape Town Annotated Principles and Best Practice on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, www.unicef.org.

## DDR Challenges

The most important DDR challenges and corresponding gaps are related to:

- Acknowledging the specific and critical needs of the demobilized without transforming them into a privileged group within the community;
- Coping with the often blurred distinction between combatants and civilians: this will require careful definition of eligibility criteria and the design of strategies to deal with paramilitary groups, militias and civil defense forces;
- Integrating special groups in the DDR process and recognizing their specific needs: male and female child and youth soldiers, female combatants/associated with the armed forces and groups, children and young people who have grown up in military camps, war disabled who left the armed forces or irregular forces before the end of the war, war widows and orphans;
- Coordinating well reintegration programs for the demobilized with other reintegration programs for war-affected groups, such as returning IDPs and refugees, through a national reintegration policy;
- Mobilizing bilateral and multilateral donor support for a long-term reintegration effort, which generally attracts less interest than the demobilization phase;
- Promoting power sharing without tying the demobilized to the state administration by means of new patron-client relations, which also represent a burden on the national budget;
- Ensuring equal rights and benefits for all the demobilized irrespective of their affiliation with statutory armed forces or irregular movements;
- Flexibly initiating and adapting reintegration programs in view of the high degree of mobility of the demobilized during the months that follow their discharge.

Box 5.3 illustrates how JICA provided DDR assistance in Afghanistan.

**Box 5.3: JICA's DDR Assistance in Afghanistan**

Insecurity is still one of the greatest challenges confronting Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) has to contend with local commanders who continue to hold considerable influence across the country. In support of ATA's Security System Reform process, a division of labor approach was agreed upon: Japan and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) became responsible for DDR; the United States for the establishment of the new Afghan National Army; Germany for police reestablishment; the United Kingdom for anti-drug measures and Italy for justice reform.

As the lead country for DDR, Japan hosted the Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan in February 2003, which resulted in the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program (ANBP) being announced. The ANBP aimed to launch administrative offices for demobilization, train office staff, register former soldiers, issue them identification cards, provide vocational training and create employment to promote ex-combatants' reintegration into society.

The DDR implementation framework was confirmed by the ATA, regional commanders, local communities and the international community and became operational in October 2003. Important challenges for this framework are to benefit ex-combatants from both statutory/regular and factional/irregular armies and to redress the ethnic balance of the Afghan Defense Ministry.

Within this framework, JICA established a vocational training program together with the Embassy of Japan in Kabul and the Afghan Minister of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA). This program included two phases: (i) training of instructors at the Instructors Training Center in Kabul and (ii) vocational training of ex-combatants in provinces by instructors trained in Kabul and/or direct local NGO implementation.

Training facilities were built in nine provinces with funds from the Government of Japan at sites provided by the MoLSA. Developed on the basis of a labor market survey carried out in key regions, courses cover: masonry, carpentry, tailoring, machinery, drafting/welding and sheet metal work.

Building an environment in which people do not have to resort to arms again is vital to preventing the recurrence of violent conflict. To be successful, however, DDR assistance must be conducted from the perspective of the whole security system reform process. Coherence needs to be sought between DDR, anti-narcotic activities and SSR policies.

*Source*: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Japan International Cooperation Agency.

## Regional Approaches to DDR

In some cases such as the greater Great Lakes crises, regional approaches to DDR are also necessary as shown in box 5.4.

**Box 5.4: The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) for the Greater Great Lakes Region of Africa**

The MDRP is financed through two was designed to provide technical and financial assistance for demobilization and reintegration activities to the countries involved in or affected by the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The MDRP recognizes cross-border and regional linkages in conflict themselves and the need to adopt coherent regional strategies to cope with them.

The MDRP was designed on the premises that: i) no single donor or agency can address the complexity of DDR in the region; ii) the demobilization and reintegration of combatants is necessary to establishing peace and restoring security in the region; and iii) peace and security are pre-conditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

An estimated 455,000 combatants from seven countries in the region will benefit from the MDRP: Angola (138,000), Burundi (55,000), Central African Republic (7,500), Democratic Republic of Congo (150,000), Republic of Congo (24,500), Rwanda (65,000), Uganda (15,300). Namibia and Zimbabwe are also expected to be included when appropriate.

The MDRP is financed through two separate but complementary windows: World Bank/International Development Association funds of up to US$150 million and a Multi-Donor Trust Fund of US$350 million, where resources of all donors are pooled in a single trust fund account. Contributing donors are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Other partners are: the African Development Bank, the Economic Community of Central African States, the European Union, the Global Coalition for Africa, in addition the UN and several of its programs and specialized agencies.

*Source*: Adapted from the MDRP website: www.mdrp.org.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Support efforts to establish a national demobilization program, which provides a single framework to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups throughout the transition country.*
- ✓ *Make sure beneficiaries are adequately represented in institutional structures responsible for planning and implementing demobilization and reintegration programs.*
- ✓ *Recognize and address specific needs of special groups – male and female children, youth, disabled and chronically ill as well as women (see annexes and tools at the end of this chapter).*
- ✓ *Assist the families of the demobilized, particularly in the case of guerrilla movements, where they have usually functioned as logistical units for the military.*

- ✓ *Be creative in supporting DDR awareness and information campaigns whether they are designed for former combatants, those associated with armed forces and groups, dependants or recipient communities.*
- ✓ *Provide adequate psychological and mental health care to former combatants and other groups affected by the conflict.*
- ✓ *Promote linkages between demobilization and reintegration programs to agricultural training and land distribution to facilitate access to land.*
- ✓ *Involve participants and beneficiaries in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of demobilization and reintegration programs.*

## 5.2.2 Mine Action

Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) pose a serious threat for the civilian population and obstruct social and economic development. Left behind after armed conflicts come to a formal end, they result in loss of life and limb, limit the freedom of movement and prevent large areas of land from being cultivated. Mine action is therefore a key element of establishing a secure environment during transitions.

**Definitions**

**Mine action:** activities that aim to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impacts of mines and unexploded ordnance (International Mine Action Standards Glossary)

**Landmine (or simply "mine"):** A munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle (Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on their Destruction, also referred to as "Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention"

**Anti-personnel mine:** A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped. (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention).

**Unexploded ordnance (UXO):** Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use in an armed conflict. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so (Article 2, paragraph 2 of Protocol V to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects also referred to as "Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons").

**Explosive remnant of war (ERW):** unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance (Article 2, paragraph 4 of Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).

### Landmine and UXO Issues

People living and working in 83 countries were affected to varying degrees by the presence of landmines and UXOs between 2003 and 2004. Nobody really knows, however, the exact number of landmines and UXOs that remain or the exact number of their victims, since many cases remain unreported.

The Landmine Monitor Report 2004 identified over 8,065 new landmine/UXO casualties in calendar year 2003, including at least 1,833 children (23 percent) and 258 women (3 percent), but estimates place the actual figures between 15,000 and 20,000 new casualties each year. Less than 14 percent of reported casualties were identified as military personnel.[22]

[22] *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*.

Of the landmine and UXO-affected countries, nearly one-third are transition countries, where such devices continue to pose a significant, lasting and non-discriminatory threat. Victims are mainly civilians both from mine-affected and non-affected countries (the latter are from countries which are free from mines, but who become victims when working in mine-affected countries). In many cases, casualties occurred in countries where conflict ended more than a decade ago, such as in Cambodia, Nicaragua and even Vietnam.

*Source*: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 **Bold: State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty** *Italics: Non-States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty*
http://www.icbl.org/resources/photo/Illustrations/Maps/Landmine_Monitor_2004/Landmine_Problem_-Large.gif

## The International Response

The international response to the landmine and UXO problem has been addressed through the adoption of international legal instruments and the development of international mine action standards. Two instruments of international law apply specifically to landmines: the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (box 5.5) and the two protocols of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which relate to landmines and other devices (box 5.6).

**Box 5.5: The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention**

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, also referred to as the Ottawa Convention, is the international law instrument that prohibits anti-personnel landmines. It is a comprehensive instrument that deals with everything from mine use, production and trade, to victim assistance, mine clearance and stockpile destruction. Other munitions such as unexploded ordnance are not covered by the Convention.

As of December 2004, there were 188 States Parties to the Convention (out of the 196 states that had signed, ratified or acceded, 8 states had signed the Convention but not ratified. Major mine-affected countries are States Parties: Afghanistan and Cambodia in Asia; Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Mozambique in Africa; Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia in Europe; Colombia and Nicaragua in the Americas.

Irregular armed groups may not become States Parties to the Convention. However, these groups may make use of mechanisms, such as Deeds of Commitment and Codes of Conduct, where they can declare their commitment to stop the use, production, transfer and stockpile of anti-personnel mines and cooperate in victim assistance and mine clearing activities.

Source: Adapted from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines website, www. icbl.org.

**Box 5.6: The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons regulates the use, and in certain circumstances also the transfer, of specific conventional weapons. Protocol II addresses landmines and other devices by limiting the use of mines to military objectives. The 1996 Amended Protocol II strengthened the rules governing anti-personnel mines, although it did not include their total prohibition. Protocol V on explosive remnants of war allocates responsibilities for their clearance, removal or destruction and calls for all feasible precautions to protect civilians from their risks and effects.

As of December 2003, there were 82 States Parties to 1980 Protocol II and 74 States Parties to 1996 Amended Protocol II. Most major military powers that are not bound by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention are States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, including China, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States. Of these, all but the Russian Federation are party to 1996 Amended Protocol II.

*Source*: Adapted from GICHD, *A Guide to Mine Action*, 2nd edition (Geneva: GIDHD, January 2004): p. 55 and 60.

Efforts to standardize and professionalize mine action have also been undertaken based on experience that national demining programs have acquired over the years. The United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS) International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) constitute an important tool for preparing mine action assistance (see www.mineactionstandards.org for the latest edition).

## Five Groups of Mine Action Activities

According to the IMAS, the objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination and in which the victims' needs can be addressed. Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities:

1. Mine risk education (also known as mine awareness): educational activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and UXOs by raising awareness and promoting

behavioral change. These activities include public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison (systems and processes used to exchange information between national authorities, mine action organizations and communities on the presence of mines and UXO and their impact, and mine action activities).

2. Humanitarian demining: activities which lead to the removal of mine and UXO hazards, including technical surveys, mapping, clearance, marking, post-clearance documentation, community mine action liaison and the handover of cleared land.
3. Victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration: all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims, including survivors, with the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-term medical and psychological implication of their trauma.
4. Stockpile destruction: the physical destruction procedure towards a continual reduction of the national accumulated stock of landmines and UXO. Techniques range from relatively simple open burning and open detonation techniques to highly sophisticated industrial processes. Stockpile destruction can be carried out by different types of organizations, such as commercial companies, national mine action teams or military units.
5. Advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines: public support, recommendation or positive publicity with the aim of removing, or at least reducing, the threat from, and the impact of, landmines and UXO.

While UN peace operations and agencies usually take the lead in mine action, in particular as it relates to humanitarian demining and stockpile destruction, bilateral aid agencies and NGOs can contribute mostly to mine risk education and victim assistance. Table 5.5 shows examples of what bilateral aid agencies and NGOs can do in these areas. Advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines is carried out more generally at the political level by donor governments and international NGOs and campaigns.

**Table 5.5: Bilateral Aid Agencies and NGOs: Assistance to Mine Action**

| | Why it is needed | How it can be supported |
|---|---|---|
| **Mine risk education** | • To prevent deaths and physical impairments in mine-affected areas<br>• Also important when there will be large population movements, such as return of refugees, IDPs and former combatants | • Developing educational strategies that are adapted to local conditions (this should take into account victims statistics, reasons for mine accidents, local contexts)<br>• Identifying and training staff, including those of local NGOs and religious groups<br>• Selecting communication means (meetings, media, theater and other cultural activities) and tools (brochures, posters, radio and television spots) |
| **Victim assistance, including assistance and reintegration** | • To reduce deaths and minimize physical impairments<br>• To support the return to a life as normal as possible<br>• To support socio-economic reintegration | • Ensuring evacuation, first aid and emergency care<br>• Providing physical and psychological treatment<br>• Providing psychosocial support for social reintegration in the family and communities<br>• Supporting return to productive life through vocational rehabilitation, micro-enterprise promotion or other form of professional reinsertion<br>• Ensuring full and equal educational access |

Tools to prepare mine risk education and victim assistance programs are:

- UN International Guidelines for Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education, www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Mine_Awareness_Guidelines_1999.pdf.

- UNDP and World Rehabilitation Fund Guidelines for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Landmine Survivors, written by Jack Victor, Steven Estey and Heather Burns Knlerim, www.worldrehabfund.org/publications/GuidelinesforLandmineSurvivors_000.pdf.

Boxes 5.7 and 5.8 show how mine risk education was undertaken in Cambodia and how a victim assistance strategy was developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively.

**Box 5.7: Mine Risk Education in Cambodia**

More than ten years after the end of the war, Cambodia is still working to clear the millions of mines and UXOs left behind throughout the country. No records exist to help identify where these mines and UXOs are located. Survey results show that some 3,075 areas are still suspected of being contaminated, which endangers people living in 46.2 percent of all Cambodian villages. Although the number of victims appears to be decreasing, CMAC still recorded 745 victims in 2003. An important area of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) is therefore to coordinate the implementation of mine risk education programs.

In this context, CMAC has developed two tools: the Community Based Mine Risk Reduction (CBMRR) and the Mobile Mine Awareness Teams. The objectives of these are three-fold: to establish an effective and sustainable community based risk reduction network at district, commune and village levels; to facilitate the access of mine/UXO affected communities to appropriate victim assistance programs and community development responses; and to maintain and improve a public information campaign to raise awareness among mine/UXO affected communities. Mobile Mine Awareness Teams were instrumental in carrying out such information campaigns through a range of communication techniques.

*Source*: Cambodian Mine Action Centre, *Annual Report 2003*, www.cmac.org.kh/Publication.htm, p. 1-3 and 9-14.

**Box 5.8: Victim Assistance Strategy Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The 2004 Landmine Victim Assistance Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the result of the collaboration of several organizations under the coordination of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center. The Strategy aimed to address inter alia the following problems with victim assistance:

- Existence of programs that partly duplicate services that already exist in the country
- Poor coordination and referral between existing services and poor cooperation between local experts and external actors
- The socio-economic reintegration of mine survivors is still very difficult in light of the country's economic conditions
- Absence of registration of the number of people with disabilities which makes available information insufficient
- Information about rights and assistance for victims is incomplete and hard to find.

*Source*: Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre, *Bosnia and Herzegovina Landmine Victims Assistance Strategy*, p. 5 and 6, www.bhmac.org.

Key mine action challenges are related to:

- Promoting comprehensive mine action strategies/programs and ensuring coherent linkages between the five different groups of mine action activities.
- Ensuring compliance with mine action standards to improve efficiency and effectiveness and avoid gaps.
- Building and reinforcing domestic institutional mine action capacity by supporting national mine action centers, both technically and financially.
- Designing and implementing coherent transfer strategies from heavy external operational involvement, most often organized within the framework of UN peace operations or large scale humanitarian relief interventions, to national institutions.
- Ensuring the sustainability of national mine action centers to effectively carry out their functions within the context of financial, human resource, and technical constraints.

*Good Practices in mine action have been extensively compiled in the International Mine Action Standards. Field practitioners should comply and encourage compliance with them as well as support efforts towards the adoption of national mine action standards adapted to the country concerned*

*Source*: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, *A Guide to International Mine Action Standards* (Geneva: GICHD, January 2004).

## *5.3 Addressing Criminal Insecurity in Transition Situations*

### 5.3.1 Reform of Police Structures

The reform of police structures is particularly challenging in transitions. When such structures do exist, they operate more like the military, serve political and ideological purposes and are often held responsible for grave human rights violations. Poor working conditions and low salaries may also make them inefficient and sometimes corrupt.

#### Absence of Widely Accepted Definition of Police Reform – Different Objectives

There is no single, widely shared definition of "police reform", "police restructuring" or "police reorganization", terms which are used interchangeably. This shows that policy-makers and practitioners have not been able to agree on a common approach to the reform of police structures.

Consequently, different objectives are generally pursued, depending on the organization supporting the reform of police structures. The most common police reform objectives are:

- To improve overall protection of internationally recognized human rights. The main focus is on improving police conduct – see box 5.9; for example, purging human-rights violators from police ranks (see chapter 7, section 7.2.2 "lustration"), revising police doctrines, training to emphasize human rights standards and establishing internal and external mechanisms for accountability.
- To build confidence in irregular armed movements and their supporters. The main focus is to strengthen the peace process; it is by nature more short-term oriented, for example, by adopting group-based selection criteria to allow former combatants to be integrated into truly national police forces and ensuring that the ethnic composition of the police reflects that of the communities in which they serve – often at the expense of individual competence and merit.
- To strengthen the law enforcement capacity of national structures in accordance with international standards to combat local and transnational crime. The main focus is on professionalization, for example, by rationalizing the size, structure and resources of law enforcement; and by improving working conditions, raising salaries and benefits, and offering advanced training.
- To strengthen democratic governance. The main focus is on establishing rule of law and promoting justice reforms. It is more comprehensive and based on a longer-term horizon. Sometimes it is an integral part of security system reforms, for example, reforming not only police structures but the whole gamut of law enforcement institutions or criminal justice systems.

**Box 5.9: Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials**

In December 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. The Code is composed of eight fundamental articles, setting forth the specific responsibilities of law enforcement officials with regard to service to the community; protection of human rights; use of force; treatment of confidential information; prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; protection of the health of detainees; corruption; and respect for the law and the Code itself. Each article is, in essence, the basic yardstick by which the

conduct of police – civilian or military, uniformed or not – is to be gauged by the international community.

Source: OHCHR, Human Rights and Law Enforcement: A Manual on Human Rights Training for the Police, OHCHR Professional Training Series no. 5, 1997, unpaged.

Box 5.10 shows some of the basic principles of democratic policing.

**Box 5.10: Democratic Policing**

- Is subject to the rule of law which embraces internationally recognized values respectful of human dignity, rather than the wishes of a powerful leader or party.
- Intervenes in the life of citizens only under limited and carefully controlled circumstances in accordance with international human rights standards.
- Is accountable to communities being policed, to the taxpayers who pay the bills, and to the legal order governing their authority.

## Leading External Actors in Police Reform

The United Nations has gained extensive experience in the reform of police structures, particularly in the various peace operations deployed in several continents over the past fifteen years:

- **Americas** – El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti
- **Africa** – Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone
- **Asia** – Cambodia, Timor-Leste
- **Europe** – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo

UN-supported police reform is usually implemented by civilian police officers (CIVPOL), usually law enforcement personnel on active duty in their home countries who are seconded by UN Member States to UN peace operations. Regional organizations and bilateral agencies have also contributed to police reform assistance:

- **OSCE** – assists and trains police in the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia
- **European Union** – has taken over and continued UN police assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has deployed a police presence in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (see box 5.11)
- **US Justice Department** – provides training to police services and judiciaries in many countries through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
- **GTZ** – carries out community policing programs in several countries

**Box 5.11: European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)**

The EUPM began its work on 1 January 2003 at the invitation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities. The EUPM does not have an executive mandate and does not perform investigations. Its objective is to bring the Bosnia and Herzegovina police closer to the best European and international practices through several programs (training and education related to internal affairs, public order and security and state border service, for example).

EUPM is also supporting efforts to establish a single police structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina. At present, the country has more than 15 independent police bodies that are fragmented and very expensive to maintain. Although the country has many qualified police officers, their efforts are often hampered by inefficient structures and a lack of cooperation across the Inter-Entity Border Line.

*Source*: Adapted from the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina website, www.eupm.org.

## Core Activities of Police Reform

Depending on specific country programs, police reform can comprise one or more of the core activities outlined in table 5.6:

**Table 5.6: Core Activities of Police Reform in Transitions**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Purging and purification** | • Weeding out police personnel who are human rights violators, war criminals or who have committed other crimes<br>• Non-compliance reporting, followed by de-certification warnings and final de-certification (loss of the authority to exercise police functions) |
| **Training** | • Organizing training courses on:<br>  ○ How to better protect and safeguard the rights and freedoms of citizens: democratic police standards, human rights principles, crisis management, crowd control<br>  ○ How to better combat local and transnational crime (such as prostitution, organized crime, economic crime and human trafficking): investigation techniques, intelligence, ,forensics, drug awareness, hazardous materials handling<br>  ○ How to better manage police structures: personnel management, relations between police and judicial authorities, finance, logistics, procurement, facilities and equipment maintenance and asset management<br>• Providing on-the-job mentoring and skills transfer, in particular through co-location (UN/EU/OSCE/bilateral police personnel with local police officers) |
| **Institution building** | • Improving internal oversight, audit and internal investigations mechanisms<br>• Establishing fair and equitable police salary scales which reward integrity and good performance<br>• Establishing transparent recruitment and dismissal procedures<br>• Modernizing management, finance and procurement systems<br>• Improving infrastructure such as police stations, training facilities, communication equipment, police vehicles, uniforms and other equipment |
| **Public awareness** | • Organizing and conducting public forums, roundtables, seminars, radio broadcasts and other outreach activities to improve public awareness of:<br>• the rights and obligations of police and citizens<br>• the fundamental principles of democratic policing, such as protection, accountability and non-discrimination, particularly in areas where the police most frequently come in contact with the public (traffic, domestic violence, detention situations)<br>• Adopting community policing which also contributes to enhancing confidence of the local community in the police |

## Common Gaps in Police Reform

There are some endemic problems that seriously impair the reform of police structures and are often beyond the reach of individual programs, whether they are carried out by the UN, the EU, the OSCE or bilateral institutions:

- Irregular payment of wages which are often not sufficient to ensure decent living conditions
- Lack of an efficient and effective criminal justice system to follow police work
- The public security gap that inevitably occurs in transitions – police reform takes time but security threats continue to exist
- Resistance from those national/military institutions which formerly controlled internal security

- Difficulty in establishing recruitment policies capable of ensuring a balanced representation of various ethnic groups
- Neglect of back office support capacities in favor of frontline patrol units
- Difficulty in ensuring that reform efforts will be sustainable in the absence of external actors
- Lack of knowledge on how the reform progress can be measured

Boxes 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate how Germany has supported police reform.

**Box 5.12: Community Policing – A Practical Approach to Supporting Police Reform (GTZ Pilot Project in Mozambique)**

In spite of the attempts of the Government of Mozambique to improve security for its citizens through judicial and police reforms since 1995, violent crime has barely been reduced and there has been a rise in the number of cases of citizens taking the law in their own hands. This situation can be remedied by giving citizens more responsibility for maintaining security in the areas where they live and for solving crime and offenses in cooperation with the police. This is referred to as community policing.

Peace councils have been elected in four urban districts as an important link between citizens and the police. Citizens are now able to pass on their concerns and problems to the police anonymously via the councils. The peace councils also arbitrate in family and neighborhood disputes before police interference is needed. Furthermore, the peace councils are also concerned with children who do not attend school and roam the streets in the area.

*Source*: Adapted from Security Sector Reform, Example of a Pilot Project, GTZ website, www2.gtz.de/security-sector/english/projects.htm.

**Box 5.13: The German-Led Police Reform in Afghanistan**

The police reform in Afghanistan began to take shape in February 2002 when Germany was designated the lead country for this sector. Following a conference held in Berlin on the international support for the Afghan police, the German government launched the Project for Support of the Police in Afghanistan. This project covered the following five areas:

- Technical advice on the structure and organization of the police force
- The rehabilitation of the Kabul Police Academy
- The reconstruction of police buildings and institutions
- The provision of equipment such as police vehicles
- The coordination of all other donor activities related to policing

Main constraints and lessons identified in 2003 and 2004 were:

**Lack of coordination:** a good level of coordination between main stakeholders – the Afghanistan Minister of Interior, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme, Germany and the United States – was difficult to achieve. Synergies between programs should be better explored to avoid duplication. Information-sharing and cooperation should be enhanced. Afghan ownership of the reform should be encouraged.

**Insecurity:** the security vacuum that prevailed in large parts of the country, particularly in the south and southeast, was a major impediment to greater progress. While some form of armed forces were needed to secure the environment, Germany and the US also recognized the urgency of the situation and took steps to quicken the pace of training by shortening the duration of training and expediting the construction of training centers.

**Lack of capacity and corruption:** capacity within the Afghanistan Minister of Interior is low at the institutional and individual levels. Allegations of nepotism and unethical recruitment practices abound. Steps should also be taken to balance the ethnic composition of this institution. Financial resources to cover salaries and other expenditures were often misappropriated.

**Funding shortfall:** Pledges and disbursement of funds were largely inferior to the amount required for the reform. The Afghanistan Minister of Interior had a persistent budgetary deficit which undermined reform. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA) was created to narrow this funding gap, but received lower contributions than expected.

*Source*: Adapted from *Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward,* Technical Annex on the National Police and Law Enforcement, January 2004, pp. 4-14.

**Good Practices**

- ✓ ***Integrate efforts to reform the police*** *with broader efforts to reform the entire rule of law/justice system/correctional system/security system.*
- ✓ *Plan and implement police reform with a* ***long-term perspective*** *– police reform is highly political and will confront resistance.*
- ✓ ***Strengthen the police as an institution*** *instead of focusing exclusively on human rights training – sound management practices are as important as knowledge and practice of human rights.*
- ✓ ***Draw selectively upon external ideas and models to ensure they are coherent*** *and respond to the needs of the transition society in question – local history, traditions and culture must be respected.*
- ✓ ***Involve police officers*** *in all aspects of police reform.*
- ✓ ***Gain the support*** *of higher ranks and involve lower ranks in all aspects of police reform.*

## 5.3.2 Civilian Disarmament and Small Arms and Light Weapons Control

Experience has shown that formal military disarmament within the framework of peace operations does not lead necessarily to the complete elimination or collection of weapons, even if it is conducted in the most efficient and effective manner. Large quantities of weapons remain in hidden storage sites or in private hands mainly because the parties are not entirely confident in the transition from war to peace.

The ready availability of these arms and weapons poses a threat to the peace process and leads to the resurgence and increase in violence, banditry and other forms of criminal activities. It is therefore important that civilian disarmament programs be established and implemented once military disarmament is completed. Box 5.14 shows the types of weapons most commonly used in internal conflicts.

**Box 5.14: United Nations Experience:**
**Types of Weapons Most Used in Internal Conflicts**

**Small arms:** revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns, assault rifles, light machine-guns

**Light weapons:** heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, mortars of calibers of less than 100mm

**Ammunition and explosives:** cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades

Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. (United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 27 August 1977, UN Doc. A/52/299, paragraph 25.)

*Source*: UNDPKO, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines*, December 1999, p. 51.

## Civilian Disarmament

Civilian disarmament initiatives are key components of transition efforts. Like military disarmament programs, they require careful planning and timing. A coherent national disarmament program has to be developed, which describes:

- The territorial coverage, based on weapons surveys
- The weapons collection procedures, which must include clear and equitable turn-in procedures
- The incentive programs, which have to be carefully planned not to create a market for weapons or attract even more weapons to the country (see table 5.7)
- The public awareness and information campaign to win the confidence and support of the civilian population
- Follow up weapons search and seizure procedures, including the confiscation of weapons and harsh penalties for holders in accordance with legislation
- The weapons storage, destruction and reutilizations procedures

Timing is also crucial in civilian disarmament. Military disarmament and civilian disarmament programs should not be carried out simultaneously. Civilian disarmament should take place only after military disarmament is completed, since incentives offered in civilian disarmament initiatives may hamper military disarmament and vice-versa.

**Table 5.7: Types of Incentives in Civilian Disarmament Programs**

| Type of Incentive | Objective | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Exchange of weapons for food or goods** | • To address the short-term basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, seeds and agricultural tools | • Has a moral and symbolic dimension<br>• Can help secure short-term survival<br>• Can reduce resources required by humanitarian agencies | |
| **Weapons in exchange for development** | • To provide job training and other vocational support and/or can be linked to other community development needs such as roads and bridges | • Supports social cohesion<br>• Contributes to economic development | • Only works if there is a perception of joint weapons ownership and if donor assistance available from other sources is limited |
| **Buy-back** | • To exchange weapons for cash | | • Can increase the value of arms, if the price is not carefully defined<br>• Cash can be used to buy newer weapons<br>• Perverse economic effects if large amounts of cash are injected into fragile economies |
| **Weapons in competition for development** | • To challenge two communities of similar size and divide the funds available for development proportionally between them, according to the | • Contributes to economic development | • Can spur new conflicts between participating communities |

| | |
|---|---|
| | percentage of weapons handed in by each community |

*Source*: Adapted from Douglas, Ian, et al., *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide* (GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC, 2004), p. 41 and Compendium of Good Practices on Security Sector Reform, "Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)", www.gfn-ssr.org.

These incentives should be carefully planned with the communities involved and decided on a case-by-case basis. They should also be of a relatively short duration to avoid the creation of a market for arms, which can result in many more being smuggled into the country. In addition to careful planning, timing and duration, experience also shows that successful civilian disarmament initiatives depend upon:

- **The level of confidence in the peace process:** If civilians perceive the peace/reconciliation process as too fragile and believe that hostilities might resume, they will be unwilling to surrender their weapons no matter what they are offered in return.
- **The security situation in the country:** If citizens feel they have to remain armed for personal security, because crime is of great concern to the population as a whole or because the local police or security forces are part of the problem, civilian disarmament programs are doomed to fail.
- **The existence of a culture of weapons:** If the possession of weapons is of cultural significance to the population and was considered a habit that existed prior to violent conflict, civilian disarmament programs will invariably fail.

***In brief, people will only surrender their weapons if they feel they no longer need them.***

Box 5.15 shows how Japan promoted a weapons for development program in Cambodia.

**Box 5.15: Weapons for Development: A Comprehensive, Community-Based Approach in Cambodia**

The excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) hinders reconstruction and humanitarian aid in countries in reconstruction. The Weapons for Development (WfD) program promoted by Japan in Cambodia is a comprehensive, community-based approach to reduce the excessive illegal circulation and possession of arms. WfD is a weapons reduction mechanism, collecting weapons from communities in exchange for assistance in improving their social infrastructure, e.g. repair and construction of roads, wells, bridges, etc. This project consists of four pillars, namely "weapons for development", "weapons destruction", "weapons registration" and "public awareness". Each of these interdependent pillars is vital for the success of the entire project. This project builds on the experience gained since 2000 by the European Union program on combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALWs in Cambodia (EUASAC).

Sustainable development is necessary to avoid the recurrence of conflicts. WfD is offered as an incentive to the affected areas. Through the support of registration of SALWs, illicit circulation can be avoided in the future. Collected weapons should be destroyed in public to demonstrate the political will to tackle this issue and raise public awareness. Public awareness projects help people realize the dangers and social consequences of illicit circulation of SALWs. Community workshops are used to help build confidence between people and security branches and promote the voluntary surrender of SALWs.

Under WfD, civil society plays an important role. Since the collection of weapons is based on the voluntary surrender of weapons, co-operation with NGOs to conduct public awareness projects is a key to success. NGOs therefore participate directly in the peacebuilding and capacity-building process. Furthermore, WfD is a peace building process that tackles the cause of conflicts such as poverty and social exclusion. People's lives are being improved through sustainable development, the creation of good governance and confidence-building between security providers and civilians.

*Source*: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (in OECD/DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice* (Paris: OECD, 2004), p. 38).

### Small Arms and Light Weapons Control

Effective small arms and light weapons control requires the adoption of a comprehensive national policy. The national policy should cover the following:

- A clear national legal framework for ownership and possession of permitted weapons and the prohibition of proscribed weapons
- Efficient and effective law enforcement mechanisms, including an independent judicial system
- Inter-state transfers control through customs procedures, such as export and import permits
- Regional and international cooperation, including the introduction of a moratorium on the transfer of specified categories of weapons

There is increasing recognition at the international level that it is impossible for a state to act on its own to control successfully the flow of small arms and light weapons into its territory. At the same time, however, there are no agreed international norms prohibiting the production, stockpiling, use and transfer of small arms and light weapons. Yet, to ban small arms and light weapons in the same fashion as landmines and UXOs would be an impossible task as states rely on these weapons for their legitimate national defense and internal security needs.

**Good Practices**

- ✓ Field practitioners should consider civilian disarmament initiatives during transitions only if:
- ✓ Military disarmament has been completed.
- ✓ Confidence in the peace/reconciliation process is high.
- ✓ Security conditions have improved considerably.
- ✓ The society in question does not have a culture of weapons.
- ✓ Implementing and enforcing effective small arms and light weapons control within the transition country in question is possible.

## *5.4 Transforming the Security System*

Security system transformation has emerged as a key activity in supporting transitions from conflict to peace. External actors have come to realize that supporting DDR, mine action, police reform, civilian disarmament and small arms control in a piecemeal fashion is not sufficient to ensure transition countries will be able to ensure the security of their people. Promoting linkages between these activities and integrating them into overall efforts to create a well-functioning security system increases the chances of establishing a truly sustainable and locally-run secure environment.

### 5.4.1 Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

The democratic governance of the security sector presupposes a well-functioning system of checks and balances. This system must be capable of ensuring the security needs of the people in a manner consistent with democratic governance principles, such as the rule of law, transparency and accountability. Bearing in mind the country differences that might exist due to various political, social, economic and cultural backgrounds:

- The Executive adopts national security policies based on accurate estimates of security threats, manages the security sector organizations through national, regional and local levels of government, determines their budget and ensures security services are delivered in a professional manner.

- The Legislature exercises parliamentary oversight through general legislative powers and exercises budget and procurement control. Parliamentary oversight can also be exercised through the creation of a parliamentary ombudsman or an investigation commission.
- The Judiciary prosecutes the illegal transgressions of security sectors officials and follows up on their law enforcement work through the criminal justice system in an independent and impartial manner.

The OSCE Code of Conduct for Politico-Military Aspects of Security outlines the main principles for proper democratic control of the security sector (box 5.16).

**Box 5.16: The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994): Key Features**

- Broad concept of internal forces that includes: intelligence services, paramilitary and police. These provisions assert the duty of states to maintain those forces under effective democratic control through authorities vested with democratic legitimacy (paragraphs 20 and 21).
- Provision of legislative approval of defense budget and encouragement of the exercise of restraint in military expenditure. Transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces (paragraph 22).
- Political neutrality of the armed forces (paragraph 23); armed forces personnel can be held individually accountable for violations of international humanitarian law (paragraph 31).
- Armed forces are, in peace and in war, commanded, manned, trained and equipped in accordance with the provisions of international law (paragraph 34).
- Recourse to force in performing internal security missions must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property (paragraph 36).
- The use of the armed forces cannot limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of citizens' human and civil rights or deprive them of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity (paragraph 37).

*Source*: OSCE Code of Conduct, Sections VII and VIII, in DCAF and IPU, "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector – Principles, Mechanisms and Practices", *Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 5* (Geneva/Belgrade, 2003), p. 156.

In transition societies, tremendous efforts need to be undertaken to align the security sector with these core democratic governance principles. This usually requires supporting initiatives and programs that go beyond reforming security sector organizations. They include inter alia:

- **Constitutional reviews:** The constitution should provide the legal basis for the democratic control of the security system. While constitutions vary from country to country, they lay down important provisions for government control, parliamentary oversight and judiciary functions.
- **Civilian control and management:** The military and government functions are often blurred in countries transitioning from war to peace. It is important to support the establishment of civilian governance institutions capable of keeping security sector organizations under civilian control. This requires carrying out national security reviews and developing national security policies in the context of national recovery and development goals. Arms control, transfer and procurement should also be an integral part of the security policy.
- **Parliamentary oversight:** Parliaments in transition countries need to be strengthened to exercise oversight of the security sector. Parliamentarians are rarely familiar with security issues and the important oversight role they can play. The Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector describes in more detail the important role that parliamentarians have to play in overseeing the security sector.
- **Judicial follow up and prosecution:** Criminal justice systems in transition countries lack capacity to properly follow up on the work of law enforcement officials. Moreover, they

are rarely regarded as independent and impartial to prosecute security officers who do not act in accordance with democratic governance principles.

As described in section 5.4.1 of this chapter, the media and civil society organizations can also play an important role in supporting the transformation of the security system. Chapter 6 examines more generally how external actors can support democratic governance in transition situations. Transitional justice is examined both in chapters 6 and 7.

## 5.4.2 Restructuring of Security Organizations

An important component of security system reform in transition countries is the restructuring of security organizations. Such a restructuring seeks to increase the transition country's ability to meet the wide range of security needs within their societies in accordance with democratic norms and sound governance principles. Main activities include:

- **Armed forces:** Reform is carried out by creating new unified armed forces, merging two existing ones or integrating former combatants into the national armed forces. Such efforts are often accompanied by downsizing over-represented categories through DDR programs and professionalizing the military forces. It also involves integrating combatants with different backgrounds on organization, rank and leadership structures and political ideologies. It requires approval from the government's military leadership and from political and military opposition leadership.
- **Civilian police forces:** Restructuring requires efforts to create an institution responsible for internal security which is distinct and independent from the military. It is most effective if supported by international civilian police officials. It should be combined and coordinated with criminal system reform. It also requires strong domestic commitment. See section 5.3.1 above.
- **Criminal justice systems:** There is growing recognition that reforming the police is not sustainable in the presence of dysfunctional judicial and corrections systems. Judicial reform is predicated on the principle of independence of the judiciary and requires an appropriate legal framework such as a criminal code. Corrections system reform implies building capacity to provide humane treatment to prisoners. A number of international instruments provide basic standards for corrections management, of which the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty are a few examples.
- **Intelligence services and paramilitary forces** (national guards, border control, coast guard, civilian defense corps, gendarmerie): Restructuring requires turning them into effective, politically neutral and professional institutions. Reforming intelligence services in accordance with democratic governance principles may include separating services for internal intelligence and military intelligence, training intelligence personnel and establishing clear procedures for the declassification of materials. Reforming paramilitary forces also involves efforts to create institutions which are distinct and independent from the military. It also requires strong domestic commitment.

In sum, restructuring security sector organizations in transition situations will necessarily depend upon:

- Reviewing/adopting legislation and regulations that describe the structure, mandate and other relevant issues related to the functioning of these organizations
- Securing the independence of all civilian organizations from the armed forces
- Redistributing spending from the armed forces to the civilian organizations
- Carrying out extensive institution-building and human resource development

Bilateral aid agencies and NGOs can contribute to the activities above by providing technical assistance, carrying out training programs and supporting institution building.

### 5.4.3 Challenges and Good Practices to Support the Transformation of the Security System during Transitions

Transitions from conflict to peace often coincide with transitions from authoritarianism to democracy (see chapter 1, diagram 1.1). This poses challenges to transforming the security system that are often beyond the reach of a single external actor. Transforming the security sector:

- Is a highly political endeavor and involves altering power balances.
- Requires change in the institutional culture and individual attitudes – dramatic changes in mindsets take long to materialize.
- Requires striking the difficult balance between the degree of confidentiality and secrecy that is necessary in security-sector activities and the need for transparency and accountability that democratic governance demands.
- Depends not only on promoting comprehensive approaches – for example, it is not sustainable to reform only the police and not criminal justice systems or to carry out civilian disarmament without small arms control – but also on promoting coherent linkages between the security system reform and other transition/development activities – for example, fulfilling the basic human needs of the population, establishing democratic governance and promoting economic recovery.
- Needs to be planned in accordance with the country's general poverty reduction strategy and development policy.

**Good Practices**

- ✓ Adopt a comprehensive security sector reform strategy that addresses the security system as a whole and the various institutional aspects of security organizations: institutional structure and culture, human resource practices and relationship with the civilian power.
- ✓ Recognize that the security system transformation agenda is a human and institutional capacity-building agenda.
- ✓ Foster local ownership of security system reform processes, in particular through participatory approaches.
- ✓ Recognize that every country has a unique history and functioning mode and that there are different ways to promote the transformation of the security system.
- ✓ Move from training to other forms of institutional capacity building.
- ✓ Identify priorities and develop strategies that are consistent with local capabilities.

## General Lessons on Establishing a Secure Environment

- ✓ Establishing a secure environment is crucial for reconciliation and long-term development. It requires addressing insecurity inherited from violent conflict (through DDR and mine action programs), ending criminal insecurity typical of transitions (through police reform, civilian disarmament and small arms control) and promoting the transformation of the security system (through democratic governance and reform).
- ✓ Achieving a secure environment is not the reserved domain of the military. Development aid agencies and other civilian actors can contribute to building the capacity of domestic security organizations to fulfill functions that are expected of them in democratic societies.
- ✓ National parliaments, civil society groups and the independent media need to be supported to become key stakeholders in ensuring the democratic oversight of the security sector.
- ✓ Assistance to security-related efforts is a highly sensitive matter in any country. Development aid agencies depend on the commitment of internal actors and can only play the role of a facilitator of changes.
- ✓ Interfacing with the military is inevitable when carrying out security-related assistance. It is crucial to understand the different role the military play in order to promote coordination and to aim for a clear division of labor.
- ✓ Linkages should be promoted between and among DDR, mine action, police reform, civilian disarmament and small arms control. These activities need also to be integrated into the overall security system reform.
- ✓ Activities aiming to establish a secure environment should also be coherently linked to wider recovery efforts, for example, by referring ex-combatants to reintegration opportunities available to returnees in general.
- ✓ It is important to ensure coherence between security-related assistance and other transition/development activities.

# Resources

## Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

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The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) was created to support SSR from the UK perspective, acting as a resource for the UK government, as well as other global institutional, organizational and government partners. The GFN-SSR does this by providing technical assistance; research that facilitates policy development; capacity-building for SSR initiatives worldwide and maintaining an information repository of SSR related materials.

# Chapter 6
# Democratic Governance

## *Chapter Objectives*

- Provide an overview of the challenges involved in democratic governance assistance.
- Discuss how governing institutions can be supported during transitions (administration, legislature and the justice system).
- Introduce two important processes in democratic governance: building or renewing the constitution and electoral systems.
- Show the important role that civil society and the media play in democratic governance.

## *Introduction*

Democratic governance has emerged as one of the most complex and sensitive components of transition assistance. It requires both enhancing the political legitimacy of governments and increasing state capacity to respond to the demands of citizens. Such legitimacy and capacity are in turn dependent on a number of inter-related issues: the separation and balance of powers, the presence of the rule of law, efficient and effective public institutions, a vibrant civil society and an independent media.

Transition situations constitute windows of opportunity for building democratic governance. Often integrated into peace agreements, the move towards democratic governance constitutes both an important means and a guarantee for the reconciliation of opposing parties and fractured societies. External actors are often invited to support democratic governance and thus have a unique opportunity to provide direct assistance in this domain.

However, building democratic governance is not an orderly and linear process. It is rather a long, unpredictable and sometimes reversed process, which may lead to intangible, indirect and less than perfect outcomes at least in the short- and medium-terms. In this context, external actors need to have realistic expectations about impact and at the same time have to be able to sustain enduring commitment.

## *6.1 Overview*

Democracy and governance are two complementary and interdependent concepts.

**The Value of Democracy**

Democracy provides legitimacy to governments by rooting their actions in the will of the governed, builds greater success for national programs by engaging the energies of the governed, increases the potential for long-term sustainable economic development, and fosters human security by providing avenues for dissent to be expressed in legitimate, non-violent forms (The Fifth International Conference of New or Restored Democracies, Ulaanbaatar Declaration, 2003).

**The Notion of Governance**

Governance concerns the state's ability to serve the citizens. It refers to the rules, processes, and behaviors by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised are the major issues to be addressed in this context (The European Commission, Communication on Governance and Development, October 2003, COM(03)615).

**Democratic Governance**

Democratic governance primarily seeks to promote power and influence of poor people in society through a democratic political process, which is characterized by participation, equality in dignity and rights, transparency and accountability. The state's will and capacity to live up to its responsibility, and to the best of its ability, for guaranteeing the human rights and freedoms for all women, men, girls and boys is central (SIDA, Digging Deeper – Four Reports on Democratic Governance in International Development Cooperation – Summary, August 2003).

## 6.1.1 Main Features and Benefits

There is wide consensus about the main features of democratic governance and the important advantages it can offer in relation to other regimes.

- Building democratic governance is first and foremost a domestic process, which arises from internal political and social dynamics. External actors can only provide assistance, both in direct or indirect manners.
- Democratization and the exercise of political rights are learned. Democratic governance can thus take many forms. Each country has to build its own institutions and rules, according to its own specific cultural, historical, political and social circumstances.
- Democratic governance is contingent on genuine political will and a strong commitment of the ruling elite and society at large. This presupposes efforts to address the underlying distribution of power, corruption and nepotism.
- Democratic governance restrains state power through the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances.
- Democratic governance includes more than the right to vote. It is about institutions that are efficient, transparent and accountable so they can be responsive to people's needs.
- Democratic governance does not automatically secure equitable social and economic development, but helps create an enabling environment for sustainable human development to take place.
- There is no linear or orderly continuum from authoritarianism to democratic governance. Building democratic governance is a long and difficult process that often goes through periods of restricted, illiberal and fragile democratic governance.
- Respect for traditional forms of governance – which can be compatible with democracy – is important when designing new forms of governance.
- Democratic governance is better than authoritarian regimes at mitigating internal conflicts. Its institutions and rules provide the necessary space for opponents to compete and hope for changes without destroying the system. Democratic governance also offers a wide range of non-violent mechanisms to resolve conflicts.

## 6.1.2 Democratic Governance during Transitions

There is a growing consensus that conflicts may arise mainly due to governance failures and that democratic governance might play a key role in reconciling opposing parties. Building democratic governance during transitions is, however, significantly more complex than in 'normal' development situations. Using as a starting point the human security paradigm discussed in chapter 3, it becomes particularly important that democratic governance focuses on acknowledging the state's responsibility to protect its own citizens, strengthening the capacity and freedom of people to exercise options and activating popular participation in implementing these options. The following specific factors affect the context in which the transition to democratic governance occurs.

- **Weak states.** Transition countries are most often weak states. Their central governing structures have invariably lost control over significant parts of the state territory to opposition movements. These state structures may also be unable or unwilling to provide

the most basic services to considerable segments of the population (hence the importance for external actors to address urgent human needs as a matter of human security, see chapter 3). Often, part of the population has fled into neighboring countries and there is widespread internal population displacement. In addition, infrastructure and human resources are often destroyed and depleted (see chapter 8), government buildings are in deplorable conditions and equipment is scarce, and civil servants may have been killed or fled during conflict.

- **Absence of state structures and no central government.** In the worst case scenario, transition countries are left with no state structures and no central government. Their territory has become fragmented, each part falling under the control of a different warring faction and/or warlord. International and local humanitarian NGOs, and sometimes private actors, are the ones providing the most basic services to the population in lieu of the state. Government buildings that have not been destroyed are abandoned or unduly occupied. The civil service has been disbanded. To fill this gap, the United Nations and other external actors may assume governing/administrative functions.
- **From military war-time to political peace-time leadership.** In addition to suffering under an authoritarian or military government, transition countries have actually experienced armed conflict for several years. The war mentality and effort are therefore widespread: the armed forces are powerful and absorb most of the national budget; the entire security sector is under military control and management (see chapter 5, section 5.4.1 on how to strengthen the democratic governance of the security sector). War/military leadership rarely becomes capable of abiding by democratic principles overnight. Clientelism, corruption, arbitrariness and the abuse of power are norms of behavior that have often paid off in war time and are difficult to change. Consequently, the learning curve required for a democratic governance model is higher than it would be in 'normal' development situations.
- **Little credibility or capacity of national institutions.** In many transition situations where neither a full-fledged war nor a sustained peace has become the norm, pockets of instability remain. In these pockets national institutions have little credibility or capacity and non-state actors (from warlords to foreign NGOs) are prominent, while the rule of law is absent.

These features that characterize transitions and adversely affect efforts to move towards democratic governance show that internal and external actors will have to accept imperfect forms of governance for considerable periods of time. For example, imposed power-sharing arrangements might be cumbersome and protracted for a while, but will increase the potential for broad based public support and a more inclusive governance agenda. The most important is to ensure that these forms of impure democracy are reconciliatory, and constitute a stepping stone towards democratic governance.

The fact that a state is weak or that it does not have a central government does not mean that its people and communities are also weak or have failed. People who have survived violent conflict and dealt with the military have sometimes become amazingly resilient. The same argument is valid for communities, which have sometimes been able to develop extraordinary coping mechanisms to survive conflict.

This means that the principles of the human security concept – assistance and protection at the same time, self-reliance, local or national ownership, capacity building of internal actors and capacity at the state level to engage in measures that provide human security – are also applicable when providing assistance related to democratic governance. This type of assistance depends upon promoting processes that encourage:

- Active participation of the population in decision-making, including an educative process about the rights and responsibilities of ordinary citizens
- Bottom-up democratic empowerment of communities
- Consensus-oriented decisions, based on widespread agreement
- Transparent/open to public scrutiny decision-making

- Capacity in acknowledging and acting upon the state's responsibility for ensuring human security
- Equity and inclusiveness for vulnerable and marginalized groups (for example, women, people with disabilities, minority groups). See box 6.1 for an example.

**Box 6.1: Women's Participation in Transition Efforts**

Countries emerging from war, where women often make up the majority of the population, cannot afford to ignore and marginalize their needs and skills. Women need to be involved in discussions about reconstruction priorities in order to ensure their voices and those of other habitually marginalized groups are heard in the planning of investments and implementation of projects.

They should also work with national governments and international actors to ensure that women's skills are developed, pay special attention to technical education and training in technologies and advocate for the employment of women in major reconstruction efforts.

Promoting women's political participation is also crucial during transitions.

- Women's participation as voters in elections is a critical expression of their rights as citizens in a democracy ("family voting", the practice of women being led into polling booths by their husbands, who effectively do the voting for them, should be prevented).
- Election administrators should include women and gender-sensitive men among their ranks and must adopt policies that do not effectively discriminate against women.
- Women should be encouraged to participate in electoral contests as candidates.
- Women should be encouraged to work in government functions (executive, legislative and judiciary branches) at all levels.
- Women can be the driving force behind NGOs and other civil society initiatives.

*Source*: Adapted from Women Waging Peace and International Alert, *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action,* November 2004, http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/toolkit.asp.

Transition societies have enormous issues to address in the field of democratic governance: all three branches of government – executive, legislative and judicial – have to be re-established. Additionally, the processes required to establish and operate these government bodies need to be designed. Elections need to be held. Electoral bodies and processes that ensure independent and transparent elections for legislators need to be established. Constitutional processes have to be designed as they are crucial in that the resulting constitution will ensure the means of governance and embody the basic law of the state.

Democratic governance is concerned not only with the government but also with other actors, such as civil society organizations and the media, that may play a role in taking decisions on matters of public concern. Therefore, the active involvement of civil society and the media in the design of the above mentioned activities is crucial. For example, human rights organisations help ensure that governing institutions uphold national laws and internationally recognised conventions. Similarly, the media has a powerful role as information-broker and reporter on governmental actions.

### 6.1.3 The Democratic Governance Assistance Framework

Democratic governance assistance presupposes building and strengthening governing structures, promoting constitutional and electoral processes and encouraging civil society and an independent media (see diagram 6.1 below).

## *Diagram 6.1: Democratic Governance Assistance*[23]

### Institutions

(Peace accords may dictate how these institutions are formed and how they relate to one another.)

**Public Administration**
- Repair infrastructure
- Deliver basic services
- Support establishment of functioning bureaucracy and civil service
- Help design revenue and taxation system
- Introduce human rights, gender and ombudsperson bodies

**Legislature**
- Finance legislature
- Provide technical assistance
- Provide training
- Encourage civic advocacy

**Justice and Rule of Law**
- Repair infrastructure (courts, libraries, law schools)
- Encourage judicial independence
- Provide training of legal personnel
- Encourage civic education on judiciary and access to justice
- Assist with police reform (see chapter 5, section 5.3.1)

### Processes

**Constitutions**
- Encourage public education and consultation
- Provide technical assistance
- Provide policy advice

**Elections**
- Support free and fair elections
- Assist with constitutional and legal reform
- Provide assistance to electoral management body
- Support voter registration
- Observe and monitor elections
- Support civic and voter education
- Strengthen political parties

### Civil Society

**Civil Society Organizations**
- Encourage group (trans-) formation
- Build capacity
- Provide financial resources
- Support political party formation

**Media**
- Encourage a free and responsible media
- Enhance media resources
- Train media

[23] This diagram is not exhaustive; rather, it illustrates the range and type of issues considered in this chapter.

# 6.2. Governing Institutions

## 6.2.1 Public Administration

**Public Administration**

The aggregate machinery (policies, rules, procedures, systems, organizational structures, personnel, etc.) funded by the state budget and in charge of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the state, society and external environment

The management and implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of laws, regulations, decisions of the government and management related to the provision of public services.

*Source*: UNDP, *Public Administration Reform - Practice Note* (undated), p. 1.

Violent conflict deeply scars the administrative capacity of a state in the following ways:

- Paralysis of the administrative structures of the central and local public institutions and disruption of the policy-making process. Uncertain policy development for lack of links between policy-making organs and line ministries
- Disruption of the delivery and maintenance of basic services (electricity, water and sanitation, sources of energy, transportation, telecommunications, education and basic health and social services)
- Depletion of human resources through the loss of personnel (death, exodus from the country and internal displacement)
- Destruction of basic management tools (facilities and office equipment, documents and means of transportation and communication)
- Lack of financial resources at central and local levels (decline in revenues generated by customs, taxes and other sources)
- Focus on a single objective (for example, winning the war, remaining in power) rather than on providing services to citizens
- Throughout the war little experience with horizontal structures and links (i.e., working within and among organizations at the same level of the hierarchy instead of traditional vertical reporting channels), lack of delegation of authority, poor record keeping, little documentation of bureaucratic rules and procedures. Lack of accountability and control mechanisms.

Main areas for assistance in public administration are therefore the government machinery, the civil service and the revenue and expenditure system.

### Government Machinery

In addition to re-inventing a new institutional structure, re-establishing functioning links between ministries and departments, and adopting a new organizational culture and ways of working at the national and local levels, transitions may also require:

- Establishing the government machinery in those transition countries that do not have state structures.
- Extending the government machinery to areas of the country formerly controlled by opposition movements.
- Integrating parallel administrative structures long run by opposition movements into the official government machinery.

Development aid agencies can support such processes by providing technical expertise and resources for:

- Functional reviews, which are the main tool of structural reform (see box 6.2)
- Reconstruction of public administration buildings and the provision of necessary equipment (see chapter 8 – Rebuilding Infrastructure)
- Implementation of government machinery creation, reform and extension plans

**Box 6.2: Functional Reviews of Government Machinery**

Functional reviews provide the analytical basis and guide for government machinery reform. They fulfill the following functions:

- Assessment and redefinition of roles, missions and tasks of the different levels of administration
- Establishing appropriate roles for government in any particular sector or function
- Identification of inconsistencies and omissions in the legal framework that hinder units from performing their functions
- Review of the match between the function and the staff engaged in performing it
- Proposing areas for improving horizontal coordination

*Source*: UNDP, *Public Administration Reform - Practice Note* (undated), p. 14.

Public administrations must also play an important coordinating role during transitions but often lack the capacity to do so (see table 6.1).

**Table 6.1: Coordination Role of Public Administration**

| Type of Coordination | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| **Internal** | Concerns organizing and coordinating between contending ministries, and between central and local services. | Coordinating demining activities with the opening of schools to ensure children can attend school safely. |
| **Internal-External** | Focuses on organizing external donors and agencies and internal ministries and local services. | Coordinating with UNHCR refugee camps and the reconstruction of roads to enhance the speedy delivery of supplies to camps. |
| **External** | Refers to coordinating between contending international donors and agencies. | Working with JICA and USAID on the provision of assistance to the rule of law. |

When extending the government machinery to areas formerly controlled by opposition movements and/or integrating parallel administrative structures into the official government machinery, internal and external actors will be necessarily confronted with the question of decentralization and to take decisions on an approach to it.

## Civil Service

The civil service at the end of a violent conflict is normally either disbanded (civil servants have fled) and/or highly politicized and often composed of only one ethnic group. Politicization also extends to a poor definition of jobs and functions, inadequate and obsolete rules for recruitment and subsequently to inadequately skilled professionals.

In addition, the civil service is often inappropriately staffed (too many or too few civil servants or inappropriately allocated civil servants) and there is only a weak control mechanism in place that ensures minimum work standards. Some behavioral norms that paid off during war times might still be prevalent, such as corruption, clientelism, nepotism and so on. Overall, during

transitions there is generally a lack of information about the civil service and its role in governance. In addition, records are often lost or badly maintained, so that very little institutional memory exists to rely upon.

In this context, it is particularly important to support efforts to screen out individuals associated with past abuses and to promote the de-politicization of civil service (see box 6.3 and also the concept of "lustration" discussed in chapter 7, section 7.2.2).

**Box 6.3: De-Politicization of Civil Service in Iraq**

During Saddam Hussein's regime, most of the civil service was formed by members of the Baath Party. After the Civilian Provisional Authority (CPA) of Iraq was established in 2003, the program of de-Baathification, or the removal of Baath Party members from the civil service, was announced. The CPA feared that leaving Baath Party members in place would lead to misuse of their position and support to violence from within the civil service. The process of de-Baathification reached deep into Iraqi public service. Not only were senior civil servants ousted from their jobs, but so were many lower level employees, such as school teachers and public health officials. Unfortunately, the removal of Baathists drained expertise from public service, contributed to unemployment and caused resentment that further destabilized the situation.

**Key Lessons:**

- There is no easy solution. There will always be a tension between keeping partisan staff in place and letting them go.
- Ousting an entire group because of their role in a previous regime may not be the best solution.
- Taking a contingent view may work better during transitions. Keeping key staff in place, providing them with training and perhaps pairing them with those known to be less partisan may help.
- Periodically review the behavior of partisan staff to ensure they are not misusing their position.

Reestablishing a professional civil service requires carefully addressing recruitment and promotion, pay, number of employees, performance and related matters in light of the needs of the transition country. This is usually done through civil service laws, control census and human resource development as described below.

- **Civil service laws.** Adoption of new legislation or reviewing existing civil service laws is often necessary. Ideally, such legislation promotes professionalism, independence, integrity, political impartiality, transparency and public service. The legislation must also avoid being overly rigid or unresponsive to the realities of the transition environment.
- **Control census.** Given the depletion of human resources, it is particularly important to conduct a census to establish who is still employed, to perform which tasks and how much they are being paid. Adequate training for those responsible for data collection and compilation is important.
- **Human resources development.** The development of human resources often requires implementing new laws and policies on recruitment, selection, retention, termination, performance management, organizational communication, training and development, salaries and benefits and means of payment.

## Revenue and Public Expenditure System

Expenditures should be aligned with revenues in addition to being appropriately allocated to match policy priorities and urgent needs. It is difficult for transition countries to generate revenues, however, usually because of the collapse of tax and customs systems and other revenue sources (see also Chapter 9, Section 9.3.2 on Fiscal Policy). In this context, therefore, development aid agencies and other external actors should not hesitate to provide:

- Budgetary support to transition countries to ensure the functioning of the public administration machinery
- Technical assistance and training in the establishment of effective expenditure and revenue collection systems

Since transition societies are characterized by severe political tensions, the basic conditions for extending explicit political support for administrative reform – that is, clearly defined goals and effective communication – generally do not apply. This does not mean, however, that progress on public administration reform is not possible. It does mean that entry points for action have to be well researched and decided upon in consultation with key stakeholders, that is, the public.

Employing a human security perspective, the following list enumerates possible support activities of bilateral aid agencies in this field. It is by no means an exhaustive list:

- Immediate infrastructure repair of public buildings (see also chapter 8)
- Delivery of basic emergency services to address urgent human needs and to help portray the image of a somewhat effective public service
- Technical assistance in the establishment of a functioning bureaucracy (rules and procedures, management, organization culture, values)
- Training of civil servants
- Policy advice
- Capacity-building, so that officials can ensure that a human security perspective is an actionable priority
- Design of a workable, efficient system to generate revenue for government services (see also chapter 9)
- Introduction of ministries for human rights and gender and an ombudsperson office (for more detail on the latter see chapter 7, section 7.2.4)

**Good Practices**

- ✓ *Ensure that reform of public administration **begins with using and developing internal capacity**.*
- ✓ *It helps to identify an **advocate for reform at highest levels** within the administration.*
- ✓ *Make sure there **is full understanding of the reforms, and support for them**, not only at the level of leadership, but also at the level of line management, civil servants as a whole and the public.*
- ✓ *Show and **publicize "good results"** and provide incentives for continued support and achievements.*
- ✓ *When supporting a reform of the civil service, devise strategies to **attract talented members of the diaspora to return**.*
- ✓ *Be careful **not to attract civil servants away** from their jobs.*
- ✓ ***Minimize corruption** as that is critical to promote people-centered development.*
- ✓ *Ensure that civil service law and **policies** are not only based on merit, but also **inclusive**, cutting across the divides of the violent conflict.*
- ✓ *Sponsor **meetings and dialogue over administrative needs**. Encourage citizen participation in functional reviews of the priorities and needs in the administrative machinery.*
- ✓ *Encourage **active involvement of women** in re-establishing administrative capacity.*
- ✓ *Remember that despite good intentions, **external actors' activities can have a perverse effect** on national processes. For example, international pressure to reform can free governments from the need to consult with and obtain policy support from their own citizens. If in doubt, go slow.*

## 6.2.2 Legislature

**Legislature**

A legislature provides representation, lawmaking and oversight.

**Representation** refers to the acting on behalf of or in the name of constituents. It involves legislators listening to, communicating with and representing the needs and aspirations of citizens in policymaking.

**Lawmaking** refers to the process of drafting and enacting laws for the country. It requires specialized skills, notably the ability to blend technical and legal competence with useful political knowledge.

**Oversight** includes the process of ensuring that the approved laws are implemented appropriately and as intended. Oversight implies keeping an eye on other parts of government.

A legislature must be competent, accountable, transparent and responsive.

*Source*: Adapted from USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 7-8.

Legislatures provide an important arena for peaceful and constructive debate and consensus. They can also help to reduce the likelihood of groups returning to violent conflict as a means of resolving their differences.

In transition environments, a legislature may be a new institution or may already be in existence. The exact nature of the legislature may be specified in the peace agreement, determined through the drafting of a new constitution or be a legacy of the pre-conflict environment.

Legislatures may be unicameral or bicameral, with an upper and lower house. In a transition context, however, it is sure that the legislature will change. New members will join (drawn perhaps from opposition movements), new issues will be on their agenda (reconciliation, reconstruction), and/or new legislative procedures may arise.

### Assessment Framework

The first step to strengthening legislative capacity is carrying out an assessment of the legislature (see box 6.4).

**Box 6.4: Legislative Strengthening Assessment Framework**

**Country Macropolitical Context**

- Priority country issues
- Importance of legislature for implementation of peace agreement and/or transition strategy
- Country experience with legislative bodies
- Importance of legislature for addressing key transition problems

**Macro Assessment of the Legislature**

- Status of Constitution making
- Constitutional powers of the legislature
- Regime type (presidential, parliamentary, hybrid)
- Electoral system
- Experience of political parties in legislative bodies
- Structure of political parties and balance of power between parties
- Executive-legislative relations
- Problems facing the legislature and their causes

**Assessment of Political Will of Key Stakeholders**

- Level of support inside legislature for institutional strengthening
- Evidence that legislature has the desire to reform itself
- Level of support outside the legislature for institutional strengthening

**Functions**

*Representation*

- Degree of openness, accountability, and accessibility of legislature to citizens and media
- Interaction between the legislature and society
- Degree of openness of political parties to public input
- Electoral system (single member district vs. party list/proportional representation)
- Organization of civil society and ability to play advocacy and watchdog role

*Lawmaking*

- Parliamentary, presidential, or hybrid structure (distribution of powers)
- Legislative powers of the executive (decree power, ability to submit bills for consideration)
- Ability of legislature to access information
- Roles of committees and of party caucuses
- Power and capacity to develop, amend or review budget and to levy taxes

*Oversight*

- Power to question ministers, hold hearings, or call witnesses
- Ability to access information about executive expenditures and program implementation
- Power to sanction those responsible for malfeasance, misconduct, corruption or mismanagement
- Power of appropriations or control over the budget

**Associated Operations: Management and Infrastructure**

- Clarity, transparency and simplicity of legislative rules of procedure
- Degree of transparency of legislative actions
- Adequacy in skill and number of legislative staff and administration

**Prioritization of Assistance Needs**

**Identification of Appropriate Programming Activities**

*Source*: Adapted from *USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening*, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 15

## Strengthening Activities

Development aid agencies can help internal actors strengthen legislatures during transitions by providing technical assistance, training and capital expenditures. Table 6.2 shows examples of activities development aid agencies can support:

**Table 6.2: Legislative Strengthening Activities during Transitions**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Political will/domestic support** | • Expose members of legislature to experiences in legislative strengthening in other transition countries through meetings, tours, workshops<br>• Assist in the conduct of legislative strengthening assessments and preparation of strategies and action plans |
| **Representation** | • Encourage civic advocacy and interest group fora<br>• Finance public opinion polling<br>• Provide assistance for the conduct of public hearings |

| | |
|---|---|
| | • Help improve the quality, distribution and timeliness of legislative records<br>• Help in the preparation and conduct of meetings with constituents; reach out to local communities<br>• Produce publications on the legislature |
| **Lawmaking** | • Eliminate discriminatory elements in the legislative framework<br>• Ensure the legislative framework reflects the requirements of international human rights and criminal law standards<br>• Train committee and research staff<br>• Develop law drafting services<br>• Provide technical expertise on issues that will have to be subjected to lawmaking |
| **Oversight** | • Strengthen role in budget making<br>• Provide exposure to other systems of oversight authority<br>• Provide technical assistance legislative oversight strategies |
| **Infrastructure/ management** | • Rehabilitate and build facilities<br>• Provide equipment, communication and transportation<br>• Draft rules of procedure and manuals |

*Source*: Adapted from *USAID Handbook on Legislature Strengthening*, Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 55.

Box 6.5 shows how assistance was provided for the creation of the legislative body in post-genocide Rwanda.

**Box 6.5: Creating a Legislative Body in Post-Genocide Rwanda**

The establishment of the Rwanda Transitional National Assembly (TNA), as a result of the Arusha Peace Accords of 1993 and following the 1994 genocide, illustrates the many challenges faced in creating a legislative body. The eight political parties and groups specified in the 1993 Accords appointed their representatives to the 74 member legislative body. In addition to this broad representation, there were 17 women legislators and a women's forum.

Voting in the legislature is supposed to be without party discipline, the representatives are to vote their conscience. Legislative initiatives can come from within the legislature, but in Rwanda an overwhelming majority comes from the executive. There is no tradition of democratic governance in Rwanda. With only 76 support staff servicing the 74 members of the National Assembly the legislative body is understaffed. Staff undertakes such tasks as translation of legislation into the three required languages, scheduling committee meetings, liaising with the executive branch, meeting with citizens, drafting legislation and so on. In addition, the infrastructure of the National Assembly is weak.

The following are challenges for the Transitional National Assembly:

Weak democratic culture

Limited public participation

Representation is indirect, as the legislators are unelected

Limited involvement of civil society

Poor information technology infrastructure

Overworked staff

Limited training for new staff and representatives.

*Source*: Teschner, Douglass, "Analysis of the Legislative Process at the Rwanda Transitional National Assembly," Rwanda National Assembly Support Project, 2002.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Before deciding on assistance, undertake a comprehensive parliamentary needs assessment.*
- ✓ *Many parliamentary development programs supported by the international community have focused on providing infrastructure and equipment to parliaments, which was greatly needed at that stage. Efforts should also be made to move beyond support for hardware. For this reason make sure that needs assessments focus more on process than on input.*
- ✓ *Develop legislative capacity through training. Legislators and their staff often operate in environments where democracy is poorly understood and often not part of the local experience. Encourage capacity building through parliamentary exchanges, training, technical assistance and secondments.*
- ✓ *Legislative development cannot be viewed in isolation from other thematic support for democratic governance. Consider the efforts of independent audit institutions or ombudsperson offices, for example, when wanting to improve parliamentary oversight.*
- ✓ *Time your program right. In transition situations, a program strengthening the legislature can benefit from a nation's post-electoral enthusiasm for democratic development.*
- ✓ *Support women's groups and other disempowered groups by promoting citizen advocacy and parliamentary groups.*

## 6.2.3. Justice and Rule of Law

**Justice-Related Definitions**

Justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large.

Rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

Justice system refers to the laws, processes and institutions that administer justice and ensure the rule of law in accordance with international standards (including judicial, police and corrections systems).

Transitional justice (see chapter 7, section 7.2 on Transitional Justice Mechanisms).

*Source*: Adapted from UN, "The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies", Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, pp 5-8.

Developing domestic justice systems is a critically important component of rebuilding transition countries. In situations, where there is no justice or where there is only unequal access to justice, violent conflict is likely to re-emerge. Without allowing the victims of violence the right to redress, the process of moving from conflict to democratization will be almost impossible. Chapter 7, Section 7.2 addresses the question of righting past wrongs, whereas the focus here is on the re-establishment of the justice system.

In the confused periods after violent conflict, laws and their application are often discriminatory and neglect the requirements of international human rights and criminal law. Judicial, police and correction systems lack the most basic human, financial and material resources to function, and these systems lack legitimacy in the eyes of citizens and are often perceived as instruments of repression. In addition, the human resources of the system – judges, attorneys, administrators, police officers, prison guards, human rights institutions and civil society organizations – have either fled or been killed; and the physical infrastructure – courtrooms, prisons, police stations and other offices – has been destroyed or damaged.

Development aid agencies can assist internal actors to enhance the justice system in four main domains: reorganization, recruitment and training, infrastructure and access to justice (table 6.3).

**Table 6.3: Enhancing the Justice System Framework**

| Justice System | Initial Response | Transformation | Sustainability |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Reorganization** | Assist in reviewing existing court and legislative system | Encourage laws fostering judicial independence, review roles of prosecutor and defense | Institutionalize new roles and responsibilities |
| **Recruitment & training** | Help to identify local legal professionals, help to select individuals for judicial positions, establish codes of conduct | Support vetting and training judges, defense attorneys and other personnel; establish law schools and law societies | Training in judicial specializations |
| **Infrastructure** | Support inventory of courts, law schools, legal libraries | Fund repairs or initiate new construction | |
| **Citizen access** | Help to create liaison between civilians and transitional authorities | Support efforts to educate population on how to access judicial system | Extend legal representation throughout society by creating public defender system and legal aid |

*Source*: Adapted from the "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2002, http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/framework.pdf.

## Reorganization of the Justice System

The following key activities should be considered in the reorganization of the justice system:

- Supporting the preparation and implementation of a national justice system strategy and action plan by specially appointed independent institutions, such as judicial and law commissions
- Establishing and reviewing laws so they conform with international human rights and criminal standards (model codes are particularly useful for transition environments)
- Setting up effective legal mechanisms for redressing civil claims and disputes, including property disputes, nationality and citizenship claims and other legal issues arising during transitions
- Ensuring that the justice sector is gender-sensitive and its reform does not result in women being excluded or disempowered

## Access to Justice

People from transition societies may be unable or unwilling to utilize the judicial system. They may be fearful, ill-informed about their rights or about the process, or denied access to the justice system because they are from a minority group. Community-empowerment is crucial in this regard. An early step that can be taken is to create links between the judicial system and civic groups, neighborhood leaders and others. This may help create legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Another important step is to encourage civic education regarding the judicial system, identifying its role and function; the physical location of courts, attorneys and administrators; and providing the overall context for the renewal of the judicial system. This should be achieved through effective communication techniques (for example, theater groups can present plays demonstrating how to access the judicial system).

Box 6.6 shows the complex nature of achieving justice in transition situations such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Box 6.6: Achieving Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The case of Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) illustrates the complex nature of achieving justice in transition situations. Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, much of the emphasis on justice in BiH has centered on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). While it is important to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in order to render justice to victims and to deter further crimes, the delivery of domestic civil and criminal justice has received much less international attention and support. Challenges that still face BiH's justice system are the influence of nationalist elements, political parties and the executive branch on the judiciary; low prosecution rate; ethnic bias and poor witness protection.

**Key Lessons:**

- International focus on one element of the judiciary may detract from others. Donors must be watchful of how their support may skew the provision of justice.
- Coordination with other external actors to ensure broad support for the justice system is important.
- A focus on national elements of justice may leave local justice systems ineffective.
- Bias, nationalism and bigotry require focused attention if they are to be prevented.

Nascent justice systems usually remain ineffective unless there is law enforcement. This is a sensitive area of judicial reform and usually reserved for governmental action. Chapter 5, section 5.3.1 describes measures that can be taken to prepare a police service for its civilian role to safeguard the security of citizens in times of peace, and describes initiatives that can help transform the culture of violence that may exist in police forces as a consequence of years of conflict.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Focus on the **immediate, as well as underlying causes** of the problem—the factors impeding access (for example, insufficient mechanisms that uphold justice for all).*
- ✓ *Try **to identify the gaps** between those who claim justice and those who bear the duty to provide justice.*
- ✓ *Efforts should be made to **take a strategic and coordinated view** on judicial matters. Avoid piecemeal assistance from different external actors, which can result in initiatives that clash and create an incoherent justice system.*
- ✓ *While seeking justice for past human rights abuses and crimes, **do not ignore the administration of civil and criminal justice**.*
- ✓ ***Support education initiatives** – sponsor local groups who can inform the public about the legal system, their rights and how to access the system.*
- ✓ ***Target disempowered groups** and enhance their capacity to utilize the justice system.*

## *6.3 Processes*

### 6.3.1 Constitution Making

**Constitutions**

- Embody the basic law of a state
- Establish the means of governance
- Define the rights, duties, and relationships between the state and citizens
- Create the identity of a state

*Source*: Hart, Vivien, "Democratic Constitution Making", *Special Report, No. 107*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, July 2003. p. 2.

Constitution making may be specified in the peace process, or may be a result of the issues of power sharing and institution building that are spelled out in peace agreements. Invariably, the constitution in some ways reflects the tension, values and issues raised in the peace process. The constitution making process in transition situations must be sensitive to the following issues:

- Distribution of political power
- Distribution of wealth
- Redress and compensation for past wrongs
- Land distribution
- Establishment of basic rights and obligations

The process of building or renewing a constitution is vital to resolving conflict and reconciling differences in transition societies. It is important that constitution building or renewal does not become exclusively an elite activity; it should be solidly built on broad based consultation to win the widest possible legitimacy. The constitution making process should endeavor to involve all segments of society, including women, refugees, ex-combatants, and the physically disabled.

## Key Institutions and Issues

The following are key institutions and issues that may be part of the constitution making process.

**Constitutional commission.** A constitutional commission has the task of organizing and administering the constitution making/reforming process.

- The commission may create a draft constitution that is passed to a constituent assembly.
- The commission should be drawn from a broad segment of society, representing the various sides to a conflict.
- Some mandate must exist to establish the commission.
- The commission must be adequately funded and staffed in order that it carries out its mandate.

**Constituent assembly.** A constituent assembly is in charge of reviewing, amending and sometimes approving the draft constitution. The constituent assembly has broader representation than a parliament or legislature and should not be dominated by one party or faction. Thus, a constituent assembly can represent a far wider segment of the transition society than a legislature. The mandate of the constituent assembly usually includes:

- Receiving the draft constitution
- Collecting public comment
- Deliberating its content
- Amending the draft constitution
- In some cases, approving the final document.

If the constitutional process employs a referendum, then the constituent assembly does not approve the final draft of the constitution. In the absence of a constituent assembly, a legislature will deliberate the proposed constitution.

**Civic education.** Education plays a crucial role in building a constitution, as such early citizen education is important to the process. Civic education must occur prior to public consultation and should explain the process of constitution making, the role the document plays, the need for change and some of the expected results. In both East Timor and Fiji civic education and public consultation occurred contemporaneously, resulting in the weakened effectiveness of both processes.[24] Box 6.7 suggests activities that can be undertaken to support civic education during constitution-making processes.

[24] "Constitution Making Process: Lessons for Iraq," U.S. Congressional testimony of Neil Kritz, director of the Rule of Law program, U.S. Institute of Peace, before a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary

**Box 6.7: Civic Education Activities for Constitution Making**

- Identify key stakeholders
- Identify disenfranchised or ignored parties
- Collaborate with local actors to design educational materials relevant to the particular country context
- Collaboratively design a civic education strategy that incorporates the method of education with the intended target audience
- Implement civic education strategy
- Audit civic education (how many participated, in what location, what did they retain)

**Public consultation.** Participation or consultation in constitution making is crucial for the success of the process and can be achieved by:

- Convening special national meetings to bring together the disabled, women, minorities, professions, or religious groups
- Disseminating opinion papers
- Conducting questionnaires
- Promoting decision-making forums[25]

This process will be made easier, if community empowerment is pursued by human security measures.

**Ratification.** The process of ratification will vary from country to country. The methods of ratification include approval of parliaments, constituent assemblies or popular referendum. Should a referendum be the preferred method, this also requires election monitoring.

Box 6.8 suggests ways in which assistance can be extended to constitution making processes.

**Box 6.8: Constitution Making Assistance Framework**

**Identify key stakeholders**

**Support the establishment of rules governing the constitution making process**

- Rules should encourage robust public engagement
- Rules should enshrine fundamental rights

**If a constitutional commission is to be appointed, it should:**

- Be representative of all political, ethnic and religious social factions
- Ensure public consultation and civic education are carried out

**Encourage sequencing of the constitutional commission's work**

- Phase one – civic education emphasizing the role of the constitution and what is to be expected
- Phase two – conduct consultations throughout the country with the public on specific questions
- Phase three – a draft constitution should be disseminated that synthesizes consultations and other submissions

**The constituent assembly, once elected, should debate the draft constitution**

*Source*: Adapted from "Constitution Making Process: Lessons for Iraq", *U.S. Congressional testimony of Neil Kritz, Director of the Rule of Law Program,* U.S. Institute of Peace, before a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, June 25, 2003.

[25] Ghai, Yash, *The Constitution Reform Process: Comparative Perspectives - Toward Inclusive and Participatory Constitution Making*, August 3-5, 2004, Kathmandu, pp. 8-9.

Box 6.9 illustrates the fact that constitutions on their own do not necessarily deliver effective democratic governance.

**Box 6.9: The 1993 Cambodian Constitution and Democratic Governance**

The Cambodian constitution of 1993 illustrates how a constitution can embody the right democratic principles, but fail to deliver effective democracy. In 1993, on the heels of the peace agreements of 1991 and a 20 year long conflict, Cambodia promulgated its fifth constitution, which was to embody the best of democratic governance. The constitution established the Royal Government, the National Assembly and the judiciary. It took less than half a year to draft and promulgate the new constitution. Unfortunately, the process was elite driven and failed to engage in a thorough and ongoing consultative process. As a consequence, there was little popular acceptance of the constitution. The social structures necessary to effectively implement the constitution simply did not exist. Civil society groups did not have the experience or support to effectively advocate for the positive aspects of the constitution. Because the process was elite driven with little popular support or understanding, the rifts that had divided Cambodian society were simply replicated in the constitution and the institutions it established.

**Key Lessons:**

- Constitution building or renewal takes time. The short time frame for the Cambodian constitution limited the extent to which parties could comment on it or have input. Ideally, the process of constitutional renew should take at least one year, if not more. Donors who support constitution building/renewal should fund projects over multiple years.
- The process counts as much as the content of the constitution. The process of consultation in developing a new constitution helps build acceptance among both elites and the general population. Donors should fund public consultation processes to follow civic education programs.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Support **civic education prior to consultation**, using radio, news media, and public meetings. The purpose is to inform the public about the principles of democratic governance and constitution making. Following the approval of a constitution, a similar public education campaign must inform the public about the details of the agreed constitution.*
- ✓ *Use questionnaires, public meetings, and submissions as a way to **gain public participation**. Train local people in dialogue techniques.*
- ✓ ***Constitution making must emphasize consultation** with the broad public to develop a new constitution, not campaigning. Political parties should be encouraged not to develop platforms or draft constitutions to bring to the constituent assembly.*

## 6.3.2 Elections

Elections represent a key step in a broader process of building legitimate governance. There are numerous examples of elections being held in transition environments including East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq.

When planning for elections the following concerns need to be considered and addressed:

- The social conflict that underlies violence may be played out in elections.
- The different values and interests of once warring parties may influence the party politics of elections.
- Elections may spark a new violent conflict.
- Poorly planned elections, or those in which there is a significant imbalance of power, may result in social discord and violence.
- Ensuring that elections are fair, efficient and free from violence is paramount. Therefore the timing, design, and mechanism of elections, and the possible impact they might have on a population, need careful attention.

## Key Issues

**Electoral system types.** There are numerous electoral systems that may be deployed in transition situations (see table 6.4). There are no hard and fast rules about which system to use. The choice depends on the context of the transition situation. No matter the type of system deployed, what is essential is that the electoral system is perceived to be fair. The perception of an unfair system will result in a parliament that becomes the object of conflict rather than the body that manages it.

**Table 6.4: Electoral System Choices for Divided Societies**

| Type | Proportional Representation | Alternative Vote | Single Transferable Vote | Communal rolls, Block vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Description** | Proportional representation elections lead to an inclusive legislature which includes all significant groups. Under a full consociational[26] package, each group is represented in the cabinet in proportion to its electoral support. Minority interests are protected through segmental autonomy and mutual votes. | Majority system with in-built incentives for inter-ethnic party appeals. To maximize electoral prospects, parties need to cultivate the second preference votes from groups other than their own. There is a centripetal spin to the system where elites are encouraged to gravitate to the moderate multi-ethnic center. In ethnically mixed districts, the need to obtain a majority leads to strong incentives to gain support from other groups. | The electoral system delivers proportional results but also encourages politicians to appeal to the votes of members from other groups via secondary preferences. This can result in inclusive power sharing between all significant political forces, but also in incentives for politicians to reach out to other groups for preference support. | The system explicitly recognizes communal groups to give them (relatively fixed) institutional representation. Competition for power between ethnic groups is lessened because the ratio of ethnic groups is fixed in advance. Electors must therefore make their voting choice on the basis of criteria other than ethnicity. |
| **Examples** | Switzerland, the Netherlands, South Africa 1994 | Papua New Guinea 1964-1975, Fiji 1997 | Estonia 1990, Northern Ireland 1998 | Lebanon Singapore, Mauritius |

*Source*: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict,* http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_deep_rooted_conflict/index.cfm.

## International Electoral Assistance[27]

Establishing free, fair and corruption-free elections helps to create legitimacy. Key concerns in doing so are:

- Election security

[26] A political arrangement in which various groups, such as ethnic or racial populations within a country or region, share power according to an agreed formula or mechanism.

[27] This section is based on Reilly, Benjamin, "Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – What Lessons have been Learned?," http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2004-1/conference%202004-1-papers/Reilly-2505.pdf.

- Independent electoral commission
- Transparent voter registration
- Effective civic education and bottom-up empowerment at the community level
- Political party development
- Oversight of the media
- Election observation

**Election security.** Protecting the election process from intimidation is a critical factor in managing elections. In transition environments former warring factions may try to intimidate voters to ensure a victory for their party.

The central elements of election security include protection of voting places, candidates and voters. International or domestic actors may provide security. If international actors provide security, then it is vital that there is coordination between those forces and election officials. If domestic actors provide security they will probably be tied to the conflict. This places a higher importance on the involvement of international monitors and the media. It is important that a criminal process is established for those from domestic security services who interfere with the elections.

Elections held too soon after violence has ended are often doomed to failure. Former military actors that convert to become representatives of political parties have insufficient time to become accustomed to democratic norms. It is also advisable that demobilization occur before elections take place.

**Independent election administration.** To be effective, election administration, often carried out by electoral commissions, requires significant resources, independence and time.

- Non-governmental personnel or civil servants may staff commissions.
- The commission may be independent of any government body, or it may be tied to a ministry.
- Electoral commissions may be constituted for each election, or they may be maintained over long periods of time covering several elections.

An independent commission, with no formal ties to the government, helps to enhance the credibility of the electoral process.

**Transparent voter registration.** Ideally voter registration emphasizes a permanent roll of voters and continuous updating of rolls. This may be very difficult in a country in transition. Adequate time and resources must be dedicated to voter registration. Using local staff to carry out the voter registration is ideal.

**Effective civic education and community level empowerment .** Closely aligned to voter registration is civic education. Informing voters of the electoral process is a mandatory forerunner of transition electoral processes. Civic education can take place through town meetings, radio or other media, leaflets and drama to name a few. If communities have been able to benefit from programs that encouraged them to take action on their own behalf, this education will have a base upon which to build.

Civic education is often best done by involving citizens in voter registration programs. Not only are citizens energized, but they come to understand the essentials of democracy suited to their context better and faster than anybody else. For example, Afghanis played a key role in registering their fellow citizens for voting.

**Political party development.** Political party development is crucial for effective elections in transition countries. In all democratic systems, political parties play a central role in selecting leaders, defining the agenda, and mobilizing the citizenry. In a transition situation, the manner in which parties conduct themselves can be the difference between sustainable peace and renewed violence. Parties can either play a role in consolidating democracy and the new political order or they can be a force to undermine it.

In transitions, the circumstances of political party formation are particularly challenging. There is often no history of democratic parties. Many of the existing groups were either opposed

to democracy or did not exist previously. The challenge is how to make the transition to democracy, which requires parties – old and new – to be willing to coexist, compromise and share power. Strategies based on offering the best program to enable the transition society to succeed, economically and politically, will cut across parties and serve to reduce polarization. In contrast, strategies based on ethnic, religious or regional appeals can undermine democracy. In essence, parties help to:[28]

- Aggregate interests
- Resolve disputes locally
- Mobilize the electorate
- Provide political leadership
- Promote democracy

To prevent political parties from being captured by ethnic or other conflict-related interests, development aid agencies can help identify cross-cutting issues that link parties rather than separate them. Providing guidance and training to help former warring factions convert themselves into political parties is vital as they may lack the expertise to make the transition.

**Box 6.10: Political Party Development in Afghanistan**

[In Afghanistan] Karzai government policies, accompanied by an inappropriate voting system, are sidelining the parties at a time when there is increasing popular dissatisfaction with the slow progress in economic reconstruction, rising corruption and continued insecurity. This is worrying since it was marginalisation and intolerance of political opposition that stunted the development of a pluralistic system, and was largely responsible for past violence in Afghanistan. If current laws constraining party functioning are not changed, political stability will be illusory.

In the absence of strong pluralistic and democratic institutions to mediate internal tensions, political bargaining and the competition for power will most likely continue to occur outside the institutions of government. Because of their past shortcomings, however, many Afghans regard political parties with suspicion. Yet, post-Taliban Afghanistan has witnessed the emergence of many small democratic parties that offer a break with this past, and the means to create a stable and democratic parliament. And many Afghans, especially young people, now recognise parties as an essential component of the legal democratic process.

The government of President Hamid Karzai would be best served by bringing any political party, regardless of its political leanings, into the legal fold if it demonstrates a willingness to work peacefully and democratically. In particular, it should:

- clarify Article 6 of the Political Parties Law relating to ethnic, racial and sectarian discrimination and violence
- revise the Political Parties Law to remove unnecessary curbs on party formation and functioning and to clarify apparent contradictions with the application of sharia (religious law) regarding women's rights
- simplify the registration process
- ensure an even playing field in the September 2005 parliamentary elections by shifting oversight of parties from the ministry of justice to an independent election commission
- support healthy political development by providing government funds to parties so as to reduce the scope for private interests to buy influence, and by facilitating training to enhance the participation of women in the political system.

The government should also urgently reconsider the possibility of amending its decision to conduct the parliamentary elections under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, which is likely to produce unrepresentative results in a country that lacks well-organised parties.

Major donor countries and the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) should support the above measures and should pay special attention to the provision of security for liberal, democratic parties that are operating in an uncertain environment.

*Source*: International Crisis Group (ICG), *Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N 39*, 2 June 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3493

[28] USAID, *Political Party Development Assistance*, Ctr for Democracy & Governance, Wash., DC, 1999, p. 20.

**Oversight of the media.** Media play a critical role in reporting on electoral issues, as well as in assisting with civic education. Training media to be conflict sensitive is critically important. In periods of transition, poor reporting by the news media can stimulate new violent conflict. Creating conflict awareness amongst the media is important. Domestic media can work with domestic election monitors, utilizing these contacts to inform their reporting.

**Election observation.** Election observation in transition environments is important to ensure a legitimate election.

- Election observation can be conducted by international observers or domestic observers. International observers may come from international bodies (for example, the United Nations), regional organizations (for example, the African Union) or NGOs (for example, the Carter Center).
- Domestic observers are drawn from elements of society with an interest in free and fair elections.

International observers receive some training in election monitoring; however, there is generally little assistance provided to domestic observers. Table 6.5 shows key areas for international electoral assistance.

**Table 6.5: Areas of International Electoral Assistance**

| Area | Description |
|---|---|
| Support for first time elections | Support free and fair elections. Focus on election planning, monitoring and budgeting. Further focus on sustainability. |
| Assistance for constitutional and legal reforms | Involves political institutions and reforms, for example, design and reform of electoral systems, legislative structures, accountability. |
| Assistance to electoral management bodies | Includes voter registration, boundary delimitation, computerization and dispute resolution. |
| Voter registration | Development of continuous and permanent voter registration, which reflects shifts in population size and distribution. |
| Civic and voter education programs | Expand participation including indigenous, disempowered, poor and other groups. Raise awareness highlighting rights and responsibilities of citizens. |
| International monitoring and observation | Ensure elections are untainted by fraud and intimidation; where this does occur; however, there is a process to document those cases. |
| Strengthening of political parties | Strengthen internal capacity of emerging political parties. |

**Box 6.11: UNMIK and Elections in Kosovo**

Following the 1999 NATO led campaign in Kosovo, the United Nations established the UN Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK's mission is to:

- Perform basic civilian administrative functions
- Promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo
- Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status
- Coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies
- Support the reconstruction of key infrastructure
- Maintain civil law and order
- Promote human rights

- Assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.[29]

Since UNMIK's establishment, two elections were held without significant violence. They are models of employing a conflict management strategy. The elements of UNMIK's strategy include:

- Persons displaced by the conflict were allowed to register and vote in order that their potential exclusion did not become a conflict trigger.
- Albanian political prisoners, released from Serbian prisons, were permitted to register past the deadline.
- A variety of options of political participation were created including political parties, non-partisan citizen alliances and independent candidacies.
- No two political parties were authorized to hold rallies at the same time at the same location.
- Isolated minorities who feared for their safety could elect to vote from home.
- Both local and Kosovo wide legislative assemblies were proportional, with seats set aside for ethnic minorities and women.[30]

**Key Lessons:**

- Organize election strategies as both opportunities to enhance democracy and effectively manage conflict.
- Help encourage political participation by taking practical steps to reduce fear among the populace.
- Do not let deadlines or regulations fuel conflict. Negotiate exceptions when it appears that such artificial roadblocks will cause problems.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Invite national electoral officials to participate*** *in some of the regular donor meetings, if appropriate to further dialogue and collaboration.*
- ✓ *Use education to* ***inform the public about the nature of democracy and the electoral process****.*
- ✓ *As elections often attract violence and intimidation,* ***use a conflict-sensitive approach*** *when developing programs and workshops (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1). Ensure that security measures are in place.*
- ✓ ***Use electoral assistance as an entry point****. Providing electoral assistance can have a direct impact on other efforts in areas such as local governance, community empowerment, legislative development, access to information and public administration reform.*
- ✓ *Carefully* ***identify a realistic time schedule*** *for elections, together with national counterparts, as the timing could determine the outcome of the election.*

## *6.4. Civil Society and the Media*

### 6.4.1 Civil Society

**Civil Society**

Civil society refers to "… voluntary associations, organizations, movements and networks that live and work in the social space outside the state and the private sector. …"[31] Often civil society is used to mean non-governmental organizations.

[29] From UNMIK online, http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm

[30] Fischer, Jeff, "Electoral Conflict and Violence," *IFES White Paper*, February 5, 2002, pp. 26-28.

Civil society includes such groups as religious groups, labor unions, neighborhood associations and women's groups.

Any non-governmental group, that is not in the private sector, is part of civil society.

Building the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) is an integral part of democratic governance. In war torn regions, populations have been traumatized and displaced. Emerging governments can engage in dialogues with groups of citizens. Governments can also tap into established organizations in the delivery of assistance to the local population. Yet, those actions often don't happen in transition situations because civil society is too undeveloped.

CSOs help to deepen the legitimacy of the process of democratization. By being actively involved in the process of democratic governance, they can represent the views, fears and aspirations of different segments of the population. Equally, CSOs can undertake important work that would otherwise be left undone by a government struggling to gain stability. It is very important that ordinary citizens regain trust in the governance system for their country. Only then will they pay their taxes and remain supportive of certain policies that might be difficult, yet necessary, for reform. CSOs can be a conduit for the development of such trust.

## Key Issues

Responding to community needs. Communities in the aftermath of violent conflict suffer both psychological trauma (see also chapter 7, section 7.3) as well as economic and physical dislocation. The capacity of individuals to coalesce is also markedly reduced. Assisting communities in coming together around interests and/or needs is vital. For example, developing groups that specifically address issues such as education, land mine clearance and food security in internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps is of tremendous value.

Strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs). Local or national efforts at strengthening civil society organizations in transition environments may need assistance to overcome mistrust and inadequate resources (financial, physical and human).

- Mistrust hinders the development of CSOs by limiting the interaction between people and reducing communication.
- Inadequate resources (financial, physical and human) prevent CSOs from developing to respond to community needs.

**Legal safeguards for CSOs.** Crucial to the development of CSOs in transition countries is the identification of necessary legal safeguards that will help foster them. Such safeguards might include establishing the right of free speech and freedom of assembly.

**Capacity-building for CSOs.** CSOs might also need help in identifying how an NGO can operate successfully, starting with human resources, financial and operational management. In addition, the relationship between the government and some groups or organizations might not have been productive during the war, and will require transformation. Assistance in building capacity in this regard might be also needed.

**Establishing links.** Establishing links with governments, donor agencies, and/or other international groups helps to foster CSOs growth. CSOs may link with other local groups or agencies to address both mistrust and resource deficits. They may also seek funding from, or partnerships with, local or central governments. CSOs may also partner with local affiliates of international CSOs such as the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Finally, CSOs may seek funding or partnership with international groups and agencies, such as JICA, USAID or DFID.

**CSOs' role in democratic governance.** CSOs play a vital role in the processes of building or renewing democratic governance. For example, they may assist with the development of a new constitution. They can do this by representing views and helping organize the consultative phase of building a constitution. They can also assist in providing civic education in the process of constitution building specifically, and democratic governance more generally.

[31] International Institute of Sustainable Development, http://www.iisd.org/didigest/glossary.htm.

**Promoting civic advocacy and interest groups.** Citizens from transition societies often lack the skill, experience and time to create open forum advocacy groups. For example, those areas missing from the public forum may include women's rights, human rights, indigenous people's rights and so on. In addition, other interests may not have created their own civil society groups. For example, labor unions, manufacturers, exporters and other industry sector groups may not be organized to represent their interests before a legislative body. Capacity-building in this regard is crucial.

Box 6.12 shows the constructive dialectic that can exist between government and civil society.

**Box 6.12: Influence of Civil Society in Sierra Leone**

In Sierra Leone in 1998, shortly after the restoration of the elected government that had been overthrown by the army and Revolutionary United Front rebels, the executive branch began developing plans for reconstituting the armed forces. In response, civil society organizations held multistakeholder consultations and offered the government a range of reform proposals—including widely circulating photographs of all recruits so that civilians could vet them for human rights abuses. The government responded favorably to many of these suggestions.

*Source*: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World - Human Development Report 2002*, p. 92 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/chapterfour.pdf.

Care must also be taken that CSOs are not established for the wrong reasons. An unfortunate dynamic is often put in place by external actors needing an addressee, a central locus of change, or a "proxy" for civil society in their attempts to provide assistance. It is of some irony that demands for accountability and assessments of the effectiveness of external actors can actually accelerate the spread of new organizational management, auditing and accounting systems, which are not indigenous or in fact ill-adapted to local circumstances.

In addition, certain "un-civil" groups might possibly disguise themselves behind the label "CSO", such as gangs, criminal organizations, drug rings, secret societies, cults, and subversive and terrorist groups. This raises the question of how these groups should be treated by both the government and external actors. The situation is further complicated by "front organizations" (whether for government, ideological, religious, business or criminal groups). Further complications in understanding "civil society" are introduced when groups have only a temporary or "electronic" existence – as with the 15,000 newsgroups on the Internet.[32]

Other complications arise when trying to relate to groups more easily found in non-western societies – and often unheard of, or of little importance, to those active in defining "civil society". These include tribal and kinship groups, name groups, guru-following groups, and secret societies.

Attempts might be made to ignore, eliminate or somehow come to terms with these uncomfortable elements of civil society. All of these approaches have their pitfalls. Perhaps the most creative approach, according to Judge (see box 6.13) might be to reframe the relationship between these un-civil elements of society and their civil counterparts and to explore ways that engender new forms of collective organization in harmony with the cultural patterns and values of those societies. One example of a successful movement not fitting into the usual definition of a civil society organization is described in box 6.13.

**Box 6.13: The Swadhyaya Movement**

A striking example of how such a challenge has been taken up in a developing country is offered by the Swadhaya Movement, notably active along the western coast of India. As described by Shri R K Srivastva of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (New Delhi): "Swadhyaya is neither a cult nor a sect; it is neither a party nor an association; it is neither messianic nor limited to a particular section of society; it is neither directed against centralizing state power nor to overcoming flaws in Indian society, though such consequences may follow. Swadhyaya is both a metaphor and a

[32]The figure comes from Judge, Anthony, *Interacting Fruitfully with Un-Civil Society. The Dilemma for Non-Civil Society Organizations*, Union of International Associations, October 1996, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/intro/def/2000/un-civ.htm

movement. It is a metaphor in the sense of a vision, and a movement in terms of its orientation in social and economic spheres."

Building on qualities long articulated within the Hindu spiritual tradition, emphasis is placed on the quality of relationship between people, especially within the context of the most impoverished villages. This has led to a remarkable, and growing, capacity to regenerate village life. Refusing any economic assistance from either Indian government or foreign sources, unusual achievements have been made in thousands of villages, even in such physical terms as replenishing wells and managing farms. (Ironically, although present by invitation at a 1995 FAO conference on poverty alleviation, the movement found itself isolated -- it was neither in search of funds (as an "aid recipient"), nor was it offering them (as a "donor"), but its experience without funding was considered irrelevant.

*Source*: Judge, Anthony, *Interacting Fruitfully with Un-Civil Society. The Dilemma for Non-Civil Society Organizations,* Union of International Associations, October 1996, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/intro/def/2000/un-civ.htm

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Help **build indigenous CSO capacity**. Collaborate with local/national CSOs to help build capacity. Provide grants and other support for indigenous CSOs to thrive. Go slow, if local circumstances do not permit fast revamping of organizational structures.*
- ✓ *Work with CSOs in transitions to **better understand local needs**. Local groups, by definition, have a better understanding of local needs than external actors. Employ a human security approach emphasizing bottom-up empowerment.*
- ✓ *Carefully **define your approach to "un-civil" society**. Differentiate who you want to support and why.*
- ✓ *View **reconstruction as peacebuilding**. Reconstruction can become an opportunity to help build bridges within a conflict-affected society. Subtly and carefully utilize civil society reconstruction projects as a way to build relationships and restore trust.*

## 6.4.2 Renewing the Media

**The Media**

The media include:

- Radio, television, video and film
- Newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and posters
- The internet, e-mail and telephones
- Theater, dance, music and puppetry
- Meetings of all sorts (for example, workshops and participatory exercises, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal or community level work)

*Source*: DFID, *The Media in Governance – A Guide to Assistance*, (London: DFID, undated), p. 4.

The media play a key role in the development of democratic governance. In a transition environment, media can also play a role of helping to stabilize the situation. Members of the news media can report on ceasefire violations, human rights violations, other emerging threats to peace and stability, progress in the peace process and progress in emerging democratic institutions.

Typically, however, the media in violent conflict have been either neutralized or have become highly partisan. Not only have the reporters and photographers that staff media organizations been displaced by the conflict, but the physical and legal infrastructure of the media have been weakened as well.

The physical resources necessary for effective media development may have been damaged in the course of the conflict. Printing presses destroyed, cameras confiscated, broadcast towers toppled and computers smashed are all real possibilities in transition environments. Furthermore, the legal framework that protects the media from harassment by government and other authorities is likely to be either non-existent or ignored.

Yet, it is vital to renew the media in transition environments, in order that useful and accurate information be disseminated among the population. Equally, it is important that the media act as a check on government behavior.

## Key Issues

Diagram 6.2 illustrates some of the key challenges faced in enhancing media in a transition environment.

### *Diagram 6.2: Key Challenges in Media Development Assistance*




**Developing the capacity of media organizations.** Violent conflict can quickly deplete the capacity of media organizations. Print, radio, television and Internet all require physical infrastructure to operate. Renewing that physical infrastructure is crucial if the media are to play a role in the transition period.

Equally important is ensuring that the media represent the broad range of social interests and points of view. Efforts must be taken to ensure that the media are broadly representative.

**Defining media rights.** In order that the media operate freely, without hindrance, it is important that a legal basis be established. Media rights may have been defined at some earlier time, but also may have been ignored during the conflict.

**Training.** Media can contribute both to the de-escalation of conflict and to the escalation of conflict. Training media in how to gather and report news is important. Equally important, however, is sensitizing media to the causes of conflict and how the media can stimulate new conflict. Conflict sensitive media reporting can help lower tensions in the broader community.

**Role in civic education.** Successful implementation of democratic governance relies upon an informed and educated population. Utilizing the media in civic education can help foster democratic institutions, deepen legitimacy of democratic processes and help maintain a peaceful transition period.

## Media Needs Analysis

Table 6.6 shows some of the basic needs encountered in the media sector during transitions.

**Table 6.6: Media Needs Analysis**

| Need | Description |
|---|---|
| **Technical** | Media require the technical equipment (for example, microphones, audio tape) to do their job. Broadcast means must exist for radio and television to be effective. |
| **Logistical** | Reporters must be able to travel throughout the country to cover stories. It must be possible for newspapers to be delivered to readers. |
| **Legal** | The legal basis for media must exist. This includes protecting their right to collect news and report as well as the freedom of speech and assembly. |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Human** | Members of the media must be trained in effective methods of reporting; ideally they should be conflict sensitive. |

Box 6.14 points out the importance of adhering to conflict sensitive standards of reporting (see also chapter 4, section 4.2.1).

**Box 6.14: Conflict-Sensitive Media in Transitions**

The media can be used as instruments of violence. One need go no further than the infamous example of Radio *Mille Collines* to illustrate the media's role in escalating conflict. Radio *Mille Collines* was used to initiate the genocide in Rwanda.

In transition environments media must be encouraged to play the role of de-escalating conflict. A growing cadre of journalists practice conflict sensitive journalism. Conflict sensitive journalism is a practice that comes from acknowledging that the media can both escalate or de-escalate conflict. Journalists practicing conflict sensitive journalism can be found in Sri Lanka, Macedonia and Indonesia for example. The elements of conflict sensitive journalism include:

- Journalists' understanding of the dynamics of conflict
- Avoiding reporting of only the bare facts of conflict
- Avoiding reporting conflict as if it were only two-sided
- Avoiding stereotyping
- Avoiding highly emotive language

While it is impossible to say that conflict sensitive journalism has prevented conflict, it offers a professional alternative to those who would use the media to escalate conflict.

**Key Lessons**

- Support training in conflict sensitive journalism.
- Monitor media for conflict escalating reporting.
- Encourage close cooperating between the media and peacebuilding agencies and NGOs.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Collaborate with media to encourage public education. Utilize the media in propagating the message of democracy and good governance. Ideally, the media provide the public with information that will help reduce tensions, rather than contribute to them.*
- ✓ *Encourage the development of professional standards, that is, codes of conduct and self-regulation.*
- ✓ *Encourage journalist training through investigative journalism, for example.*
- ✓ *Support efforts in the media to focus on women's and minority groups' stories. Strengthen networks between the media and CSOs in order that reliable channels of information are available to interest groups.*
- ✓ *Educate the media in conflict sensitive reporting. Support media in transition environments by promoting conflict sensitive reporting.*

## *General Lessons on Democratic Governance Assistance*

- ✓ The existence of genuine political will and strong commitment to democratic governance among official government, opposition movements and the society at large should be carefully assessed. It is particularly important to address issues related to the distribution of power and the roles of interest groups.
- ✓ Democratic governance can take many shapes and forms. Thus, imposing, implicitly or explicitly, a particular understanding of democratic governance should be avoided. Internal actors have to make their own choices based on their country's cultural, historical, political and social background.
- ✓ The results of democratic governance assistance are intangible, indirect and take long to materialize. Be prepared to accept imperfect solutions as long as they constitute progress toward democratic governance.
- ✓ An emerging government or administration must not be weakened by relying on international NGOs and other external counterparts in the fulfillment of traditional state functions. Their efforts should not compete or dwarf progress in building and strengthening the capacity of national and local governing structures to fulfill their roles.
- ✓ Internal actors need support in addressing the following key issues: the separation of powers, de-politicization of public administration, autonomy of the parliament, independence of the judiciary and civil control of armed forces. Technical assistance and capacity building are useless when these fundamental issues are ignored.

## Resources

Administration and Cost of Elections Project, http://www.aceproject.org.

The Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electronic Publication represents the attempt to provide a globally accessible information resource on election administration. It provides operationally-oriented information on options, detailed procedures, alternative solutions and the administrative and cost implications associated with organizing elections. The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) worked together to produce the materials on www.aceproject.org.

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Chr. Michelsen Institute, http://www.cmi.no.

The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) is an independent, non-profit research institution and a major international centre in policy-oriented and applied development research.

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# Chapter 7
# Social Fabrics

## Chapter Objectives

- Describe the social destruction that confronts a transition society.
- Provide an overview of the legal and social mechanisms that exist to address the rebuilding of social fabrics.
- Point to the role that external actors can play in this field.

## Introduction

Activities geared toward social rebuilding seek to gradually reconstruct the intangible but crucial social fabric that allows a society to function, while also meeting the immediate psychosocial needs of a society that has been devastated by violence. In the first years citizens of transition societies are grappling with the challenges of rebuilding social cohesion, trust and confidence in each other, in fellow groups and in the state. This is the time to approach the issues of justice, accountability and truth. Equally important, however, is social reconciliation, a process involving the restoration of trust and hope within communities, increased cooperative behavior, and the development of shared values and expectations. It is this reconciliation that might eventually lead to peaceful coexistence and healing. External assistance is more easily provided in the legal field and can only have a sensitive, facilitative function when addressing social issues. Key owners of the healing process must be the local communities themselves. Sometimes assistance in empowering communities from the bottom-up, while addressing basic human needs, can be helpful to the process of restoring the torn social fabric.

## 7.1 Overview

In transition societies the social fabric apart has been torn apart by the atrocities of the war and concomitant human rights violations. People are traumatized and deeply mistrusting of one another. Key elements of a destroyed social fabric are:

- Victims demand justice and the punishment of perpetrators. Perpetrators of violence are still present; they provide constant reminders of the past, as well as the threat of further incidents.
- The police and the justice system are weak and may have been partly responsible for the atrocities, or may simply be unable to address the crimes that have been committed.
- International peacekeeping missions or police contingents serve to uphold law and order and provide a minimum of security.
- Self-administered justice replaces formal justice systems and conflict resolution.
- Large numbers of prisoners of war and political prisoners are held captive. Prisons and detention camps are full.
- Large parts of the population are uprooted and displaced.
- A strong identification with one's own group, the idealization of this group and pride in it are prevalent to the detriment of other associations. This can occur to such an extent that an enemy group might even be dehumanized.
- Psychosocial degeneration, in which a large fraction of the society loses its sense of basic trust, is likely. Feelings of rage alternate with feelings of helplessness, humiliation and victimization.

- New maladaptive social patterns are possible, such as prostitution, domestic violence and organized crime.
- Organized civil society is only nascent.

Social rebuilding in transition societies is a complex, delicate and time-consuming process. Dealing constructively with the past means engaging in a process that will always be conflict-ridden because the historic definition of "truth" is at stake. Victims require that their suffering is duly noted. They also demand justice and liberation from the shadows of the past. Perpetrators mostly try to justify or deny their individual responsibility, claiming that they acted under orders. Displaced persons will want compensation and to "go home", but their homes might be destroyed or inhabited by new communities.

Even though it is impossible to completely heal the social wounds of war, serious attempts must be made to deal with the pain, anger and renewed fear of war which large parts of the population feel. Unless they are dealt with, they will fester and eventually contribute to renewed violence. Attempts to address these will go a long way in providing human security.

Because the desire for justice and accountability can be contradictory to the call for reconciliation and forgiveness, a tension may exist over how best to address these wounds. Justice and reconciliation must be goals side-by-side; the contradictions can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

An overview of the mechanisms that address the rebuilding of social fabrics is presented in table 7.1. These mechanisms can be divided into those that are transitional justice instruments, which approach rebuilding the social fabric from the point of view of accountability and responsibility (and possibly complement it with truth-telling), and those that are focused on a range of projects that aim to rebuild the community, such as psycho-social support, reconciliation and coexistence projects. None is exclusive of the other; in practice, a mix of measures is used.

**Table 7.1: Overview of Transitional Justice and Social Mechanisms in Rebuilding Social Fabrics**

| Transitional Justice Mechanisms | Social Mechanisms |
|---|---|
| **Retributive justice** instruments, such as<br>▪ Local courts<br>▪ International tribunals<br>▪ Hybrid courts<br><br>To be complemented by:<br>▪ Lustration (see below)<br>▪ Amnesty<br>▪ Reparation | Individual psychological support<br>▪ Targeted psychosocial support projects, counseling etc. |
| To be replaced by or complemented by:<br>**Community justice/traditional forms of justice**<br>▪ For example, the Gacaca process in Rwanda (see below) | **Community building**<br>▪ Direct community-building measures, such as sports clubs, community councils, volunteer activity, and capacity-building measures aimed at psychosocial healing at the community level. This would also include special projects for women, children and youth, in recognition of each of their special contributions (women as peacebuilders, youth and children as future generations) to build community<br>▪ Reconciliation projects, including co-existence projects<br>▪ Reintegration projects<br>▪ Dialogue and trust-building projects |
| **Restorative justice**<br>▪ For example, truth commissions | |

Healing is essentially a process that must be taken on by each individual. At the same time, however, it necessitates deep societal and political change. It is thus both an individual and societal process that takes a long time. Table 7.2 contains a selected menu of activities, principles of intervention and resulting requirements for program/project personnel in this field.

**Table 7.2: Overview of Activities, Principles and Requirements of Assistance**

| Selected Menu of Activities | Principles of Intervention | Requirements for Project/ Program Personnel |
|---|---|---|
| ▪ Specific legal and technical advice (see chapter 6)<br>▪ Training of judges, attorneys and police officers (see chapter 6)<br>▪ Support of structures that help provide the local population with access to the justice system (see chapter 6)<br>▪ Observation of legal processes by independent experts (see chapter 6)<br>▪ Dissemination of materials and findings arising from truth commissions and other instruments of justice<br>▪ Support to traditional justice models, alternative conflict resolution mechanisms<br>▪ Provision of ombudspersons<br>▪ Legal aid to political prisoners<br>▪ Help with the re-integration of ex-prisoners<br>▪ Help with the reintegration of returnees<br>▪ Direct psycho-social support<br>▪ Creation of a framework in which values can be rediscovered<br>▪ Support to local civil society initiatives in the field of reconciliation, peaceful co-existence, trust-building and dialogue promotion<br>▪ Special projects for women, children and youth as a contribution to rebuilding a strong civil society | ▪ Respect for local ownership of conflict, current situation and future actions<br>▪ Respect for limitations of international actors, yet confidence that the outsider role can be helpful; humility and service-attitude<br>▪ Sensitivity to all factors contributing to the current situation<br>▪ Prevention of self-administered justice and renewed violence<br>▪ Prevention of lawlessness, whenever possible<br>▪ Sensitive selection of partners and instruments of action<br>▪ Involvement of multiple partners in program implementation<br>▪ Participation of local actors in program planning, implementation and evaluation<br>▪ Belief in the individual as a fundamental force for security<br>▪ Belief that all activities should essentially support the human security paradigm<br>▪ Acceptance that this process is tedious and long-term<br>▪ Acceptance that progress will be only partly measurable, realistic expectations | ▪ Close cooperation with national partners<br>▪ Coordination with other donors and NGOs locally<br>▪ Preferably local personnel employed in program<br>▪ Ideally expert support in certain technical areas, as needed<br>▪ Excellent political assessment of what can and what cannot be done in program implementation through decentralized and competent field office<br>▪ Special importance of service-oriented, partnership-intelligent and empathic personnel, who are conscious of the human security concept<br>▪ Ability to mainstream concerns for reconciliation and peaceful co-existence into all areas of program<br>▪ Modeling of valued behavior |

# 7.2 Transitional Justice Mechanisms

**Defining Transitional Justice**

Transitional justice comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all), and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.

*Source*: United Nations, "The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies", *Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, § 8.

A range of mechanisms is subsumed under the heading of transitional justice including (1) retributive justice, (2) mechanisms complementing prosecution, (3) community justice or traditional forms of justice, (4) restorative justice including truth commissions and (5) ombudsperson offices.

## 7.2.1 Retributive Justice/Prosecution

Retributive justice is a Western concept that focuses on holding the perpetrators accountable for committed crimes. It thus addresses wrong-doing and at the same time promotes law and peace, upholding human rights. If new governance and judicial structures can prove themselves and be seen as credible and legitimate, they will provide some guarantee that similar atrocities will not occur again. Retributive justice mechanisms are thus an important part of rebuilding social fabrics. Three retributive justice instruments are discussed below:

### Local Courts

The best option for prosecuting war crimes and related abuses is to proceed before a domestic court that everyone views as independent, unbiased and professionally competent. This is a preferred option because using a local court will help promote a culture of justice and accountability in the society in question and its verdicts will be less easily dismissed as those of outsiders.Transition societies often find themselves unable to deal with the enormity of the task, however, especially in view of such major offenses as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Indeed, perpetrators of these crimes might be out of reach of the local authorities.

### International Tribunals

International tribunals have been used for such major offenses as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, relying on international expertise and resources and exerting more forceful international pressure than local courts could wield. Box 7.1 describes the work of three prominent international tribunals.

**Box 7.1: The International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)**

The **ICC** is a permanent international tribunal which will try individuals responsible for the most serious international crimes. One hundred and sixty countries attended the UN-sponsored conference in Rome in 1998 to draft a treaty establishing the ICC. The court was established on 1 July 2002, after ratifications by 60 of the 120 countries that voted for the adoption of the treaty. The court is located in The Hague, The Netherlands.

The **ICTY** was established by Security Council resolution 827. This resolution was passed on 25 May 1993 in the face of the serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and as a response to the threat to international peace and security posed by those serious violations. The ICTY is located in The Hague, The Netherlands.

Recognizing that serious violations of humanitarian law were committed in Rwanda, and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council created the **ICTR** by resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. The purpose of this measure is to contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace in the region. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. It may also deal with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations of international law committed in the territory of neighboring States during the same period. The ICTR is located in Arusha, The United Republic of Tanzania.

## Hybrid Courts

Hybrid courts use both international and local staff and combine positive elements of both local courts and international tribunals. These courts add international expertise and resources but also have the major advantage of operating on location, which makes the justice process visible and accessible to local actors. Jurisdictional limitations, however, can still hamper the effectiveness of certain hybrid courts. Experience with hybrid courts has been gained in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. The hybrid court in Timor-Leste is described in box 7.2.

**Box 7.2: Hybrid Court in Timor-Leste**

"The East Timorese judicial system was virtually non-existent by the time of the establishment of the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAET). Court buildings had been burned and looted, furniture and equipment destroyed or stolen, as were law books and case files. Judicial system personnel were virtually all gone. It was plain that the justice system completely lacked the capacity to deal with major crimes committed during the violence which had so recently occurred.

In response, UNTAET created a hybrid international-local body, situated within the local justice system. A "Serious Crimes Unit," headed by an international prosecutor with a mixed international and local staff, was established to investigate and prosecute the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, sexual offenses and murder. Cases are heard by a Special Panel for Serious Crimes at the Dili District Court, comprised of two international judges and one East Timorese judge. The operation began functioning in relatively short order.

Despite language barriers, insufficient resources and personnel problems, it has been relatively effective. The hybrid criminal justice system in East Timor indicted 101 individuals in thirty-five serious crimes cases in less than two years. Twenty-two people have been convicted, including ten for crimes against humanity, with sentences ranging from four to thirty-three years. As a function of the mixed international and East Timorese personnel, all proceedings are translated into both Bahasa Indonesian and English. This has been accomplished for a fraction of the cost of the Yugoslavia or Rwanda tribunals, in much less time, with the advantage of local participation and local access and visibility." [Yet, some international observers have perceived the East Timorese court as less than optimally effective, as some perpetrators were out of the jurisdictional reach of this court.]

*Source*: Kritz, Neil, "Dealing with the Legacy of Past Abuses", in Bleeker Massard, Mô and Jonathan Sisson (eds.), Dealing with the Past, Critical Issues, Lessons Learned, and Challenges for Future Swiss Policy, Working Paper 2/2004 (Berne: International Peacebuilding Center (KOFF), 2004), p.17, http://www.swisspeace.org/publications/wp/KOFF_DealingWithThePast.pdf

War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide involve a multitude of people, and none of the instruments outlined above is able to deal with more than a small percentage of the potential cases. Prosecution is generally inadequate by itself in these types of situations and has to be complemented by other mechanisms of justice.

## 7.2.2 Complementary Mechanisms of Justice

Retributive justice alone might be too dangerous or too cumbersome a path to pursue. Access to justice and legal remedies is important for victims, but the justice system might not be functioning properly or may be ill-equipped to deal with huge caseloads. For this reason, additional instruments have been developed that complement punitive measures. The most notable forms are the following:

***Lustration*** refers to a means by which some countries deal with a legacy of human rights abuses. Lustration is the mass *barring from public office* of those associated with the abuses under the prior regime. The practice acquired notoriety in post-Soviet Eastern Europe where most countries adopted some form of lustration to exclude former communist party functionaries and those who collaborated with secret police forces from public office for certain periods of time.

***Amnesty*** is the official imposition of "forgiving and forgetting." In a transition society it is a disputed instrument, because it has the potential to alienate many people. It comes in many forms which depend on the way it is decided upon and on the range of perpetrators and crimes it indemnifies (for example, amnesty after full exposure of the facts; amnesty reserved for certain perpetrators, such as child soldiers; amnesty reserved for crimes committed during a specific period). If the end of a violent conflict cannot otherwise be obtained, however, amnesty can be a last resort for ending the conflict.

***Reparation.*** In order to move towards a peaceful future, governments must acknowledge and respond to the injuries of the past, especially human rights violations. Doing so takes various forms. One way is through compensation programs and reparations for the victims of injustice. Customary international law provides the legal foundation for victims' right to compensation. Various international treaties have recognized that victims of gross human rights violations and war crimes have a right to restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation. The obligation to provide compensation for victims of injustice has become part of international humanitarian law. Article Eight of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, states that everyone has the right to an effective remedy.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Take care to be **perceived as not taking sides** on hot issues such as restitution for land or housing. The personal security of staff might be at stake.*
- ✓ *Care needs to be taken that international staff do **not** get **embroiled in the political vicissitudes** of well-meaning yet unconstructive assistance, for example, as donors did when they paid reparation funds into the "Fonds d'Appui aux Rescapés du Génocide (FARG)" in Rwanda.*

## 7.2.3 Community Justice/Traditional Forms of Justice

Traditional forms of justice may complement and even replace more formal and punitive ways of dealing with past human rights violations. Para-legal institutions and healing rituals can sometimes offer ex-combatants, including child soldiers, opportunities to repent and become respected members of the community again. Sometimes traditional efforts are a response to the inability of the formal justice system to deal with the sheer magnitude of abuses during the conflict phase, as illustrated by the example of the Gacaca process in Rwanda (see box 7.3). A key benefit of invoking traditional forms of justice is the central role the local communities normally play in the proceedings.

### Box 7.3: The Gacaca Process in Rwanda

***Background:***

After the genocide in Rwanda close to 130,000 people accused of having organized and taken part in the genocide were put into prison, often in horrific conditions. Despite some significant investment in rebuilding the justice system by the Rwandan government and several bilateral agencies, the justice system proved unable to cope with the multitude of trials in a speedy manner.

The Rwandan government thus came to the conclusion that a conventional European-style justice system could not be the only solution to the problems Rwanda was facing and began searching for alternatives. In 1999, this led to the proposal of an alternative justice system: the *Gacaca* jurisdictions, a modernized version of participatory justice/community conflict resolution. Donors were skeptical mainly because *Gacaca* would compromise on principles of justice as defined in internationally-agreed human rights and criminal law, but later adopted a cautiously supportive approach (see below under “issues”). After several drafts, the "*Gacaca* law" was adopted and published in March 2001.

***The aims of the Gacaca process:***

According to the government, the aims of the *Gacaca* jurisdictions are as follows:

- The Gacaca courts will deal much faster with the genocide than the formal justice system. The culture of impunity will be ended.
- The cost to the taxpayer for the upkeep of prisons will be reduced.
- The participation of every member of the community in revealing the facts of a situation will be the best way to establish the truth. The truth is needed for healing.
- *Gacaca* will aid the healing process in Rwanda, which is seen as the only guarantee of peace, stability and the future development of the country.

***The Process:***

The main principle of the *Gacaca* courts is to bring together all of the protagonists at the actual location of the crime and/or massacre, that is, the survivors, witnesses and presumed perpetrators. All of them participate in a debate on what happened in order to establish the truth, draw up a list of victims and identify the guilty. The process is chaired by non-professional judges elected from among the people of integrity in the community, who decide on the sentence for those found guilty.

***Legal categories of prosecution:***

The people accused of genocide are divided into four categories:

1. The planners, organizers and leaders of the genocide, those who acted in a position of authority, well known murderers and those guilty of rape and sexual torture
2. Those guilty of voluntary homicide, of having participated or been complicit in voluntary homicide or acts against persons resulting in death, of having inflicted wounds with intent to kill or of committing other serious violent acts which did not result in death
3. Those who committed violent acts without intent to kill
4. Those who committed property-related crimes

The perpetrators who belong to the first category are judged by ordinary magistrates’ courts, not the *Gacaca* process.

***The structure:***

The government created about 11,000 *Gacaca* jurisdictions, each made up of 19 elected judges known for their integrity. Over 254,000 of these civil judges were elected between 4 and 7 October 2001 and received training in 2002 before the courts began to function. There are four levels of jurisdiction for the different categories of crime (2, 3 and 4) tried by the *Gacaca* courts. Only the first and second categories may appeal. The judgments are then examined by the highest district and provincial levels of the administration.

The 9,201 *Gacaca* jurisdictions at "cell" level investigate the facts, classify the accused and try the fourth category cases (no appeals). The 1,545 *Gacaca* jurisdictions at "sector" level are in charge of third category crimes. The 106 *Gacaca* jurisdictions at district level hear the second category cases and the third category appeals. The 12 *Gacaca* jurisdictions at provincial level or in Kigali are in charge of appeals of second category cases.

Three structures coexist at each jurisdictional level:

1. The General Assembly (at cell level, the entire population over the age of 18; at all other levels a group of 50 or 60 elected "people of integrity")
2. The Chair: 19 judges in each jurisdiction
3. The coordination committee made up of 5 people

***Issues*** *(some of which were the reason for the initial reluctance of the donor community to support Gacaca):*

- *Gacaca* courts only deal with the crime of genocide. Yet, some crimes were committed just after the genocide in the spirit of revenge. Such crimes are dealt with by ordinary courts with all the costs that such trials engender.
- The brutality of some confessions is potentially dangerous, as it is likely to weaken the already fragile social stability.
- How can witnesses be protected? So far no appropriate solutions have been found.
- *Gacaca* courts are supposed to ease overcrowding in prisons and thus solve the problem of the expenses and resentment that it causes. The courts, however, may actually risk increasing the number of suspects and therefore increasing the number of detainees.
- *Gacaca* courts compromise on principles of justice as defined in internationally-agreed human rights and criminal law (no separation between prosecutor and judge, no legally reasoned verdict, great encouragement of self-incrimination and a potential for major divergences in the punishments awarded). In this case, however, the practice of formal justice also violates human rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, reasonable detention times and decent conditions of detention. Under these conditions, the issue then involves determining the most pragmatic and potentially effective road to take.
- There is a need to determine what indicators can be used to show that *Gacaca* courts have achieved their objectives, that is, that some form of reconciliation has been genuine and that the culture of impunity has been replaced by a culture of accountability.
- Regarding the future, what mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that these courts are not temporary but rather become a permanent instrument of conflict management?

***Assessment:***

Despite many unresolved issues, if successful, the *Gacaca* process could produce enormous benefits for the Rwandan society. They may solve the problems of the current slow judicial practice and they also have the potential to create significant benefits in terms of truth, reconciliation and even empowerment. For these reasons the international community decided to cautiously support the process.

*Sources:* Adapted from Uvin, Peter, "The Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda", in International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict- A Handbook*, Bloomfield, David, Teresa Barnes And Luc Huyse (eds.), (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003), pp. 116-21, http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_chap08cs-safrica.pdf

Adapted from Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), *Building Lasting Peace in Rwanda - The Voice of the People*, (Kigali/Geneva: IRDP/ WSP International, 2003), http://wsp.dataweb.ch/wspapplets/data/Documents/Country_Note_Final_IRDP_English.pdf

Box 7.4 demonstrates the attitude of one bilateral agency to the *Gacaca* process in Rwanda.

**Box 7.4: The Government of Belgium's Support to Rwanda's Legal Mechanisms**

"The Belgian Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation has pronounced that it is concentrating on improving the legal system and combating impunity (both traditional justice mechanisms and popular *Gacaca* courts to deliver fast rulings on crimes committed during the genocide) to settle genocide-related disputes, and on supporting demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters. Belgium is currently the largest donor in this area."

*Source:* The Belgian Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. "Chapter 10: Belgium and Africa. Africa – A Major Focus for Belgium." http://www.diplomatie.be/en/pdf/Activity%20report/2003/10EN.pdf.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Particularly in this field, **be respectful of local traditions and customs** and limit your role to that of an advisor. Functioning local institutions, even though not perfect, should not be replaced by international mechanisms.*
- ✓ *Attempt to be seen as **fully impartial** when providing legal aid or advice.*
- ✓ ***Focus** first on the **problem at hand**, even if it seems small. Radical changes (of the whole legal system, for example) might be unattainable.*

## 7.2.4 Restorative Justice

**Restorative justice** is not designed to punish the wrong-doer, but rather to restore the victim and the relationship to the way they were before the offense. Restorative justice is concerned with healing victims' wounds, restoring offenders to law-abiding lives and repairing the harm done to relationships and the community. Examples of restorative justice are victim-offender reconciliation or mediation programs.

In transition societies a central goal of rebuilding the torn social fabric is to restore the community as a whole. Mechanisms under the rubric of restorative justice depend on how much the relationship between formerly opposing parties can be changed for the better. In principle, such restoration cannot take place unless it is supported by wider social conditions and unless the larger community makes restorative processes available. Restorative justice in the transition context is therefore linked to social structural changes, reconstruction programs to help communities ravaged by conflict, democratization and the creation of civil society institutions. An example of a restorative justice mechanism is given in box 7.5.

**Box 7.5: Restorative Justice in Bougainville**

"The civil war on Bougainville (concerning secession of this island from Papua New Guinea, and fighting between different local factions) has been a testing ground for a restorative justice approach to peacemaking. The PEACE Foundation Melanesia, funded by Caritas, the New Zealand Overseas Development Agency and Princess Diana Fund, has given basic restorative justice training to 10,000 people on Bougainville, 500 as facilitators, including many traditional chiefs, and 50 to 70 as trainers. Out of this, the PEACE Foundation Melanesia expects to have some 800 active village-based mediators to deal with the conflicts that have arisen in the aftermath of civil war, from petty instances of ethic abuse up to rape and political killings. The Bougainvillians are discovering their own ways of doing restorative justice consistent with their Melanesian principle of wan bel (literally 'one belly') or reconciliation."

*Source*: Braithwaite, John, quoted in International Institute For Democracy And Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict- A Handbook*, Bloomfield, David, Teresa Barnes And Luc Huyse (eds.), (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003), p.113., http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation.

## Truth Commissions

Truth commissions have become increasingly popular instruments in the efforts to deal with past abuses in an official but non-judicial manner. At least 25 official truth commissions have been established around the world since 1974. They have gone by different names, which have included “commissions on the disappeared” in Argentina, Uganda and Sri Lanka; “truth and justice commissions” in Haiti and Ecuador; “truth and reconciliation commissions” in Chile, South Africa, Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a “commission for reception, truth and reconciliation” in East Timor.

By far the most famous of them is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission that held hearings into the human rights abuses that occurred during the apartheid era and held out the possibility of amnesty to people who showed genuine remorse for their actions. Box 7.6 enumerates the general characteristics of truth commissions. Box 7.7 provides an example of the workings on a particular truth commission, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala.

### Box 7.6: Characteristics of Truth Commissions

Truth commissions generally

- are temporary bodies, usually in operation from one to two years
- are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the state and, in some cases, by the armed opposition as well as in a peace accord
- are non-judicial bodies that enjoy a measure of *de jure* independence
- are created at a point of political transition, either from war to peace or from authoritarian rule to democracy
- focus on the past
- investigate patterns of abuses and specific violations committed over a period of time, not just a single specific event
- complete their work with the submission of a final report that contains conclusions and recommendations
- focus on violations of human rights and sometimes of humanitarian norms as well.

*Source:* International Institute For Democracy And Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict- A Handbook*, Bloomfield, David, Teresa Barnes And Luc Huyse (eds.), (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003), p.125., http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation.

### Box 7.7: Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala

The civil war in Guatemala, fought between anti-communist government forces and leftist rebels, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG), lasted over 30 years and resulted in some 200,000 deaths and disappearances.

The Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH) was created by the 1994 "Accord of Oslo," one in a series of accords negotiated between the Guatemalan government and the URNG before the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in December 1996. Unlike truth commissions in other countries, such as El Salvador and South Africa, this Commission was assigned only the task of *clarifying* “the human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the armed confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan people." The Commission was explicitly prohibited from assigning individual responsibility for human rights crimes and was not given any juridical authority.

The CEH completed its report in February 1999. Ninety-three per cent of the violations that it documented were attributed to the military or state-backed paramilitary forces; three per cent were attributed to the URNG. Perhaps the CEH’s strongest conclusion was that, on the basis of the patterns of violence in the four worst-affected regions of the country, agents of the state committed acts of genocide in the years 1981–1983 against groups of Mayan people.

***Results:***

- The government believes that recommendations of the CEH were sufficiently addressed in the peace accord
- Some judicial investigations into gross human rights violations have taken place, albeit at the initiative of victims and human rights groups, not the state
- Because of the limited dissemination of the CEH's final report, many of the communities that suffered the worst abuses often know little about the commission's work.

***International responses***:

International commitment to support the CEH was good. Canada was the first donor to contribute to the start-up costs of the Commission, thereby prompting a positive response from other donors. Out of a total budget of US 11 million dollars, ten million came from the US, Norwegian, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Japanese governments.

Support to implement the recommendations has been as important as support to establish the commission in the first place. As a follow-up to the recommendations, USAID, the largest donor to Guatemala, provided support for exhumations of clandestine cemeteries, mental health services to victims and family members, and for land conflict resolution services. Germany, the second largest donor to Guatemala, supported the peace secretariat ("Secretaría de la Paz de la Presidencia", SEPEZ). In partnership with 54 local NGOs the peace secretariat supported historical clarification and truth finding through the establishment of a network for psychosocial rehabilitation of affected people, and a range of education, health and infrastructure projects. Japan was involved in infrastructure projects, the establishment of a new civilian police force, justice sector reform, strengthening of civil society organizations, and direct assistance to war-affected communities.

A donor dialogue group was also formed to engage the President and cabinet in frank discussions to implement peace commitments and key reforms. Despite these initiatives, wide-ranging social inequalities remain even today. Discrimination across ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines remains disturbingly prevalent.

In general, a range of donors affiliated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Consultative Group tied its support for Guatemala to a comprehensive neo-liberal agenda. In addition to the over-riding priorities of macroeconomic stability and privatization, this agenda implies a degree of commitment to administrative efficiency, political pluralism, social investment and basic human rights. This agenda created an incentive for the Guatemalan government to take the findings of the commission more seriously.

*Sources:* Adapted from Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Grossmann, Georg S und Hildegard Lingnau, *Vergangenheits- und Versöhnungsarbeit: Wie die TZ die Aufarbeitung von Gewaltsamen Konflikten Unterstützen Kann*, (Eschborn. GTZ, 2002), http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/de-crisis-versoehnungsarbeit.pdf, and USAID, *Guatemala- Activity Data Sheet*, http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/lac/gt/520-006.html.

## Ombudspersons

An ombudsperson is someone, sometimes a government official, who investigates citizens' complaints against the government or its functionaries. Although, not quite a mechanism of restorative justice, ombudspersons nevertheless play an important function in providing a means of conflict resolution outside the courts. Often appointed by the government, but situated in an independent office, ombudspersons have become significant in many transition societies. Ombudspersons can be a particularly useful mechanism for preventing human rights violations, corruption and a general deterioration of the rule of law. Unfortunately, however, these offices are often overwhelmed with requests, have mandate limitations (can only advise, recommend, propose, but not actively carry out) or do not wield enough authority.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Be highly **respectful of local circumstances** and the political and historical context. Do not necessarily apply pressure to establish truth and reconciliation commissions, if reconciliation is not the first concern in the context of the transition society (for example, Rwanda).*
- ✓ *Have **patience** with a process that is not focused only on legal aspects but on restoring dignity and peace as well.*

Concluding the discussion of transitional justice mechanisms, table 7.3 provides selected examples of international support activities in this field.

**Table 7.3: The Experience of External Actors with Transitional Justice Support Activities – Selected Examples**

| Transitional Justice Instruments | Menu of Support Options Employed to Date | Actor |
|---|---|---|
| Support for International Criminal Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) | ▪ Funding via the General Assembly of the United Nations<br>▪ Seconded personnel to act as prosecutors and investigators<br>▪ Forensic experts<br>▪ Training of judges and attorneys<br>▪ Process monitoring | United Nations<br>Personnel secondments from individual countries such as the US and Canada<br>NGOs |
| Truth commissions | ▪ Funding (multilateral via the Security Council/General Assembly; bilateral via human rights/democracy rubrics within cooperation agencies)<br>▪ Database creation and management<br>▪ Investigators<br>▪ NGO counseling and support to victims<br>▪ Publication and dissemination of findings<br>▪ Meetings and conferences of commission staff and members in different countries<br>▪ General support<br>▪ Fact-finding enquiries | UN<br>European Union, range of bilateral donors for major truth commissions (for example, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, US), private foundations |
| Ombudsperson offices | ▪ Support to various offices in Latin America | European Union |
| Transitional justice generally | ▪ Experts<br>▪ Mediators<br>▪ Documentation<br>▪ Research on the relationship between truth commissions and prosecutions, reparations and other mechanisms<br>▪ Independent research on a process like *Gacaca* | Several NGOs, most notably:<br>▪ The International Center for Transitional Justice<br>▪ The United States Institute of Peace<br>▪ University of Notre Dame's Center for Civil and Human Rights<br>▪ Ulster University's Centre for |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | ▪ Development of policy guidelines<br>▪ Development of moral codes<br>▪ Provision of fellowships<br>▪ Legal aid to political prisoners or disadvantaged population groups, such as women and child prisoners<br>▪ Advice on lustration, amnesty and reparation laws<br>▪ Help with ensuring that laws, once passed, become operationalized, for example, information and public dissemination campaigns (see chapter 6, section 6.4.1 for a discussion of the importance of the media)<br>▪ Special projects on the re-integration of prisoners | Transitional Justice<br>▪ Max Planck Institute<br>▪ Range of bilateral donors on legal aid and advice on law |
| "Dealing with the Past" | ▪ Special thematic focus/desk officer | Swiss Foreign Ministry and Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation |
| Personnel needs in transitional justice | Via Human Rights Fund, Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights | Norwegian Government |

## *7.3 Social Mechanisms*

Transitional justice mechanisms alone will not be able to address the rebuilding of social fabrics. A large percentage of the population will suffer from a range of symptoms that exacerbate the breakdown of society. These symptoms range from:

- emotional disturbances, such as depression, intense fear, and feelings of helplessness
- cognitive responses, such as memory loss, poor judgment and inability to make choices
- physical responses, including headaches and stomach pains
- behavioral responses, including irritability, hyper-alertness, insomnia and alcohol abuse.

Social injustices exacerbate these symptoms and can lead to a more generalized fragmentation of society, as whole sections of society lose basic trust, and where feelings of rage alternate with feelings of helplessness, humiliation and victimization. These issues must also be addressed.

In addition, the need to reintegrate large numbers of displaced people places a huge burden on the transition society. Their needs must be addressed explicitly to ensure that reintegration and demobilization processes are undertaken with the best results.

A wide range of activities, termed social mechanisms, has been developed to address social rebuilding with the aim of fostering community-building, reconciliation and peaceful co-existence. Among the bases for action are the OECD-DAC guidelines[33] that describe two fundamental aspects in this regard:

[33] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, (Paris: OECD, 2001), pp. 113-125.

**Good governance:** respect for human rights, participatory processes, strengthening of public institutions, strengthening of security and justice systems. (Good governance is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.)

**Civil society:** support to certain traditional institutions, promotion of dialogue and cooperation, mediation and negotiation, education and intercultural capacity-building and support to freedom of and access to information (see also chapter 6, section 6.4.1).
Within these two areas, the following types of activities are most significant: (1) psychosocial support and direct community building measures, (2) social reconciliation, coexistence and social reintegration and (3) dialogue and trust building. These are discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.

## 7.3.1 Psychosocial support and direct community-building measures

***Psychosocial support*** projects are most often implemented through international or local NGOs that provide counseling services or therapy for trauma healing. While individual counseling is very important, it is not further discussed here. This is because, in transition societies, the issue needs to be focused on societal trauma, which needs instead a societal response.

A key element in achieving psychosocial healing of society is anchoring the healing process in the community and therefore on ***direct community-building measures***. True communities are groups of individuals who have learned how to communicate honestly with one another and who have developed some significant commitment to accompany and support each other. The aim of building these communities is to restore people's confidence in each other and the group they belong to, and thus assist with the rebuilding of the social fabric. (See also chapter 3 for the importance of community-building from a human security perspective).

Several different kinds of projects, implemented through international or local NGOs, fall under the rubric of community-building. The role of the external actor is mainly to help provide a framework in which values can be rediscovered and where belief systems and modes of behavior stress healthy and sustainable beliefs and actions. Development actors can integrate community-building aims into their development projects, such as employing volunteers or pursuing capacity building. Table 7.4 explains in more detail what role external actors can play in direct community-building.

**Table 7.4: Possible Engagement of External Actors in Direct Community-Building**

| Activities | Commentary |
|---|---|
| ▪ **Establishment of community groups** for trauma healing | These groups are important, but practically hard to organize. Having to face the urgent task of rebuilding destroyed houses, schools, hospitals, wells and fields around them, many people believe that they have no time to tend to their psychological wounds. |
| ▪ **Local-level psychosocial projects**, such as support groups for children or youth (football clubs or other athletic group work), or those that provide assistance to women (such as vocational training) | One way to address community-building is through tangible activities that will result in community-building, even if it is not an explicit goal of the program/project. |
| ▪ **Recruitment of volunteers** from within the community or internationally | Instinctively, most human beings wish to help others who are suffering. Yet, since people will automatically first provide for their own safety and welfare, this sort of spontaneous volunteer activity often extends only to one's own family and closest friends. Therefore, a more systematic means of providing consistent and organized volunteer aid is required. |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Objective:**<br>to harness the full capacity of people's instinct to help fellow citizens, while directing this help where it is most needed | Volunteer action is a strategy to train and empower individuals to provide volunteer aid in transition situations. Volunteers collaborate with professionals to:<br>▪ Reassure victims of war that they have been listened to<br>▪ Provide practical assistance to refugees in adapting to new environments<br>▪ Help build communities during a post-conflict transition. |
| ▪ **Capacity-building and training**<br>**Objective:**<br>to allow more and more volunteers and professionals to better respond to societal trauma | As a result, over time more and more capacity will exist in the society to deal with psychosocial needs.<br>As the society becomes more aware of its needs and adequate responses to societal trauma, a self-healing process will have been put in motion. In this sense, capacity-building is a cornerstone of any social rebuilding program in a transition society. |

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *When building community groups, **create safe space** where people feel comfortable with each other.*
- ✓ *Promote **co-existence** of individuals in groups. Appreciate differences. Be inclusive. Ask the question: "why should this person NOT be a member of this group" rather than "why should s/he be?"*
- ✓ *Work with **consensus**, even if it takes a long time.*
- ✓ *Appreciate the **process** just as much as the outcome. Know that social rebuilding is not a defined event.*
- ✓ *Provide adequate **training, support and supervision** to volunteers.*
- ✓ *Try to **prevent a high turn-over rate** by hiring locally recruited volunteers and explain to their families why so much time must be spent away from them.*
- ✓ ***Integrate capacity-building and training** programs into existing structures rather than creating parallel ones.*
- ✓ *Pay special **attention to the needs of those supporting affected people**. They might exhibit burnout syndrome, counter-transference problems or indirect traumatization, as a result of the emotional stress of their work.*

The Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Former Yugoslavia is one example of an organization that applies the good practices of community building. Box 7.8 describes its work.

**Box 7.8: The Work of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) in Former Yugoslavia**

The IRSS was founded in 1984 to promote international security and sustainable use of natural resources. One of IRSS' largest integrated action projects -- the Health Bridges for Peace (HBP) project -- utilizes a shared concern for public health as a vehicle to convene, train and engage health-care professionals in conflict management and community-reconstruction programs. Through the HBP

project, IRSS helped to develop the Medical Network for Social Reconstruction in the Former Yugoslavia (Medical Network, www.irss-usa.org).

The Medical Network has pioneered a broad range of psychosocial healing programs including community-integration programs, development of volunteer action and training of professional and lay people to take part in psychosocial healing. These programs have demonstrated that psychosocial healing can be an effective way to heal post-conflict societal trauma and rebuild a society with a vastly improved quality of life. Diagram 7.1 shows the process of psychosocial healing as applied by the Network.

### *Diagram 7.1: Community-Based Process of Psychosocial Healing*

Provide training in trauma healing and psychosocial assistance

I. Identify existing social support capacity within the community

II. Strengthen existing social networks

III. Develop community capacity for psychosocial support

IV. Develop volunteer capacity for psychosocial support

V. Develop local organizations (NGOs)

VI. Develop civil society

VII. Engage in structured learning

VIII. Modify goals and methods according to lessons learned

IX. Provide training of trainers and help to helpers

X. Repeat cycle and extend program to larger community




*Source:* Gutlove, Paula and Gordon Thompson (eds.), *Psychosocial Healing – A Guide for Practitioners*, (Cambridge, MA and Graz, Austria: Institute for Resource and Security Studies/OMEGA Health Care Centre, May 2003), p 27, http://www.irss-usa.org/pages/documents/PSGuide.pdf.

## 7.3.2 Social reconciliation, coexistence and social reintegration

***Social reconciliation*** is a process involving the restoration of trust and hope within a community, increased cooperative behavior and the development of shared values and expectations. Reconciliation is a long-term process involving attitudinal change and careful examination of feelings and beliefs. Such a process cannot be rushed. It might take a generation rather than a few years. It is almost impossible to judge when reconciliation has been achieved. The process might be as important as the goal.

In recent years external actors have pushed for "social reconciliation" as a "technical instrument" in the field of international transition assistance. Many internal actors, however, are not comfortable with this idea. In particular, the historical responsibility of the international community for existing conflicts (for example, not intervening to prevent the genocide in Rwanda) evokes strong resistance among internal actors to the external actors' call for national reconciliation. In addition, many internal actors perceive reconciliation as a reorientation process where the emphasis is on the search for a reason for continued living and the restoration of personal human dignity and peace, not as an act of reconciliation *between* various actors (the external actors' model).

Such a reconstruction of the personality and the community, however, requires a minimum of economic and personal security. It is impossible to think of reconciliation while homeless or without the possibility of making a living. Even more important than economic security is personal security. Unless people feel personally secure, they will not begin the process of reorientation (see chapter 3 for a discussion of human security). Social reconciliation can thus not be a first goal and is not one to be pursued in isolation. It is an enormous task, as box 7.9 describes.

**Box 7.9: Enormity of the Reconciliation Task**

Reconciliation in today's Guatemala means overcoming an armed conflict that has probably claimed more than 200,000 lives over a period of 34 years. According to the Truth Commission, the government forces comprising members of the military and paramilitaries were responsible for around 90 per cent of these deaths. About 80 per cent of the victims were *indígenas*, that is, descendants of the continent's Mayan cultures.

*Source:* American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Science and Human Rights Program, Guatemala, *Memory of Silence - The Report of the Historical Clarification Commission*, http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html.

The attempt to promote co-existence is similar to reconciliation in its objective. Coexistence is present before and after violent conflict, but after conflict, people are much more prone to separate than to live peacefully together. The wounds of war are not yet forgotten and mistrust reigns. At best, communities merely tolerate other groups (passive coexistence). The aim of coexistence projects is to move from a state of violent conflict, during which a separation of groups may have taken place, to passive coexistence to active coexistence and eventually to sustainable peaceful relations. Box 7.10 describes an innovative co-existence project focused on community building between returnees and local groups.

**Box 7.10: Imagine Coexistence**

One innovative project commissioned and implemented by UNHCR in partnership with Harvard University and then with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University is the "Imagine Coexistence" project. It was launched in the spring of 2000 and began its operation in the spring and summer of 2001. The project encouraged joint activities or joint use of public spaces (for example, schools, playgrounds, or health clubs) as a means for members of conflicting groups to replace deeply rooted mistrust with cooperation and peacebuilding. Both a field component, implemented in two countries (Bosnia and Rwanda) and a research component were carried out.

The mandate for the research was to: help UNHCR strengthen its ability to support coexistence in areas where refugees are returning to divided communities by (1) evaluating current UNHCR funded coexistence efforts; and (2) based on this analysis, making recommendations to UNHCR on ways to focus their future efforts so as to make coexistence a more explicit and systematic element in their work.

Ms Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees at the time of the Imagine Coexistence projects, assesses the results of "Imagine Coexistence" as follows:

"Some surprising outcomes were observed. In Drvar in western Bosnia, for example, a group of Croat and Serb farmers started to run a joint strawberry farm. Also women from both ethnic groups started a bakery. A communal meeting place was set up for women to meet and undergo training. Considering the intense enmity between the two ethnic groups that had existed in Drvar, the initial impact of the coexistence experiences was surprisingly positive. However, while these small-scale community projects were invaluable at the start of communal reconciliation, their effectiveness was limited without links to larger economic activities. True to many post-conflict societies, the introduction of development assistance and investments remained too slow for these small, struggling communities."

She concludes, "If we were to choose the most crucial entry point for "imagine coexistence" projects, I would not hesitate to insist on the early phases of peace, particularly when refugees and displaced persons head home and reintegration process begins. As the essence of "imagine coexistence" is the rejoining of divided communities to communicate, interact and cooperate through joint activities, preparations must be made to seize repatriation opportunities. Currently, peace and repatriation prospects seem ripe for some 6.7 million refugees and displaced persons from Sudan."

*Sources:* Adapted from The Fletcher School Of Law And Diplomacy, Tufts University, *Imagine Coexistence, Assessing Refugee Reintegration Efforts in Divided Communities*. Tufts University: 2002, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/chrcr/pdf/imagine.pdf.

Ogata, Sadako, "Imagine Coexistence and Peace", Excerpt of a Speech given at the Transitional Justice and Human Security Seminar, Cape Town, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation/Japan International Coordination Agency, 28 March- 1 April 2005, pp.3-5, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/resources/announce/2005/pdf/apr.pdf.

An example of a bilateral agency's commitment in the field of reconciliation is included in box 7.11.

**Box 7.11: Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) Engagement in Reconciliation in Sierra Leone**

"Shortly after the signing of a peace accord in July 1999, the Canadian government, through CIDA, established a $500,000 child-protection program to help reunite former child combatants with their families, to support other child-protection initiatives, and to foster forgiveness and reconciliation in communities traumatized by years of slaughter, amputations, and other atrocities. World Vision Canada, Save the Children, and CAUSE Canada (Christian Aid for Under-Assisted Societies Everywhere) are leading the effort to trace scattered families and sensitize communities."

*Source:* Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), CIDA's Social Development Priorities, *Building Peace - One Child at a Time*, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vLUallDocByIDEn/380C48FDA3554DD185256969007145F7?OpenDocument.

Table 7.5 describes possible support activities in social reconciliation, including co-existence.

**Table 7.5: Possible Engagement of External Actors in Social Reconciliation**

| Activities | Commentary |
|---|---|
| ▪ Reconciliation projects, implemented through local or international NGOs<br>▪ Mainstreaming the goals of reconciliation into other assistance projects | See good practices below<br>When development aid agencies plan and implement community-based/rural development projects, it is vital to assess if and how the project impacts relations between different beneficiary groups (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1 and chapter 3, section 3.2.4) |
| ▪ Reconciliation projects with the aim of promoting co-existence, implemented via UNHCR or NGOs<br>▪ Mainstreaming the goals of co-existence projects into other assistance projects | See Imagine Coexistence above |

Development assistance might be particularly well placed to promote reconciliation, especially if the assistance agencies have been in the country for a while and have already won considerable trust locally. Quite obviously the ethical standards and the quality of the staff of the assisting organization will also be important prerequisites for convincing work in the reconciliation field. For example, in 1995 in Rwanda external actors engaged in the following reconciliation initiatives described in box 7.12.

**Box 7.12: Engagement of External Actors in Rwanda in 1995/6**

Eight teams of African and non-African members facilitated open discussions of needs, views, ideas and methodologies, and arranged for subsequent technical assistance in areas such as micro-enterprise and development of cooperatives. In addition, several NGOs, such as Feed the Children, CARITAS and the Salvation Army, actively promoted ethnic integration within their normal programs by providing a legitimate and organized venue for interaction. One example was the latter's housing reconstruction programs, in which those who remained in the community were helping returnees rebuild their homes. Some agencies were also promoting cross-ethnic interaction between refugees and groups in Rwanda via message, gift or marketing exchanges. Food for the Hungry in Gisenyi, for instance, offered logistical support for women refugees to sell their crafts to other women's associations in Rwanda.

*Source*: Steering Committee Of The Joint Evaluation Of Emergency Assistance To Rwanda, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, 1996.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Make mending relationships and restoring dignity and trust an **explicit policy objective.***
- ✓ *Be aware that it is **too early for reconciliation/co-existence** when the survivors of genocide or other atrocities are **still** occupied with **surviving**.*
- ✓ ***Do not force reconciliation/coexistence upon people**: there is no right to reconciliation for the perpetrators, and victims must not be put under pressure to reconcile. It is therefore important to analyze who has asked for the reconciliation and why.*
- ✓ *Engage in **in-depth research on the indigenous social aspects of violent conflict** such as gender variations, resiliency, indigenous coping strategies, social vulnerability or indigenous community mobilization. For instance, the valuable role community leaders and extended family members play as counselors may often have been overlooked as a crucial element of psycho-social healing.*

## Social reintegration

It is no accident that Imagine Coexistence was spearheaded by UNHCR and focused on the reintegration of returnees. In transition societies, reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) or other vulnerable groups into local communities (such as ex-prisoners or demobilized combatants including child soldiers) is often not as smooth as it should be. Returnees might be unwelcome and even face violence, if they are not of the same identity group as the majority in the community or if they have been compromised through the war. They might be discriminated against and find it impossible to support themselves and their families. In such instances, sustainable return and reintegration is severely compromised. Projects that aim to prepare the social environment for returnees by addressing equally the needs of the receiving communities are key in this regard. Table 7.6 suggests possible activities of external actors with regard to social reintegration.

| Table 7.6: Possible Engagement of External Actors in Social Reintegration | |
|---|---|
| **Activities** | **Commentary** |
| ▪ Support to reintegration projects, via UN agencies, governmental efforts or NGOs | UNHCR has developed a comprehensive approach known as the "4Rs" (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction).[34] From the reintegration point of view, this approach tries to ensure that the social environment into which the groups are meant to reintegrate is prepared optimally for the influx. Reintegration is measured by the ability of returnees to secure the necessary political economic legal and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity.[35] |

***Good Practice***

*Many good practices pertain to planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating reintegration programs. See UNHCR materials (footnote 2 below) for details. From a social rebuilding point of view, key in all of these is that the receiving population is adequately sensitized and prepared, that established human rights/rule of law standards guide program development and that, as much as possible, self-sustaining structures are created.*

## 7.3.3 Dialogue and trust-building

The fact that people are ready to work together in rebuilding programs such as "Imagine Co-existence" does not necessarily mean that they no longer harbor resentments against each other. Other programs and projects aimed at developing a culture of healing and trust play an important role. Notable among them are dialogue and trust-building activities. Table 7.7 proposes possible activities in these areas.

| Table 7.7: Possible Engagement of External Actors in Dialogue and Trust-Building | |
|---|---|
| **Activities** | **Commentary** |
| ▪ Special dialogue and trust-building projects, implemented by NGOs, focused often on problem-solving (external actors are in the facilitator's role)<br>▪ Mainstreaming the goals of dialogue and trust-building projects into other assistance projects | Dialogues are commonly used in transition situations to build up mutual understanding and trust between members of (formerly) opposing groups. Through dialogue, public discourse can become more sophisticated, informative and inviting, eventually helping to manage conflicts better. |

[34] See for further information: United Nations High Commission For Refugees, *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*, (Geneva. UNHCR, 2004).

[35] United Nations High Commission For Refugees, *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*, (Geneva. UNHCR, 2004). Module One, p.8.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Learn to **establish excellent human relations** through dialogue as a matter of course in daily work.*
- ✓ *Put **dialogues in the context of the overall dynamics of conflict** and conflict management.*
- ✓ *Even if dialogue processes cannot provide the whole answer, setting up **channels for ongoing communication and information exchange among a range of parties is responding to a key need** in transition societies.*
- ✓ *Care must be taken that **dialogues do not become one-sided** (that is, if excellent communication modes are established between an external actor and a local NGO, the national government might feel bypassed).*

Perhaps of quite some relevance in the rebuilding of social fabrics is an ecological model, proposed by Berkeley's human rights center,[36] in which activities occur at multiple levels and in many segments of society simultaneously; and in which all actors are constantly aware that change or interventions in any one area have ripple effects across all other areas.

[36] Stover, Eric and Harvey M. Weinstein, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 345 p.

## General Lessons on Rebuilding Social Fabrics

- ✓ Rebuilding social fabrics in transition societies is a complex, delicate and time-consuming process. Large parts of the population see themselves as victims of the war. Victims demand justice and accountability but they also require that their pain, anger and fear of renewed war are addressed.
- ✓ Tension might reside in how best to address these demands because the desire for justice and accountability can be contradictory to the call for reconciliation and forgiveness. An acknowledgement of the pain and anger of victims might realistically be the first goal. Contradictions can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
- ✓ There will never be a generally accepted definition of the historic truth. On the contrary, different expectations and interests are at play in presenting the truth as it is perceived. It is therefore particularly crucial that at the outset of any social rebuilding program fundamental questions are answered, concerning the motives, objectives and purposes that the intervention serves. This must include an honest self-reflection process. The objective cannot be to find and defend the "truth."
- ✓ Transitional justice mechanisms include retributive justice instruments, community justice and restorative justice. Social mechanisms include targeted psychosocial support projects; direct community building measures; and projects aimed at reconciliation/ coexistence, reintegration and/or dialogue and trust-building.
- ✓ The influence of external actors is fundamentally limited. External assistance is more easily provided in the legal field and can only have a sensitive, facilitative function when it addresses social issues. Key owners of the healing process must be the local communities themselves.
- ✓ International assistance on justice must always follow international standards of justice and human rights.
- ✓ Victims and their families can sometimes see reconciliation as being imposed too early or, sometimes view reconciliation as simply impossible.
- ✓ Particular attention must be paid to the needs of the large number of displaced persons or otherwise disadvantaged groups, such as returnees, ex-combatants and ex-prisoners, as well as to the needs of the communities to which they are returning.
- ✓ Adopting a realistic time-frame is essential. While it may be more attractive to support truth commissions and other prominent instruments associated with reconciliation, the steady and serious support of building communities and transforming parts of the social system (for example, educational reform and reform of political institutions) might be of higher value in the long-run. In addition, short-term social rebuilding projects run the risk of being discredited as insincere and victims may feel abused by the process.

## Resources

Bleeker Massard, Mô and Jonathan Sisson (eds.), *Dealing with the Past, Critical Issues, Lessons Learned, and Challenges for Future Swiss Policy*, Working Paper 2/2004 (Berne: International Peacebuilding Center (KOFF), 2004), http://www.swisspeace.org/publications/wp/KOFF_DealingWithThePast.pdf.

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), http://www.csvr.org.za. CSVR is an independent South African NGO working in the fields of reconciliation and transitional justice, criminal justice transformation, victim empowerment, youth and gender-based violence and in the building of durable peace and reconciliation.

Gutlove, Paula and Gordon Thompson (eds.), *Psychosocial Healing – A Guide for Practitioners*, (Cambridge,MA and Graz, Austria: Institute for Resource and Security Studies/OMEGA Health Care Centre, May 2003), http://www.irss-usa.org/pages/documents/PSGuide.pdf.

The Initiative for Inclusive Security (formerly known as "Women Waging Peace"), http://www.womenwagingpeace.net. The Initiative for Inclusive Security advocates for the full participation of all stakeholders, especially women, in peace processes around the world. The website offers a range of research and case study materials examining women's activities in conflict prevention, pre-negotiation and negotiation, and post-conflict reconstruction.

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), *Approaches to Transitional Justice*, http://www.ictj.org/approaches.asp. The ICTJ assists countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocities or human rights abuses. It provides comparative information, legal and policy analysis, documentation, and strategic research to justice and truth-seeking institutions, non-governmental organizations, governments and others. The ICTJ assists in the development of strategies for transitional justice comprising five key elements: prosecuting perpetrators, documenting violations through nonjudicial means such as truth commissions, reforming abusive institutions, providing reparations to victims and advancing reconciliation.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA), *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict – A Handbook*, edited by David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003), www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation.

Kritz, Neil J., "The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice" in: *Transitional Justice*. Vol. I. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995).

Mendez, Juan, "National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice and the International Criminal Court", *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol 15 (1), Spring 2001, http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/484.

Stover, Eric and Harvey M. Weinstein, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Truth Commissions Project, http://www.truthcommission.org. This website, a collaboration of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Search for Common Ground, and the European Centre for Common Ground, is part of a process designed to help build a Truth Commission that fits the unique needs of countries in post-conflict situations.

United Nations, "The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies", *Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees, *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*, (Geneva. UNHCR, 2004).

United States Institute of Peace Library, http://www.usip.org/library. US independent federal institution providing an on-line library of truth commission and peace agreement documentation.

Notes:

# Chapter 8
# Infrastructure Rebuilding

## *Chapter Objectives*

- Provides an overview of infrastructure rebuilding.
- Discusses a useful approach to infrastructure rebuilding.
- Describes principal actors and proposes potential activities.

## *Introduction*

Infrastructure is required for human survival and livelihood: it enables people to live in safety and good health. People need a hygienic environment to live in, with access to safe potable water and sanitary sewerage. They need easy access to health care facilities. They need irrigation on their farmland to produce a stable supply of food. They need feeder roads to link outlying villages to the markets of local towns.

Many of these needs, however, are jeopardized in transition societies. Physical infrastructure is destroyed, non-functioning or outdated; social or community infrastructure is equally disrupted. Infrastructural rebuilding is important because it responds to basic needs and because it can often jump-start assistance in other areas. Care must be taken, however, that infrastructure projects do not become non-sustainable. They must be planned for and implemented in a strategic way. Common infrastructure rebuilding activities generally fall within the following five domains:

(1) food supply
(2) roads/transportation systems
(3) water/sewer, electricity and telecommunications
(4) education
(5) health care

## *8.1 Overview*

**Defining Infrastructure**

Infrastructure is defined as the basic facilities, services and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. Many organizations, however, prefer to distinguish between *economic infrastructure* and *community infrastructure* or *social infrastructure.* This view considers infrastructure as either the physical structures that form the foundation for development or the systems that are considered essential for enabling productivity.

**Economic infrastructure** refers collectively to the roads, bridges, rail lines, government/public administration buildings, wastewater and water works, electric power, communications, oil and gas pipelines and the associated facilities required for an industrial economy to function.

**Community or social infrastructure** includes the public institutions of schools, health facilities, post offices and libraries – as well as the agricultural infrastructure needed for food security.

In practice, however, it is difficult to characterize the functions of a given facility as exclusively economic or community/social.

As a result of war, societies in transition exhibit either destroyed or damaged infrastructure. Transportation lines are cut, buildings are destroyed and production and distribution facilities are malfunctioning. Remaining facilities are often outdated. Limited road and railway networks and

broken links between regions hamper the development of production and distribution. Electrical power and telecommunications are diminished, causing a serious loss in production. Clinics, schools and public administration buildings are in ruins. Agricultural lands lie fallow, contaminated by either landmines or the poisonous effects of chemical/ biological weapons. Water might not be safe to drink and there is little food security. Returnee reintegration and environmental protection programs will not function efficiently without properly functioning infrastructure.

If not attended to, the deficiencies of the infrastructure become a major constraint on the country's economic and social development. Yet, the investment required to bring the infrastructure to a semblance of normality is enormous compared to the available resources of a country just emerging from war. This is why the assistance of external actors in this field is crucial.

Rebuilding the physical and social infrastructure of a transition society is an obvious area of attention for external actors. Rebuilding the physical infrastructure amounts to visible changes from a look of "war-ravaged" to "peaceful and functioning" and it provides measurable success stories. Moreover, infrastructural rebuilding projects are typically employment-intensive and yield tangible and relatively quick results (objectives are normally targeted for achievement within two years).[37]

Key objectives of infrastructure rebuilding are to provide basic human needs (see also chapter 3 on human security), and to jump-start the economy. As economic growth kicks off, sustaining livelihoods and developing production will become easier and dramatically affect the population. Once people have shelter and a minimum of economic security, they will also be better able to take action on behalf of themselves. For example, the construction of a link road to an agricultural area with high potential for development can lower production costs and, with the opportunity of bringing excess products to the market fairly easily and cheaply, farmers will be encouraged to produce more. They will also assert ownership and responsibility for their own livelihood and their community development.

In addition, if carefully planned and implemented, infrastructural assistance can further other sectoral objectives of transition assistance such as aiding the reintegration of returnees (as roads are reconstructed and inaccessible areas become open for resettlement) and helping the government to restore public services with the additional benefit of being perceived as efficient. The impact of infrastructural rebuilding can be significant as illustrated in diagram 8.1.[38]

[37] UNDG/ECHA, *Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues,* (New York: United Nations, 2004) p. 21.

[38] The diagram is only an indicative representation as the interrelationships among the elements are more complex and there are more potential results of these investments.

***Diagram 8.1: Role and Potential Impact of Investments in Infrastructure***




*Source:* JICA, *A New Dimension of Infrastructure: Realizing People's Potentials* (Tokyo, The Social Development Study Department and The Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Development Study Department) March 2004, p. 7.

If one ignores infrastructure, however, the results can be potentially quite damaging. For example, people might not have enough "freedom from want" (see chapter 3) to be able to regain self-reliance. Infrastructure failures in the transition period can also be used by combatants and opponents of peace to derail and undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the reconstruction process. This may exacerbate civil strife or demoralize staff working in remote locations and thus further delay the process of state rebuilding. More importantly, infrastructure failures can act on gender and other aspects of identity and exaggerate powerlessness, vulnerability and disability.[39]

## *8.2 Designing an Approach to Infrastructural Rebuilding*

When national governments develop their policies and draw up strategic plans of action in the field of infrastructural rebuilding they need to outline their vision of the new way of functioning with a time horizon of at least ten years. These plans should clearly outline the priorities and how infrastructural rebuilding relates to the rebuilding of other sectors. Scarce resources and realistic cost-benefit analyses will limit the scale of infrastructural rebuilding and will also mean that

[39] Anand, P.B. *Getting Infrastructure Priorities Right in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Helsinki World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) and the United Nations University (UNU), Research Paper No. 2005/42, June 2005) p. 4.

investment in infrastructure in a certain locality must be justified in terms of the benefits that will be generated, be they economic, social or political.

In practice a multi-phased mixed approach is used most often when it is:

1. a multi-sector approach addressing the immediate problems covering the restoration of essential agricultural and industrial activities and institutional capacity
2. a longer-term development approach striving to enhance the country's comparative advantages and sustained economic growth.

Supporting a strategic national approach through key investments is a useful role for external actors. Determining whether to invest or not, however, is difficult. In general, infrastructure projects tend to be expensive. By using the human security perspective (see chapter 3) as a guide, however, the criteria for deciding on investment is whether it will result in a catalytic effect, that is, generating many social and economic benefits that are consistent with the overall transition development objectives. Box 8.1 summarizes JICA's views on infrastructure rebuilding.

**Box 8.1: JICA's Views of Infrastructure Rebuilding**

Given the reaffirmed importance of infrastructure and lessons gleaned from past experience, the following approaches are recommended for infrastructure development in the future.

1. **Toward "People's Infrastructure**." Infrastructure is redefined as a foundation of basic services, guaranteeing all people the right to live in safety and good health and ultimately helping them realize their dormant potentials by self-empowerment.

2. **Helping People Realize their Hopes**. In order to design and implement infrastructure projects and thereby deliver basic services efficiently, it is essential to seek accurate understanding of the diverse needs among people, integrate them by prioritization and select the actionable goals and targets. It is also essential to adjust the goals and targets flexibly in response to changing externalities and circumstances.

3. **Integrated Approach of Service Delivery**. The integrated approach is defined as a statement of commitment where the development goals proposed by the government of a developing country are translated into a prioritized bundle of relevant project proposals, related institutional supports and policy instruments. They require a clear schedule of project implementation by designated executing agencies or organizations.

4. **Concepts for Designing Empowerment: Pro-Poor Project Designs**. A pro-poor policy objective can be put into practice on two levels in the infrastructure sector. One level is to design an entire project by directly targeting the poor. The other level is to design a supplementary project in such a way that the poor can access the core economic infrastructure. To emphasize empowerment of the poor and the primary importance of having basic infrastructure services reach them, a four-point framework for design is suggested: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability.

*Source:* JICA, *A New Dimension of Infrastructure, Realizing People's Potentials* (Tokyo, JICA, March 2004) p. 6 – 17.

A useful approach to infrastructure rebuilding exhibits ten attributes: (1) early, (2) long-term, (3) sequential, (4) holistic, (5) focused, (6) strategic, (7) participatory, (8) appropriate, (9) sustainable and (10) coordinated. Some of these attributes may, at times, seem contradictory, but often the balance between one and the other choice has to be carefully determined. Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues, such as environmental thinking, into the approach is also important.

## Early

In the past, donors and international financial institutions delayed involvement in transition situations in the belief that it was too risky to make investments in an unstable environment. It is now clear, however that refraining from involvement may actually prolong the process of a country becoming stable. Infrastructure programs initiated in the early stages of transition can contribute to:

- Jump-starting the economy, improving livelihoods

- Bringing food security sooner, with the additional benefits of reducing malnutrition and improving health
- Improving communication among all stakeholders, which may facilitate dialogue and reconciliation.

Box 8.2 explains JICA's commitment to early action in this regard.

**Box 8.2: JICA's Role in the Early Stage of Transition**

JICA is able to impact transition recovery through strategically designed and located small and medium-scale infrastructure projects, since these projects can have a large multiplier effect. For example, a low-cost repair of a road that is integral to moving goods to markets may be the most important step in the economic recovery of some communities.

## Long-term

Even though early involvement is catalytic and thus essential, it is equally important to not view infrastructure projects as a temporary fix. For example, in the case of resources available for health care programming, it may be more helpful to build new clinics in communities where there is rapid growth than to repair a clinic in a community where the population is in decline. Infrastructure projects must also consider the likely long-term impacts of the (re)building.

## Sequential

Some transition assistance must be sequential to maximize the investment benefits – or to derive any benefit at all. For example, if a project is implemented to rehabilitate a destroyed port facility before the railroad system is repaired, that investment may not produce any benefits until it is linked with a functioning railroad. Another common error is the reconstruction of school classrooms before the education system has prepared teachers, acquired teaching materials, developed or revised the curriculum, or secured funding to pay the teachers and maintain the buildings.

## Holistic

One step further along from addressing infrastructural assistance sequentially is to plan assistance in a holistic manner, recognizing that infrastructural rebuilding is only part of a larger package. For example, a typical food-for-work project to rebuild community infrastructure can:

- Provide relief through the distribution of food rations (food security).
- Provide legitimate employment opportunities and work skills, including to recently demobilized soldiers (employment and demobilization).
- Rehabilitate a school building that has been destroyed (reconstruction).
- Help create the national capacity to administer similar projects in future emergencies (planning, preparedness and capacity-building).
- Help ensure that primary education is not unduly interrupted (development).[40]

Thus, the planners for an infrastructure project need to envision the entire "system" of which the infrastructure element is a part (food supply system, education system, planning, for example). Decisions about which component of a system is selected as a priority should be based on whether that component is helpful for getting the entire system back functioning sooner.

## Focused

While infrastructure projects undertaken in a development context usually need to have a long-term, holistic perspective, they also need to be highly focused especially at the beginning of a transition. The criteria for selecting activities must begin with meeting basic human needs as

[40] Adapted from OECD, *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict,* (Paris: OECE, 2001) p. 108.

the first priority. As the transition period progresses from emergency to greater stability, JICA and other external actors need to continue monitoring how well basic human needs are being met.

One tool to assess how well basic human needs are being met through infrastructure resources is found in "Annex 32: Sector Performance Indicator List" in the *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations.*[41] This document provides examples of key sectors, including infrastructure, in need of support in the post-conflict period.

## Strategic

Infrastructure projects are often a physical demonstration of the benefits that can come from peace. But they are also expensive and can consume a large proportion of the transition assistance budget. Because of this, program planners in transition situations need to be strategic in determining which infrastructure projects to fund. The investment needs to achieve a catalytic effect, by generating many social and economic benefits that are also consistent with the peacebuilding process. A negative example of non-strategic infrastructure rebuilding is demonstrated in box 8.3.

**Box 8.3: Infrastructure Rebuilding: Avoid Possible Negative Impacts**

Some cases of infrastructure development are reported to have created a variety of negative impacts. Some projects involved the relocation of local inhabitants at the site, and these people were made to suffer worsened livelihoods by dislocation. Other projects had serious negative impacts on local habitats and irreparably damaged surrounding ecosystems. Some projects involved the issues of good governance: namely, corruption in selecting project sites or in evaluating tenders, rigging or other unfair practices against competitive bidding. In other cases, the overestimated demand for service led to the inflated project costs, which subsequently placed a heavy burden on the government budget in the developing country concerned.

*Source:* JICA, *A New Dimension of Infrastructure, Realizing People's Potentials* (Tokyo, JICA, March 2004) p. 5.

## Participatory

In order to be on target and design projects that are useful and efficient, participatory planning should be incorporated. Unless field practitioners know clearly the needs of the beneficiaries and their viewpoints on suggested projects, infrastructural rebuilding can easily turn out to be a wasted investment. Box 8.4 illustrates this point.

**Box 8.4: Contrasting Results of Two Water Projects in Sri Lanka**

The Gal Oya water management project in Sri Lanka generated both development and peacebuilding benefits. Interestingly, its peacebuilding function was entirely incidental to the project which was designed and implemented according to development criteria. By cultivating the mutual interests of members from different ethnic and socio-economic groups, the project managed to thrive even in the midst of severe communal conflict. Perhaps more importantly, it resulted in the construction of ad hoc institutions of inter-communal co-operation beyond the scope of water management. In other words, it had a significant, positive impact on the incentives for peace within a particular area of Sri Lanka.

Another water project in Sri Lanka — the Maduru Oya project, which was one component of the massive Mahaweli Project — illustrates the dangers of not considering the peacebuilding requirements of development projects. Although the Maduru Oya project was designed to meet a number of development objectives, the failure to fully consider the highly political issue of population displacement and resettlement in the context of a communal civil war, ultimately led to its downfall. The project would have resettled displaced Sinhalese villagers in the Batticaloa District where Tamils constitute two thirds of the population and where ethnic tensions were escalating. Opposition to what

[41] A Joint UNDG, UNDP and World Bank Guide, prepared by GTZ with the support of BMZ, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations: A Joint UNDG, UNDP and World Bank Guide,* Supporting Material, Annex 32: Sector Performance Indicator List. 174 p. http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/PracticalGuidetoMultilateralNeedsAssessmentsinPost-ConflictSituationOverviewofSupportingMaterial/$FILE/PCNA+Supporting+Material.pdf.

some called the West Bank plan to alter the demographic and thus political balance in the East had reached a critical point even before project implementation started.

What does the Gal Oya teach us about successful peacebuilding? Some of the factors that contributed to its success as a development project also contributed to its success in peace-building explained in part by its thoroughly participatory development approach. The emphasis on promoting participation — as both a means and an end — generated a number of operating principles which have clear peacebuilding implications:

- Ensuring continuity of personnel to make a learning process more feasible
- Having a network of supportive, committed people in a variety of positions
- Avoiding partisan political involvement
- Attracting and retaining the right kind of community leadership
- Going beyond narrow conceptions of self-interest.

*Source:* Uvin, Peter "The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A Synthesis and a Commentary on the Lessons Learned from Case Studies on the Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations," *Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers*. (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee – Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2001).

## Appropriate

It is essential that all agencies employ standards that are appropriate for the context in which the infrastructure project is implemented. There are two types of risks of using inappropriate standards. If the standards used are too high, the beneficiary community may not be able to maintain and operate a facility, for example, because it may be too costly or require technical expertise not available in the community. The facility may represent an inappropriately expensive investment in one area, while other elements of the economic and social infrastructure suffer from lack of resources. Roads, for example, may be "over-designed" and able to withstand heavy truck traffic when far less demanding specifications would have been more cost effective.

The other risk is to implement infrastructure below locally acceptable standards or use standards that are culturally inappropriate. In these cases, the local community may even reject the project, refusing to use it, or dismantle it and try to salvage the materials for some facility that is helpful to them. Therefore, an assessment of the transition situation needs to include the process of identifying prevailing standards in the community, verifying if those standards continue to be appropriate in light of economic and technological developments and including the local community in the determination of the standards to be used.

Similarly, projects need to take into account the expectations of the beneficiary population. Care must be taken not to raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled, such as announcing plans to undertake a project which a subsequent feasibility study determines is overly ambitious or inappropriate.

## Sustainable

Sustainability in the context of infrastructure projects means that the design of the project includes a plan that will meet future needs of the infrastructure elements. This might include a maintenance system, such as community members who agree to regular maintenance of irrigation canals. Another example might be a plan that provides for the salaries of teachers for the classrooms that the project built.

This principle does not mean that the budget for the project has to include annual recurring costs for the future. Instead it means that arrangements for maintenance and operations are included in the project concept. The national or local government, for example, may demonstrate their ability to staff health clinics. A preferred approach is one in which the beneficiary community demonstrates its ability to provide the labor and financial resources required to support the project over the long term.

Sustainability of infrastructural assistance through community-building and large-scale geographic coverage in close cooperation with the relevant Ministry was pursued by IOM's Afghanistan Transition Initiative Programme, described in box 8.5.

**Box 8.5: IOM's Afghanistan Transition Initiative Programme (ATI)**

Since March 2002, IOM has implemented the Afghanistan Transition Initiative, a USAID-funded small grants program focusing on community level infrastructure such as schools, clinics, potable and irrigation water and secondary and tertiary roads. Working closely with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD), IOM has implemented over 382 projects in 31 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces. The majority of these projects have been implemented through local construction contractors selected through competitive open tender and closely monitored by IOM's engineers.

*Source*: International Organization for Migration (IOM), *IOM in Afghanistan: An Information Sheet - March 20*04, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64C6GP?OpenDocument.

## Coordinated

In chapter 2, box 2.3 and table 2.3 harmonization initiatives and coordination mechanisms among donors and implementing agencies are described. The need for coordination and collaboration in the field of infrastructure is perhaps even greater than in other sectors. Since infrastructure projects may be the most costly of all forms of assistance and the total amount of financial resources available is limited, it is all the more urgent that the projects are selected carefully to be cost effective. Cost effectiveness or the return on investment can be expressed in both economic and non-economic terms. Expressed as non-economic project outputs, return on investment refers to the impact of infrastructure on institutional strengthening and capacity building projects. Thus, return on investment also has a subjective value.

## Cross-cutting issues

Chapter 4 deals with mainstreaming cross-cutting issues. Of particular importance in infrastructure rebuilding is the mainstreaming of environmental thinking. Out of all the transition activities supported by assistance organizations, infrastructure projects may have the most significant impact on the environment. Even though there is an urgency to move forward with assistance projects, it is nevertheless important to undertake a rapid and informal environmental impact assessment. Other issues such as social impacts of proposed projects, impact on gender or a project's sensitivity to the conflict should also be determined at the outset. Box 8.6 outlines JICA's approach to the environmental and social considerations of infrastructural projects.

**Box 8.6: JICA Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations**

It is important for JICA supported infrastructure projects to meet the JICA *Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations*. Regarding environmental issues, the guidelines address:

- human health and safety
- the natural environment including trans-boundary or global scale impact, through air, water, soil, waste, accidents, water usage, ecosystems and biodiversity

The social impacts to be assessed include

- migration of population and involuntary resettlement
- local economy such as employment and livelihood
- utilization of land and local resources
- social institutions such as social infrastructure and local decision-making institutions
- existing social infrastructures and services
- vulnerable social groups such as those living below the poverty level and indigenous peoples
- equality of benefits and losses and equality in the development process
- gender

- children's rights
- cultural heritage
- local conflict of interests
- infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS

In an emergency, whether caused by natural disaster or conflict, there may not be time to undertake a full environmental and social impact assessment. In that case JICA will ask its Advisory Council to determine an approach to evaluate the environmental and social considerations at an early stage. The Council is required to produce a report of the inquiry.

## *8.3 Implementing the Approach: Actors and Activities*

Designing an appropriate approach needs to be followed by implementation. Principal actors and potential activities in five domains are described in the following sub-sections.

### 8.3.1 Principal Actors

All residents of a country hold a stake in the lifelines and critical facilities that make up a community's or country's infrastructure. The general public, as well as public and private institutions, are dependent on the adequate functioning of economic and social infrastructure.

Actors that bear responsibility for building, managing and maintaining infrastructure are primarily government, parastatal and private utilities and some private companies. Agencies that provide transition assistance to infrastructure reconstruction range from the largest donors in the world to small, local NGOs. Major projects, including inter-city road and bridge building and rehabilitation of urban water and sewer systems, are frequently supported by the World Bank, regional banks such as the Asian Development Bank and major multilateral and bilateral donors. Smaller-scale projects, such as rural road and irrigation canal repair, are often supported by UN organizations, NGOs, and bilateral donors. Examples of how these actors support infrastructure rebuilding are described below.

#### Bilateral Donors

**The European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).** Much of ECHO's aid to countries in or recovering from conflict is humanitarian assistance, addressing the emergency needs. They also support infrastructure rehabilitation in the areas of food supply, water and sanitation, health care, agriculture development and logistics.

**Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).** The GTZ's corporate objective is to improve people's living conditions on a sustainable basis. Although primarily a development organization, GTZ provides transition assistance to countries that are rebuilding after conflict. To prevent violence from flaring up again, rehabilitation and crisis prevention measures combine physical reconstruction with elements of violence and conflict prevention. This work includes undertaking projects in food security and infrastructure.

**United States Agency for International Development – Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)**. OTI does not highlight infrastructure among its many focus areas. Nevertheless, OTI funds many infrastructure projects as a vehicle to reinforce the impact of other projects. For example, a program of "community-based approaches" will include implementation of quick impact small infrastructure projects. Other offices of USAID, such as country mission offices, provide support to infrastructure projects through their normal development channels.

#### Multilateral Donors

**World Bank.** The World Bank has created new financing tools and revised existing instruments in order to provide more effective and timely financial support for reconstruction. The Bank claims a comparative advantage in providing technical assistance and support to the special needs of countries emerging from conflict. Although Bank funding, analysis and

expertise has moved away from a narrow focus on rebuilding infrastructure as a first priority, this area remains one of the Bank's strengths. Box 8.7 exemplifies the Bank's approach to infrastructure rebuilding.

**Box 8.7: World Bank Support for National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan**

In 2005, the World Bank approved a US$28 million grant to continue supporting the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program (NSP), which provides resources for reconstruction and development activities at the community level and for strengthened local governance. The NSP was launched in 2002, is financed by several sources, and is under implementation in 159 districts in 33 of the country's 34 provinces.

The NSP provides thousands of rural villages with access to drinking water, small irrigation schemes for agriculture, rural roads, micro hydro-electrical plants and generators for domestic and rural productive activities, training and livelihood projects, schools, sanitation and clinics among others.

The National Solidarity Program provides technical assistance and assigns grants to the rural communities for reconstruction and/or development projects that are planned and managed by the communities themselves through a democratic process.

A critical aspect of this project is the process of decision making surrounding the use of the grants. Building the foundation for solid local governance, consultation, and the legitimacy of local leadership, Community Development Councils are elected through secret ballot. These councils then lead a participatory process in the community to decide how the funds will be used. By May 2005, implementation of the project was ongoing in 8,268 villages, of which 7,348 had elected Community Development Councils and 9,247 subproject proposals had been submitted.

The project has enhanced government effectiveness by supporting the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and by developing capacity to set standards and procedures for financial management, disbursement and implementation of community projects.

*Source:* World Bank, "Afghanistan: World Bank Provides Supplemental Grant for National Solidarity Program", *Water Supply & Sanitation*, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTWSS/0,,contentMDK:20565783~menuPK:511995~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:337302,00.html, 30 June 2005.

## United Nations

**UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**. UNHCR is operational in most countries emerging from conflict. It supports infrastructure rehabilitation through its Quick Impact Projects (QiPs) (see box 8.8), which are mini-grants to jump-start the rehabilitation of communities impacted by repatriation or refugee populations. It is necessary to consider infrastructure rebuilding as an opportunity to facilitate the reintegration of returnees. Without such community rehabilitation, the reintegrating population might add too much stress on existing community facilities and resources, which are likely already damaged or overwhelmed by the local population. Infrastructure (re)building then is an important step to avoid resentment of the returnees by the local population. In addition, infrastructure projects can potentially create employment for returnees, which will also increase the level of welcome by the host population – or resentment, if they need employment too.

**Box 8.8: QiPs**

QiPs are small, rapidly implemented projects intended to:

- help create conditions for durable solutions for refugees and returnees through rapid interventions
- provide for small-scale initial rehabilitation and enable communities to take advantage of development opportunities through community participation
- help strengthen the absorptive capacity of target areas, while meeting urgent community needs

Main features of QiPs are as follows. They:

- Are simple, small-scale, low-cost and rapid to implement
- Support and are part of the overall transition and/or local development strategy

- Have an agreed funding ceiling
- Are implemented in areas of high concentration of people-of-concern to JICA
- Respond to the basic priority needs expressed by beneficiary communities
- Require community participation in identification, design, implementation and monitoring
- Benefit the entire community: locals, displaced persons, refugees/returnees
- Promote area development, preferably as part of regional development plans
- Are sustainable, replicable and environmentally-friendly
- Encourage a gender and age-focused approach
- Best managed if grouped as one "program" under specialized implementing partners, provided each QiP is adequately designed, implemented, monitored and reported.

QiPs are a flexible tool to jumpstart the recovery process. They are thus often used in infrastructural rebuilding. However, unless QiPs form part of an integrated strategy for reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and are designed with community participation, their impact is likely to be insufficient, isolated and short-lived.[42]

*Source*: UNHCR, *QiPs, Quick Impact Projects: A Provisional Guide* (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004).

**UN Development Programme (UNDP)**. UNDP is often present in a country before, during and after a conflict. They therefore claim special capabilities to work in the transition environment. Their thematic priorities and technical focus areas do not highlight infrastructure. However, infrastructure is identified as one type of quick impact project to help jump-start a community's recovery. UNDP also funds larger scale infrastructure projects that are implemented through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

## Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs, both international and national, may self-finance or implement infrastructure projects on behalf of donors and international organizations. It is unusual for an NGO to take on large-scale projects, for example, over US$5 million. Instead, NGOs frequently specialize in micro-projects. NGOs often have the technical expertise and administrative and management capacities to implement infrastructure projects, especially in the areas of food supply, water and sanitation systems, education and health care. Many NGOs provide services in irrigation canal and road repair. Few NGOs, however, work in road and bridge construction, electrical distribution systems and telecommunications.

## Private Investors/Companies

The private sector brings both strengths and concerns to its involvement in transition assistance. It is now recognized that tapping into the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector is an important element of generating economic growth and is a condition of sustainable development. These attributes of the private sector enable it to be a major player in contracting for and implementing infrastructure projects. Of concern, however, is the private sector's frequent lack of a holistic approach to reconstruction and often an over-reliance on technical solutions to the perceived problems.

As long as countries are not at peace and guerilla activities and banditry make the countries unsafe, private investors are unlikely to invest in infrastructure projects. Once the countries are at peace, however, economic reconstruction has to occur in parallel with economic reform (see chapter 9). Without an adequate legal and regulatory framework, countries are unlikely to attract private investment (see chapter 9, section 9.4.1). Research has shown, however, that the willingness to pay for safe water and energy is high and thus the water and energy sectors could, in principle, be attractive to private investors.

[42] UNHCR, *QiPs, Quick Impact Projects: A Provisional Guide* (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004) p. 1.

## 8.3.2 Activities – Menu of Options

A comprehensive menu of infrastructure projects is lengthy and depends on the scope of the infrastructure definition used. The priority infrastructure elements to support are those that help meet basic human needs. They embrace both economic and social infrastructure elements.

Infrastructure projects range from costly state-of-the-art projects to inexpensive low technology and sometimes labor intensive projects. JICA frequently invests in the costly projects while UNHCR typically invests in the less expensive end of the spectrum. Both are important, but they usually have different objectives and approaches.

The following infrastructure examples are in areas that JICA has identified as priorities and for which it has a comparative advantage and a great deal of experience: (1) food supply, (2) roads/transportation systems, (3) water/sewer, electricity and telecommunications, (4) education, and (5) health care. Some specific examples illustrate the contrast between the "high-end" costly projects versus the "low-end" inexpensive projects.

### Food Supply (agriculture development, agriculture rehabilitation)

Food supply is integral to achieving food security (an aspect of human security that is discussed further in chapter 3), which includes food production, delivery and economic accessibility. The food supply system is linked to the level of a country's or region's agriculture development. In the transition period, rehabilitation or development of the agriculture sector may be required to achieve food security.

After conflict, activities aimed at agricultural rehabilitation return agriculture systems to a functioning level. Often agricultural lands have become minefields. Agriculture rehabilitation may therefore need to be linked to mine clearance programs (see chapter 5, section 5.2.2 on Mine Action). Other rehabilitation activities include:

- Rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage facilities
- Replenishment of seeds and tools
- Construction of rural water supplies

In parallel with these activities, rehabilitation also aims to accelerate the ongoing agriculture reform process by building the capacity of public sector agencies, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and extension services, as well as farmer organizations. Activities aimed at longer-term agricultural development are also begun and include:

- Training of agricultural workers
- Development of new and appropriate agriculture technologies, such as sustainable agriculture practices and development of animal and plant sciences
- Support to the infrastructure of the agricultural economy, such as road and irrigation systems
- Land reclamation
- Soil improvement
- Improving agriculture management
- Fostering agricultural cooperatives
- Financing any of these activities

An assessment of the agriculture sector may reveal that any, or even all, of the areas referenced in this section have suffered damage or setbacks. The prioritization of projects depends on identifying which components represent the bottlenecks to achieving food security. Donor resources should address those bottlenecks first. The most rigorous tool to make such an assessment is WFP's *Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA).* (See the Resources section for more information.)

Boxes 8.9 and 8.10 illustrate very different approaches, by the same donor agency, to infrastructural rebuilding in agricultural development. In Afghanistan the program was large-scale, whereas in Zimbabwe the focus was on providing low-cost technology.

**Box 8.9: USAID in Afghanistan – Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP)**

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided $132.5 million over three years to support a substantial initiative in Afghanistan's agricultural sector – the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP). This three-year program (2003 – 2006) was aimed at improving the lives of Afghans by increasing food supplies and food security, creating jobs, increasing incomes, and strengthening the competitiveness of Afghan's agricultural products.

- Activities were focused on five critical areas:
- Agricultural technology – Increase crop and livestock productivity and production through new technologies, new crop varieties, fertilizers and equipment
- Livestock management – Improve livestock health and breeding practices
- Infrastructure improvement – Rehabilitate and construct irrigation systems, roads and local market facilities
- Market development – Enable more effective linkages between producers, processors and markets
- Rural finance – Expand lending to farmers, processors and agribusinesses

Source: USAID, Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP) in Afghanistan, http://www.ramp-af.com/overview/index.html.

**Box 8.10: USAID's Agricultural Development Project in Zimbabwe**

USAID's LEAD program (Linkages for the Economic Advancement of the Disadvantaged) has helped 20,000 food-insecure families by installing low-cost drip-irrigation kits for household nutrition gardens. The implementing partner, Development Alternatives, works with 40 local NGOs in the targeting and selection process and provides the necessary technical assistance. Beneficiary households include those headed by females or orphans, and those infected and affected by HIV and AIDS.

*Source*: USAID in Zimbabwe, *Drip Irrigation*, http://www.usaidzw.org/html/HumanitarianAssistance.html

## Roads/Transportation Systems

Because of their strategic value, roads, bridges, port facilities and airports are often targets for destruction. This may paralyze transportation and distribution systems thus restricting the supply of food and other necessities and crippling the overall economy. Once security can be assured, returning these elements to service is a high priority since many other forms of priority transition assistance depend on a functioning transportation system.

Rebuilding roads and bridges can be very costly, requiring a large portion of the assistance budget. Small-scale road and bridge construction, however, is one of the most effective types of projects as they provide an opportunity to generate jobs for a large number of workers. The economic benefit of generating income for unemployed families may make it possible for those families to purchase adequate food and medicines and send their children to school.

Plans for the rehabilitation of conflict-affected transport facilities need to be formulated early in the transition period and put into practice. At the same time, systems for operating and maintaining these facilities should be established, which may require relevant human resource development. Boxes 8.11 and 8.12 below illustrate examples of road and bridge reconstruction of strategic importance to the reestablishment of the security and economy of Afghanistan and Cambodia, respectively.

**Box 8.11: JICA's Support to Road Construction in Afghanistan**

The infrastructure of Afghanistan was devastated during the continual internal conflicts over 25 years. At the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in January 2002, the donor countries and international organizations, including Japan, committed to support peace and stability in Afghanistan and to provide aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.

Reconstruction of the road network, especially trunk roads connecting principal cities, was viewed as vital for reconstruction of the devastated country and also for promotion of the resettlement of refugees. The Government of Japan (GOJ) agreed to provide a grant for the rehabilitation of the Kabul – Kandahar road.

JICA was entrusted by GOJ with the execution of the design and dispatched a basic design study team for the Project for Improvement of the Trunk Road between Kabul and Kandahar. On approximately 150 km of the Kandahar – Kabul road the study team collected field data required for the basic design. Subsequently, the GOJ agreed that it would restore 50 km of this road. Based on the agreement, GOJ decided to carry out the project under the Sector Programme Grant Aid System and implemented the project between April and December 2003.

**Box 8.12: JICA's Bridge Construction in Cambodia**

The civil war that lasted until 1991 ruined much of Cambodia's socio-economic infrastructure, including transport networks, power generation and supply facilities, information and communications networks, waterworks and sewerage systems. The advent of peace finally brought in aid from donor countries for the reconstruction of the country.

JICA contributed to the reconstruction of Cambodia's infrastructure by supporting the building of the Mekong road bridge (spanning a length of 1,360m, with a two-lane road). Construction begun under the Japanese government grant-aid scheme in 1997 was completed in 2001. It is the first bridge to connect the two areas of a country that are divided by the Mekong River. There are high expectations that the bridge will contribute greatly to the nation's flow of goods in a country where 85 percent of the land area is located in the Mekong River basin.

## Water, Sewer, Electricity, Telecommunications

Water, sewer, electrical and telecommunications are all systems that provide lifelines to communities. They are often vulnerable to deliberate destruction in a conflict as well as to neglect and disrepair. Breaks anywhere in a system may render it completely inoperative. Yet, without the functioning of these systems, many basic human needs cannot be met. Insufficient water and the absence of proper sanitation can crucially impact on human security (see chapter 3).

In East Timor, JICA launched a water supply "Quick Project" in February 2000 as part of a Pilot Development Study, which included rehabilitating water pipelines and preventing leakage, and the restoration of roads and compilation of maps, specifically topographical charts of the area.

The realization that participative and community-managed approaches would provide real benefit in water and sanitation development has also been critical to the success of such projects. The shift in roles, of former service providers to facilitators and of target beneficiaries to actively participating managers, is still taking place today. Issues that led to this type of infrastructure project are described in box 8.13.

**Box 8.13: Issues in Private Sector Participation in Low Cost Water Well Drilling in Africa**

The project set out on the assumption that if small businesses receive manageable technologies and training in their deployment, training in good business practice and other forms of support, they can be released to effectively implement water source construction at the community level.

The project also assumed that the end users of rural water will be more likely to maintain and sustain their sources if they own them, with real ownership being achieved through the community (or farmer or school, for example) paying the full cost of source construction.

The logic of this position led to the need to identify or develop affordable water supply technology - affordable by both small contractors and by the end-users. The technology focus of the project lay in low-cost shallow well construction.

These starting points also raised questions and issues in relation to the entire set of primary and secondary stakeholders involved in the process of private sector service provision. Central and local Governments, their policies and the incentives (or obstacles) they create for small businesses; local Government and NGOs and their capacities to manage private sector contractors; and communities themselves and their adaptability to yet another set of development policies all took on increasing prominence.

Finally the issue of regulation – encompassing construction quality control, water quality, price regulation, and consumer protection – emerged as a key issue which is crucial to the success of the privatization of any monopoly.

*Source:* Cranfield University, Institute of Water and Environment, *Private Sector Participation in Low Cost Water Well Drilling in Africa*, http://www.silsoe.cranfield.ac.uk/iwe/projects/lcdrilling/.

Electrical systems are essential as they are required to power water and sewer systems as well as to operate health, education and communications facilities. Yet, the rehabilitation of electrical service is often overlooked.

The restoration of telecommunications is often the first priority. These systems are strategically the most critical as all other aspects of social, economic and political recovery depend on communications. The discussion in box 8.14 indicates that the market place understands this order of priority.

**Box 8.14: The Importance of Telecommunications – A Study by the World Bank**

The private sector has been more than willing to invest in telecommunication services in countries recently affected by conflict. In the two years after the fall of the Taliban, the private sector poured $130 million in telecommunications into Afghanistan. In Iraq more than 200 companies submitted proposals in October 2003 when three, two-year phone licenses came up for bids. Such interest not only helps business, but also creates a key government ally for restoring stability to conflict-affected countries. Technologies such as cellular networks and Web kiosks can help improve government performance by linking local, municipal, and federal officials and systems, especially in countries undergoing decentralization.

*Source*: Carvalho, Antonio and Samia Melhem, *Attracting Investment in Post-Conflict Countries: The Importance of Telecommunications*, (Washington DC, World Bank Conflict Preparedness and Reconstruction Unit, 2005), http://rru.worldbank.org/Discussions/topics/topic63.aspx.

## Education

Children are victimized by conflict in many ways. Lack of access to education is a frequent consequence. This leaves large segments of the population without basic literacy, vocational and social skills essential to their ability to be good citizens and productive members of their families and communities.

A conflict may damage or destroy an entire education system. Classrooms have been demolished, textbooks and supplies have been burned or looted, teachers have fled or been killed, the administrative structure has collapsed and the financial tax base has eroded. In order to put it back together, post-conflict interventions in this sector need to address the education

system holistically. This means transitional assistance should be coordinated to ensure that final results include:

- Access to safe and secure schools for the children
- Provision of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials
- Availability of trained teachers and administrators
- Supportive educational policies and financing

Box 8.15 shows USAID's educational rebuilding program in Iraq. Even though the data are not comparable, as the timeframes of the reported activities differ, box 8.16 also describes UNICEF's education program in the same country.

**Box 8.15: USAID's Program to Rebuild Education Infrastructure in Iraq**

USAID and the Ministry of Education are working together to improve access to quality education in Iraq at the primary, secondary and university levels. Programs have provided essential supplies and training to support schools nationwide. A series of model schools have been established where Iraqi educators implement new and innovative teaching methods while giving students access to improved equipment. USAID also developed partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi universities, which has helped re-equip and revitalize Iraq's higher education system.

Accomplishments:

- Through September 2005, over 2,800 schools have been rehabilitated and 45 constructed.
- Internet access and computers have been installed at the Ministry of Education and in all 21 Directorates of Education. To improve planning and resource management, official baseline data have been gathered and an Education Management Information System (EMIS) is being developed.
- Over 47,500 secondary school teachers and administrators nationwide have received training.
- More than 80 primary and secondary schools are being established to serve as model schools. At these "centers of excellence," teachers will receive up to five weeks of training and schools will be equipped with computer and science laboratories.
- Hundreds of thousands of desks and chalkboards have been distributed countrywide.
- USAID edited, printed and distributed 8.7 million Iraqi math and science textbooks.
- More than 550 out-of-school youths completed a pilot accelerated learning program. An expanded program, targeting more than 11,000 youths, is being implemented during the 2005–06 school year.
- School supplies have been distributed to one million primary school children and two million secondary; sports equipment has been distributed to every school.
- An early childhood learning television series is currently being developed.
- Through university partnerships, more than 1,500 Iraqi faculty and students at 10 Iraqi universities have participated in workshops, trainings, conferences and courses in Iraq, the greater Middle East, Europe, and the United States.
- At 10 Iraqi universities, USAID has rehabilitated and equipped 23 specialist libraries, 23 computer laboratories, 20 specialist science labs and 17 auditoriums or classrooms. These efforts have benefited approximately 50,000 university students in colleges of law, engineering, medicine, archeology and agriculture. In addition, books and electronic resources have been provided to university libraries.

*Source*: USAID, *Assistance for Iraq*, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/education.html.

**Box 8.16: UNICEF's Program to Rebuild Education Infrastructure in Iraq**

In 2003, UNICEF worked with key partners such as the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), Netherlands NPL, Japan and Korean Governments and others to rehabilitate 162 schools throughout the country, benefiting about 130,000 pupils.

Classrooms have been rebuilt, latrines replaced, rubble removed from schoolyards and school supplies – provided by UNICEF in the form of student kits – have enabled the children of Iraq to return to their studies.

Overall, UNICEF spent about $15 million in the education sector in 2003. This included a massive back-to-school campaign that began right after the war with the distribution of 1,000 school-in-a-box kits. UNICEF support also enabled 5.5 million children to take their annual examinations in June 2003. More than US$1 million was spent on printing examination books and restoring examination centers that had been damaged or looted after the war.

In September, UNICEF began delivery of education kits for every primary school pupil, teacher and principal in the country. This included more than 8,000 primary schools, covering approximately 3.6 million primary school children and 131,000 teachers/school principals at an approximate cost of $8 million. By the end of 2003, over 95 per cent of school kits had been distributed.

UNICEF arranged printing of more than 33 million student textbooks that were distributed to primary schools across the country by November 2003. These were soon followed by 11 million textbooks for vocational education and teacher training.

*Source*: UNICEF, *Iraq - Country in Crisis*, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/iraq/index_helping_children_families.html.

External actors must take care to reflect upon the longer-term effects an infrastructure project might have and must collaborate with other actors in order to achieve real success. At the workshop piloting the first edition of this handbook, the following example was used to illustrate this point. In southern Africa, UNHCR was able to successfully reconstruct primary schools using solid materials and its QiPs methodology, but was dependent on others for optimal use of the schools. UNHCR constructed the schools in partnership with DANIDA (which provided returnee teacher salaries), SIDA and UNICEF (which provided teacher training and capacity building) and the Ministry of Education. Primary schools could only be used to their full potential, however, if certain collateral issues were also solved, which included the inability of parents to pay school fees, low family incomes in general and the resulting need of children to contribute to income, gender discrimination, and cultural patterns that influenced which children had access to school. These broader issues could not be addressed by UNHCR alone, but needed a concerted, comprehensive and long-term approach. Indeed such an approach would require the collaboration of a multitude of actors and a common vision of where policy priorities for the country as a whole should be set.[43]

## Health care

Health security is addressed in chapter 3, section 3.3.3. This section focuses on the health care system that a transition society needs to support the health of the population. Interventions in post-conflict health care consist mainly of:

- Provision of basic health-care services, including public health care
- Reconstruction and functional reinforcement of public health-care systems
- Support for people disabled during the conflict
- Support for human resources development and reinforcement of administrative functions through training and expert advice

[43] Thompson, Paul and Agneta Johannsen, *Transition Assistance: Toward Ensuring Human Security, Report on the JICA/UNHCR Pilot Workshop***,** Yokohama, Japan, 6-11 November 2005, unpublished document.

Programs for rehabilitating and reconstructing war-ravaged health-care facilities should be urgently formulated and carried out as early as possible. Meanwhile, establishment of the maintenance and operation systems for these facilities as well as human resources development must also be carried out, as this will be essential to ensure sustainability of the services. An example of support to rebuilding the health care system is provided in box 8.17.

**Box 8.17: Rebuilding the Health Care System in Kyrgyzstan**

The Swiss Red Cross (SRC), funded by the Swiss government, is helping rebuild four hospitals in Kyrgyzstan's eastern Naryn Oblast (administrative region) and supplying them with basic medical equipment. The region is home to some 240,000 people. SRC is also helping the Kyrgyz government restructure its healthcare system. At the time of independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan had a relatively sophisticated network of well-trained medical specialists and nurses, along with an extensive hospital network. However, the system was overly centralized, and suffered from a lack of family doctors.

Currently, the SRC is helping establish a grassroots health care system, involving 27 village medical services. It is also supporting the further training of more family doctors in Kyrgyzstan's medical schools.

Source: Adapted from swissinfo, *Rebuilding Kyrgyzstan's Health Care System*, http://www.swissinfo.org/sen/swissinfo.html?siteSect=2156&sid=4490576&cKey=1075210181000.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Plan assistance in terms of the **logical sequence** within rebuilding priorities, **align** it with the needs of the beneficiaries and **coordinate** it with the plans of other assistance agencies.*
- ✓ *Be aware that any infrastructural project needs to have **benefits beyond its physical value**. Be **strategic**. Telecommunications may be strategically critical as other aspects of social, economic and political recovery depend on communication.*
- ✓ *Look for **opportunities to provide jobs** through infrastructure projects whenever and wherever possible.*
- ✓ *Only engage in infrastructural projects when the project has **catalytic value** and provides substantial benefits in economic, social or political terms. Be focused.*
- ✓ *Be **speedy** in planning and implementing your intervention, because the need for assistance is urgent, **but retain a long-term, holistic and strategic** perspective.*
- ✓ *Despite the urgency, **apply principles of good project design**. Infrastructure projects have frequently failed because of poor operations and maintenance practices. In a transition situation the risk of failure for these reasons is greater because of the sense of urgency to accomplish something done.*
- ✓ *Plan beyond immediate needs and **strengthen local administrative capacity.** Assistance unaccompanied by planning beyond immediate needs can contribute to a weakening of local administrative capabilities. In crisis situations, local organizations, often already weak, can be totally overwhelmed when development aid agencies set up parallel systems to procure and distribute assistance. When external actors leave the country there is an administrative vacuum that hinders the rehabilitation effort.*
- ✓ *Think* of ***auxiliary and indirect benefits** when designing infrastructural projects. Incorporate cross-cutting issues such as environmental thinking, conflict-sensitivity and gender (see also chapter 4, sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.2) into the project design. Use infrastructure projects as an opportunity to facilitate reconciliation, where, for example, former adversaries work side by side towards common community goals (see also chapter 7, section 7.3.2).*

## General Lessons on Infrastructure Rebuilding

- ✓ Infrastructure is the artery of the economy. Therefore its rehabilitation and extension play an important role in post-conflict recovery and the integration of the affected people. Infrastructure rebuilding is vital for the social, economic, physical and even political cohesion of a society.
- ✓ If not attended to, infrastructural deficiencies may also become a major constraint on the country's economic and social development. Returnee reintegration and environmental protection programs will not function efficiently without properly functioning infrastructure.
- ✓ In a country just emerging from war, the investment required to bring the infrastructure to a semblance of normality is enormous compared to available resources. This is why the assistance of external actors is crucial.
- ✓ If security conditions are precarious, infrastructural rebuilding will be slow. Worse, if the transition context has created a "security vacuum," donor funds will be diverted to address security concerns and not be spent on providing clean water, electricity and other basic services. External actors must find a healthy spending balance.
- ✓ An important consideration in infrastructure rebuilding is community ownership. Infrastructure generally is not maintained unless communities own and have skills and knowledge to manage the infrastructure once it is built.
- ✓ Infrastructural rebuilding using local labour has the potential to create massive immediate employment and income-generation.
- ✓ Infrastructural rebuilding includes construction as well as aspects of management and operation so that quality service delivery is assured. Capacity-building in these areas is also crucial.

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# Chapter 9
# Economic Recovery

## *Chapter Objectives*

- Examine economic recovery in the transition context (the economy's links to conflict, the existence of war-related economies and the difficulties facing macro-economic management).
- Review key areas of macro-economic recovery: monetary policy, fiscal policy, trade policy.
- Show the importance of supporting nascent industry and promoting investment.
- Understand aid dependency, its contributing factors and the conditionality involved.

## *Introduction*

Economic recovery is a long and complex process with the aim of (re-)establishing positive and productive national, regional and local economic activity and accompanying institutions, infrastructure and markets. In many of today's transition situations, the lack of macro-economic institutions, such as national banks, and sound policy predate the war – such that recovery is not re-establishing the former system, but developing new institutions and policy.

As economic activities determine resource distribution they are inherently tied to social and political systems. Achieving a basic level of economic stability and starting economic activities are crucial for sustainable peace.

This chapter concentrates on macro-economic issues including government efforts with regard to monetary, fiscal and trade policy. The chapter also reviews investment and industry support – key components to jump-start an economy and that provide alternatives to war-related economies. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of aid dependency, a common pitfall in recovery efforts.

As every transitional environment is different, economic recovery programs must be tailored to each specific case. Economic recovery also requires great coordination and the well-timed implementation of strategies including reforms both at the national and local level that do not undermine or contradict each other.

## *9.1 Overview*

**Economic Recovery**

In times of transition, economic recovery aims to:

- Meet immediate needs
- Prevent a relapse into conflict and support conflict resolution and peacebuilding
- Jump-start the economy
- Initiate macro-economic stabilization and restore state capacity for macro-economic management
- Set the groundwork for long-term economic stability, growth and poverty reduction.

Although economic recovery objectives are often inter-related (for example, preventing a relapse into conflict depends somewhat on jump-starting the economy), the need to prevent a relapse into conflict or meet immediate needs will initially take precedence over other objectives. The most efficient or long-term economically sound project may not be the best immediate choice during transitions.

It is extremely important, however, to monitor progress – economically, socially and politically – during transitional periods in order to identify opportunities to shift policies to a more rational long-term economic basis – including increased emphasis on decision-making and the ownership of programs by host governments and communities.

It is also important to analyze the social, political and economic impacts of economic recovery and other transitional initiatives on different groups, especially those that are more vulnerable including conflict-affected groups (such as demobilized soldiers, war widows, IDPs, returnees and the poor).

For these reasons many multinational organizations (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and donor governments (for example, DFID, USAID) incorporate "pro-poor" strategies that include participatory elements in their economic recovery initiatives. These initiatives span macro-economic efforts and link to micro-economic activities (for example, micro-credit and job creation) that supplement macro-economic ones.

## Transition Economies

The key to designing and implementing successful economic recovery initiatives is understanding the economic context of the specific transition situation. Although conflict and its linkages with the economy differ from one situation to another, there are some general commonalities that relate to economies emerging from conflict.

In general, conflict can greatly disrupt economic activities. It commonly leads to a decline and shift in production and consumption. It can also change the distribution of resources and relationships between different actors. The results depend on the scope and duration of the conflict in question. Box 9.1 provides an overview of potential dilemmas that may face an economy emerging from conflict.

**Box 9.1: Characteristics of Transition Economies**

**Economic activities**

- Decreased production (in most sectors, potential increase in military related sectors)
- Decreased consumption and wealth (generally lower income, lost assets)

**Human capital**

- Population displacement (whole communities, wage earners, the educated, the wealthy)
- Diminished capacity due to "brain drain" (skilled/educated people have left the country); suspension or destruction of education, vocational training and skilled labor; as well as dependency on war-related livelihoods
- Conflict-affected populations (soldiers, war widows, female headed households, orphans and unaccompanied children as well as war-disabled)

**Infrastructure**

- Damaged and not functioning (see chapter 8)

**Natural resources**

- Problems pertaining to ownership of and access to resources (for example, power relations, landmines, insecurity)

**Monetary**

- Unstable currency and use of foreign currencies
- High inflation
- Weak and poorly managed banking system
- Distorted policy
- Low government capacity

**Fiscal**

- Low funds (potential debt)

- Low revenue and distorted tax system
- Low information
- Inadequate and distorted spending policy
- Low government capacity

**Markets, industries and investment**

- Weakened and disconnected
- Distorted from war and post-conflict context
- Reduced business activity due to high uncertainty and risk
- Reduced regulation
- Reduced investment due to reduced foreign capital and insecurity (civil disorder, landmines, unprofessional military and police, unemployed former combatants)
- External indebtedness

**Livelihoods**

- Increases in poverty and vulnerability due to loss of income and assets
- Continued dependency on war-related economies

It is important to note that transitional economic recovery does not start from a "blank slate" and is very different from economic development in a country unaffected by conflict. The economy may be linked to conflict as follows:

- Scarcity, grievance and economic greed may be underlying causes of the conflict and reasons for its continuation.
- Some economic activity and livelihoods may gain profit from or be dependent on the conflict (war-related economies).
- Government economic policy may be diverted towards the war effort.

The economy may be disrupted beyond decreased production and income in different ways:

- Exodus of the population and investment (human and capital resources)
- Potential damage to institutions and economic management
- Damage to infrastructure
- Distortion of access to natural resources, wealth, local markets and international trading.

It is also important to note and address as much as possible the impact of external actors on local economies. Depending on the size of their influx, external actors can:

- Usurp competent government staff
- Create a boom in a service industry catering to expatriates
- Increase prices (for example, housing costs, commodities) in urban areas.

Other aspects that may impact transition economies include:

- **Poor countries.** The majority of conflicts over the past ten years have been in least developed countries, which are characterized by rampant poverty, poor infrastructure and weak economic institutions.
- **Wide differentiation between people's income and access to resources.** Large gaps between the wealthy and poor exist in many places, but the lack of regulation and competition inherent to conflict-affected areas can greatly increase economic differentiation among people.
- **Shift from central economic planning to market-based economy.** Numerous countries emerging from war are changing their economic bases. These countries need to develop new institutions and policies and are often pressured into quickly privatizing state-owned enterprises and decentralizing the government (see box 9.2).

**Box 9.2: Moving to a Market-based Economy in Russia**

The move to a market based economy from a planned system brings many problems. Following the collapse of the communist regime, many price controls were removed which led, in 1992, to inflation rates of 2,520%. Current rates of 11.5 % seem to be small by comparison and are a measure of the progress that Russia has made in adapting to a market system. Unemployment also rose following the introduction of market reforms; the very notion of unemployment was not something many Russians were used to under the communist system and as such represented a massive culture shock and a source of resentment.

The unemployment rate currently stands at around 8.3% but it is difficult to be precise about the true extent of unemployment because of the widespread existence of an informal economy. Many of the government's problems have stemmed from corruption and an inability to impose a sufficiently robust taxation system that is adhered to by the population as a whole. Other problems that have been a feature of the transition involve the removal of all manners of restriction on trade both within and outside Russia. Much of the trade under the planned system was with Russia's satellite republics – Poland, Ukraine, Georgia and so on. The market system has meant that western powers can now seek to invest in Russia and engage in trade; equally Russia has to find its way into a financial and trading world for which many Russians simply did not have any prior experience. The notion of marketing products was alien and the extensive privatization that was undertaken has necessitated a very steep learning curve for those involved – the Russian stock exchange, for example, is still relatively new.

The problems faced by Russia are typical of those being experienced by most of the so-called 'transition economies'. Potentially they represent burgeoning new markets with massive resources and economic potential but the problems along the way also make for a very volatile political and economic mix that can, as highlighted in Georgia, lead to explosive situations.

*Source:* CIA World Factbook; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.

- **Other impacts on the economy.** When analyzing the transition environment, one must take into account other impacts on the economy – such as natural disasters, economic sanctions, external market changes (for example, a drop in commodity prices) and the economic impact of external assistance itself.

## *9.2 Assessing the Economic System, History and Context*

If economic assistance is not planned or implemented well, great risks for the future of the country can be posed because pursuing any economic goal has tremendous economic, social and political impact. It is thus of utmost importance to conduct or have access to thorough analyses at the outset of any intervention. (Conflict analysis is a crucial tool, as discussed in chapter 1, section 1.3). Another important starting point may be viewing economic assistance from the perspective of what it can do to make people feel more (economically) secure (see also chapter 3 on human security). Unless economic recovery programs are related to the lives and needs of the people that agencies are trying to assist and to the agencies' own activities in the country, they will not truly help make a difference.

Any aid agency working on economic recovery needs to know the current state of the economic systems in operation in the transition country, their history and context. The likelihood of whether there will or will not be a return to conflict and the commitment of the government to reconstruction are crucial factors to consider at the outset of programming activities.

Assessing the economic system requires understanding as much as possible various parts of the affected country's economy: (1) livelihoods, including immediate needs, vulnerabilities (inflation), capacities, motives and access to resources; (2) the state of macro-economic policies and institutions, government needs and resources; (3) industries, investment, trade and markets (includes analysis of uncertainty, ownership, access to resources); (4) the legacy of war-related economies; and (5) the potential impact of external actors on local economies.

### 9.2.1 Livelihoods

An analysis of livelihoods is important as it acknowledges the broad context within which people live. Livelihoods analysis seeks to take into account different economic, political, social and cultural factors affecting people's lives and livelihoods, from the local up to the national and international levels. Another important aspect of livelihood analysis is the interaction between livelihoods and war-related economies (see section 9.2.4).

Livelihood analysis includes a broad analysis of people's immediate needs, vulnerabilities, capacities, motives and access to resources. It is thus easily combined with a human security approach, as discussed in chapter 3. If people are not economically secure, it will be hard for them to achieve sustainable peace and to become self-reliant.

Organizations such as DFID and CARE International have adopted this approach as a basis for their development programming. Keys to livelihood analysis are:

- Examining the social, political and economic conditions of the country, such that recovery programs can address power relations, capacities, vulnerabilities and access.
- Focusing on households in order to better target specific populations (the poor, ex-combatants, returnees).

Livelihood approaches are also critical to many micro-economic initiatives (such as micro-credit and job creation – see box 9.11). One must be careful not stop at investigating livelihoods alone, but combine such an analysis with others, as described below.

### 9.2.2 The State of Macro-Economic Policies and Institutions

External actors need to identify the details surrounding the macro-economic situation of the country, for example the state of the money supply and inflation, currency use, budget deficits, debt and spending policies. They also have to gauge the state of and functionality of various government institutions and staff. This is important because macro-economic insufficiencies have a significant impact on social and political structures. The outcome of non-stabilized macro-economic factors is often socio-economic decline, which invariably leads to deepening stratification in society whereby poorer or marginalized groups are further isolated from the political and economic mainstream leading to increased tension and violence.

The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other actors initiate assessments to this end. External agencies should ensure cooperation with and support to these efforts. Tool 9.1 shows how the International Monetary Fund designs questions for an initial analysis of the macro-economic situation in a post-conflict environment.

**Tool 9.1: IMF Macro-Economic Analysis – Key Questions**

- What are the key steps in the monetary and financial areas that should be taken to facilitate the urgent humanitarian efforts that are needed?
- Is there, in effect, still a legal tender? Are several currencies co-circulating? Is the economy being demonetized?
- Is any formal exchange rate regime being maintained?
- What relevant institutions and resources are intact?
- What parts – if any – of the pre-conflict institutions and policy set ups should be restored for re-establishing a monetary authority?
- Is there anything worth keeping from what remains of the previous payments and banking systems?

*Source:* Lonnberg, Ake, *Restoring and Transforming Payments and Banking Systems in Post-Conflict Economies*, (International Monetary Fund, 2002), pp. 8-9.

## 9.2.3 Industries, Investment, Trade and Markets

Analysis should also be undertaken to understand how the conflict's links to the economy have disrupted investment, production and industries, trade and markets. Much investment and many firms will leave a country during conflict for physical and financial security. Some actors will remain and some new ones can arrive even though the environment is high risk as competition is also potentially low – yielding high profits. In a similar vein, trade routes and markets will be disrupted and new ones can develop. The influence of the diaspora in financing small enterprises in the transition country will also have an effect that is often considerable, but not easily traceable.

Organizations arriving in the transitional period must assess the current state of investment, industries, trade and markets, including uncertainty, ownership and access to resources. Resources, capacities and obstacles to recovery must be identified. A thorough analysis of the power relationships within these sectors should also be completed so that economic recovery can move forward and address imbalances that might disrupt further growth and long-term development.

Identifying key sectors, which could make a real impact on economic regeneration, is one of the most important aspects of economic recovery. Conflicts will undoubtedly have destroyed or damaged physical assets and infrastructure and local and national industries (for example, agriculture, textile industries, telecommunications and banking).

Diversity of industries is good for a strong economy – a diverse base will provide protection against crises that affect specific industries, such as drought impacting agriculture or a drop in world commodity prices. Specific industries in any location and their development will depend on:

- Resources (natural, capital and human) that are available
- Demand from local, regional and international consumers (dependent on trade networks)
- The impact of the conflict, through destruction and distortion (by disruption of trade networks and access to resources), on existing industries and the eventual creation of new war-related industries (for example, arms trade).

An analysis must also look at the potential for new industries and their place in the regional and global economies. Local and national resources may also uncover new opportunities. As part of a thorough conflict analysis, it is important to examine the following industry-specific factors:

- Different patterns of control, competition and entry – ownership of resources, production, distribution and networks
- How they were impacted by the conflict
- How they exacerbated conflict or can support peace
- The overall impact on the economy and economic development.

Box 9.3 shows some high potential investment sectors in transition environments.

**Box 9.3: High Potential Investment Sectors in Transitions**

There are three sectors in conflict-affected regions, besides extractive industries such as mining or petroleum, with high potential: mobile phones, construction and commercial banks. Mobile phone companies make small investments with almost immediate returns. Construction and engineering companies can benefit from short-term reconstruction contracts.

*Source:* Bray, John, *International Companies and Post Conflict Reconstruction – Cross-Sectoral Comparisons*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2005).

## 9.2.4 The Legacy of War-Related Economies

An extremely important aspect of transition economies – and one that is often under-analyzed – is the legacy of war-related economies. These types of informal economies may continue or reappear during transitional periods. They can continue to promote war-related profit

incentives and create unstable dependencies. They affect livelihoods, government capacity and resources, industry, trade, markets, investment, and, if overlooked, can overtake economic recovery programs. These "war-related" economies include:

- War economies (economic activities that are motivated by war efforts)
- Black economies (economic activities by actors who are seeking profit and not interested in the war itself but that indirectly contribute to the war effort)
- Coping economies (economic activities by ordinary people caught up in the war who are trying to survive).

A possible feature of all three of these economies is illegal commerce that can fester in the unregulated environments enabled by ongoing conflict (for example, trafficking, arms, drugs). Criminal activity can support war economies directly (such as "conflict diamonds"), be part of black economies (through trafficking and smuggling, for example) or coping economies (such as poppy cultivation).

War-related economies can be extremely important in transition environments as they continue to provide subsistence to people trying to survive and incentives for businesspeople (legal and criminal). At the same time, they can threaten regional peace, limit opportunities for long-term growth and support monopolies and predatory relationships. Box 9.4 provides an example of a war-related economy in the South Caucasus.

**Box 9.4: War-Related Economy in the South Caucasus**

During and after conflict, war affected economies can serve important economic functions not only for households but for entire regions. Organizations and institutions working in economic recovery must be aware of them and understand their dynamics and importance.

Ergneti market lies between two warring parties, Georgia and South Ossetia, and is the only economic mechanism that continues to thrive in the post-conflict period. The market is characterized by a large flow of goods which are legal only in terms of South Ossetian laws and norms, but are up to 90% illegal in Russia and Georgia. This situation is quite unstable in political terms, but it also works as a price-setting mechanism for the entire Caucasus and serves a function integral to the region's economic development.

Although the market constitutes the lion's share of the South Ossetian economy, it is in no position to provide for the region's stable economic growth. Although Ergneti market is the dominant source of budget revenue for South Ossetia and is profitable for the entire Caucasus region, these very qualities also create conditions that support the current status quo and work against final settlement of the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict. The closure of the market by an executive order in Georgia or Russia could cause the collapse of the economy of the entire region and result in further escalation of the conflict. Under such conditions, it is vital to reduce the region's economic dependence on the illegal border trade.

*Source:* The Economy and Conflict Research Group, *From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus*, (London: International Alert, 2004), p.199.

When analyzing war-related economies, the different actors' motives and their relationship to each other and resources become of paramount importance. Table 9.1 provides a simple template for analyzing war-related economies. The table is based on the situation in Afghanistan in 2002 and illustrates important characteristics of the three war-related economies in terms of the actors, motives, key activities and commodities, as well as the impact of each on the overall economic situation.

**Table 9.1: Types of Conflict-Affected Economies in Afghanistan**

| | The War Economy | The Black Economy | The Coping Economy |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Key Actors** | Commanders, 'conflict entrepreneurs,' fighters | Profiteers, transport mafia, businessmen; 'downstream' actors (truck drivers, poppy farmers) | Poor families and communities (the majority of the population) |
| **Motivations and Incentives** | ▪ To fund the war effort or achieve military objectives<br>▪ Peace may not be in their interest as it may lead to decreased power, status and wealth<br>▪ Fighters may have an interest in peace if there are alternative sources of livelihood | ▪ To make a profit on the margins of the conflict<br>▪ Entrepreneurs profit from the lack of a strong state and a highly liberal economy<br>▪ Peace could be in their interest if it encourages long-term investment and licit entrepreneurial activity | ▪ To cope and maintain asset bases through low-risk activities or to survive through asset erosion<br>▪ Peace could enable families to move beyond subsistence |
| **Key Activities and Commodities** | ▪ Taxation of licit and illicit economic activities (opium, smuggled consumer goods, lapis and emeralds, wheat, land tax)<br>▪ Money, arms, equipment and fuel from external state and non-state actors<br>▪ Economic blockades of dissenting areas<br>▪ Destruction of means of economic support<br>▪ Asset-stripping and looting | ▪ Opium economy<br>▪ Cross-border smuggling<br>▪ Mass extraction of natural resources (timber, marble)<br>▪ Smuggling of high-value commodities (emeralds, lapis, antiquities, rare fauna)<br>▪ Hawala (currency order and exchange system)<br>▪ Aid manipulation | ▪ Diverse livelihood strategies to spread risk<br>▪ Subsistence agriculture<br>▪ Petty trade and small businesses<br>▪ Agricultural wage labor<br>▪ Labor migration and remittances<br>▪ Redistribution through family networks<br>▪ Humanitarian assistance |
| **Impacts** | ▪ Disruption to markets and destruction of asset bases<br>▪ Violent redistribution of resources and entitlements<br>▪ Impoverishment of politically-vulnerable groups<br>▪ Out-migration of educated people | ▪ Concentrates power and wealth<br>▪ Undermines patron-client relationships, increasing vulnerability<br>▪ Smuggling circumvents Pakistan's customs duty and sales tax, affecting revenue collection and undercutting local producers<br>▪ Increased drug use | ▪ Coping may reinforce social networks, but survival may lead to negative or regressive coping strategies<br>▪ Lack of long-term investment<br>▪ Long-term effects on human capital – lowering levels of health, and education |

*Source*: Collinson, Sarah (ed.), "Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies for Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action", *HPG Report 13* (February 2003), p. 72.

### 9.2.5 Potential Impact of External Interventions

During relief and transitional periods, external actors may swamp a particular country and its capital. Depending on the size of the influx, local economies can be overwhelmed as external actors can:

- Usurp competent government staff
- Create a boom in a service industry catering to expatriates
- Increase prices (for example, housing costs, commodities) in urban areas.

As seen in box 9.5, the political economy of intervention greatly distorts local economies.

**Box 9.5: Political Economy of Intervention**

The most vibrant economic area in post-conflict environments remains the service sector- stimulated by generous UN salaries supplemented by a field per diem.

In the case of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the introduction of peacekeepers led to a graphic increase in the price of rice, fish, meat and housing; the devaluation of the local currency by 70 percent; and a rise in prostitution and the HIV/AIDS rate.

In East Timor, soon after the Australian-led INTERFET intervention in late October 1999, Dili's central Mercado market was offering little but the most basic foodstuffs – with substantial price increases seen in a number of primary commodities. At the same time, Australian entrepreneurs were providing cold beer, ice cream and pizza to expatriates.

*Source:* Bhatia, Michael, "Postconflict Profit: The Political Economy of Intervention", *Global Governance*, 11 (2), Spring 2005.

Prices often increase, which brings vulnerability. External actors need to analyze and address their impact on local economies by:

- Identifying and minimizing the negative impacts as much as possible – this includes working with the government and other actors to set wages that will allow the government to be competitive.
- Identifying and implementing projects that address increases in vulnerability (for example, housing and food).
- Working with government and other actors to identify and implement projects that may assist foreign industries and those working in them to prepare for their pull out.

From a different perspective, good intentions for providing economic assistance with a community-building element can also lead to awful consequences, if one does not carefully match goals and realities. When local participation is taken out of context and responded to at a remote level by one external actor, warning bells should ring. Box 9.6 exemplifies such a case.

**Box 9.6: Good Theory, Awful Consequences**

In 1999-2000, a trust fund was set up, administered by the World Bank to assist in the economic recovery of East Timor. To supplement the macro-economic initiatives, the Fund included a Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP). The objective was to jump start the rural economy and to "build democracy" by decentralizing government. CEP also intended to make available block grants to locally elected CEP councils for small projects that met their community's development priorities.

When the CEP was completed nearly three years later, over 400 CEP councils had contributed with a range of community projects, such as repaired roads, water and sanitation projects and micro-credit funded kiosks. Overall 54 percent of the micro-credit loans went to kiosks.
The large investment in kiosks created an "oversupply" that led to predictable owner complaints of few customers and too much competition. These difficulties were exacerbated by the sky-rocketing price of wholesale goods due to the inflationary pressures of the international reconstruction circus with its well paid consultants and US dollar economy.

The widows from Meligo do not know the exact financial health of their businesses because they are illiterate, but a World Bank researcher concluded that in 70 percent of cases, widows under this program were not making enough money to pay back the original loan. If the project actually enforced loan repayment, most of the recipients would plunge further into poverty.

*Source:* Adapted from Moxham, Ben, *The World Bank in the Land of Kiosks: Community Driven Development in East Timor*, Focus on the Global South, (2004), http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/2004/1012easttimor.htm#author.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Coordinate information collection efforts and analysis*** *to avoid duplication and to secure the best information possible, as other agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, will be collecting these, too. Gaps in information collection should also be identified (for example, on the war economy and power relations).*
- ✓ ***Work locally if community-building aspects are intended*** *and continuously assess whether intended results materialize.*
- ✓ ***Analyze before intervention and during program implementation****. Programs can become co-opted by powerful individuals and cease to address their core goals.*
- ✓ ***Analyze national macro-economic strategies****. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have been criticized in the past for recommending austere measures that lead to great suffering by certain populations (for example, as a result of unemployment). Identifying potential gaps and crises and designing programs to assist populations through tough periods can be crucial in sustaining peace.*
- ✓ ***Share your analysis organization-wide****. Experience shows that analysis and understanding may exist in one part of an organization but may not be linked to field-level operations; or individual staff or partners at field level may have a very good understanding of the context in which they are working, which is not shared within the organization, and is therefore easily overlooked amid rapid staff mobility and turnover.*

## *9.3 Economic Interventions: Macro-Economic Recovery*

Economic interventions will focus on macro-economic recovery or investment and industry support. The former is discussed in this section; the latter will be dealt with in the next.

**Macro-Economic Recovery**

Macro-economic recovery aims to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace and to support economic and social development. This requires that a peacetime economy be built as soon as possible and that state-society relations be restored at all levels.

The cost of conflict in fiscal and monetary terms may include:

- High inflation. Inflation is the persistent increase in the level of prices or a persistent decline in the purchasing power of money caused by an increase in available currency and credit beyond the proportion of available goods and services. In periods of inflation, earnings are distorted as money is worth less over time.
- Rising external indebtedness. Remaining in debt vis-à-vis outside creditors can be a major stumbling block to economic recovery. A number of observers have argued that high external indebtedness is a major cause of poverty.
- A decline of private sector investment due to political instability and economic costs.

- A lack of well-functioning policy. In some cases government policy might have actually contributed to causing conflict.
- Weak administrative and institutional structures.

Solving completely these problems will not necessarily be possible during transitions. Indeed their solution is part of a long-term economic development process. Nevertheless, it is important that governments:

- Take immediate actions to stabilize the economy
- Remove obstacles if possible
- Begin setting the framework for better policies and institutions.

In macro-economic recovery, the onus falls on governments to establish the necessary reforms and build the capacity and policies. External actors, including international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, play major roles in assisting and guiding macro-economic recovery (see box 9.7). Very generally, the international financial institutions assist by providing:

- Financial resources
- Information – for example, assessments and analysis
- Technical assistance and expertise
- Capacity building
- Supplementary programming.

The role for development aid agencies is less obvious. Ideally their roles are based on assessed needs and valued resources. Many bilateral and multilateral agencies go beyond providing information and technical assistance. In addition, they could also work through their governments to lobby decision-makers to ensure, for example, that peacebuilding and pro-poor policies are adapted. The key to action is to be aware of the government's capacity and resources and of options and to then identify where optimal support can be extended (see the importance of assessments in section 9.2)

**Box 9.7: The Role of the World Bank and IMF in Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

The **World Bank**[44] outlines its role in post-conflict reconstruction as follows: "As a development institution, the Bank focuses on its comparative advantage, including rehabilitation of infrastructure, advice on economic policy, aid coordination, institution building, and investments in social sectors."

With regards to monetary and fiscal policy, the World Bank focuses on:

- jump-starting the economy through investment in key productive sectors; creating the conditions for resumption of trade, savings, and domestic and foreign investment; and promoting macroeconomic stabilization, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.
- re-establishing the framework of governance by strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work effectively.
- normalizing financial borrowing arrangements by planning a work-out of arrears, debt rescheduling, and the longer-term path to financial normalization.

In addition to the World Bank, the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** also plays a major role in assisting national governments during transitional phases. The IMF provides emergency assistance loans as well as policy advice and technical assistance.

"Policy advice, covering the full range of macroeconomic policies and supporting structural measures, is an essential component of IMF emergency assistance. In post-conflict cases, technical assistance is also very important for rebuilding the capacity to implement macroeconomic policy. Areas of focus include rebuilding statistical capacity and establishing and reorganizing fiscal, monetary and

[44] This section is adapted from The World Bank, *Press Briefing: Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/spring99/pcr-pb.htm.

exchange institutions to help restore tax and government expenditure capacity, payment, credit, and foreign exchange operations. ”

“Because the IMF plays a key role in monitoring member countries’ financial health, as well as providing the lead role for strengthening management capacity in this area, it is important that macroeconomists have a good grasp of financial programming as prepared by the IMF.”

*Source:* Hoffman, Richard, *Post-Conflict Economic Management*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), p. 36.

### 9.3.1 Monetary Policy

**Monetary Policy**

Monetary policy refers to actions by the central bank and government to control the availability of money to companies and consumers and, in particular, to focus efforts on fighting inflation or otherwise control or stimulate the economy.

Depending on the context, scope and duration, conflict can greatly impact the monetary system in a country. Banks may collapse, governments may unwisely use monetary policy, and citizens and entire regions may adopt other currencies. The resulting monetary costs include uncertainty, inflation and unstable exchange rates. These further inhibit growth and require immediate action in a transition environment. In transition situations, monetary instability is common. Problems may include:

- Extremely high inflation
- Low and unstable exchange rates
- Popular use of foreign currency
- Inadequate formal banking system
- Limited government capacity
- Regional differences in currency use and prices.

The lack of a dependable currency and banking system undermine a country’s economy in many ways:

- The government loses its ability to influence/manage the economy through manipulation of the money supply and interest rates.
- The government loses its ability to generate government revenues through making money.
- The unstable currency greatly increases uncertainty throughout the system reducing investment (foreign and domestic) and increasing vulnerability.
- Lack of banking institutions limits saving and investment opportunities.

Despite the lack of capacity or institutions, governments emerging from conflict must immediately tackle monetary policy. Key areas of immediate intervention include:[45]

- **(Re-)establishing a credible monetary authority**: governments must establish a credible and functioning monetary authority. This may require the setting up of an independent body, such as a central bank, that will aim to maintain price stability.
- **Setting currency and exchange rate policy**: stable prices are important to reduce vulnerability and increase investment. Although a government may want to retain a sovereign currency and support it with a credible body, many countries emerging from conflict peg or adopt foreign currencies. The eventual policy option of any specific country or region will depend on that location’s economic structure, its political situation

[45] Hoffman, Richard, *Post-Conflict Economic Management*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), p. 36.

and the availability of a suitable foreign currency. See table 9.2 for a breakdown of different factors related to three policy options.

- **Improving banking supervision**: drafting legislation for banks and credit unions is an important step in gaining some control over an uncontrolled proliferation of lending institutions and activities. Transparency and accountability should be emphasized to discourage corruption.
- **Rebuilding mechanisms for collecting and analyzing key economic information:** macro-economic management will require timely information on prices, balance of payments and other monetary statistics.

**Table 9.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Currency Policies**

| Option | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|
| **Maintaining sovereign currency** (reform governance, e.g., reform mandate of central bank) | ▪ Government retains opportunities to gain revenue from money creation<br>▪ Government retains opportunities to use monetary policy to offset economic shocks<br>▪ Sovereign currency provides a symbol of national identity | ▪ Requires reforming central bank – which ideally is negotiated democratically and codified in law<br>▪ Effective policy requires timely data on changes in economic conditions and a reasonable understanding of how monetary policy affects prices and output<br>▪ Requires commitment from government |
| **Pegging the currency to a major international currency** | ▪ Establishes credibility quickly<br>▪ Promotes trade and capital flows by eliminating exchange-rate fluctuations<br>▪ Government retains some opportunity to gain revenue through interest earned on foreign-currency assets held in reserve | ▪ No independent monetary policy<br>▪ Possibility that the pegged rate may drift out of line with the scarcity value of foreign exchange<br>▪ Government loses last resort of borrowing from central bank |
| **Adoption of a foreign currency** | ▪ Establishes credibility quickly<br>▪ Reduces almost all uncertainty about the value of money<br>▪ No costs of changing funds into adopted currency<br>▪ Promotes trade and capital flows by eliminating exchange-rate fluctuations | ▪ No independent monetary policy<br>▪ Government loses last resort of borrowing from central bank<br>▪ No opportunity to gain revenue |

*Source:* Starr, Martha, *Monetary Policy in Post-Conflict Countries: Restoring Credibility* (American University: 2004), pp. 5-7.

One example of how monetary policy, in this case the use of a stable currency, can be key to maintaining macro-economic stability is shown in box 9.8.

**Box 9.8: Monetary Stabilization in Kosovo**

One of the many challenges that Kosovo faced after the conflict was to choose a monetary framework. Given the massive rush towards foreign exchange cash holdings and the vanishing of the Yugoslav dinar as a medium of transactions, it was not surprising that, in September 1999, by one of its first Regulations "On the currency permitted to be used in Kosovo", UNMIK legitimized the use of the Deutsche mark and other foreign currencies in Kosovo. In fact, it was Kosovo's population that adopted the Deutsche mark as its common currency. The UNMIK Regulation merely identified the Deutsche mark as the currency in which the budgets, financial records and accounts of public bodies, agencies and institutions, and UNMIK itself, were to be formulated. At the same time, the Regulation offered freedom to the parties to any contract, or any other voluntary transaction, to denominate such transaction in any widely accepted currency agreed upon by them. Furthermore, the Regulation

removed all foreign exchange controls and restriction on the possession, use, or disposition of any currency, whether in cash or in a bank account, whether situated inside or outside the territory of Kosovo. The Deutsche mark was adopted unilaterally, as the de facto legal tender currency of Kosovo. This did not involve any negotiations with the Deutsche Bundesbank or European Central Bank at that time.

The adoption of the Deutsche mark, and subsequently the Euro, was not accidental. It followed two decades of extreme monetary instability, accompanied by a high degree of unofficial use of the Deutsche mark as a store of value and medium of exchange. In the pre-conflict period, the Deutsche mark was the most widely used foreign currency; there were significant amounts of physical cash already in circulation. The population was also familiar with the currency. The Kosovar Diaspora remittances, estimated at over 500 million euro in 2002, had been generating a regular and significant flow of money into Kosovo for years. These inflows were almost entirely made in the form of physical cash. After the end of the conflict, in the absence of banking facilities in Kosovo, most direct foreign assistance also necessitated physical cash inflows. At the time when the UN assumed administration of Kosovo, the adoption of a monetary framework anchored by the use of the Deutsche mark presented itself as a natural choice. The use of a stable currency was pivotal in maintaining macroeconomic stability and played a critical role in rebuilding people's trust in the financial sector.

*Source:* Syetchine, Michel, *Kosovo Experience with Euroisation of its Economy* (Speech given at Bank of Albania – Fifth International Conference), Last retrieved on July 25, 2005 at http://www.bpk-kos.org/downloads/Speech%20for%20Bank%20of%20Albania%20Conference%20(final%20text).pdf.

The role of external actors in this area is limited to providing expert advice in monetary policy, banking and revenue collection, and to training and capacity-building of staff in these fields.

### 9.3.2 Fiscal policy

**Fiscal Policy**

Fiscal policy is the use of the government budget to affect an economy. When the government decides on the taxes that it collects, the transfer payments it gives out or the goods and services that it purchases, it is engaging in fiscal policy. The primary economic impact of any change in the government budget is felt by particular groups – a tax cut for families with children, for example, raises the disposable income of those families. Discussions of fiscal policy, however, usually focus on the effect of changes in the government budget on the overall economy – on such macroeconomic variables as GNP and unemployment and inflation.

*Source:* Weil, David, N., "Fiscal Policy", *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FiscalPolicy.html

Fiscal policy is related to resource distribution and is therefore potentially important in both conflict management and conflict generation. Poor resource distribution, exacerbated by poor or corrupt fiscal management, is a common grievance leading to conflict. Perceived discriminatory spending or taxing can raise discontent and, if bolstered by other causes such as political disenfranchisement, can lead to conflict. This includes many groups from resource-rich areas that do not feel they have received an adequate return (for example, Cabinda province in Angola). Liberia under the Taylor government is another case in point, as illustrated in box 9.9.

**Box 9.9: Engine of War in Liberia – Resources, Greed and the Predatory State**

Unaccountable governments with large revenue streams at their disposal have multiple opportunities to divert funds for illegal purposes. Relying on off-budget accounts, the Taylor government in Liberia fomented national and regional instability by providing arms and other support to a vicious rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in neighboring Sierra Leone and rebel groups in western Côte D'Ivoire, as well as to fund its own war within Liberia. Meanwhile, Liberia remained one of the poorest countries in the world.

Despite international arms embargoes, the Taylor government spent millions for its own wars and to supply the RUF, using revenue from government-controlled diamond and timber sales and from monies diverted from Liberia's lucrative maritime registry. An arms embargo was placed on all parties to the civil war in Liberia in 1992 after the Economic Community of West African States intervened militarily in large part to prevent Taylor, at the time the leader of rebel forces known as the National Patriotic Front for Liberia, from taking power. The sanctions remained in effect when Taylor subsequently was elected president of Liberia in 1997 but were largely ineffective because they were poorly enforced. It was only after the U.N. Security Council introduced a new expanded package of sanctions in May 2001, this time accompanied by a serious international enforcement effort, that Taylor's predatory behavior was checked.

For years, Taylor used illicit funds to pay for illegal weapons. Liberia's weapons purchases from 1999 to 2003, for example, were mainly financed by off-budget spending by the Liberian government. Taylor favored maintaining major off-budget agencies – the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA), the Forestry Development Authority (FDA) and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company – headed by his close associates. While neither the BMA nor FDA published its financial accounts or provided financial information, the IMF estimated that, in 2002, off-budget revenues from shipping and timber totaled about US $26 million, some 36 percent of the government's total revenue and almost six times what the government spent on education and health.

*Source*: Ganesan, Arvind and Vines, Alex, *Engine of War: Resources, Greed and the Predatory State*, (Human Rights Watch: 2004), http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/14.htm.

Fiscal policy can also be used pro-actively to lay the foundation for peace. Fiscal policy should be set up to include different groups and to target areas of hostilities and specific conflict-affected populations (for example, demobilized soldiers).

## The Relationship between Conflict and Fiscal Policy

Government spending and revenue collection are adapted throughout a conflict to new spending needs and revenue sources. At the same time, opposition movements exact their own fiscal policy – taxing, resource manipulation and spending.

With regard to governments, conflict encourages shifts in spending. The shift in spending is most likely related to an increase in military expenditures with expenditures for services like health and education reduced. If revenue collection does not keep up with spending, governments may cut back on wages to various public employees including police, teachers, and administrators.

Revenue can decrease during conflict, due to lower overall production/income and an increase in economic activities outside of government control (non-formal markets). This can generate:

- Lower capacity to collect tax and regulate economic activities
- Decreased access to areas and resources
- Greater incentives and feasibility of avoiding government regulation and tax.

In transitional periods, the result is great pressure on the government to both cut and increase spending. Faced with this dilemma, government fiscal policy in transition settings is further hindered by:

- Potential debt and the inability to raise revenue
- Weak and distorted spending policies (military build-up, reduced spending on social services, reduced and infrequent payment of public employees)
- Inadequate and distorted revenue collection (tax evasion, reduced tax base)
- Lack of transparency and accountability
- Shadow economies
- Weak government capacity.

Due to weak government capacity and general overwhelming needs, emphasis during transitional periods should be placed on:

- Stabilizing fiscal policy and building fiscal institutions
- Identifying revenue streams
- Prioritizing spending.

## Stabilizing Fiscal Policy and Restoring Fiscal Institutions

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) states the aim of fiscal institutional (re-)construction to be "effective and transparent" fiscal policy and fiscal management. To achieve this, it lays out three components to building fiscal institutions:

1. Creating a legal/regulatory framework for fiscal management
2. Establishing and/or strengthening the fiscal authority
3. Designing appropriate revenue and expenditure policies, while simultaneously strengthening revenue administration and public expenditure management.

The sequencing of these depends on the specific needs of the country, the feasibility of working with current policy and capacity.[46]

## Revenue Collection

Revenue collection is a significant component of rebuilding government because of the strong demand to acquire internal funding quickly to finance economic recovery and secure operation of public services. Governments emerging from conflict face several problems with regard to revenue collection:

- Limited tax bases
- Poor tax policies may be in place (policies may be discriminatory, overly complicated, or simply ineffectual)
- Possible low administrative capacity and poorly functioning institutions.

A government's options will center on the different resources available to them:

- Any current tax system already in place
- The administrative and technical capacity available
- Availability of external assistance.

The third resource listed includes direct budget support from donor countries (bilateral) and potentially international funds managed by external actors, such as the World Bank. The dire nature of some countries emerging from conflict supports the provision of direct budget support. External actors must ensure, however, that this direct aid does not lead to dependency (see section 9.5). Bilateral agencies should make sure that the recipient country begins policies and procedures that will eventually make up for the lack of revenue and reduce their need. Box 9.10 illustrates the challenges associated with taxation and revenue collection.

**Box 9.10: Taxation and Revenue Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries**

Peace agreements often contain general commitments to take action to improve living standards, as a way of redressing grievances, but the fiscal implications are seldom spelled out. In rare cases one party or parties to the conflict may insist that the peace deal include an explicit set of fiscal commitments. Guatemala's 1996 peace accords that ended the 38 year-old civil war included specific fiscal measures to redress grievances. The accords included a provision for a minimum 50 per cent increase in the tax/GDP ratio by 2000, using the 1995 rate as a base, with the additional revenue to be allocated to raising public spending on basic services and infrastructure for the country's indigenous people (who comprised the core of the rebel movement and who have suffered long-standing discrimination).

[46] International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, *Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries,* (New York: IMF 2004), p. 4.

For all countries, but particularly those without mineral wealth, considerable innovation is necessary in revenue institutions (both tax authorities and customs and excise). Some success has been achieved with semi-autonomous revenue authorities, notably in Uganda, where the ratio of revenue to GDP rose from a low of 5 per cent in the mid-1980s to 12 per cent by the end of the 1990s (Chen *et al.* 2001). However, such authorities, including that in Uganda, are not without their own governance problems (DFID 2000, Fjeldstad 2002). Equal attention must be given to reforming customs and excise collection; these revenue sources are especially important in the early years of reconstruction. Mozambique raised its tariff revenues by radical institutional innovation. The UK's Crown Agents won the first three-year contract (starting in 1997 and subsequently extended) to reorganize the customs service, cut delays in customs clearance, and meet higher revenue targets. Customs revenue rose to US $198 million in 1999 up from US $86 million in 1996, despite a reduction in the average tariff rate under the trade-liberalization programme (Crown Agents 2000).

*Source*: Addison, Tony et al., *Taxation and Revenue Collection in Conflict-Affected Countries*, (2002), http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/activities/Addison2.pdf.

Table 9.3 describes some examples of short-term revenue initiatives. The key is to consider all potentially relevant policies and analyze their effectiveness for each particular context – examining costs (for example, the impacts of policies on different groups and political opposition) and benefits (for example, increased revenue or decreased spending).

**Table 9.3: Comparison of Different Fiscal Initiatives**

| Fiscal initiative | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|
| **Indirect taxation** | ▪ Provides a revenue stream<br>▪ Requires low administrative capacity | ▪ Popular/political opposition<br>▪ The poor are potentially disproportionately taxed<br>▪ Could discourage industrial development |
| **Import duties on non-essential consumer goods** | ▪ Provides a revenue stream<br>▪ Does not hurt the poor | ▪ Political opposition<br>▪ Can increase prices – inflation |
| **Eliminate exemptions** | ▪ Improves transparency | ▪ Political opposition |
| **User fees** | ▪ Increases accountability | ▪ Citizens will expect better services<br>▪ The poor are potentially disproportionately taxed |
| **Cutting subsidies** | ▪ Reduces expenditures | ▪ Political opposition |

## Ensuring Spending Patterns Reflect Government Priorities

The demands on government spending during periods of transition are particularly high. At the same time the government is struggling to collect revenue. In addition, governments face problems of capacity and scope:

- Budget information may not exist, money may not go through the treasury
- Lack of budgetary framework
- Distorted and unchecked spending may be in place
- Possible low administrative capacity and poorly functioning institutions.

With regards to fiscal spending, governments in transitional periods must:

- Improve information on government financial flows and restore control over spending
- Create a budget that prioritizes spending (for example, public employees, such as police, teachers and health personnel, as well as infrastructure)
- Develop accounting measures.

Just as in other areas of macro-economic intervention, the role of development aid agencies in supporting the transition government to adopt a healthy fiscal policy is rather limited, unless cooperation with the international financial institutions is envisaged.

### 9.3.3 Trade Policy

During conflict and in the transition phase, trade can plummet because of insecurity, low production and trade restrictions. The lack of government capacity and control will further encourage smuggling and the proliferation of shadow markets.

Re-establishing domestic and foreign trade opens up markets for domestic goods and allows citizens to buy foreign goods. In transition situations, these new markets can play particularly important roles in jump-starting the economy and supporting livelihoods. At the same time, customs and taxes on formal trade can also provide a simple form of revenue for governments. In order to facilitate formal trade, governments with the assistance of external actors will need to do the following:

- **Address unnecessary restrictions and obstacles to trade.** Examples may include increasing the number of commodities available for export or reducing the paperwork involved in licensing exporters.
- **Strengthen customs administration.** Improving the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of customs offices is a critical step in decreasing waste and facilitating a quicker government response in trade.
- **Clarify and simplify taxing policy.** A thorough review of tariffs, exemptions, export taxes and the revenue they bring in versus obstacles they present to increased trade should be performed. Taxes that hamper trade and do not provide sufficient revenue should be reduced or removed.

A key issue in trade policy is the importance of regional trade. Regional economic cooperation appears to be lacking in many areas affected by conflict, and affected countries often have stronger commercial ties with overseas countries.[47] To increase both potential markets and regional stability, it is within the interests of countries to form better economic ties with their neighbors. Therefore, efforts should be put into regional trade negotiations.

International trade is also a political issue. Any changes to trade policy may result in gains and losses to different parties. It is important to be aware of who gains and who loses as a result of trade policy reform. Efforts should be made to compensate the losers to avoid a relapse into conflict. Structural inequality can, to some extent, be addressed through global trade policies that favor disadvantaged governments. Pro-poor policies of external actors can also help in the appropriate negotiations. In addition, direct technical assistance to help transition governments design favorable trade policies will be useful.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Keep it simple**. The lack of government administrative and operational capacity restricts the ability to carry out complex laws and procedures. Simplifying rules and procedures can also make them more transparent.*
- ✓ *Develop a **comprehensive strategy**. Governments with the assistance of external actors should design a short to medium-term strategy with regards to activities – monetary authority and currency reform, priority spending, collecting revenue and also implementing reforms.*
- ✓ ***Provide long-term assistance** in areas where capacity is particularly low. Long-term advisors can assist in policy development and implementation, while they train local staff.*
- ✓ *Where possible pursue long-term objectives. Where **possible short-term measures should be consistent with the longer-term objective** of moving to a modern fiscal and monetary system. However, due to immediate needs with regard to revenue collection, for example, short-term needs may override long-term goals – but these should be phased out as soon as possible.*

[47] Hoffman, Richard, *Post-Conflict Economic Management*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), p. 40.

- ✓ *Be aware that the significant role that the IMF, World Bank and other partners may play in assisting economic recovery requires a **strong understanding of and coordination** with their programs.*
- ✓ *Emphasize **transparency, accountability and standards** at all times.*

## *9.4 Economic Interventions: Investment and Industry Support*

In addition to macro-economic interventions, and far more likely for development actors, are interventions to invest or provide support to industries. Because of the high level of uncertainty, businesses and foreign investors will be reluctant to invest in transition countries, particularly in ventures taking a long time to yield profits. Any form of investment will most likely be directed at short-term contracts and projects, such as construction works. Facilitating investment and providing support to key industries are viable ways to jump-start the economy and provide a foundation for future economic growth.

### 9.4.1 Promoting Investment

To restart economic activities and industries, transition countries need to attract investment. A potential lack of capital and great uncertainty, however, undermine investment in post-conflict situations. Consistent investment in the right industries and the right actors can enable these industries to flourish. In transition environments, obstacles to investment are high due to:

- Uncertainty
- Insecurity
- High risk
- Low incentives (low payoff)
- Lack of rule of law and regulation
- Bureaucracy, high costs and taxes.

In addition, banks in transition societies generally show little interest in appraising projects and lending to start-ups and small firms. There are often two problems:

- Staff of credit banks have no skills in evaluating and monitoring small business loans
- Banks are afraid of the risks associated with lending to small businesses, especially when borrowing without any tangible collateral.

These problems need to be overcome by training bank staff in project appraisal and micro-credit benefits. In general, there are two exceptions to the lack of investment:

- A large reconstruction budget (for example, by an international fund) can provide strong incentives for specific work, such as construction and security. By far the large majority of contracts will go to foreign companies who will leave when the fund is depleted. Fund management should thus at least attempt to maximize the benefits to the local population (for example, by creating employment) as well as generate some long-term benefits, such as capacity building.
- Remittances from refugees and others working abroad are a potential source of domestic investment. Often they bypass the banking system (as it might not yet be judged reliable) and invest in small- to medium-sized enterprises, which can be both positive and negative. Remittances are a common and significant aspect of many of today's transition situations (see box 9.11). Programs need to identify ways in which local investment can be promoted and facilitated.

### Box 9.11: Remittances and their Potential

Although the data on remittances sent by asylum seekers and refugees is scant and difficult to estimate, Koser and Van Hear (2003) argue that the extent of this phenomenon can be ascertained by looking at the figures for countries that have experienced conflict and produced refugees in recent years: Colombia (more than $650 million annually), Sri Lanka (close to $1 billion). Such remittances can have both beneficial and negative impacts on the people and countries receiving them, especially in the case of societies in conflict (Van Hear, 2003). Remittances, for instance, can further inequalities because of the unevenness in their distribution, and they can help fuel the conflict in the homeland by providing funding for warring parties (Van Hear 2003). The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, like some other guerrilla groups, relied on a wide network of offices and cells across the world to raise funds from the diaspora (Uppsala Conflict Database).

However, the contributions of refugee groups to their countries of origin are not only economic but, as with other immigrant groups, they extend into the political and social fields as well and can have beneficial effects.

*Sources:* Forced Migration Review, *The Role of Refugees in Conflict Resolution and Post Conflict,* http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo039/fmo039-4.htm.

Van Hear, N. "Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development and Conflict". *Migration Information Source. (2003),* http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=125

Uppsala Conflict Database, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=151.

The first step to encouraging consistent investment is creating a semblance of economic stability. Government actions including establishing relevant laws (property, commercial) and monetary stability are preconditions to increasing domestic and foreign investment. Reducing barriers to investment such as high taxes and other obstacles to market entry are also pivotal.

Development aid agencies can play a role in both policy advice and technical assistance to the government to meet these aims. They can also provide:

- Incentive programs, where risks to investments are shared by the agency
- Market research, facilitation and support of foreign companies willing to invest
- Macro-credit assistance to firms or micro-credit assistance to individuals.

Box 9.12 provides further information on micro-credit programs.

### Box 9.12: Micro-Credit[48]

Micro-credit and micro-finance (hereafter referred to as simply micro-credit) refer to programs that provide small to medium sized loans to individuals and businesses. In transition situations, these services help conflict-affected families rebuild household and business assets as well as act as a catalyst for economic activities and markets. The basic principles of micro-credit are to:

- Offer services that fit the preferences of poor micro-entrepreneurs
- Streamline operations to reduce unit costs
- Motivate clients to repay loans
- Charge full-cost interest rates and fees
- Achieve scale.

These principles are effective in transitions, as seen in Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique and Rwanda. In addition, well designed and implemented micro-credit programs can develop into permanent institutions and be part of long-term economic development. Micro-credit has also become a tool to reach the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

[48] This section is primarily taken from a series of briefs published by USAID, "MBP Microfinance Following Conflict", *Development Alternatives*, (Washington, D.C.: USAID).

**Intangible benefits of microfinance**

"In addition to the core microfinance values of breadth and depth of outreach, impact, and sustainability, microfinance may play a real role in social and political reconciliation. This may occur through encouraging inter-ethnic economic activities, or by building trust through multi-ethnic community banks or solidarity group lending. These goals are enhanced by the success of microfinance – in terms of longevity and scale – and in the increased economic wellbeing that conflict-torn communities experience due to microfinance's availability."

*Source:* USAID, "MBP Microfinance Following Conflict", *Development Alternatives*, Brief No. 5, (Washington, D.C.: USAID), p. 5

For research studies describing the positive side effects of micro-credit loans, see the fact sheet of the Year of Microcredit Organization at http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/docs/MF_MDGs.pdf.

The transition context does pose additional challenges to micro-credit programming. Challenges include:

- Human resource limitations
- Challenge in assembling local boards
- Advocacy and education tasks
- Additional attention to security
- Higher costs
- Increased timeframe for sustainability

In a survey sponsored by USAID, three "essential" preconditions for post-conflict microfinance were identified:

- A certain degree of political stability
- Evidence of sufficient economic activity that can use credit services
- A relatively stable client population.

Microcredit may be inappropriate where conditions pose severe challenges to loan repayment. For example, populations that are geographically dispersed or have a high incidence of disease may not be suitable microfinance clients. In these cases, grants, infrastructure improvements or education and training programs are more effective. For microcredit to be appropriate, the clients must have the capacity to repay the loan under the terms by which it is provided.

*Source*: International Year Of Microcredit 2005, *Understanding Micro Credit and Micro Finance*, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/docs/MicrocreditBrochure_eng.pdf.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Involve** all **stakeholders** and **increase their understanding** of microfinance.*
- ✓ ***Focus on demand**. Ensure that demand for micro-credit exists and adapt micro-credit strategies to the specific context (loan amount, training).*
- ✓ *Start slowly and set a foundation for future growth. **Begin cautiously with pilot programs and modest objectives**. Allow for programs to adjust policies and practices, systematize operations, train staff and understand the operating context.*
- ✓ ***Work with** institutions and individuals that have **solid experience in micro-credit**. Where human resources are limited, it may be wise to invest in external technical assistance and in extensive staff development programs.*
- ✓ *Strengthen networking and cooperation between micro-credit organizations and business support services.*
- ✓ *Supplement loans with **business management and development training**. Development aid agencies can provide micro and macro credit assistance and market research.*
- ✓ *If possible**, funds should be granted on the basis of a multi-annual rather than yearly agreement** to help people achieve sustainability in their micro-credit activities.*

## 9.4.2 Industry Support

To support industries, the first step is to thoroughly assess industries, from resource acquisition and control to production, as follows:

1. Resource acquisition and control
2. Production: preparation of goods; quality control; access to natural, human and capital resources; credit and investment; human capacity; and technology
3. Distribution: infrastructure; trade networks; and market access.

For each stage, what counts is the added value (for example, improving the quality of the product or decreasing costs). It is also important to identify obstacles or opportunities, such as certification and regulation. An important aspect of industry support is also that it should favor the creation of jobs (see box 9.13).

**Box 9.13: Job Creation**

Transition countries are characterized by extremely high unemployment levels. Investment and industrial support should, whenever possible, encourage job creation because it:

- Improves the material welfare of people
- Helps reduce poverty/social exclusion
- Brings communities together
- Provide a means for social healing
- Reduces chances of youth/vulnerable groups being mobilized by opposition movements
- Greatly assists the economy
- Encourages the return of displaced populations.

Industry support might also mean:

- Providing commercial support in rebuilding infrastructure and investing in productive sectors
- Building local human capital and business capacity, especially for small-scale businesses.

Business can help shape the prospects for peace. In a recent guide for extractive industries produced by International Alert,[49] the importance of conflict-sensitive business practice was highlighted. As the guide points out, at first sight, the concept of "contributing to peace" can appear to be beyond companies' legitimate activities as private sector entities, but conflict-sensitive business practice simply enables companies to carry out their legitimate business activities in a manner that prevents conflict and promotes peace.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Carefully **target the support** to promising industries.*
- ✓ *Develop strong **commitment to local and person-to-person relationships** with entrepreneurs, as these will provide the value-added for successful support.*
- ✓ *Encourage **local hiring** – various programs including infrastructure projects and community development can produce jobs for local individuals.*
- ✓ *Ensure decent work – **hold job creation up to international standards**.*
- ✓ *Work for **job sustainability**.*
- ✓ *Provide **on-the-job training** that helps build people's skills.*
- ✓ ***Target populations**, such as ex-combatants, war widows and people with disabilities.*

[49] International Alert, *Manual on Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice for Extractive Industries*, (London: International Alert, 2005).

- ✓ *Be aware of the role **that a company or industrial sector** is likely to play **in preventing, creating, exacerbating or resolving conflict,**[50] and **adopt a conflict-sensitive approach** in your support (see also chapter 4, section 4.2.1).*
- ✓ *Ensure that **early, consistent and empowering stakeholder engagement processes** are established.*

## *9.5 Aid Dependency*

Having met people's basic needs in the aftermath of conflict, it is important that external actors plan an economic recovery strategy which will incorporate a developmental aspect to avoid creating long-term aid dependency. Without clear planning or coordination, there is a serious risk that countries in post-war transition will become reliant on external assistance, whether financial, technical or human.

Avoiding aid dependency is essentially concerned with building local capacity. It is therefore necessary for any agency providing assistance in transition environments to have a clear idea of its own roles and to plan how best to administer aid, and when and how a handover to the local population will take place.

### Contributing Factors

Factors contributing to aid dependency include:

- Lack of domestic capacity to absorb international resources
- Disconnect between foreign governance bodies (such as the UN) and the host government
- Disproportionate aid flows to a particular sector (for example, financial, banking) to the detriment of other sectors (for example, public)
- Lack of knowledge on the part of aid agencies of existing local governance and survival structures
- Lack of "perceived end goals" among aid organizations
- Hasty "exit strategies" by external actors without careful or timely handovers to local partners (see box 9.14).

**Box 9.14: Exit Strategy**

The precipitous departure of ONUMOZ from Mozambique – where a "resource-intensive, high-profile operation engulfed Mozambique for two years and then left as swiftly as it had come" – is much criticized because of the lack of regard for the effects of the rapid hand-over to locals.

*Source:* Woodward, Susan L., *Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation* (International Peace Academy: 2002).

**Identifying key areas:** development aid agencies should identify the areas where the likelihood of dependency is great.

**Planning "exit strategies" and encouraging participation:** capacity building of civil society representatives should be any aid organization's priority when planning their exit strategy (see also chapter 10, section 10.2.2 on exit strategies).

**Knowledge of local communities and local peace building efforts:** by undertaking a thorough analysis of a country's informal arrangements for survival and reliance, building on these systems can avoid later dependency on foreign ones (see box 9.15).

[50] Nelson, Jane, *The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution*, (London: The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, International Alert, Council on Economic Priorities, 2000)

**Box 9.15: Building on Pre-Existing Local Self-Help Structures**

In conflict-affected crisis zones, the resilience of community leaders, activists and women in particular is often revealed in self-help based on community solidarity – even if this includes retaining patterns of trade with neighbors from opposing ethnic or interest groups. As the sweep of conflict extends and large-scale population movement from affected locations follows, traditional livelihoods become impossible to sustain. In these circumstances, and before humanitarian aid arrives, war-affected communities will often improvise means of survival. Either temporarily, as in the efforts of Goma residents to cross the volcanic lava flows that engulfed their town in 2001, or effectively permanently, by establishing parallel systems for administering food and welfare systems, as the Albanian majority population in Kosovo did during the 1991-1999 period.

When international agencies arrive in-country, therefore, an indigenous self-help movement is often already in place. This takes the form of traditional subsistence patterns adapted to meet new levels of need imposed by the effects of violent conflict, which therefore excludes the element of inter-community exchange that existed previously. The decisions facing international agencies include the extent to which external assistance should seek to build on those informal arrangements, which of the groups, associations and organizations providing them should be chosen as operational partners, and on the basis of what type of agreement this partnership should function. International Alert's research and consultations indicate that in many cases the effectiveness of an entire subsequent aid intervention (from the immediate relief of suffering to dealing with its underlying causes) depends on choices made at this stage.

*Source:* Quinn, Mick, *More than Implementers: Civil Society in Complex Emergencies*, A Discussion Paper, (London: International Alert, 2002.

One of the greatest challenges facing aid organizations in a transition environment is to build up trust with and among local participants. It is equally important for any aid organization devising participatory strategies to:

- Understand the political economy of war and its interface with development
- Become familiar with the impact of conflict on how social relationships have been transformed
- Understand how and whether participatory processes can exacerbate the conflict
- Look into where people are at in terms of distrust and expectations
- Be clear about what can be delivered
- Be prepared to compromise on speed to enhance ownership.[51]

Local ownership (see also box 9.16) is important and can be ensured through participatory methods such as:

- Recognizing work that has already been done by local partners
- Supporting local initiatives
- Inviting local partners into the program planning process
- Providing formal training sessions.

**Box 9.16: Local Ownership**

Every effort should be made from the outset to ensure that programs are "owned" by national actors and the conflict-affected groups, with external actors disciplining themselves in line with an advisory or facilitating role. Participation, by communities and interest groups, is both the vehicle for national ownership and stability and a bulwark against losing it. Strengthening local capacity to cope with the immense labor-related challenges should be a major thread woven through all technical assistance activities.

*Source:* International Labour Office (ILO), *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-Affected Countries,* (Geneva: ILO 1998), p.19.

[51] Points taken from: International Alert, *More than Implementers – A Discussion Paper*, http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubdev/67143_2nd_Briefing.pdf.

## Conditionality

One way aid dependency can be avoided is by attaching conditions to the granting of assistance. Initially such conditions should be minimal, flexible and realistic, and only later should they be stiffened. Allowing for flexibility is key as conditions in transition settings change rapidly. Aid conditionality does, however, carry the risk of harming the most vulnerable members of society. This dilemma can be avoided by applying conditions to aid that is of greatest benefit to warlords or politicians. Box 9.17 shows the basic set up of aid conditionality based on poverty reduction demands.

**Box 9.17: Poverty Reduction and Aid Conditionality**

The UK and Ethiopian governments have drawn up a 10-year agreement that aims to link action on reducing poverty with progress on key issues such as justice, human rights and enhancing democracy. The initiative seeks to build a stronger partnership between the two governments by setting out their mutual commitments and expectations.

As part of the arrangement, there will be regular dialogue between the two sides, making the future actions of each government easier to predict. As a result, the Ethiopian government should be able more accurately to predict future aid, and the UK should have more confidence in the outcome of aid – to the ultimate benefit of the poor.

*Source:* Government of the United Kingdom – Department for International Development (DFID), *Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Changing Aid 'Conditionality'*, Draft Policy Paper (London: 2004), p. 10.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Monitor the project's progress****. Monitoring is vital in order to determine when a handover should occur (see also chapter 11, section 11.2).*
- ✓ ***Coordinate*** *with other donors so that one does not immediately replace the other at the time of hand-over. From a local perspective, replacement of support is always easier than self-sustainability.*
- ✓ ***Involve local partners*** *at each stage. Ensure that local partners feel that they "own" the process.*
- ✓ *Pay attention to* ***management support*** *from the outset, as handing over technical expertise is easier than handing over management responsibilities.*
- ✓ *Work with* ***local partners to set long-term goals*** *beyond those of your agency.*

## General Lessons on Economic Recovery

- ✓ **Transitional economies are not "blank slates."** The potential lack of a functioning government does not mean that economic recovery begins at point zero. Despite a potential lack of infrastructure and institutions, economic activities continue throughout a war and economic relations evolve. People have different access to resources, vulnerabilities and coping strategies. In-depth analysis is key to designing and implementing appropriate and effective programs.
- ✓ **The World Bank and International Monetary Fund play major roles in macro-economic recovery.** An organization must be aware of their policies and strategies and coordinate efforts with them and other key donors/implementers. An important element is understanding and possibly bridging any likely gaps in their strategies.
- ✓ **Despite great obstacles, governments must initiate monetary and fiscal reform as soon as possible following conflict.** Initial reform will not be comprehensive but will set a foundation for economic stability. This is needed to promote stability and to add credibility to the government's economic management. It is also important for external actors to guarantee further assistance.
- ✓ **Initial efforts may not contrast with long-term economic strategies.** During the early parts of a transitional period, the government will need to focus on immediate tasks including revenue collection, basic needs and infrastructure. Governments may need to adapt policies that are less than optimal, including indirect taxes, aid, and relief efforts. When possible, these efforts need to be adjusted and more long-term focused policies and procedures developed and implemented. In the same way, war-related markets must be addressed when it is feasible to do so in a transitional environment. Long-term strategies that need to be adopted as soon as possible include pro-poor policies and community participation.
- ✓ **Flexibility** should be considered during initial planning stages and an exit strategy developed accordingly.

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International Monetary Fund (IMF) – Fiscal Affairs Department, *Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries,* (New York: IMF 2004).

International Year of Microcredit 2005, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org. Under the auspices of the International Year of Microcredit, patrons, sponsors and member states have come together to pursue the aim of reaching the Millennium Development Goals by providing microfinance tools to halve extreme poverty by 2015. United Nations agencies, IFIs and regional commissions are observing special events to support the same goal. Member states were requested to establish National Committees to facilitate activities and to create a dialogue on best practices to build more inclusive financial sectors in their countries. As of the end of September 2005, a total of one hundred countries developed activities to support the International Year of Microcredit. The website explains facts and figures, points to research in this field and provides a calendar of events.

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Notes:

# Chapter 10
# Planning and Implementation

## Chapter Objectives

- Describe a project management approach to planning and implementing transition assistance.
- Highlight that transitions require more operational flexibility than normal development situations.

## Introduction

Planning and implementing transition assistance is a dynamic process that begins with the initial awareness of the potential for an end to violent conflict. Development aid agencies need to take advantage of these early opportunities to intervene in post-conflict situations in order to accelerate the process of stabilizing a society and building confidence in peacebuilding initiatives. Although there is some risk in this proactive approach, there is potentially more risk in waiting for the higher level of confidence necessary to ensure that investments in early interventions are not lost in the chaos of recovery from conflict. For this reason, planning and implementing transition assistance needs to be a *streamlined* process, with an emphasis on the following tasks:

- **Readiness**: collection of background information, preparedness planning and awareness of benchmarks for engagement.
- **Analysis**: analyze the implications of the background information and current conditions (conflict and situational analyses, see chapter 1) and prepare a needs assessment.
- **Strategic planning**: develop a vision of the assistance and describe a successful outcome, then decide on the priority sectors for intervention.
- **Program design**: select activities that effectively operationalize the strategic plan, that link activities with other programming and organizations; identify personnel and/or agencies to implement the activities.
- **Quality implementation**: monitor progress closely in order to adjust project design to accommodate developing circumstances.
- **Evaluation**: use the information (both quantitative and qualitative) from monitoring and evaluation, document lessons learned for future reference.

Of particular consideration in planning and implementing transition assistance is operational flexibility.

## 10.1 Using a Project Management Approach to Planning and Implementation

Working in countries that are recovering from violent conflict is typified by underlying conflict, confusion, and competing priorities (see also chapter 1, section 1.1). Information, the basis for decision making, is generally incomplete and often inaccurate. Thus in this fluid situation, the need to be creative and flexible is paramount, even though operational flexibility alone cannot be the only guiding principle for an intervention (see section 10.2.1 below “operational flexibility”). Bi- and multilateral agencies need to look for opportunities and innovations to swiftly address unique and unanticipated circumstances specific to the transition environment.

Fortunately there are many aids to decision-making and designing assistance programs/ projects. Planning and implementing transition assistance is not a linear process of fixed steps.

Rather, it is a collection of inter-related activities, each with certain benefits and value to designing transition assistance. Neglecting any of the activities is likely to result in a less successful approach to transition assistance, although in some circumstances, delays in the implementation of some projects may be inevitable.

Organizations that have project management systems and structures designed to meet the needs of development work may need to adapt their systems and modify their structures if they are to be effective at transition assistance. There may be a need to analyze processes and procedures to identify bottlenecks which prevent expedited decision-making. Information collection is required, even before the end of the conflict, to identify potential scenarios of transition activities, enable organizations to prepare preliminary plans for assistance activities and so to ensure a swift response.

Assessment techniques and methodologies specifically designed for rapid information collection and rapid analysis further shorten response time (see also chapter 2, section 2.3.2). Decision-making needs to be delegated to key staff in the field, who have project approval authorization. Pre-screening potential implementing partners to determine their capacity and qualifications may expedite project approval times.

Putting money transfer and banking mechanisms in place (if banking systems in the country are still functioning; otherwise alternative arrangements will be necessary) may also speed initiation of project work. In short, all the elements of project management systems can potentially be streamlined so that there can be a speedy and flexible transition assistance programming. At the same time, however, speed and flexibility should not compromise the quality of the assistance.

While the following project management activities are presented sequentially, in practice these are inter-related and may overlap as well as have very different timelines.

1. Information gathering, benchmarks, and preparedness
2. Situation and conflict analysis
3. Strategic planning, including the planning of entrance and exit strategies
4. Detailed assessment
5. Project planning: objectives, stakeholders, activities, budget, workplan
6. Selecting implementing partners
7. Implementation and management, including hand-over
8. Monitoring and evaluation

Diagram 10.1 represents the relationships among these activities. The timeline is only a relative indicator; the actual duration of a program/project depends on the variables of the situation.

### *Diagram 10.1: Elements of a Project Management Approach for Transition Assistance*




The following sections describe each of these components of planning and implementing transition assistance.

## 10.1.1 Information gathering, benchmarks and preparedness

Development aid agencies work in fragile states under volatile conditions. They cannot know when peace will be a reality or that there will not be a return to instability or even violence. The agencies need to continuously gather information through lines of communication and networks with other organizations involved in the situation and initiate preparedness plans to facilitate rapid engagement as soon as circumstances allow.

**Information Gathering, Benchmarks and Preparedness**

**Information gathering** includes the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crisis for the purpose of:

- Anticipating the termination of violent conflict
- Collecting information using specific indicators
- Analyzing information – attaching meaning to indicators, setting it into context, recognizing an opportunity for intervention
- Formulating best and worst-case scenarios and response options
- Communicating to policy-makers for the purposes of decision-making and action.

**Benchmarks** are used to determine whether a country presents real opportunities to consolidate peace. See chapter 1, box 1.8 for an enumeration of these benchmarks as suggested by the UN Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs.

**Preparedness** means putting into place plans, management system, trained staff and access to funds and administrative arrangements to maximize the potential value of an early intervention to reinforce peacebuilding and stabilizing communities. These plans ensure timely, appropriate and effective organization and delivery of assistance.

### 10.1.1 Information-gathering and benchmarks

Place and time of intervention are key considerations during the information-gathering stage. Even if politico-strategic considerations, such as geographic proximity, strategic importance and other foreign policy priorities, cannot be completely ignored, the choice of ***where to intervene*** should be guided to the extent possible by the following variables:

- **Existing needs:** these range from supporting consensus-building and coordination among internal and external actors for a broad-based transition strategy through to assisting in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of more concrete sectoral activities.
- **Unfilled "gaps" in transition assistance:** even after needs are assessed and tentatively addressed, "gaps" in assistance often emerge that need to be filled either through the expansion of existing programs and projects or the creation of new ones.
- **Equitable distribution:** assistance is not necessarily well balanced around the globe; decision-making should therefore favor those countries that receive too little assistance rather than those that receive too much;
- **Political will and strong commitment of internal actors:** commitment to the transition process and the likely changes and reforms within the process are crucial for success. Without them, there will be very few achievements and already scarce resources will be wasted.
- **Existing comparative advantages:** country-related comparative advantages such as the existence of programs or projects that can be easily reoriented towards fulfilling transition goals or special relationships that might have been built with government authorities, non-state actors and local NGOs in the past should also be considered when making decisions.
- **Special partnerships with other external actors, in particular humanitarian actors:** expanding partnerships with other external actors that have more experience in a particular transition country, either because they were present during the conflict phase or because they provided assistance immediately after the peace settlement was reached, can also be an important decision-making factor. (See also chapter 12 for a discussion of coordination.)

High-level political acknowledgement of the potential for peace often signals that it is ***time for transition assistance***. Normally a ceasefire has been called, peace negotiations are underway and/or a peace agreement has been signed, signals that a country is moving from war into a transition situation. In addition to positive political developments, indicators of peace include combatants abandoning their posts, repatriation of refugees, the return of displaced populations and increased economic activity. These benchmarks are described in chapter 1, box 1.8. However, they must be meaningfully acknowledged at the operational level as well. There has to be:

- Strong domestic support for transition assistance
- Willingness of key and potential national stakeholders to work toward peace
- Availability of resources and partners to embark on transition assistance
- Acceptable levels of security in the country or region to jump-start transition assistance (see more on safety and security conditions at the field level in chapter 12).

The positive indicators related to where and when to jump-start assistance can only be determined by actively liaising with key internal and external actors, through regular communication, meetings and field missions. These indicators should be assessed much more rapidly for transitions than they are for normal development situations.

### Preparedness Stage

Agencies that support transition assistance must ensure that the information gleaned from analyses is part of their preparedness planning process. As analyses indicate that a peace process may be initiated, that progress has been made and peace is anticipated, the opportunity exists to begin transition assistance. Therefore resources devoted to preparedness activities for transition programming should increase. Overall preparedness actions include:

- Training and other capacity building of staff in the skills required to implement each component of the approach to planning and implementing transition assistance.
- Putting into place the resources required to support preparedness plans, such as staff, logistical arrangements (rental of accommodations, office space, vehicles) administrative arrangements (plans and Terms of Reference for hiring local staff, banking arrangements, agreements with local government on terms of operating in the country.)
- Continuously collecting information for situation and detailed assessments (see chapter 1, section 1.3 on "conflict analysis").
- Screening potential implementing partners, especially national NGOs with which international organizations are unacquainted.
- Working towards integrated planning, that is, collaboration with other assistance actors.

Many organizations have information collection and preparedness planning systems. For example, a "Watching Brief" is used as a monitoring tool by the World Bank to keep track of socio-economic developments in conflict and post-conflict countries by collecting critical macro-economic and socio-economic statistics. This assists the Bank to prepare timely and effective strategies to support post-conflict interventions when normal lending operations are resumed. While most organizations collect this information and utilize it in their own systems, sharing of information is not common. Participatory and integrated planning is initially more resource intensive but creates a streamlined approach which ensures a more effective use of resources longer term. As soon as practical, the information obtained needs to become part of the situation and conflict analysis.

## 10.1.2 Situation and Conflict Analyses

In designing transition assistance, there are two critical stages for undertaking assessments. The first stage is the earliest opportunity where it appears that a successful intervention might be possible. This is the situation analysis, or full conflict analysis, which includes mapping the situation, actor analysis and a "capacities for peace analysis", as described in chapter 1, section 1.3. The second critical stage occurs after an analysis has indicated an intervention is needed and the decision is made to begin assistance projects. At this stage, more information is needed in order to better define the scope and nature of the assistance. This is the detailed assessment (see section 10.1.5 below).

**Situation and Conflict Analysis**

Situation analysis (also known as initial reconnaissance) is the immediate estimate of the impact of a conflict. A situation and conflict analysis, sometimes only called "conflict analysis" (see chapter 1, section 1.3) is normally carried out at the earliest opportunity to determine the extent and nature of the conflict's effects, locations of critical need and the operating status of lifelines and critical facilities. It is also needed to evaluate which sectors are priorities and in what sequence activities need to be undertaken.

JICA has developed an approach to peacebuilding assistance that is based on the results of a Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (PNA). The first step of this assessment methodology is a situation analysis (see chapter 2, diagram 2.4).

If the country undergoing transition is one in which external development actors have been active, then those agencies present may choose to take a leading role in a situation and conflict analysis or be an active collaborator in a joint assessment process. If, however, they have not

been present before and/or during the conflict, then they will generally not be able to undertake a situation analysis quickly or satisfactorily. In those situations, organizations new to the scene should collaborate closely with organizations that were present during the conflict (see coordination, chapter 12). These organizations are often humanitarian organizations and are well-informed regarding the context of the conflict, the root causes, and the key players.

### 10.1.3 Strategic Planning

**Strategic Planning**

Strategic planning is a dynamic and continuous process that results in a strategy outlining the vision and broad objectives of assistance agencies in a transition situation. This strategy also establishes the parameters for the program plan, proposes a time frame for intervention, lays out the assumptions and describes the methods for reaching the objectives. The written strategy should be a working document that is concise and specific and produces action.

Even in the earliest stages of transition assistance, organizations should develop a coherent set of specific, easily understood strategic objectives (which should be quantifiable where possible and appropriate) that meet the most vital transition needs, and then mobilize resources to those ends. The strategic plan begins with a vision statement that describes where the agency wants to go, what it wants to achieve and what success will look like at the end of the program. It describes an overarching view and purpose for the assistance as a whole and should include an exit strategy. A full stakeholder analysis and inclusion of national counterparts in the strategic discussions are vital for developing a strategic vision that is on target.

Strategic planning processes can be rigid and time consuming but, in a transition situation, the process must remain flexible, fast and simple to implement (see section 10.2 below). The basic elements of every strategic planning process include: mission/mandate and goals, needs and situation assessment, strategic objectives, outcome measures, strategies on how to achieve the objectives, and performance monitoring. Each of these must remain flexible to best respond to emerging needs.

Diagram 10.2 represents how these six elements relate to each other. Arrows indicate the general sequence of the elements, but planners often find themselves re-examining elements that have already been drafted. Thus, the steps can be repetitive (or iterative) and the process becomes truly "continuous."

***Diagram 10.2: Strategic Planning Cycle***

## Element 1: Mission/Mandate and Goals

The *mission/mandate* is the starting point for determining a response in any transition situation. The mission statement is usually produced in an organization's headquarters by senior management.

G*oals* describe the general results, or outcomes, the organization intends to achieve. Goals focus externally, showing the intended impact on the target population. V*alues* describe other issues and principles important to the organization. For example, the organization may decide that implementing partners should include the participation of a cross section of the target population in project planning.

## Element 2: Situation Analysis and Needs Assessment

An analysis of the assessment results is necessary in order to:

1. Decide whether or not the agency will launch an assistance program.
2. Identify where the strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats lie in order to determine how the assistance will support the agency's overall objectives (see annex 10.1 for a description of the SWOT analysis).
3. Identify what resources are available within the country and what resources need to be brought in.
4. Define the goals of the agency's intervention.
5. Develop the strategic objectives of the intervention and the outcome measures.
6. Design the strategies, that is, the approaches or implementation methodologies for the intervention.

Post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) are normally carried out by national authorities together with multi- and bilateral agencies. They tend to focus on short-term and mid-term recovery priorities and determine financial requirements based on a long-term vision. See chapter 2, section 2.3.2 for more detailed information on PCNAs. A strategic situation analysis must also include in-house considerations, such as:

- Whether there are in-house resources and expertise to provide the type of assistance required
- Whether it is possible to put together resources and expertise to provide the assistance required rapidly
- If the existing resources and expertise complement or respond to specific needs rather than result in duplication and overlap
- How existing resources and expertise can be maximized through coordination and partnerships (see more detailed information in chapter 12).

## Element 3: Strategic Objectives

Strategic objectives describe the major functions and operations of the organization in all sectors and program areas and ideally will also state the intended results, outcomes or effects expected from the organization's program intervention. These objectives should contribute to advancing the organization's mission in the direction indicated by the mission, mandate and value statements. (See also the discussion in a following section of this chapter regarding setting objectives for program planning.)

## Element 4: Outcome Measures

An outcome measure is a standard used to measure success in achieving a strategic objective. It measures how well the organization is doing. An outcome measure is a tool, or indicator, used to assess the actual impact of the organization's activities. (Indicators are discussed in more detail in chapter 11, section 11.4.5.) These standards and indicators can assist the organization to respond appropriately with specific program objectives and monitor performance and progress towards the objectives.

### Element 5: Strategies

Strategies are approaches or implementation methodologies that will lead to achieving a strategic objective. They are descriptions of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, including a description of the operational process and all resources needed, such as human, technical, equipment and financial. In most situations, there are many approaches to implement any one strategic objective. It is the program planner's responsibility to evaluate these options and to select the one that will be most effective for meeting the organization's criteria. Planning for and implementing entrance and exit strategies is an important element in achieving the overall strategic objectives (see section 10.1.4 and section 10.1.10 below).

### Element 6: Program and Situation Monitoring

A strategic plan, or an overall operations plan, should outline how programs and situations will be monitored and how frequently this monitoring should be done. Monitoring is discussed in more detail in chapter 11.

## 10.1.4 Entrance Strategies

Planning a concrete entrance strategy will be predicated on the considerations outlined above, taking into account place, time and resources, partnerships, benefits to stakeholders and feasibility. There are several operational approaches that need to be incorporated for adequate entrance strategies. Table 10.1 below shows the key questions external actors need to answer:

**Table 10.1: Operational Approaches to Jump-Starting Transition Assistance**

| Decision-Making Checklist | Alternative or Combined Set of Options |
|---|---|
| Which activity should be supported in view of the wide range of needs? | ▪ Consensus building and coordination on the preparation of broad-based transition strategies<br>▪ Support to sectoral activities identified in the transition strategy:<br>- Basic human needs<br>- Secure environment<br>- Democratic governance<br>- Social fabrics<br>- Infrastructure<br>- Economic recovery |
| Which conduit is the most appropriate? | ▪ Single project<br>▪ Program<br>▪ Dispatch of experts/teams in support of other programs and agencies<br>▪ Financial and in-kind support to other programs and agencies (grant aid) |
| Which implementing arrangement should be used? | Direct execution<br>Joint execution with one or more internal or external actors<br>National execution (single government mode, multiple government agencies mode, steering committee mode, local NGO execution mode )<br>NGO/private company execution |

Two processes are crucial for more rapid and informed decision-making:

- An overarching transitional strategy (or national recovery strategy)
- A domestic absorptive capacity analysis

These will contain important information which will aid decision-making. If they have not been undertaken, they should form part of preparedness. Planning and implementing an entrance strategy is just as important as planning and implementing an exit strategy. See section 10.1.10 for a discussion of exit strategies.

## 10.1.5 Detailed Assessment

**Detailed Assessment**

A detailed assessment is an information collection process to determine needs, set priorities for action and provide data for program planning.

### *Diagram 10.3: The Assessment Process*




Assessments are essential for external actors to understand the transition situation. An assessment helps ensure an efficient and appropriate response that avoids gaps and duplication of services, and provides baseline data for further monitoring.

The assessment process is a cycle that begins with identifying the information that needs to be collected and the resources required to collect it. It requires planning of how, when, and where to do the assessment. Subsequent steps include conducting a survey and data collection, analyzing and interpreting the data. The assessment results are then reported to the potential implementers and fed into the decision-making and design process. Subsequent cycles of the process will shape modifications and response activities.

There is a delicate balance between too little and too much information. Sophisticated and comprehensive surveys that require considerable time to design, conduct and analyze must be avoided. They are costly in both time and resources. The assessment process must allow organizations to assess and analyze quickly, but at the same time do so with a sufficient level of comprehensiveness for developing a program design. The following box summarizes key considerations and actions.

***Good Practices of Organizing a Detailed Assessment***

- ✓ *Plan and prepare the survey tool(s) for transition assistance in advance.*
- ✓ *Involve the impacted population and government — talk to them personally.*
- ✓ *Identify users — who wants the assessment and for what purpose?*
- ✓ *Limit scope — assess only what is required (make that clear in the terms of reference).*
- ✓ *Determine time and place — ascertain location and deadline for reporting.*
- ✓ *Choose a team experienced in assessments of transition assistance.*
- ✓ *Prepare adequate Terms of Reference (TOR) for the team members.*
- ✓ *Seek additional technical input if needed.*
- ✓ *Analyze the demographic characteristics of the population.*
- ✓ *Use simple methods for the initial assessment.*
- ✓ *Cross-check and interpret critical information.*
- ✓ *Share your results by reporting quickly.*
- ✓ *Monitor the evolving situation — things change quickly in transition situations.*

*Source*: Adapted from UNHCR Emergency Preparedness and Response Section, *Planning an Emergency Response,* (Geneva: UNHCR, March 2002). pp. 24 – 25.

### Assessment Partnerships

Organizations are increasingly working together to undertake assessments. The largest effort of organizational cooperation and collaboration is the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). The CAP is discussed in more detail in chapter 2, table 2.6.

On a less comprehensive scale, but with a greater degree of flexibility, many UN organizations are conducting joint assessment missions (JAMs). These are becoming standard operating procedure for organizations such as UNHCR and WFP who undertake JAMs for food assessments of refugee populations. UNDP and the World Bank also have agreements to undertake JAMs in specific cases, while after a disaster such as the Pacific Tsunami in 2004, virtually all UN organizations, the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank, undertook many such JAMs, but with different configurations of participating partners in each country affected by the tsunami. The structure of a JAM is illustrated in chapter 2, diagram 2.3. Coordination and partnerships at the field level are also discussed in chapter 12.

## 10.1.6 Project Planning: Objectives, Stakeholders, Activities, Budget and Workplan

This stage of designing transition assistance, which can also be called operations planning, takes place when the transition situation is secure and stable enough to begin operations, and the decision has been made to provide assistance.

Project (or operational planning) for transition assistance facilitates change from the current (violent conflict) state to some desired future (peaceful) state. Transition assistance planning must be a formalized link between the present situation and the intended results. This can be accomplished through the shared design and coordination of inputs and activities by the various stakeholders involved in the assistance.

The planning process is intended to produce an efficient and logical design (or guide) for those responding to the transition situation. It is necessary to reduce the possible response actions to those that will be most efficient and effective for the specific situation. The planner is responsible not for simply defining what *should* be done but for planning what actually *can* be done, given the resources, capacities, weaknesses and other constraints of the situation. Decisions need to be built upon the strategic analysis discussed in the previous section. Project planning builds upon the strategic plan. Many of the steps of strategic planning are refined for this stage.

### Objectives

**Objectives**

Objectives are **clear, concise, measurable statements** of desired performance, conditions under which performance is to occur, and the standard or level of performance that will be considered acceptable. The objectives describe the desired result or impact of the program activity and not the process.

The first step in the planning process is to set objectives. Objectives forms the basis of an organization's actions in transition assistance. Once the overall goal has been established, objectives provide a more detailed statement of what the organization intends to achieve and serve as the rationale for the organization's presence in a country. Objectives are set as a result of the analysis and the development of planning scenarios in terms of assumptions, parameters, and constraints analysis. Objectives will also facilitate more meaningful reporting, based on what has been achieved rather than how funds have been spent. The SMART criteria described below are a useful way to define objective.

**Objectives should be SMART**

| Properties | Definition |
|---|---|
| **S**pecific | Objectives reflect those things the project intends to change, avoiding objectives that are largely subject to external influence. |
| **M**easurable and unambiguous | Objectives must be precisely defined so that their measurement and interpretation is unambiguous. They should involve objective, not subjective data so that they can be measured independent of who is collecting the data. |
| **A**ttainable and sensitive | Objectives should be achievable by the project and therefore sensitive to changes the project intends to make. |
| **R**elevant | Objectives must be relevant to the project in question. |
| **T**ime bound | Objectives should describe by when a certain change is expected. |

***Good Practices of Establishing Objectives***

- ✓ ***Link objectives*** *to an overall strategic plan for transition assistance.*
- ✓ *Explore a* ***range of implementation tactics*** *in order to determine which approach will have the most impact.*
- ✓ ***Collaborate with partners/stakeholders*** *to identify program objectives (see also chapter 12 on coordination). Involving partner agencies in setting objectives can bring several benefits including: (1) better quality objectives because of the wider experience of the whole group, (2) commitment to the agreed objectives, and (3) broader awareness of the objectives of the plan.*

**Example:** An objective for a water sector project in a transition situation.

*The objective is to restore water systems to pre-war levels of service within one year with the primary objective of the activity being to reduce water-related morbidity and mortality rates. A secondary objective is to promote self-reliance and self-sufficiency among the affected populations. Therefore, a component of the restoration will include the re-establishment of water committees which will create fee-for-service mechanisms and technical training in maintenance and repair.*

Such an objective provides meaningful guidance to specialists or program officers working on program planning in the water sector.

## Stakeholders

A successful program design process includes the involvement of its stakeholders, especially in transition situations. The stakeholders include not only the bilateral agencies, implementing partner(s) and the target population of the program, but also populations indirectly impacted by the program who stand to gain or lose from it. They include commercial interests, political parties, representatives of civil society and former combatants or adversaries. Bi- and multilateral agencies need a process that brings these stakeholders together to collectively identify transition assistance needs and to agree on the priorities of these needs and the mechanisms of project implementation that are of concern to this body.

### Activities

Transition assistance projects may need to be conceptualized and described differently than development projects, as the working environment is likely to be less well known and defined. Key considerations are that they:

- Contribute toward achieving the overall project goals and objectives
- Can be modified to best meet evolving needs.

**Budget**

Key considerations in the design of budgets for transition assistance projects are that they:

- Identify the cost components of administrative and human resource support; such as personnel salaries and benefits, consultants, travel, equipment, space rent, vehicle purchase and operation, direct costs such as office supplies and printing, and indirect costs of overhead.
- Allow for greater than normal flexibility in reallocating budget line items as shifts in needs and priorities occur.
- Include transparent and adequate procedures for record keeping that are not bureaucratically demanding but that establish, from the beginning of the project, expectations for full accountability.

**Workplan**

Key considerations in the design of workplans for transition assistance projects are that they:

- Are realistic in terms of accommodating the typical constraints of transition environments, such as: inoperable infrastructure, lack of banking systems, security limitations, and low capacity of institutions.
- Are developed with the participation of all concerned parties.
- Establish dates for completion of milestones that are monitored regularly to determine if modifications are required.

## 10.1.7 Selecting an Implementing Partner

Because transitional situations are non-predictable, external actors need to be creative and flexible in selecting an implementing partner. The selection process also needs to be more stringent than in a development situation. Many organizations have lost capacity and resources in the conflict and new organizations spring up without a track record. Bilateral agencies need to be confident that they are working with qualified, competent and trustworthy agencies. An analysis of organizational capacity and competence therefore may be appropriate. On the other hand, new local organizations may hold considerable promise as organizations to support, contributing toward the goal of capacity building and institution building. Therefore, an analysis of organizational capacity also needs to be flexible regarding this objective.

Criteria for deciding which agency should be chosen to implement a project are listed in annex 10.2. Partnerships between organizations are discussed in chapter 12 (coordination). Integrated planning processes involving all relevant external actors in-country and led by the UN Country Team (UNCT) are now often the norm.

## 10.1.8 Implementation and Transition Assistance Management

Implementation and the management of transition assistance for each relevant sector have been described in some detail chapters 5-9 of this handbook. In transition situations, implementation and assistance management must assure robust links between the assistance and the rebuilding of local institutions. The core challenge is to balance immediate reconstruction priorities with long-term institutional development. The most important recommendation is to tailor the design and sequencing of financing and coordination of assistance to the circumstances of the specific case.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Use your assistance to **encourage government capacity building** and facilitate local initiative as much as possible, particularly in the area of strategic planning.*
- ✓ *Be **proactive in communication** to deflate early unrealistic expectations and the ensuing erosion of public support.*

- ✓ *Set up a tight **timetable of political and economic progress**, with appropriate benchmarks, to maintain momentum and focus.*
- ✓ *Acknowledge that the **divergence between the political timetable and the reconstruction timetable** is normal but needs to be recognized in order to be bridged. In cases when the UN exercises civilian authority and serves as de facto government, it is especially necessary for the donors and the UN to reach early and clear understandings of each other's roles and responsibilities.*
- ✓ *Set **public management standards and sound policies**, which are key for sustainable fiscal and institutional development. Be aware that in high-profile cases, efforts to do so can be frustrated by external pressures to keep the money flowing. Reasoned firmness by the donor, through judicious use of its resources, has a chance to prevent excessive expansion of governmental structures and erosion of standards of transparency, integrity, accountability and the rule of law—but only if there is a general consensus on policy direction and the donor community coalesces around those standards.*
- ✓ *A large diaspora can be a human and financial asset, but a **balance between "outsider nationals" and "insider nationals" is important** for sustainability. Be mindful of external agencies' natural bias in favor of the "outsiders" and try to correct it.*
- ✓ *Exercise caution to **avoid inadvertently discouraging existing NGO** activities and local structures through use of the reconstruction assistance. This is necessary because post-conflict reconstruction is inherently a top down affair. Beyond protecting what exists, donors should aggressively encourage the recipient government to incorporate into the reconstruction program the contribution of local communities, and of the local and international NGOs that have been laboring in conflict areas for years.*

*Source:* Adapted from Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore, *Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations*, CPR Working Papers No. 6, Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, (Washington, DC: World Bank, June 2003).

## 10.1.9 Monitoring and Evaluation

Field practitioners monitor transition assistance projects to determine if progress is being made toward the intended outputs and impact. Where monitoring reveals a gap between the implementation plan and the reality on the ground, then it may be necessary to modify the implementation plan. Evaluations are critical to learning the lessons of the experience in an effort to improve future performance. The principles and practice of monitoring and evaluation are described in chapter 11.

## 10.1.10 Planning and Implementing an Exit Strategy

**Exit Strategy**

An exit strategy is a sound approach toward the termination or substantial reduction of transition assistance, with the gradual hand-over of responsibilities to governments and other authorities, paving the way for more traditional development cooperation.

The way in which operations are terminated can have a significant impact that lingers long after transition assistance has ended. Even now, however, some external actors do not plan their exit. Others have an exit plan, but because their strategy is not revised, the exit strategy is no longer viable. Such unprepared termination of transition assistance has negative effects on national recovery plans and their beneficiaries that can, in the worst case, even play a role in reviving conflict.

## Types of Exit Strategies

Transitions are complex non-linear processes that involve military, political, humanitarian and development actors (see chapter 1, box 1.3). Thus, termination or the substantive reduction of several transition-related projects and programs may take place throughout the transition phase. For example,

- The military and political actors' exit strategies depend on the improvement of the security and political situation in the transition country.
- The humanitarian agencies' exit strategies rely on and are closely linked to the development aid agencies' entrance strategies.
- Development aid agencies, carrying out transition assistance, phase out such assistance in favor of more traditional development cooperation activities, which may mean to other departments within their own agencies or to other development aid agencies.
- An organization may close down a project or program, or may close down its entire operation at the country level.

## How Long to Remain and When to Exit

Influential factors that can help decide when to remain and when to exit include:

- The extent to which the objectives of the transition assistance were met (evaluation is crucial to decide on the right time to exit - see chapter 11).
- The roles assumed (or to be assumed) by other national and international development actors as well as the degree of self-reliance of beneficiaries for the sustainability of the transition assistance in question.
- The overall politico-military considerations surrounding the broader transition assistance framework – this will also influence the exit strategies of development aid agencies supporting such broader transition endeavors.

Taking these factors into consideration, a coherent exit strategy must be defined from the start. This also means that it must be:

- Integrated into the design of transition assistance
- Constantly reviewed and adjusted to changing transitions contexts
- Designed in coordination with key stakeholders, be they internal or external actors at the community, provincial and national levels.

## How to Facilitate Exit Strategies

There are also secondary considerations that can facilitate exit strategies if integrated in the design of transition assistance. These are:

- Capacity building of internal actors, systems and institutions, including in the field of planning, strategic thinking, and analysis.
- The increasing involvement of internal actors/gradual devolution of responsibilities to internal actors.
- Absorption of recurrent costs related to the transition assistance into local and national budgets.
- Early phasing in of development considerations into transitional activities.
- A broad and inclusive consultation process with the direct beneficiaries.

Box 10.1 shows how the United Nations Mine Action Center implemented an exit strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Box 10.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mine Action Exit Strategy**

Even though all entities' armies were requested to remove mines, exchange minefield records and conduct marking in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, it soon became clear that this was just the beginning of the mine action work necessary in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The urgency and complexity of the work prompted the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to request the United Nations to establish a mine action structure.

The United Nations Mine Action Center (UNMAC) was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 with the support of UNDP. This marked a shift from military to humanitarian demining. In addition to creating mine action capacity, the driving force behind UNMAC was its willingness to establish a national structure to take the lead of the mine action process in the country. To this end, UNMAC worked closely with the Entities to create the necessary consensus and encouraged the hiring and training of local personnel.

The gradual draw-down of UN staff paved the way for the full transfer of UNMAC to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998, which was formalized by the Law on the Establishment of Entity Mine Action Centers and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center. To facilitate this event, a Government Liaison Office was established in UNMAC. Other initiatives to maximize national capacity in mine action included *inter alia*: continued technical and financial assistance from UNDP, enactment of a national law on demining in 2002; and obtaining a commitment by the government to directly support the mine action program by financing staff salaries.

*Source:* Adapted from Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center website, www.bhmac.org.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Prepare beneficiaries throughout implementation for what to expect*** *when transition assistance ends and more traditional development cooperation projects begin.*
- ✓ ***Engage beneficiaries in discussing impacts*** *and planning termination and hand-over of transitional assistance.*
- ✓ ***Communicate exit plans*** *to beneficiaries well – choose language carefully and show progress achieved to justify closure.*
- ✓ *Do not waste* ***infrastructure*** *built for particular projects during transitions –* ***find creative ways of integrating*** *it in hand-over strategies to governments and local communities.*
- ✓ *Carefully* ***assess*** *the* ***best hand-over strategy*** *– whether the government, a local NGO or a community take over – and arrange for them to be supported by development aid agencies.*
- ✓ ***Ensure*** *that the termination and* ***hand-over will not create gaps*** *in the fulfillment of needs.*

## *10.2 Operational Flexibility: An Implementation Requirement*

The highly volatile environment of transition situations brings enormous challenges to development aid agencies that once provided mainly technical cooperation assistance. Such agencies have to operate with much greater agility in transitions than their internal policies and procedures usually permit.

Even when organizations with traditional development experience have taken or are taking official steps to enhance their response capacity in transitions, field practitioners will inevitably come across policies, procedures and practices that prevent them from establishing prompt transition assistance. They will have to rely on a great deal of common sense and innovation to act pragmatically and expeditiously. Thus, operational flexibility is a key element of good transition assistance implementation.

**Operational Flexibility**

Operational flexibility can be defined as suppleness and agility in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation without sacrificing on the quality of transition assistance. Operational flexibility presupposes capacity to:

4. Seize "windows of opportunity" rapidly
5. Readjust to meet rapidly changing local needs
6. Readjust to unexpected circumstances.

Policies, procedures and practices that work well in development programming, administration and finance severely limit the flexibility to quickly adapt to the changing circumstances and highly volatile conditions found in transition environments. This recurrent problem has led many development aid agencies to create new structures or adapt their existing institutional structures, operational policies and funding mechanisms to meet the demands of transition situations (see chapter 2, section 2.2).

Development aid agencies have also extended these reforms at the operational level. There are some widely recognized measures that greatly improve operational flexibility in transitions.

## Pillars of Operational Flexibility

Operational flexibility in transitions requires development aid agencies to ensure or establish:

- Early field presence or assessment missions to utilize the "windows of opportunity" that open as transition triggers occur.
- More decentralized decision making and financing or delegation of authority to the field to accelerate transition assistance approval. (This may, however, depend on the context.)
- Transition-tailored design of assistance, that is, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation procedures and practices that are well-suited to respond to transitions (see previous section 10.1).
- Procedures that allow for the periodic adjustment of programs and projects to respond to fast moving transition contexts. (This should be done carefully not to undermine the credibility of transition assistance through ad hoc and frequent changes.).
- Special budgetary reserves, financial mechanisms or funds for quick response and procurement (see box 10.2, which shows the budget line Norway created specifically to address transitions).
- Mechanisms for rapid deployment and staffing, such as personnel rosters and stand-by arrangements which are accompanied by specific training.

**Box 10.2: Norway: Budget Line – Transitional Assistance**

Budget line no. 162.70 entitled Transitional Assistance was introduced in 2002 to cover assistance to countries and areas recovering from conflict and natural disasters. The constitutional responsibility for transitional assistance lies with the Minister of International Development. The Department for Bilateral Affairs of the MFA has the overall budget responsibility, while NORAD administers the funds, and is consulted in the drafting of the budget. Transitional assistance was introduced against the background of difficulties in finding resources for this type of development cooperation; institutionally and financially it fell between the traditional long-term development assistance and the more short-term humanitarian experience. Experiences from the field revealed that the time-span between the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance from a country, and the initiation of long-term development cooperation, was often too long. A flexible system of financing was therefore needed to reward and support active peace processes and reconstruction work.

*Source:* Adapted from Royal Norwegian Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, *Norwegian Peacebuilding Policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead*, Evaluation Report 2/2004, p. 11 and 12.

## Pervasive Inadequacies

Despite a consensus among development agencies about the need for operational flexibility, not all of them may have revised their policies and procedures to better respond to transition situations. Even where such attempts have been undertaken, newly adopted policies and procedures may not be efficient because of difficulties associated with changing institutional cultures. The following shortcomings may be common within one's own agency or in partner agencies:

- Delays in program and project approvals and release of adequate levels of funding
- Slow procurement procedures and other bureaucratic procedures
- Cumbersome reporting requirements that overtake more urgent program and project activities
- Ill-adapted evaluation procedures that penalize rather than reward flexibility
- Incomplete teams due to the difficulty of recruiting well-qualified international staff and high staff turnover given the physical and emotional challenges related to working in transitions
- Colleagues and interlocutors who are not suited to working in transition situations

Providing transition assistance efficiently and effectively can be challenging in spite of good intentions. Field practitioners are constantly challenged to find creative ways to overcome operational obstacles.

## Overcoming Obstacles

Overcoming operational obstacles requires a great deal of individual flexibility as well as institutional efforts to establish flexibility. Experience has shown that field practitioners working in transitions have to be able to absorb and adapt to flexible working practices, such as:

- Innovative use of available resources
- Improvise as necessary
- Willingness to take calculated risks

Recognizing the importance of achieving operational flexibility to respond more efficiently and effectively to transitions, development aid agencies are becoming more likely to reward such flexible responses in lieu of traditional performance monitoring. Such operational flexibility, however, needs to be balanced against other equally important values such as accountability, strategic coherence, local ownership, capacity building and sustainability. These values often constrain or limit operational flexibility because they are necessarily time-consuming and difficult to achieve. Box 10.3 shows how JICA has been careful to consider strategic coherence in transitions.

**Box 10.3: JICA's Fast Track Mechanism for Transitions**

Recognizing that transition assistance has to be implemented more rapidly and more flexibly than in normal development situations, JICA created a "fast track" mechanism that simplifies internal procedures and allows for quicker responses. An important characteristic of this mechanism is that it recognizes the importance of acting faster and simultaneously ensures an overall strategic vision for transition assistance. The fast-track procedure thus includes a strategic assessment at the outset together with due consideration given for speed in the decision-making process.

The challenge for field practitioners and their agencies is therefore to achieve optimum levels of flexibility without compromising on these other core values that tend to limit flexibility.

**Good Practices**

- ✓ *Be **willing to risk circumventing long-ingrained bureaucratic obstacles** to get the job done, but **do not take the need for flexibility too far**. This will lead to lack of accountability and disregard for other core values, which can cause more harm than good.*
- ✓ ***Borrow and adapt successful response strategies** and techniques from other bilateral and multilateral agencies, but **exercise caution and common sense.** Do not export flexible response tactics that may be inappropriate in a new setting.*

## General Lessons on Planning and Implementing Transition Assistance

- ✓ Planning requires a balance between fast action and risk. Responding rapidly may be critical to prevent instability. Yet the risk of failure is great if one does not take the time to plan sufficiently. The challenge is thus to address critical needs while minimizing problems and side effects.
- ✓ Fast action without sufficient planning can lead to implementation problems, such as a lack of capacity to sustain action, logistical/equipment problems or limited organizational capacity. There might also be concerns about high and recurring costs. Continued use of planning tools (for example, analysis, strategy development, problem solving and monitoring) during implementation, however, can minimize these problems.
- ✓ The institutional capacity of the development aid agency to support the transition in question needs careful assessment. The existence of resources and expertise, capacity and flexibility of response, capacity to respond to needs rather than create duplication, and the capacity to partner to maximize resources are all factors to be considered during the planning process.
- ✓ Agency staff tend to focus on their own organization's mandate and operational activities, and do not always see the benefits of working together with others. Key obstacles can be differences in planning cycles, competition for resources or desired visibility, and the unwillingness to put resources into an integrated planning process. Yet integrated planning has proven to be most effective in addressing the challenging needs of transition societies. Integrated planning requires all partners to be fully involved in the planning process from the outset.
- ✓ Ownership of the process by internal actors; integrated planning; commitment by agencies and by donors to provide timely financial and political support to transition strategies; and participation in the planning and implementation process by relevant internal actors, such as NGOs or local groups are key factors in the successful planning and implementing of transition assistance.
- ✓ There may be a need to train government authorities and local communities in strategic planning (prioritization of resources, monitoring, evaluation, assessment, etc.).
- ✓ Each project needs to be linked to a strategic view of the global needs of a population and consistent with the vision and objectives; otherwise the project may not be as effective as it could have been.
- ✓ A clear policy on the duration of transition programs is desirable. Such a policy addresses how exit strategies could facilitate phasing out or down in the most efficient manner and specifies what roles and responsibilities remain for the external actor.
- ✓ Operational flexibility must be pursued without compromising on accountability, strategic coherence, local ownership, capacity building and sustainability.

## Resources

DFID, *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*, January 2005, 28 p.

InterWorks, *Monitoring and Evaluation Workshop for US State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration*, (Washington, D.C. August 1997) 7 p.

Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore, *Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations*, CPR Working Papers No. 6, Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, (Washington, DC: World Bank, June 2003) 59 p.

Sphere Project, *Sphere Project Training Manual, The Project Cycle*, (Geneva: Sphere Project, May 2000).

United Nations, *No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2001/394, 20 April 2001, 13 p.

United Nations Development Programme **(**UNDP), *Institutional Flexibility in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations – Best Practices from the Field*, Evaluations Office, 2004, 74 p.

United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*, August 2004, 41 p and Annex, 171 p.

U.S. Agency for International Development, *Fragile States Strategy,* (Washington DC: USAID, January 2005) 18 p.

USAID/OTI, *Guide to Program Options in Conflict-Prone Settings*, September 2001, 43 p.

## *Annex 10.1: SWOT Analysis Tool*

One approach to arriving at the realistic set of opportunities and obstacles for any given response is called **S**trengths/**W**eaknesses/**O**pportunities/**T**hreats or **SWOT** analysis. This analysis can be thought of as having two general areas of concern: internal and external. Internal factors (the strengths and weaknesses) relate to the human and organizational capacities and limitations of the target population, JICA, partner agencies, government counterparts, and other actors involved in the response. External factors are the opportunities and barriers (threats) presented by the external environment within which all of these partners must act. A comprehensive internal/external SWOT analysis should be undertaken in order to ground the plan in the realities governing the transition situation, including those under the assistance organization's control and those beyond the organization's control. The diagram below is a simplified depiction of a SWOT analysis including both internal and external factors.



# *Annex 10.2: Criteria for Selecting an Implementing Partner*

1 Evaluate the **management capacity** of the organization. Does it have:

- **Capacity to plan**?
  - Does it have a strategic plan that leads toward a vision laid out by top management?
  - Does it have clear objectives for the organization's activities?
  - Is the organization flexible in its planning process, can plans be readily amended to cope with changes in the operating environment? (A comparison of the organization's past project proposals with its project performance reports – status, completion and impact reports – should give a good indication of its capacity to formulate clear, realistic objectives, and to amend them over time if necessary.)
- **Sound organizing function?** This is assessed by a review of the organization's structure, staff, and information management systems.
  - Is there a clear organizational chart with logical departmental layout and clarity of the lines of authority within the organization?
  - Are there clear departmental roles and responsibilities, with the authority to carry out those responsibilities? (A review of the minutes of the organization's board of directors meetings is useful in identifying top management priorities, roles, responsibilities and allocations of authority.)
  - Do the staff have clear role definitions? (The assistance organization should review the descriptions for those positions involved in the activities funded by the organization. Well conceptualized job descriptions are a good indication of a developed organizing capacity.)
- **Capacity to produce and disseminate needed information?**
  - Does the organization present its information in a clear, logical manner in easy-to-read reports which are useful to the assistance organization, top management and other users?
  - Does the organization produce needed reports in a timely manner and on an as-needed basis? (A review of project performance reports is a useful means of understanding the organizing capacity. Do they include management tools such as logical frameworks, Critical Path Analysis charts, Gantt charts, project calendars or the findings from statistical samples?)
- **Sound controlling functions?**
  - How closely are managers involved in the daily operation of the organization?
  - What is their capacity to determine whether or not systems are operating satisfactorily? (Managerial control systems are generally used to collect, classify and accumulate information, including project finance/budget performance and information. The assessment should attempt to ensure that the formal procedures to do so exist, are communicated to staff, and actually implemented by the organization).
  - What financial control mechanisms exist? Of all the controlling functions, financial control may be the most important. Key questions include:
    - What is the control environment, that is, do the staff understand the need for and importance of executing and maintaining good financial controls?
    - Is the management involved in the daily financial operations of the organization?
    - Is there an accounting policies and procedures manual? If so, is it used and followed?

        - Is there an appropriate segregation of duties, that is, are the various tasks necessary to complete financial transactions performed by separate people to maintain a coordinated system of checks and balances?
        - Are there sound record-keeping and information management systems in place, that is, does the capacity to collect, classify, and accumulate financial information clearly exist?
        - Is the financial reporting system adequate, that is, does the organization's financial management system produce concise, comprehensive, simple and straightforward reports on a timely basis?
    - Are there periodic, independent reviews of the control system?
    - Is there a good budgetary control system in place to prevent project implementers from (1) incurring obligations in excess of planned amounts and (2) drawing down cash in excess of immediate needs?
    - How well does the organization take corrective action, that is, how has the organization in the past attempted to deal with errors or abuse when discovered?

2 Evaluate the **technical soundness** of the organization to implement projects in the transition environment. Key issues to determine:

- Does the proposal demonstrate a thorough understanding of the assistance organization's mandate and the nature of the work it performs?
- Does the proposal have a proven in-depth knowledge of the most critical issues and themes related to transition assistance?
- Does the proposal present a sound Plan of Action?
    - Does it provide an overall framework for action?
    - Have the individual activities necessary to meet the program objectives been adequately identified?
    - Is there a realistic timetable for implementation?
    - Will the Plan of Action become a useful monitoring tool?
- Does the proposal have a well considered budget?
    - Does the budget serve as an accurate checklist that ensures all costs are considered?
    - Is the budget an adequate framework for considering all of the resources that will be needed to complete the project?
    - Does the budget reflect efficient use of resources by considering the likely cost of the approach taken?

3 Evaluate the **ethical soundness** of the organization to implement projects in the transition environment. Key issues to determine:

- Does the organization have a record of unethical business or contracting performance?
- Does the organization have any known links to criminal organizations or black market activity?
- Does the organization have a current or former affiliation with a political or other partisan group that would compromise its effectiveness?

# Chapter 11
# Monitoring and Evaluation

## Chapter Objectives

- Provide an overview of monitoring and evaluation in transitions (why it is critical and the challenges involved).
- Explain both monitoring and evaluation.
- Describe evaluation approaches and tools.
- Discuss the design process for conducting monitoring and evaluation.

## Introduction

Planning and implementing is discussed in chapter 10. Without monitoring and evaluation the project cycle would not be complete. They are vital components. Monitoring activities are necessary to make effective day-to-day management decisions and to communicate with stakeholders. Implementing evaluation results will increase the general efficiency and effectiveness of ongoing and future programs.

Field practitioners in transition environments experience considerable pressures to implement programs quickly and flexibly. These pressures, however, do not diminish the need to implement high-quality monitoring and evaluation activities; rather, the effectiveness of these programs relies on high-quality monitoring and evaluation.

Although recently the *Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)* has analyzed monitoring and evaluation practices in humanitarian action, there is no equivalent analysis of monitoring and evaluation in transition situations. This may be due to the fact that transition, as a distinct phase, is still very new. Therefore a common understanding among field practioners of monitoring and evaluation specifically for transition situations does not yet exist. Presently, transition monitoring and evaluation borrows from both humanitarian and development tools and approaches.

In general, external actors have not been diligent in putting the theories of monitoring and evaluation into practice, which has weakened program impact. Field practitioners should take responsibility to attain the highest standards in monitoring and evaluation and ensure that the activities are consistently planned, implemented, documented and shared. In this way, field practitioners can make valuable contributions, not only to their own program impacts, but to the global understanding of transitions.

## 11.1 Overview

### Importance of Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation in transition environments are important activities to provide feedback for project management. In addition, monitoring and evaluation activities are critical in order to capture lessons learned and to reinforce accountability.

**Providing feedback for project management.** As transitions progress, changes will take place in political and societal contexts. Program objectives and activities will need to take these changes into account if they are to be effective. For example, as new laws are put into place or authorities are elected, activities may change to reflect the laws and support the new authorities. Field practitioners will also need to be attuned to new programs and new approaches, and must monitor changes closely.

**Promoting lessons learned.** Learning is particularly important for transitional societies as they are vulnerable to falling back into conflict. As lessons are collected and shared through

monitoring and evaluation, both external and internal actors should ensure that these lessons are incorporated into programs and projects and aim for positive behavior changes as a result. Organizational and personal learning through monitoring and evaluation has been shown to measurably improve performance and enhance accountability. Taking the time to routinely document lessons and good practices can exponentially contribute to global, national and personal understanding. Not taking the time to do so, will result in repetition of mistakes and wasted resources.

**Reinforcing accountability.** Transparency is critical to help win public support and understanding, particularly for projects in transitions. Transitional government agencies, however, may not be fully operational and typical modes of accountability such as the press, police and legal systems may not be functioning. The public, both internally and externally, may be skeptical regarding transitional processes so heightened vigilance in monitoring and evaluation is needed to assure support.

## Challenges and Possible Responses

Frameworks used for monitoring and evaluation in development and humanitarian assistance are useful but must be modified given the transition challenges. The important methodological and strategic differences are the need to enhance speed of data analysis and incorporation into project design, the need to vary data collection methods and mechanisms and the need to establish new baselines and foundations.

**Enhance speed of data analysis and incorporation into project design**

- Intensify monitoring, particularly situation monitoring (see box 11.1 below)
- Use joint and participatory evaluations more frequently
- Monitor process and outcomes, as well as impact

**Vary data collection methods and mechanisms**

- Use both qualitative and quantitative data
- Use secondary data more frequently
- Work in close partnership with other organizations to collect and analyze data, especially baseline data
- Use internal as well as external evaluators

**Establish new baselines and foundations**

- Collect baseline data, vulnerability assessments and social assessments (see also the assessment tools discussed in chapter 10)
- Conduct a PCIA (Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, described in the section below)

Table 11.1 provides an overview of the effects of the transition on monitoring and evaluation and shows where field practitioners must place their emphasis.

**Table 11.1: Transition Characteristics, their Effects on Monitoring and Evaluation and Possible Responses**

| Transition Characteristics | Effect on Monitoring and Evaluation | Possible Responses |
|---|---|---|
| ▪ Loss or damage to institutional infrastructure and loss of trained personnel | ▪ Partner organizations require capacity building to conduct monitoring and evaluation | ▪ Intensify collaborative monitoring<br>▪ Use participatory evaluations |
| ▪ Weak judicial, fiscal, administrative and regulatory capacities of the state | ▪ Normal accountability mechanisms may not be reliable – monitoring and evaluation need to be strengthened | ▪ Intensify situation monitoring, real time and participatory evaluations |

**Table 11.1: Transition Characteristics, their Effects on Monitoring and Evaluation and Possible Responses**

| Transition Characteristics | Effect on Monitoring and Evaluation | Possible Responses |
|---|---|---|
| ▪ Loss of statistical databases such as population numbers, socio-economic data, etc., changes in demographics | ▪ It will be more difficult to measure changes brought about by the project in quantitative terms – more qualitative data is needed | ▪ Use of qualitative data and baseline surveys |
| ▪ Fragile peace processes and thriving cultures of violence; some groups politically excluded | ▪ Monitoring and evaluation must be undertaken with recognition of the political realities – field practitioners need to be sensitized to possible harmful effects of programs and projects | ▪ Conduct a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), enhance conflict-sensitivity (see chapter 3, section 3.2.1) |
| ▪ Elites and the military dominate government and decision making bodies | ▪ Information may be classified, conflicting or more difficult to obtain – aid agencies need to join forces to be more effective | ▪ Joint evaluations, greater use of secondary data |
| ▪ Large shadow economies outside of state control such as parallel markets or criminal activities | ▪ Monitoring and evaluation of project inputs and outputs may be more difficult or dangerous – aid agencies need to find alternatives to collect data. | ▪ Joint evaluations, greater use of secondary data |
| ▪ Security issues such as presence of weapons and landmines | ▪ People may be hard to access and fearful – special techniques may be needed and pooling of information | ▪ Joint evaluations, greater use of secondary data |
| ▪ Widespread unemployment and changes in sources of income | ▪ Vulnerability may be much more extensive – field practitioners need to be sensitized to social and economic realities | ▪ Conduct or sponsor vulnerability analysis, social assessments |
| ▪ Breakdown in social fabric and normal development processes | ▪ People may be distrustful and their behaviors hard to predict – processes will have to be carefully followed | ▪ Monitor processes and outcomes, outcome evaluations |
| ▪ Many national and international organizations working on transitional issues in a rapidly changing environment | ▪ It will be harder to distinguish impact of any one project – impact may need to be seen in terms of small incremental steps | ▪ Conduct rapid impact evaluations, outcome evaluations |

## *11.2 Monitoring*

Monitoring must be a daily concern for all field practitioners and monitoring activities must be integrated into everyday programming. Monitoring tends to receive less attention than evaluation, which may be due to a lack of clarity about what monitoring is to achieve. All field practitioners should ensure that they have an understanding of the goals of monitoring and how it is to be implemented. They should receive routine training to help them conduct effective monitoring.

**Monitoring**

Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds. Monitoring helps to verify the output, activities, input and important assumptions of the logicall framework planning tool. In essence, monitoring is the tool that tells field practitioners if they are on the right track.

*Source:* Adapted from OECD-DAC, *Evaluation Feedback for Effective Learning and Accountability, Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness*, No.5 Paris. OECD Development Assistance Committee-Working Party on Aid Evaluation. 2001

JICA promotes regular monitoring. At the onset of the project, the project team incorporates timing, issues, methods of monitoring and benchmarks to be monitored into the Plan of Operation. The actual situation related to the implementation process is carefully documented.[52] In transitions, the intensity and pace of monitoring should be augmented by the following:

- Routine visits by field practitioners to sites or offices where programs are being implemented to collect feedback from project managers and stakeholders
- Daily to weekly data collection to check that resources (human, financial and material) are being used as planned and services are delivered as planned
- Formal reporting, for example monthly or bi-monthly
- Frequent informal reporting perhaps in the form of situation reports for the benefit of all staff working on the program. Information might include results of visits to stakeholders or results of meetings.

Frequent and routine monitoring should reflect both deteriorating and improving situations as both affect the planning process. It should also note long-term effects of the past crisis as well as the progress made through transitional assistance. Some tools to gauge whether projects and programs are making an impact and are appropriate in the context include:

- ***Collection of baseline data***: Surveys to determine demographics, household economy, health status, gender roles, attitudes, knowledge and skills, etc. and subsequent checking on progress made in relation to the baseline
- ***Situation monitoring*** (see box 11.1 below)
- ***Process and outcome monitoring***: Surveys of primary stakeholders and staff to indicate perceptions of intervention performance, analysis of issues related to social processes and distribution of project inputs.

**Box 11.1: Situation Monitoring**

In addition to performance monitoring, ALNAP studies stress the importance of situation monitoring, which measures change or lack of change in a condition or a set of conditions. Situation monitoring differs from performance monitoring, which generally measures progress in achieving objectives in the implementation plan. It includes monitoring of the wider context, such as early warning monitoring or monitoring socio-economic trends and the country's policy, economic or institutional context.[53]

*Source:* Adapted from ALNAP, *Humanitarian Action: Improving Monitoring to Enhance Accountability and Learning*, (ALNAP Annual Review 2003) p. 28.

[52] See JICA's "Main Checkpoints in Monitoring" in *Guideline for Project Evaluation*, p. 139.

[53] Sources of information on situation monitoring include: FAO's Global Information Early Warning Systems, USAID's Famine Early Warning System, Save the Children UK's Household Economy Approach, World Food Programme's Vulnerability Assessment Monitoring (VAM), and monitoring conducted by numerous peacebuilding organizations and conflict early warning systems.

## Improving the Effectiveness of Monitoring

Typical problems in monitoring include task overload, already over-worked staff members, the tendency to rely on quantitative data because it seems more "safe" or is easier to collect and a reticence to report negative findings. Box 11.2 provides tips on improving the effectiveness of monitoring.

**Box 11.2: Improving the Effectiveness of Monitoring**

- Ensure adequate resources are available to cover monitoring needs
- Recruit staff with appropriate monitoring skills
- Provide routine training for staff to improve the effectiveness of monitoring
- Establish the reporting structure, to ensure that monitoring reports go "up" the system and the requirements for feedback, to ensure that information is used
- Promote a culture of openness so that reporting errors becomes a positive part of the learning process
- Prioritize information needs
- Promote joint monitoring
- Use qualitative data to promote understanding of social processes underlying the transition

*Source:* Adapted from ALNAP, *Humanitarian Action: Improving monitoring to enhance accountability and learning*, ALNAP Annual Review 2003, page 55.

Monitoring may indicate flaws in the initial design of the program or activity. This is to be expected, especially in a transition situation, where flexibility is required. It is vital that monitoring is carried out in good faith, without attempts to "whitewash" activities simply because of the investment that has been made in the program. The results of monitoring must be taken seriously and incorporated into the workings of the organization. If this means redesigning a project, it is better to begin anew than to ignore monitoring results.

From a different perspective, sometimes a sectoral assistance project underperforms in terms of its principal objective, but is sensitive to the dynamics of the transition context, its actors and capacities for peace. In this case, it may well be considered a success. Because sustainable peace is the overarching objective of assistance in a transition context, the way an agency considers the success and failure of projects requires fresh thinking.

***Good Practice***

- ✓ ***Make monitoring and evaluation part of the routine****. Outcomes, process, situation and impact monitoring must form part of daily duties and be topics of regular discussions among project managers and partners and other stakeholders. It should not only be a consideration at typical evaluation points in time.*
- ✓ ***Take monitoring results seriously*** *and act in good faith.*
- ✓ ***Involve local groups in the process of indicator development and analysis****. Participating in monitoring may help local groups to better understand program implementation and the value of their own contributions.*

## *11.3 Evaluation*

**Evaluation**

Evaluation is the process of determining the worth or significance of a development activity, policy or program. It is a systematic and impartial examination which is intended to improve policy and practice. It determines the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partners and donor.

*Source:* Adapted from OECD-DAC, *Glossary of Key Management Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, 2002, page 22.

### 11.3.1 JICA's Approach to Evaluation

JICA has developed a systematic approach to evaluation and many tools relevant to various types of evaluations.[54] While JICA's guidelines do not mention specific application to transitions, they form a basis for planning evaluation activities. The following illustrates how JICA's evaluation framework can be applied to transition assistance.

1. The **ex-ante evaluation** is conducted before a project begins and determines whether the project should be implemented. It examines the risks, threats and opportunities in the transition environment and sets out the most efficient and effective approach to project implementation. (The SWOT analysis in annex 10.1 can be a useful tool in this regard.) The ex-ante evaluation (sometimes referred to as the preliminary study or the feasibility study) is particularly critical in the transition environment due to the higher level of risks involved.[55]
2. The **mid-term evaluation** is conducted approximately halfway through the project cycle and helps to determine whether the project plan should be revised to better respond to the changing needs or to increase effectiveness.
3. The **terminal evaluation** is conducted near the end of the project cycle and determines whether the project should be completed, extended or followed up with additional cooperation.
4. An **ex-post evaluation** is conducted after the project has ended and seeks to ascertain the intended and unintended effects and the level of sustainability that was achieved. The ex-post evaluation collects the lessons that other projects and programs need to consider in the future. In transition situations, the ex-post evaluation is particularly critical, since by their nature, transition programs produce unintended results. These results may not be visible until after a certain period passes, which is often after a project has ended. (Transitions can last for more than 20 years. See chapter 1, section 1.1 for additional information on the characteristics of transitions.)

### 11.3.2 Evaluation Approaches and Tools

In addition to the above, the following tools and approaches are relevant in transition environments. These approaches can be complementary and are often more effective when combined. For example, evaluations which test outcomes may use techniques employed in participatory or real-time evaluations and may also be part of a terminal evaluation. Some of these evaluations can be managed by field practitioners themselves, without external evaluators.

[54] See *JICA Guideline for Project Evaluation*, September 2004, Office of Evaluation, Planning and Coordination Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency.
[55] See "Key Issues of Ex-ante Evaluations", in JICA. *Guideline for Project Evaluation,* (Tokyo: JICA, 2004), p. 115.

## Participatory evaluation

**Participatory Evaluation**

A participatory evaluation is one in which those entrusted with the design and delivery of a transition intervention evaluate the program. This would include stakeholders such as internal actors and local groups as well as the project managers.

**Objectives:** Participatory evaluations:

- Give a voice to local groups
- Improve collaboration among implementing partners
- Provide staff with learning opportunities
- Provide information, analysis and recommendations that can be put to immediate use

**Scope and features:** Participatory evaluation is generally a form of internal evaluation[56] but an external evaluator may help to guide the process and help participants agree on results. Participatory evaluations are very effective when combined with periodic external evaluations to gain the benefit of multiple perspectives. The range of participating groups may vary. Some evaluations may target only program providers or beneficiaries while others may include the full range of stakeholders.

**Process and Methods:** Approaches used may include lessons learned exercises and after action reviews. They are exercises undertaken right after a response is implemented for staff to assess its effectiveness. Data collection methods may be determined by the participants or in coordination with outside evaluators. One or more outside experts can serve as facilitators, supporting the process as a mentor, trainer, group processor, or negotiator.

**Expected Outcomes:** National and local initiatives are often the basis for successful transition programs. In this situation, participatory evaluation is particularly effective as the initiators are part of the evaluation process. The process has been shown to improve program performance and results indicate that program providers and beneficiaries are more likely to act on the knowledge gained.

**Necessary Resources:** A facilitator should be selected who may also be an evaluator. It is important to secure resources, such as a place to hold the planning exercise and collect and analyze data as determined in the design.

**Management and Responsibilities:** The donor agency helps the participants conduct their own evaluation thus building their ownership and commitment to results. The process should be jointly undertaken by the project manager and the counterpart (for example, the recipient government).

Box 11.3 outlines the various steps to take in conducting a participatory evaluation.

**Box 11.3: Steps in Conducting a Participatory Evaluation**

**Step 1:** Decide if a participatory evaluation approach is appropriate. Such evaluations are useful to answer questions about implementation difficulties, program effects on beneficiaries, or stakeholders' knowledge of program goals or their views of progress. Traditional evaluation approaches may be more suitable when there is a need for independent outside judgment. Participatory evaluation approaches can be blended with external evaluation.

**Step 2**: Decide on the degree of participation. Participation may be broad, with a wide array of program staff, beneficiaries, partners and others. It may, alternatively, target one or two of these groups.

**Step 3:** Prepare the evaluation scope of work. Consider the evaluation approach – the basic methods, schedule, logistics, and funding. Define the roles of the outside facilitator (if applicable) and

[56] OECD-DAC defines internal evaluation as "evaluation of a development intervention conducted by a unit and/or individuals reporting to the management of the donor, partner, or implementing organization."

participating stakeholders. As much as possible, decisions such as the evaluation questions to be addressed and the development of data collection instruments and analysis plans should be left to the participatory process rather than predetermined in the scope of work.

**Step 4:** Typically, the participatory evaluation process begins with a team meeting or workshop where the facilitator and participants build consensus on the aim of the evaluation and clarify roles and logistical and administrative issues.

**Step 5:** Conduct the evaluation. Participants define the questions; and consider the data collection skills, methods, and commitment of time and labor required. Participatory evaluations usually use rapid appraisal techniques, such as key informant interviews, focus group interviews, community group interviews, direct observation, mini-surveys and case studies. They may also include group reflection exercises such as lessons learned exercises and after action reviews.

**Step 6:** Analyze the data and build consensus on results. Once the analysis is complete, facilitators work with participants to reach consensus on findings, conclusions and recommendations. Developing a common understanding of the results, on the basis of empirical evidence, becomes the cornerstone for group commitment to a plan of action.

**Step 7:** Prepare an action plan. Facilitators work with participants to prepare an action plan to improve program performance. Empowered by knowledge, participants become agents of change and apply the lessons they have learned to improve performance.

*Source*: *Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, TIPS*, USAID Center for Development, Information and Evaluation, 1996, Number 1, Washington, D.C.: http://www.dec.org/usaid_eval/.

## Impact Evaluation (Rapid)

**Impact Evaluation (Rapid)**

Impact evaluation is the systematic identification of the effects, positive or negative, intended or not on individual households, institutions and the environment caused by a given project or program.

**Objectives:** Impact evaluation gives a better understanding of the extent to which activities reach the target groups and the magnitude of their effects on people's welfare. It is used for:

- Measuring outcomes and impacts of an activity and distinguishing these from the influence of other external factors
- Clarifying whether costs for an activity are justified
- Informing decisions on whether to expand, modify or eliminate projects
- Identifying lessons learned
- Comparing the effectiveness of alternative interventions

**Scope and Features:** Impact evaluations which involve large-scale surveys are not appropriate in transitions, unless baseline data are available. Even when baseline data are available, however, implementing a large-scale survey tends to be expensive and requires long periods of time. Small-scale rapid assessment and participatory appraisals which obtain estimates of impact are more appropriate but will not always provide clear connections between inputs and outputs.

**Process and Methods**: Two types of impact evaluations are more appropriate for transitions:

1. *Ex-post comparison of project and non-equivalent control groups* – Data are collected from project beneficiaries after the project has been implemented. A control group is assigned that did not receive project inputs. For example, the World Bank assessed the impact of micro-credit programs in Bangladesh by comparing villages with programs to villages without programs.
2. *Rapid-assessment ex-post impact evaluations* – Participatory methods (key informant, focus group and community interviews, direct observation, etc.) allow groups to identify

changes resulting from the project and who has benefited and who has not. The project strengths and weaknesses are identified. Triangulation is used to compare information from focus groups, key informants and secondary sources. Case studies may be produced to provide more in-depth understanding of the processes of change. SWOT analysis[57] is a useful tool for impact evaluations. See chapter 10, annex 10.1 for a detailed description of a SWOT analysis.

**Expected Outcomes**: This is an assessment of project impact, including assessment of who did and did not benefit and why. Expected outcomes trace impact back to project design and implementation and determine strengths and weaknesses.

**Necessary Resources:** The team should have a balance of qualitative and quantitative data collection skills. The human and material resources needed for data collection should be available and sufficient time allocated.

**Management and Responsibilities**: The process should be jointly undertaken by the project manager and the counterpart (for example, the recipient government) and results disseminated to all stakeholders.

## Outcomes evaluation

**Outcomes Evaluation**

Outcomes evaluation examines changes in the short, medium and long terms regarding impacts and benefits to the targeted people. It focuses on changes in behaviors, relationships, actions and activities of people and groups with whom a transition program works directly.

**Objective:** Outcomes evaluation supplements other forms of evaluation by focusing specifically on related behavioral change. It aims to provide the critical context for interpreting quantitative data and whether numbers represent meaningful changes in the lives of people. It shifts away from assessing the impact, or changes in state, to emphasizing correlating changes in behavior.

**Scope and Features:** Outcomes evaluations look at projects and programs as systems that have inputs, activities, processes and outcomes. It is an ongoing process and can be combined with monitoring. It features case studies and anecdotes that indicate typical outcomes with the acknowledgement that common activities can result in different outcomes for different beneficiaries.

**Process and Methods:**

1) **Identify outcomes:** Identify short-term outcomes in intervals of 1-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-9 months, etc. Then ask what behavior, knowledge and skills should be demonstrated at each interval and what processes should be in place toward achieving the objectives.
2) **Select indicators**: Identify at least one indicator per outcome. (Note that these may already be part of the logical framework analysis or can be developed based on the objectives included in that analysis.)
3) **Collect and analyze data:** Collect the data and then analyze it to determine project outcomes and the impacts already achieved from the project inputs and to determine whether there are any problems that the design did not anticipate.

**Expected Outcomes:** These indicate progress toward outcomes and impacts; they indicate where strategies and level of support should be changed to promote the achievement of goals and objectives and provide enhanced learning about the transitional environment and attitudes that have changed during the period of implementation

**Necessary Resources:** An adequate number of qualified and willing personnel and sufficient time should be allocated, in order to design indicators and collect the data. In addition, the logistical requirements for data collection (vehicles, interpreters, databases, and meals and lodging if traveling) must be arranged.

[57] SWOT stands for “Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.”

**Management and Responsibilities:** The process should be jointly undertaken by the project manager and the counterpart (for example, the recipient government) and results disseminated to all stakeholders.

## Real-time Evaluation

**Real-Time Evaluation**

The real-time evaluation (RTE) is a timely, rapid and interactive peer review of a fast evolving intervention which is usually undertaken in the early stages of a project or activity.

**Objective:** The RTE is a form of dynamic monitoring that provides swift feedback for interventions. It gauges effectiveness and impact and ensures that findings are used as an immediate catalyst for organizational and operational changes. It is motivated by the ideas that conventional evaluation does not provide timely enough feedback to the planning processes.

**Scope and Features:** The RTE is undertaken in the early phase of a project when key operational and policy decisions are being taken. For JICA this occurs between the ex-ante and mid-term evaluation periods. The evaluators are directly involved in the planning processes and use their repository of knowledge to improve the process and outputs of the evaluation. A key element is the quick flow of information to the targeted groups and to the senior managers. Real-time evaluations are similar in concept to strategic reviews except that the latter are usually run by managers themselves whereas RTEs are conducted by evaluation staff or external evaluators.

**Process and Methods:** The RTE is similar to an external evaluation except that findings are used immediately in the planning. Various forms of RTE are being undertaken by organizations. UNHCR pioneered the concept and the World Food Programme (WFP) also uses it. NGOs such as Groupe Urgence Réhabilitation Développement (URD) use iterative evaluations with periodic workshops to integrate findings.

**Expected Outcomes:** Planning and implementation is enhanced by observations provided by evaluators and is more responsive to transitional changes.

**Necessary Resources:** Adequate time should be allowed to consult with beneficiaries. RTEs are not mainstreamed into programming as are other forms of monitoring so funds should be secured to support the needed data collection.

**Management and Responsibilities:** The RTE may be conducted by staff from the evaluation department in coordination with partner agencies or by external consultants who have a close understanding of the agency's operation. A key factor in the success of an RTE is the sensitivity of the evaluators so that staff are not disempowered as a result of the process. The evaluation department should have the capacity to quickly package the RTE information and be open to sharing controversial findings.

## Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

**Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)**

The PCIA is a set of tools to analyze the causes of tensions and conflict, the effects of peace and conflict on the sector where an intervention is planned, and the potential outcomes and impacts. It projects whether the project will strengthen or weaken peace, interprets the direct and indirect effects on different parts of society and develops a plan to increase future outcomes and impacts.

**Objective:** The PCIA enables users to make concrete suggestions, both in terms of outcome and impact, on how to reduce the potential negative effects of interventions on conflict dynamics and how to enhance the positive effects on peacebuilding and transition to a well functioning society.

**Scope and Features:** The PCIA is a developing methodology. The term is sometimes used interchangeably with conflict analysis but the two are not the same. A PCIA is a specific tool used

particularly for impact assessments. As such, a conflict assessment can be a foundation for the PCIA (see chapter 1, section 1.3 for more information on conflict analysis). The specific functions of the PCIA for different types of interventions should be clarified. For new interventions, a peace and conflict impact assessment tries to anticipate the outcomes and impacts of the program/project and is used to help to develop indicators. For existing interventions, a peace and conflict impact assessment looks at whether results have been achieved and if there have been any unintended effects. The more comprehensive approach now frequently used is "conflict-sensitivity" (see chapter 3, section 3.2.1).

**Process and Methods:** See box 11.4.

**Expected Outcomes:** The PCIA will result in greater sensitization of project stakeholders to the potential effects of their projects on minimizing the causes of conflict. Project designs will be fine-tuned to create the desired outcomes and impact to promote transition.

**Necessary Resources:** The PCIA can be conducted by agency staff or by hiring an external consultant to carry it out. Appropriate funding and adequate time will be needed to implement the components and reach all of the stakeholders.

**Management and Responsibilities:** The design of the PCIA should be a joint effort between aid agencies and the government. The undertaking of and results of a conflict analysis and sector mapping should be shared with other organizations.

Box 11.4 describes the various steps involved in conducting a PCIA.

**Box 11.4: Conducting a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)**

The number of steps in a PCIA depends upon the depth that is needed and available resources. Six general components are:

1. **Conflict mapping or analysis** may include conflict history, context, issues, dynamics, dividers and connectors, trends and peace opportunities. A number of frameworks are available such as the World Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) which captures these aspects to help determine appropriate strategies.
2. **Sector mapping** focuses on the range of activities taking place in a sector such as education, agriculture, etc. and discusses how the intervention will affect the sector.
3. **Impact assessment** looks at what achievements are planned or have taken place. If no baseline data are available, the objectives of the intervention are unclear or indicators are weak, then other assessment options need to be used, [58]such as the "Do No Harm Framework," that collect opinions of stakeholders on the effects of the project.
4. **Conflict impact assessment** complements the impact analysis and assesses the overall impact on the transitional processes.
5. **Conflict impact interpretation** determines the extent of the effects, ranging from none to direct impact on the conflict dynamics. It also looks for missed opportunities.
6. **Design or re-design** of the project is the final step to increase the positive outcomes and impact. An accurate needs assessment or social assessment should underpin this step.

Examples of PCIA questions can be found at www.idrc.ca/peace/en/reports/paper.

## *11.4 Designing a Monitoring and Evaluation Process*

There are many common elements between monitoring and evaluation. They are both systematic exercises and involve data collection that seeks to answer critical questions related to project and program effectiveness. Together they provide continuity in support of program development and their combined use should significantly enhance impact and improve program design, resulting in positive outcomes for stakeholders. Field practitioners should ensure that

[58] See *Do no Harm Framework (A Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict)*, November 2004, CDA Collective Learning Projects, www.cdainc.com.

monitoring outputs are designed to feed into evaluations and that the results of evaluations are used to strengthen data collection through monitoring.

Evaluations must be factored into the project cycle right from the beginning. Field practitioners have admitted that "the quality of their work would increase if evaluation were incorporated when planning the intervention. The evaluation process would be less onerous and overwhelming for stakeholders, and data could be collected at the outset of the work, thereby providing a baseline for comparing mid-project and final results" (INCORE 2003:13).

In the transition environment, joint monitoring and evaluation, participatory internal, and external/internal forms of evaluation are the most efficient as they require fewer resources. Joint monitoring and evaluation are conducted in collaboration with organizations from transition countries or with other external actors. Joint ventures mean that monitoring and evaluation data as well as baseline data will be shared, thus saving time and resources. Agencies can also help each other to deal with logistical and operational problems in data collection, such as access to local groups.

The selection of monitoring and evaluation approaches, tools and timing depends on various factors:

- the information needs during the phases of the project
- the budget – adequate funds must be secured in the planning stages
- the time available – management should reserve the needed time well ahead
- the context including the security situation
- the availability of appropriate evaluators and staff trained in monitoring techniques

Table 11.2 indicates at what phase in the program/project certain monitoring and evaluation activities are appropriate.

**Table 11.2: Program/Project Phases and Appropriate Monitoring and Evaluation Activities**

| Program/Project Phase | Monitoring activities | Evaluation activities |
|---|---|---|
| **Pre-project** | Baseline data collection, situation monitoring, social assessment, PCIA, pre-involvement monitoring, SWOT analysis | Ex-ante |
| **Preliminary implementation** | Routine data collection and reporting, situation monitoring, baseline data collection, SWOT analysis | Real-time evaluation |
| **Mid -project** | Routine data collection and reporting, Process and outcome monitoring, situation monitoring, secondary sources, PCIA, SWOT analysis | Mid-term evaluation; outcome evaluation, rapid impact evaluation, participatory evaluation |
| **Project end** | Routine data collection and reporting; process and outcome monitoring, PCIA, SWOT analysis | Terminal evaluation, outcome evaluation, rapid impact evaluation, participatory evaluation |
| **Post-project** | Routine data collection and reporting Process and outcome monitoring, situation monitoring, PCIA | Ex-post evaluation, outcome evaluation, rapid impact evaluation, participatory evaluation |

The planning process for monitoring and evaluation should incorporate

- accountability towards stakeholders
- appropriate skills

- selection of evaluation criteria and questions
- development of evaluation terms of reference (TOR) and monitoring plans
- determination of indicators
- selection of data collection methods
- utilization of results
- evaluation of monitoring and evaluation activities.

### 11.4.1 Accountability towards Stakeholders

As described earlier, monitoring and evaluation are important tools for accountability. OECD-DAC defines accountability as an "obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and standards. For evaluators, it connotes responsibility to provide accurate, fair and credible monitoring reports and performance assessments. For public sector managers and policy makers, accountability is to taxpayers/ citizens."[59] Upward accountability tends to be thought of as obligations to bilateral agencies, headquarters and auditors, while downward accountability is attention devoted to local groups in the target country.

A concern of both internal and external actors is who is accountable to whom. Both monitoring and evaluation often focus on upward accountability. It is critical that all stakeholders are included in evaluation planning and utilization of results. However, ALNAP studies[60] have identified learning and accountability gaps because organizations tend to direct their attention upward and pay insufficient attention to the views of local groups participating in transition projects. However, improved downward accountability:

- Supports closer consultation and participation of local groups in the design and implementation of the interventions
- Promotes interventions that are more likely to reflect genuine needs and priorities
- Optimizes impact.

Local groups are often referred to as "primary stakeholders" in transition projects, since they are the target of government programs, whether directly or indirectly. As such, they have a great deal to contribute to and learn from monitoring and evaluation. In transitions, field practitioners should increase efforts to dialog with local groups creating a strong downward feedback loop.

### 11.4.2 Appropriate Skills

Data collection and analysis for monitoring requires skills such as participatory techniques, sampling techniques and data analysis program skills. Experience in developing and using monitoring tools, such as checklists and surveys is also important. Monitoring should be undertaken by well trained field practitioners preferably with experience in transition societies or by local management staff.

For evaluations, the skill balance of the team is critical to success. An internal/external team with, for example, one external evaluator and one or two internal evaluators, is especially effective in the transition environment. It can promote a more rapid start up of the evaluation process, can be more cost effective and allow easier access to affected areas and to affected people. Learning and data analysis are enhanced by a close sharing of internal/external perspectives.

A well-balanced evaluation team makes a difference in terms of acceptability of results in transition environments. Users of the report may be especially sensitive as to how results and recommendations are developed by the evaluators. Ideally, the team should have the following characteristics:

[59] OECD-DAC, *Glossary of Key Management Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, 2002, p. 15.
[60] ALNAP, *Humanitarian Action: Improving monitoring to enhance accountability and learning*, ALNAP Annual Review 2003, p. 14.

- All evaluators have experience in the transition environment and be aware of the risks and constraints
- The team is gender balanced
- The team has at least one expert in evaluation methods and data analysis
- The team is multi-disciplinary or diverse in perspective.

Annex 11.1 provides some guidance on choosing the right evaluators to match the terms of reference for the evaluation.

### 11.4.3 Selection of Evaluation Criteria and Questions

For evaluations, JICA has adopted criteria that are typically used to evaluate development interventions: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability[61]. These are the criteria suggested by OECD-DAC. Humanitarian evaluations also use other criteria such as timeliness, coherence, coordination, cost-effectiveness and coverage, as well as participation and protection. It has been suggested that evaluating transition assistance should include both development and humanitarian criteria since transition assistance bridges the divide between development and humanitarian activities.

Accordingly, criteria such as participation, coordination and coherence are also important for transition. Evaluation questions should be developed based on the objectives and indicators included in the logical framework analysis. Staff of the aid agencies and staff from partner organizations as well as other stakeholders can collaborate to develop questions that address key issues.

### 11.4.4 Developing Evaluation TORs and Monitoring Plans

Monitoring plans should be updated as projects progress and the environment changes. The plan for monitoring should be very explicit including the indicators to be monitored, data sources, data collection methods, frequency of data collection and the persons responsible for collecting and analyzing the data. Local groups and partners should be involved in planning for monitoring.

The terms of reference (TOR) for evaluations is a critical document as it is referred to constantly by team members and managers. It is therefore an excellent guidance tool.[62] Some organizations require the completion of an "inception report" which comments on and expands on the TOR. This reduces the chance that the conditions in the TOR are not clear which may ultimately result in problems in the evaluation. (See also Annex 2: Troubleshooting the TOR.)

### 11.4.5 Determination of Indicators

In order to measure the progress of a country's level of stabilization it is necessary to determine a set of standards or a baseline against which progress can be measured. Current thinking suggests that progress ought to be measured on the basis of impact rather than on the basis of mandates or program/project goals. A special report by the United States Institute of Peace and the Centre for Strategic International Studies posits that the main barrier to measuring progress is actually political rather than conceptual. This is for two reasons: (1) political pressure exists to declare that policy objectives have been obtained and (2) individual agencies are inclined to report their success at implementing their programs rather than their impact on stabilization.[63] There is also recognition that traditional indicators are not appropriate for transition situations. Here is why traditional indicators often fail:

- **Lack of conceptual clarity in the design of indicators.** Indicators cannot both predict and describe at the same time, otherwise self-fulfilling prophecies are the result, such as "the country is unstable, because the country is unstable."

[61] See "Perspectives on Five Evaluation Criteria", JICA *Guideline for Project Evaluation,* (Tokyo: JICA, 2003), p. 56.
[62] See "Preparation of the Advertisement of the Contract," JICA *Guideline for Project Evaluation*, op. cit., p. 100.
[63] Cohen, Craig, *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Special Report, (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic International Studies and United Institute of Peace, Feb 2006)

- **Pre-fixed templates of "observable, verifiable indicators."** Such indicators tend to be crude reflections of the state of peace in a country. Transition situations need indicators that measure intangible rather than tangible outcomes.
- **Confusion of terms.** Terms such as indicators, goals, impact achievements and measurements are often used interchangeably, even though conceptually these terms denote different elements.
- **Structures not in place for generating useful indicators.** Indicators of progress can only be usefully designed when structures are in place to collect information at the right moments and for turning this knowledge into information that decision-makers can utilize when making assessments.
- **External consultants.** Indicators are often generated by external consultants and thus do not maintain vital linkage to the program/project's overall goals.
- **Timing and sequencing.** Indicators must be tied to a coherent strategy, yet timing and sequencing are often ignored when generating indicators.
- **Shopping list approach.** Indicators are generated for the sake of producing them, but not in a way that helps decision-makers set priorities. The relationship of an indicator to a certain development needs to be clearly spelled out.
- Traditional indicators cannot take **unanticipated impact or negative impact** into account.

Determining indicators is thus not easy. A United States Institute of Peace/Centre for Strategic International Studies Working Group on Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction came up with some tentative considerations, as shown in Box 11.5.

**Box 11.5: Indicators of Progress**

Indicators should focus primarily on impact, signify changes in structures and behavior and incorporate qualitative and quantitative information – including changes in the perception of local people. By definition, indicators are measurable, and thus reliant on the availability of information. The true test of any set of indicators is whether they are applicable across a range of cases – able to be adapted to both the specific country context and the particular objectives of each intervention.

From their analysis of about 15 select models the group also found the greatest agreement with singling out the following indicators:

**Security:** Civilian safety, local security capacity, relative strength of obstructionist forces

**Governance:** Civic participation, political process development, and elections; human rights and freedoms; anti-corruption, transparency and accountability in the public sector.

**Rule of Law:** Public order and peaceful resolution of disputes; equal access, respect for minority rights, and end of impunity; the capacity to confront organized crime.

**Economic Recovery/Opportunity**: Job creation; macro-level framework for public finances and resource allocation; open economy to foster growth.

**Service delivery /Social welfare:** Basic needs: education, restoring communications, power, and transportation.

*Source:* Centre for Strategic International Studies/United Institute of Peace, *Summary Record of the Second CSIS/USIP Working Group Meeting on Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction.* (Washington, D.C.:CSIS/USIP, unpublished report, Jan 2005).

One example of developing indicators for monitoring progress in assisting landmine victims over several years is described in box 11.6.

**Box 11.6: Monitoring Progress of Assistance to Landmine Survivors**

"Monitoring progress in Victim Assistance is not easy. First, there are no deadlines by which anything related to victim assistance must be accomplished according to the Mine Ban Convention; secondly, we have poor baseline information from which to judge progress; and thirdly, the thing to be monitored, victim assistance, has a six part definition and spreads across many sectors.

Nevertheless, we must monitor victim assistance. Landmine survivors are the reason the Mine Ban Convention exists. Victim assistance is one of the pillars of the treaty. Signatories to the treaty signed ALL of it, not just the parts they prefer, or the parts they could easily report on. There are no provisions that allow States Parties to opt out of victim assistance or indeed any other obligations under the treaty. Although reporting on victim assistance activities is not mandated under the Convention, we must monitor it in order to be able to judge progress.

The history of attempting to monitor various aspects of the Mine Ban Convention dates back to a 1998 conference near Ottawa, when sets of indicators were drafted for victim assistance and for other treaty requirements. The six indicators for victim assistance are:

- Indicator 1: The extent to which information on mine victims' demographics *(and needs*)* is available.
- Indicator 2: The extent to which a national disability coordination mechanism exists and recognizes mine victims.
- Indicator 3: The extent to which programs and services for the medical care and rehabilitation of mine victims are available.
- Indicator 4: The extent to which programs and services for the social and economic reintegration of mine victims are available.
- Indicator 5: The extent to which mine victims are protected and supported by effective laws and policies.
- Indicator 6: The extent to which there is a disability community advocacy network.

Using the above indicators, the results of three studies by the Canadian government to examine victim assistance in 69 mine-affected countries can be found at http://www.landminesurvivors.org/documents/indicator_final.pdf.

*Source*: Landmine Survivors Network/ ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance, *Monitoring Progress in Victim Assistance: Analysis of the Victim Assistance Indicator Study*, Update, September 2003, http://www.landminesurvivors.org/documents/indicator_final.pdf.

## 11.4.6 Selection of Data Collection Methods

Collecting and analyzing qualitative data is particularly important in transitions. A combination of qualitative and quantitative data obtained by combining various data collection methods is the best way to ensure that a variety of perspectives are included and that bias is reduced. Quantitative data help to balance anecdotal data while qualitative data offer insight into social processes.

Triangulation, or collection of data using multiple methods and multiple sources, is even more critical in transition environments, since there is likely to be a higher degree of bias on the part of many people. The "proof" that results have been triangulated helps to support the acceptance of findings. Reports should indicate the mix of methods that were used as well as the variety of sources. This can still be done while maintaining confidentiality to the sources of information.

There may be a tendency for evaluation teams or staff on monitoring missions to focus on interviews in capital cities or with key organization staff. It is critical, however, that time and resources are allocated for interviewing citizens and collecting a balanced perspective. In transitions, this would include visiting distant, impoverished or disadvantaged communities. Visits should include majority and minority ethnic groups, both winners and losers in the conflict and different political parties. Since the ultimate effects of the transition project are felt by citizens, interviews must take place with them directly, wherever they are located.

Key informant or single informant interviews are considered to be a good source of data due to the ability to be confidential. Focus group interviews are also an efficient means of collecting information from communities. They are also effective with organization staff, within one organization or with multiple organizations, and may result in greater acceptance of findings. The drawback of focus groups is that people may be reluctant to criticize or disclose sensitive information that would benefit the analysis.

## 11.4.7 Utilization of Results

A "user focus" ensures that monitoring and evaluation is designed with users' needs in mind. For example, monitoring reports should provide analysis in a narrative form when quantitative data are collected in order to explain the problems and progress. They should provide guidance as to what future monitoring efforts should focus on. They should stipulate the changes that are recommended based on monitoring results and how the reports will be followed up.

The policy of the UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU)[64] seeks to ensure that the investment in evaluation leads to real improvement in the quality and impact of the organization's work. To meet this objective, managers are expected to respond to findings and recommendations in writing within three months of receipt of the final report in order to comment on the findings and describe what action is being taken.

JICA puts emphasis on following up on evaluation results and takes surveys of staff to find out how many are using the results. In recent years use of evaluation recommendations has increased due to the use of the Internet to post results. Feedback is used to improve the decision making process and to promote the learning process. All evaluation results are accumulated and meant to be used for future projects. Results are disseminated through:

- Debriefing meetings
- The evaluations network on electronic mail
- A database on lessons (so far developed for education and telecommunications)
- Synthesis studies

UNHCR[65] recommends these additional means of dissemination of evaluation results:

- Include a brief report on the evaluation in other related meetings.
- Use the evaluation as input to a working group.
- Widely disseminate the evaluation report to all countries where similar activities or operations have taken place.
- Disseminate evaluation summaries (two pages at most, desktop published to make them attractive and read easily and quickly).
- Use the evaluation to formulate the agenda of a policy setting or strategic planning meeting.
- Incorporate evaluation findings into policy papers, guidelines or training material.
- Publish articles in general and academic publications.

**Lessons Identified:** A space is available on the "Ex-ante Evaluation Table"[66] for listing the lessons identified from similar past projects that should be applied to the current project.

## 11.4.8 Evaluating Monitoring and Evaluation

Evaluations and monitoring processes themselves should be routinely evaluated. The checklists provided in the annexes are useful for evaluating an evaluation process. ALNAP's

[64] UNHCR, *UNHCR's Evaluation Policy,* (Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, 2002).

[65] UNHCR, *Planning and Organising Useful Evaluations,*. UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service, January 1998.

[66] JICA "*Guideline for Project Evaluation", op. cit. p.* 129

Quality Proforma[67] is a tool which helps to judge the quality of evaluation reports. The tool is useful for reaching general conclusions on trends from a number of evaluations. Organizations that contribute their evaluations to the multi-agency synthesis process help the entire process of evaluating transition programs. Importantly trends in transition programs and their evaluations can be eventually ascertained. JICA's synthesis studies[68] offer valuable feedback on its evaluation process. The ex-post evaluation is useful to determine whether previous monitoring and evaluation efforts steered the program toward success.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ ***Integrate monitoring and evaluation in early project planning****. Monitoring and evaluation tools, such as social assessments, collection of baseline data, situation monitoring, the PCIA, and relevant evaluations, must be integrated into the earliest planning of projects. Project planning documents should clearly articulate intended impacts and outcomes and identify key indicators to monitor process, outcomes and impacts.*
- ✓ ***Involve local groups in planning.*** *Choice of appropriate indicators should be made in consultation with local groups. This not only increases local ownership of the project but can be an educational tool which empowers local groups as they interact with other external actors.*
- ✓ ***Use swift processes.*** *Processes must be timely and effective. Use of secondary data, internal evaluators, joint monitoring and evaluation, and evaluations that promote rapid changes such as real-time, participatory and outcome are relevant.*

## *General Lessons in Monitoring and Evaluation*

- ✓ Recognition of the problems inherent in matching indicators to success in the transition environment is important and the willingness to learn should underscore all monitoring and evaluation efforts.
- ✓ Findings from monitoring and evaluation processes should be incorporated into project implementation expeditiously.
- ✓ Monitoring and evaluation must be sensitive to unintended impact, secondary impact, and long-term impact which may not be immediately apparent in the program/project's life cycle.
- ✓ It is difficult to prove the causal link between interventions at the project level and subsequent improvements in governance, consolidation of peace, and other intended outputs of the program/project. Realistic claims for impact and program/project outcomes must be made.
- ✓ Planners of monitoring and evaluation activities should tie certain factors to success such as selecting effective forms of monitoring and evaluation, choosing well-balanced evaluation teams, developing a clear, relevant TOR, commiting to the use of results, and securing adequate resources and a sufficient number of well-trained personnel.
- ✓ Enhancing the way an agency understands success requires an organizational willingness and capacity to think differently about how it measures impact.

[67] ALNAP, *Humanitarian Action: Improving monitoring to enhance accountability and learning*, ALNAP Annual Review 2003, page 182.
[68] See JICA, *Annual Evaluation Report FY 2003*.

## Resources

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# *Annex 11.1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Sources of Evaluators in Transition Environments*

**Extrapolated from:** Case Studies in Wood A (ed), 2001 *Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners* Zed Press; and the ALNAP Proforma found in InterWorks, *How to Evaluate Humanitarian Action,* workshop participant guide, in coordination with ALNAP and UN WHO, John Hopkins SAIS and the Cuny Center, Madison, Wisconsin, 2003.

| Source | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|
| **Internal Evaluator (Internal Evaluation); agency staff and partners** | • Knows the organization<br>• Understands organizational behavior and attitudes<br>• Knows other staff<br>• May be less threatening<br>• Usually less expensive<br>• Does not require lengthy recruitment procedure<br>• Builds internal evaluation capability<br>• Contributes to program capacity<br>• May be more aware of and sensitive to transition program context and history<br>• May be better able to track follow-up on recommendations<br>• May have local language capacities | • May find it harder to be objective<br>• Personal work duties may constrain particpation<br>• May avoid negative conclusions that might reflect badly on individuals and organizations<br>• Accepts the assumptions of the organization<br>• May not be trained in evaluation methods<br>• May not have necessary technical expertise<br>• Results may not be as acceptable to outsiders |
| **External International Evaluator (External Evaluation) Non-aid agency staff** | • May be more objective<br>• Less organizational bias<br>• Fresh perspectives<br>• Broader experience<br>• Can compare transitional context with other contexts<br>• More easily hired for longer periods of time<br>• Not part of the power structure<br>• Can bring in additional resources<br>• Trained in evaluation<br>• Experienced in other evaluations<br>• Regarded as an 'expert' | • May not know the organization policies and procedures<br>• May not know of constraints affecting recommendations<br>• May be perceived as an adversary<br>• May be expensive<br>• Contract negotiations may take time<br>• Less likely to follow up on recommendations<br>• May be unfamiliar with the particular transition environment |
| **External Local Evaluator** | • Has local language skills and local social knowledge, local expertise<br>• Can adapt evaluation tools to local perspectives<br>• Can analyze data with local perspective | • May be only a token member of a team<br>• May not be familiar with international standards |
| **Internal Local Evaluator (Project Target Group, Project Managers)** | • Has day to day familiarity with project issues<br>• Participation can be self-motivating<br>• Closest to the local initiatives important to peacebuilding | • May be too close to the issues to have a balanced perspective<br>• May be seen as manipulative |

| Source | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|
| **Internal/External Team** | • (All advantages mentioned above)<br>• Less need for outside evaluators or need for fewer outsiders<br>• Richness in sharing of internal/ external perspectives | • (All disadvantages mentioned above)<br>• Internal evaluator may perceive advantages on the part of external and vice versa<br>• May be difficult to establish trust and transparency with each other |
| **Evaluators hired by multiple organizations or each organization contributes evaluators to a team (Joint Evaluation )** | • Multiplier effect – one evaluation provides many opportunities for feedback<br>• Can improve coordination<br>• Can improve information sharing<br>• Can improve efficiency and effectiveness in evaluation through sharing of human and material resource<br>• Security and safety may be enhanced | • Coordination of the schedules of many actors may be difficult<br>• Agreement on design and findings may be more complex<br>• Organizational mandates may be complicating factors<br>• Attribution of impact might be more difficult |

## *Annex 11.2: Troubleshooting the TOR*

Extrapolated from: Case Studies in Wood A (ed), 2001 *Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners* Zed Press; and the ALNAP Proforma found in InterWorks, *How to Evaluate Humanitarian Action*, workshop participant guide, in coordination with ALNAP and UN WHO, Johns Hopkins SAIS and the Cuny Center, Madison, Wisconsin, 2003.

The following are indicators that the TOR and related processes need strengthening.

- ☐ The motivating factors, purpose, focus of the evaluation are unclear
- ☐ The background information supporting these is weak and insufficient
- ☐ The objectives mix too many agendas, such as lessons, audits, cost-effectiveness, or forward planning, that might compromise each other
- ☐ The TOR has not been approved by all stakeholders who will have a role in the evaluation (particularly country offices and beneficiaries)
- ☐ Important cross cutting issues are not mentioned such as relief-development linkages, sustainability, partnership, co-ordination, interrelationships between sectors, etc.
- ☐ The need is not discussed for gender balance on the team and a gender perspective in the programs
- ☐ The criteria for program success are not appropriate for transitions
- ☐ The standards and criteria for good practice are not discussed; the learning motive seems weak
- ☐ The breadth of questions is too ambitious, or the scope of the study is too vast, the stakeholders too numerous, the timeframe being studied too far in the past and/or too long, so that they cannot be covered in depth with the material and human resources available
- ☐ The questions are not prioritized or cannot be effectively organized
- ☐ There are side interests included or other questions not clearly related to the purpose
- ☐ The methods or ways of working (with whom, how, when, where, and with what resources) are unclear
- ☐ There are not enough participatory mechanisms to support stakeholders' participation to the end
- ☐ The methodology (study or comparison of methods) is not clear or delegated to the team
- ☐ Not enough time is allowed for the team to develop tools/methods (surveys, questionnaires, interview guides, etc.) and gain approval from stakeholders
- ☐ There are no reports on program progress cited or available; alternatives to hard data or lack of baseline data are not mentioned
- ☐ Guidance on the reporting format is not included; the intended use of the results is not clarified and whether different formats will be required by different users
- ☐ Not enough time is allowed for deliberation on conclusions and recommendations and for review and redrafting
- ☐ No follow-up activities are planned
- ☐ An evaluation of the evaluation is not planned from the start
- ☐ The time and strategy for a TOR review process (or preparation of an inception report) is not included by the planners
- ☐ Significant questions and issues remain inadequately addressed after the preliminary meetings
- ☐ Modification of the TOR has to be done once the team gets to the field without the reconfirmation of major stakeholders

Extrapolated from: JICA "Guideline for Evaluation," 2004, Case Studies in Wood A (Ed), 2001 Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners Zed Press; and ALNAP Proforma.

# Annex 11.3: Evaluating the Evaluation Process

Extrapolated from: Case Studies in Wood A (ed), 2001 *Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners* Zed Press; and the ALNAP Proforma found in InterWorks, *How to Evaluate Humanitarian Action*, workshop participant guide, in coordination with ALNAP and UN WHO, Johns Hopkins SAIS and the Cuny Center, Madison, Wisconsin, 2003.

This tool provides some questions to help the stakeholders analyze the process as it moves along, facilitating a quicker and more effective "evaluation of the evaluation" at the end. (This should be used in combination with the "Troubleshooting the TOR" tool in Annex 11.2.)

**Evaluation Management and Planning**

- ☐ What are the motivating factors (donor requirement, learning activity) for the evaluation?
- ☐ What is its primary purpose (lesson learning, accountability, empowerment)?
- ☐ If it is multipurpose – what percentage is relative to each emphasis?
- ☐ What is the primary focus (partner performance, program, project, policy, institutional analysis, sectoral, co-ordination, etc.)?
- ☐ What political realities and contextual issues affected the planning process?
- ☐ Is the team able to understand the realities of the key components – stakeholder interests, the budget and resources, feasibility and timing, development of the TOR, and formation of the team prior to or soon after arriving?
- ☐ What is the structure of the evaluation management? Who are the key management contacts?
- ☐ Were the stakeholders involved in planning – discuss goals, build consensus, plan the evaluation approach – and to what degree?
- ☐ Were the constraints (security, lack of data, etc.) to the evaluation made clear to the stakeholders?
- ☐ Are resources sufficient to support the activities in the TOR?

**Nature and Make-up of the Evaluation Team**

- ☐ Was the rationale for selection of the team appropriate to the purpose?
- ☐ Was balance achieved in the composite team, in terms of gender, sectoral expertise, experience in transition and peacebuilding environments, local knowledge?
- ☐ Are the particular sensitivities and security needs of individual team members considered?
- ☐ What team building mechanisms are used and are they effective?
- ☐ Is planning sufficient to prevent or solve problems in security, logistics, and health matters?
- ☐ How frequently will meetings and communications take place between the management and the team? Is this adequate?
- ☐ Are inter-active processes planned to enhance communications and relationships with stakeholders throughout the evaluation? Are they included in the TOR and budget?

**Briefings with the Commissioning Organization(s) and Key Stakeholders**

- ☐ Do the briefings allow all team members to understand the issues raised by staff in headquarters and in the country offices?
- ☐ Do team members feel a sense of personal responsibility for addressing these concerns? Do the commissioning agency staff and other stakeholders support the evaluation?

- ☐ Are the relationships and their roles and participation clear between players in "joint" endeavors? Are the power relationships disrupting – if one is providing funding to the other?

**Document Review**

- ☐ Does the available documentation contain the very basic information needed for the team to operate – including lists of staff, key people to meet and protocols for meeting them, relationships, procedures and structures, maps of the study site, briefing papers, basic statistical data?
- ☐ Is adequate time allocated for reading materials, particularly if the team members are unfamiliar with the area and context?
- ☐ Has the necessary documentation been saved and records kept throughout the operation to facilitate monitoring and evaluation? If not, how will the team retrace the steps? Are there secondary sources, or parallel operations that may have some records?

**Methods for data collection and analysis**

- ☐ What are the constraints faced by the team in terms of budget, time and logistics, culture, and weather that may limit the possibilities for use of certain methodologies?
- ☐ Can good secondary information be obtained?
- ☐ Are the methods selected appropriate for the criteria and questions asked? Do they match realities in time, budget and complexity?
- ☐ Does the methodology selected provide opportunities for triangulation?
- ☐ Is there a cohesive plan for selection of the unit of analysis from which data will be collected (individuals, families, farms, communities, clinic, wells, etc.); data disaggregation requirements (e.g. by gender, ethnic group, location); the procedure to be used to select examples or cases to examine from this population (e.g., random sampling, convenience sampling, recommendations of community leaders); techniques or instruments to be used to acquire data on these examples or cases (e.g. structured questionnaires, direct observation, loosely structured interview guides, scales to weigh infants, instruments to measure water quality, etc.); and timing and frequency of data collection?
- ☐ Do team members clearly understand how data will be analyzed (e.g., quantitative methods such as cross tabulations or regression analysis or qualitative methods such as content analysis)?
- ☐ Are standardized procedures in place to minimize bias such as use of sampling techniques, forms for interviews and direct observation, etc.?

**Communications strategy to guarantee feedback, follow-up and early drafting**

- ☐ Are regular meetings scheduled with relevant staff in the HQ prior to departure and with country office staff on arrival and departure in the field?
- ☐ Are the stakeholders provided with in-depth information such as through feedback meetings and translation of relevant documents into local languages?
- ☐ Are a series of steps planned for feedback, learning and capitalizing on the knowledge to be followed up on return including a series of numbered drafts to be circulated in order to stimulate responses and reactions?

**Participatory Methods**

- ☐ Is a plan in place for reaching the targeted citizens and involving them in the evaluation as much as possible?
- ☐ Are evaluators aware of the problems that may be encountered when interacting with stakeholders, such as fear of criticism, conflict-related biases, control of access, trauma, distrust, etc.? Do they have methods for dealing with them?

**Data Analysis**

- ☐ Have a variety of analytical tools been considered and used to portray data from different perspectives?
- ☐ Have the assumptions been changed as needed on the Logframe? Have the indicators been modified?
- ☐ Are statistical programs for data analysis (results of surveys and interviews) appropriate and available? Is an advisor available if team members are not familiar with their use?

**Measurements, Standards and Benchmarks**

- ☐ Have evaluators determined in collaboration with stakeholders which standards and indicators are appropriate?
- ☐ Have evaluators agreed on what desirable outcomes of the programs should be?
- ☐ Can the impact be traced to the intervention? If not, what methods can be used to interpret causes and effects (recall, interviews, observations, lessons learned from other evaluations)?

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

- ☐ Do team members have adequate time and space to debate their conclusions?
- ☐ Are all data analyzed and draft reports written prior to attempts to compile results?
- ☐ Are team members prepared to substantiate conclusions in presentations? Are they prepared to accept feedback from stakeholders?
- ☐ Are workshops and feedback mechanisms in place?
- ☐ Are recommendations sensible, feasible and realistic?

**The Evaluation Report**

- ☐ Was a checklist agreed upon for writing by team members?
- ☐ Is adequate time allowed for review and incorporation of comments by stakeholders?
- ☐ Are achievements highlighted? Can criticisms be made more palatable?
- ☐ Is methodology clearly described and constraints to objectivity and measurements discussed?
- ☐ Is the report engaging and interesting to read?

**Dissemination and Follow-up**

- ☐ Will team members undertake a process of self-evaluation?
- ☐ Are follow-up interactive seminars planned for longer term learning?
- ☐ How will targeted people be presented with the results of the evaluation? How will other stakeholders in the field receive them?
- ☐ What forms will be effective in distributing results; summaries, booklets, etc.?

# Chapter 12
# Special Considerations in Designing Transition Assistance: Coordination and Staff Safety and Security

## *Chapter Objectives*

- Describe effective coordination at the field level.
- Discuss how to forge partnerships during transitions.
- Provide an overview of the main safety and security issues when working in volatile environments.

## *Introduction*

Operational considerations of how to make transition assistance work well would be incomplete without discussion of two important and special issues: coordination and staff safety and security. Curiously there might be a connection between the two, as better coordinated and effective assistance will mitigate the pervasive confusion concerning why and by whom assistance is carried out, that has sometimes given rise to threats against staff.

Field coordination is crucial for obvious reasons of effectiveness, yet it is a complex issue, as no one likes to be coordinated. Ways to share and to partner, including with local interlocutors and stakeholders, must be found for the common good of all. A catalogue of ideas and examples are given in this chapter.

Ensuring staff safety and security is necessary in order for agencies to work in transition situations. A range of measures taken at the field level is discussed. While some security measures might be resource-intensive, staff are the most important asset an organization has and it is thus well advised to do its utmost to ensure their protection.

## *12.1 Effective Field Coordination*

Working together to support transitions from conflict to peace seems necessary and reasonable, in particular if a human security approach is used, which requires concerted action. While chapter 2 highlights institutional, strategic, and financial gaps within the assistance community in responding to transition situations, this chapter considers operational practice in the field. This division is somewhat artificial and only necessitated for practical reasons because policy and practice must be informed by each other and should go hand-in-hand. Hopefully, as positive developments at the larger institutional level take shape and form through the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Standing Peacebuilding Fund, practice on the ground will also improve.

Achieving effective field coordination during transitions is a big challenge. Obstacles to effective coordination are widely recognized as:

- The large number of actors operating in transitions and their overlapping mandates
- Competition for visibility, influence and funding
- Different institutional cultures and operational procedures
- Political agendas and national interests
- “Straight-jacketing” of mandates, which do not include the possibility of reallocating budget resources or redefining priorities

- High cost in time and money that effective coordination entails.

This situation is further complicated by the fact that internal actors are usually unskilled in the process of defining national priorities and coordinating assistance. External actors often find themselves in situations where they have to take more initiative than in normal development circumstances, while attempting to encourage the increasing involvement of internal actors in coordination.

## 12.1.1 Purposes and Characteristics of Effective Coordination

Although a commonly agreed definition of coordination is non-existent, there is broad agreement on the purposes and main characteristics of coordination.

**Coordination**

Coordination is a process through which actors work together to ensure that:

- Resources are delivered as efficiently and effectively as local conditions allow
- Their contribution is complementary and allocated in line with indigenous priorities and policies.

Coordination is voluntary and therefore also consensual. It is fundamentally different from the concept of "management," which implies substantial control. Coordination should not be understood as forcing all activities into a single mould. Rapid responses and innovation by individual actors should be encouraged.

*Source:* Adapted from OECD, *The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris: OECD, 2001): p. 95.

Furthermore, effective coordination is increasingly regarded as depending upon harmonization and alignment (see chapter 2, box 2.3).

One problem that has arisen is the unpredictable behavior of transition governments with regard to providing some of the resources for reconstruction. For example, some transition governments with natural resources to export take a fairly active part in designing recovery strategies and even agree to take responsibility for some of the costs associated with transition assistance.

## 12.1.2 Coordination Tools in Transitions

A first, rather ad hoc, element in coordination of operational transition assistance is a donor conference, which typically takes place shortly after the signing of a peace agreement and is organized under the auspices of one or several donor governments or a UN entity. The primary objective of such a conference is to proclaim the benefits of a stable peace and to pledge support to make such benefits visible. These conferences have begun to lack credibility, however, as the gap between the pledge and a true commitment is often considerable. For the most part, transition assistance activities are chronically under-funded. One causal factor in this financial problem might well be the uncoordinated response of external actors, as funds are disbursed in parallel, through a multitude of mechanisms and "ear-markings" within budgets. (See chapter 2, section 2.2.1 for a more detailed discussion on financial gaps). In practical terms, effective field coordination takes place through the following tools:

- **Mechanisms for operational consultation:** UN agencies are usually called upon to assume coordination and leadership responsibilities, based on the recognition that coordination of external assistance is best exercised by a body perceived as legitimate to represent a wide range of actors. Where the UN is not judged appropriate because it is not present or does not play a leadership role, other coordination mechanisms are established.
- **Joint assessment of transition needs and requirements:** coordination is more effective when based on a broad consensus as to the needs and requirements in transitions. Many coordination problems arise from differing perceptions among actors, resulting in varying opinions on the most appropriate way to provide assistance. This

problem can be overcome through joint assessment missions (see chapter 2, section 2.3.2 on post-conflict needs assessment).

- **Common strategic framework for transition assistance:** coordination requires external actors to agree on a common strategic framework that sets the transition priorities and operational roles of different actors based on their comparative advantages (see chapter 2, sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 on transition appeals and strategies and transition results matrices, respectively. See also box 12.1 on the state of coordination in the Democratic Republic of Congo and how difficulties are related to the absence of a strategic framework for transition assistance).
- **Common funding mechanisms**: common funding mechanisms can also contribute to coordination, such as trust funds to support a specific country, region or sector and pooled funding, where the managing agent is chosen jointly by participating organizations in consultation with the national counterpart. It is hoped that the Standing Fund for Peacebuilding, established at the September 2005 UN Summit, will make a difference in more effectively coordinated funding of transition assistance.

## 12.1.3 Coordination Arrangements at the Field Level

Coordination arrangements are usually established by agencies designated to take the lead in transitions at the national, provincial, district or community levels. These are:

- Government-led mechanisms (for example, multi-donor consultative mechanisms on transition issues)
- Multilateral coordination mechanisms (for example, through the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and under the overall coordination of the Resident Coordinator). If a peacekeeping operation is involved a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) would take on the coordinating function, attempting to "unify" the peacekeeping mission with the UNCT which is, in itself, a very challenging task.
- Broad strategic planning (for example, to devise a transition strategy and monitor its implementation)
- Sectoral coordinating mechanisms (for example, to devise sector strategies on DDR, health, education and repatriation as well as to monitor their implementation).

**Box 12.1: State of Donor Coordination in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Relation to Emerging Good Practice in 2004**

The International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT/French acronym), chaired by *the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by the French acronym* MONUC, has established regular dialogue among donors and government officials on transition issues such as the upcoming elections. Other examples include support of the International Conference on the Great Lakes (IC/GRL) by a group of donors led by Canada; local donor meetings led jointly by UNDP and the World Bank and the Consultative Group Process. There are also positive efforts of co-ordination at the sectoral level with the "Tables Rondes," led by Belgium, in the areas of agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure; as well as thematic groups led by some bilaterals or UN organizations.

However, the absence of a common road map, or a locally owned Strategic Framework that integrates political, security and economic/social development, makes it difficult to work towards a joint vision, let alone joint donor planning and implementation. In a country as large and complex as the DRC with such huge needs, it is difficult to achieve long-term development without a clear, nationally-owned, common road map and planning tool as well as the effective means for implementation. An additional lacuna was the lack of sufficient regional co-ordination among donors and general donor policy coherence since most donors are better organized to consider problems on a country by country basis.

*Source:* Donor Workshop on Harmonization and Coordination, in *DAC Experts Meeting on Peace Building and Development in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in the Context of the Region of Central Africa*, 7-8 October 2004, Geneva, p. 9, OEDC Doc. DCD(2004)21, 6 December 2004 (sentence in italics added).

### 12.1.4 Integrated Information Management

When collecting information during transitions, it is important to take into account the need to support the development of a system that will eventually become the information management system for long-term development. This entails working with partners to establish an information framework that serves a larger goal. This framework or system should be fed with information collected by internal and external actors, which requires:

- Adopting common standards for collecting and managing information (common geographic dataset and common sectoral dataset to ensure compatibility and make joint outputs possible).
- Carrying out an inventory of existing data sources before beginning a data collection exercise.
- Carefully choosing the institutional location of the information system that will be put in place.
- Building the capacity of end users for effective and optimal use of data collected and stored.

Box 12.2 shows how an integrated information management system was achieved in Sierra Leone.

**Box 12.2: Sierra Leone Information System (SLIS)**

The Sierra Leone Information System collects and analyzes data in order to create coordinated tools to enhance informed decision-making and policy formulation for key government ministries, donors, UN organizations and their implementing partners.

SLIS was originally established as an OCHA project in 2001 and is presently administered by the UNDP Recovery Unit in partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone. The data collection and analysis have evolved over three distinct phases: humanitarian (2001-2002), recovery (2002-2003) and development (2004 to present) to remain a useful tool to its users.

SLIS has been able to produce a series of data products: the Sierra Leone Encyclopaedia, a collection of documents, maps and photos); data pack series (compiles information on 9 sectors and 14 districts); spatial data infrastructure (administrative boundaries, topographic maps, infrastructure), mining cadastre system (accurate registration of geographic and administrative data related to mining rights), land management/property cadastre; disaster preparedness system (list of resources for disaster response). It has contributed tremendously to development aid coordination and MDG and PRSP monitoring.

*Source:* Sierra Leone Information System website, http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia2004/1_coord/1_2slis.htm.

In brief, the main benefits of coordination are the reduction of transaction costs and the enhancement of the benefits of assistance. In other words, coordination should help maximize the resources of external actors and should lead to increasing assistance efficiency and effectiveness. To achieve this, however, coordination has to move beyond information exchange towards joint planning and implementation. This is often achieved through partnerships.

***Good Practices***

- ✓ *Support the coordinating agency by cooperating in its effort to collect, process and share information as well as by supporting joint planning and implementation.*
- ✓ *Ensure government agencies and officials participate actively in coordination and increase their capacity to assume coordination functions as soon as possible.*
- ✓ *Harmonize and align procedures with other donors, implementing agencies and national governments – this will inevitably mean streamlining regulations and simplifying procedures.*

- ✓ *Be transparent in assessments, concerns, goals and strategies.*
- ✓ *Establish or suggest that the Resident Coordinator establish a "Group of Friends" to have direct contact with all relevant external partners and to obtain greater authority vis-à-vis local actors.*
- ✓ *Stay within the confines of the common transition strategy agreed among internal and external actors.*
- ✓ *Avoid unhealthy competition for visibility and influence.*

## 12.1.5 Partnerships in Transitions

The needs of countries in transition far outweigh the resources of individual agencies and organizations. Genuine commitment to working closely together with other actors, both internal and external, is crucial. These partnerships are instrumental in forging transition strategies and in maximizing often scarce resources and expertise.

**Partnership**

A partnership is defined as a relationship where two or more parties, having compatible goals, form an agreement to do something together. True partnership does **not** exist when:

- There is simply a gathering of people who want to do things
- There is a hidden motivation
- There is an appearance of common ground but actually many agendas exist
- There is tokenism, or the partnership was established just for appearances
- One person has all the power and/or drives the process
- There is no sharing of risk, responsibility and accountability of benefits.

*Source:* Frank, Flo and Anne Smith, *The Partnership Handbook*, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2000, p. 5-6.

Partnerships for transition assistance can be established as follows:

- **Partnerships with government agencies:** transition assistance is multi-dimensional and requires the involvement not only of development agencies, but also of various other government ministries, departments or offices (foreign affairs, defense, justice, labor, for example). An example of a partnership bringing together various governments agencies and departments is the United Kingdom Conflict Prevention Pools.
- **Partnerships with multilateral agencies:** efforts of multilateral agencies within the United Nations system or within regional organizations can be complemented through partnerships with bilateral agencies, such as the UNHCR-JICA partnership (see box below).
- **Partnerships with other donor agencies:** partnerships can also be established with other donor agencies and offices, such as the Joint Canada-Japan Peace-building Learning Project (see box below). Many of these agencies have also created offices or units and it is important to liaise with them to explore joint implementation of transition assistance.
- **Partnerships with international NGOs or private companies:** international NGOs and private companies have also become instrumental actors in transitions. Where countries have lost their ability to provide essential services to the population, NGOs have also filled this vacuum through the provision of food, water, sanitation, shelter, health and education, as well as through community rehabilitation and other activities.
- **Partnerships with host governments, other authorities and local NGOs:** internal actors are important partners in transitions.

Partnerships, like any other undertaking, also have advantages and drawbacks as shown in table 12.1 below:

**Table 12.1: Advantages and Drawbacks of Partnerships**

| Advantages | Drawbacks |
|---|---|
| ▪ Creative solutions emerge from the differing perspectives which partnerships offer.<br>▪ Partnerships often improve relationships between diverse groups, and they extend "buy in" or ownership to a greater number.<br>▪ Communities grow stronger with participation and inclusion of many, and partnerships are a good way to enhance existing strengths and activities.<br>▪ Partnerships can sometimes be a good response to funding and program requirements when they make effective use of limited resources.<br>▪ Partnerships tend to bring about holistic approaches through discussion and the shared finding of solutions.<br>▪ Partnerships can promote, improve or enhance communication.<br>▪ Partnerships can be a powerful vehicle to support change. | ▪ Agencies and organizations do not always share the same values and interests, which can make agreement on partnership goals difficult.<br>▪ Most partnerships have internal conflicts of one sort or another, and individuals may not have the training to identify issues or resolve conflict.<br>▪ There can be problematic power and status differences between the partners.<br>▪ Some partnerships do not have the commitment that is needed to hold them together under strain.<br>▪ The various individuals, agencies and organizations involved may have different authority levels and approval processes.<br>▪ The merging of different "institutional cultures" is not easy.<br>▪ Budgets sometimes decrease when they are being shared.<br>▪ Partners are not always chosen carefully, and it is difficult to "de-partner". |

*Source:* Adapted from Frank, Flo and Anne Smith, *The Partnership Handbook*, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2000, p. 7.

## Types of Partnerships

Partnerships can take various shapes and function differently from one another. (See also chapter 10, section 10.1.7 on selecting implementing partners.) The partnership models most commonly found in partnerships for transition assistance are:

- **Consultative or advisory:** partnerships that are formed to provide input to strategies and policies on a particular topic (see Box 12.3 on the advisory partnership between JICA and CIDA).
- **Operational:** partnerships that are formed to set the strategic direction for transition assistance – these are governments in transition countries, multilateral organizations, bilateral agencies and NGOs that work to develop joint programs but do not receive funding for implementing projects or programs.
- **Collaborative:** partnerships that are formed to share resources, risks and decision-making (see box 12.4 on the collaborative partnership between JICA and UNHCR).
- **Implementing:** partnerships that involve an agreement to implement a project or program; they also require that funding be transferred to the implementing partner.

### Box 12.3: The Joint Canada-Japan Peace-building Learning Project: Advisory Partnership between JICA and CIDA

The major objective of the Joint Canada-Japan Peace-building Learning Project was to review the experiences on peace-building projects by both Japan and Canada and to exchange lessons on the peace-building needs assessment methods that both organizations had piloted.

The on-site survey in Guatemala used the method under development by Canada to monitor and evaluate peace-building projects. The on-site survey in Cambodia used the Japanese version of the method. These on-site surveys yielded several recommendations to improve the Japanese post-conflict needs assessment (PNA).

As a result, JICA held several review meetings to review the method. The PNA revision included *inter alia*: adapting the tool for use in fragile countries, in addition to transition countries, allowing for the gathering of views from internal actors and direct beneficiaries, and preparing a manual for easy reference.

*Source*: Adapted from JICA, *Annual Evaluation Report 2003*, p. 124.

### Box 12.4: Collaborative Partnership between JICA and UNHCR since 1999

**Objective:** ensure smooth transition by linking humanitarian relief interventions with development programs (through Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction - 4Rs programs – by supporting refugee host communities and the reintegration of returnees).

**Modes of Collaboration:** staff exchange, field collaboration and staff development as illustrated below:




**Outcomes**

- Understanding about refugee issues enhanced in JICA
- Understanding about JICA's mandate/approach enhanced in UNHCR
- Staff development opportunities diversified
- More development projects in refugee/returnee affected areas
- Japan's overall contribution to transition assistance increased

**Challenges**

- Overcoming two different systems of finance, personnel and project management
- Overcoming different organizational cultures and ways of thinking

## 12.2 Staff Safety and Security

Ensuring safety and security is about coping with unexpected situations and being well prepared to reduce risks to the maximum extent possible. Operational flexibility and rapid entrance strategies should not be achieved at the expense of the safety and security of staff, whether international or local.

Safety and security are necessary to ensure that agencies can enter and remain in transition situations during the required time to fulfill their mandates. The loss of staff and assets makes it difficult for any agency to deliver assistance in accordance with plans.

### 12.2.1 Overview

Security of field staff has been a growing concern for bilateral and multilateral aid agencies operating in transition environments. Safety concerns have become particularly prevalent as hard-to-reach conflict protagonists carry on the legacy of the war and often remain outside legal reach. In addition, assistance is sometimes identified with Western values or even a specific ideology and thus is being manipulated, resisted or simply disregarded. Furthermore, because competition among assistance providers and double mandates (that is, political/military military/humanitarian and humanitarian/developmental) often blur each agency's specific role, threats to the safety of assistance personnel frequently follow resistance for political reasons. Grasping the complexity of the situation characterized by general anarchy and complex ideological persuasions is exceedingly difficult for external actors. In addition, the material wealth that assistance actors display in the country in question also account for a certain increase in crime.

While the host government has primary responsibility for the security and protection of those living and working in their country's territory, they are usually unable to fulfill this function during transitions. Agencies are thus responsible to provide safety and security to their staff to the best of their abilities. Embassies can also extend protection to their nationals living and working in the host country. They can provide consular services and arrange for evacuation if the situation deteriorates.

**Definitions**
(for the purposes of this section only)

**Safety** is the protection of field personnel from accidents and health threats.

**Security** is the protection of field personnel and assets from acts of violence and theft.

**RISK = THREAT X VULNERABILITY**

**Risk** is the likelihood and impact of encountering a particular threat.

**Vulnerability** is the level of exposure to a particular threat.

**Threat** is a danger to the staff, the organization or property.

*Source*: Adapted from ECHO, *Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organizations*, 2004, p. 11.

Often, little or nothing can be done about the level of threat, but vulnerability can be reduced through the adoption of safety and security measures. These measures usually aim to reduce the chances of a threat taking place (for example, driving slowly, improving locks) and the impact of the threat if it takes place (wearing seat belts, limiting the amount of cash in the safe, avoiding travel routines).

## Types of Threats

Table 12.2 below shows examples of safety and security threats commonly found in transitions. In addition, Annex 12.1 describes security incidents including how to prevent and react to them.

**Table 12.2: Types of Threat**

| Safety Threats | Security Threats |
|---|---|
| • Vehicle accidents (car, airplane, helicopter, train)<br>• Natural hazards (mudslides, floods or earthquakes)<br>• Fire<br>• Other accidents (tripping, slipping or falling; drowning)<br>• Health threats (communicable diseases and HIV/AIDS) | • Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance<br>• Bombs<br>• Fighting<br>• Theft and other crimes<br>• Kidnapping<br>• Rape and sexual violence<br>• Murder |

## Levels of Security Risk

The United Nations monitors levels of security in most transition countries as shown in box 12.5. Other external actors such as bilateral agencies and international NGOs usually keep an eye on these assessments and adopt safety and security procedures in accordance with the level of security risk the UN identifies.

**Box 12.5: UN Security Phases and Procedures**

The United Nations operates a system of five security phases, each denoting a different level of insecurity, and requiring different security measures:

**Phase One: Precautionary**

- Exercise caution
- All travel into the area requires advance clearance by the Designated Official (DO)

**Phase Two: Restricted Movement**

- Staff and families remain at home
- No travel into or within the country unless authorized by the DO

**Phase Three: Relocation**

- Internationally-recruited staff and their families are temporarily concentrated or relocated to specified sites/locations and/or eligible dependents are relocated outside the country
- According to the local UN security plan and the decision of the DO/Country Director, locally recruited staff may:
- Leave the duty station on special leave with pay, or
- Be relocated to a safe area within the country with up to 20 days Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA), and
- Receive up to 3 months salary advance and, if needed, a grant to cover transport costs for themselves and eligible dependents

**Phase Four: Emergency Operations**

- All internationally-recruited staff who are not directly concerned with the emergency or humanitarian relief operation or security matters are relocated outside the country
- Locally-recruited staff: as for Phase Three

**Phase Five: Evacuation**

- This requires the approval of the UN Secretary-General
- All remaining internationally-recruited staff leave
- Locally-recruited staff: as for Phase Three

*Source:* Adapted from ECHO, *Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organizations*, 2004, A 40, p. 145.

## 12.2.2 Effective Safety and Security Management

Authority and responsibility, lines of communication and decision-making have to be straightforward and clear for effective safety and security management.

### Types of Safety and Security Models

Table 12.3 below shows the most frequent types of safety and security models adopted by agencies operating in transition environments. A sole model can be adopted, or two or more models can be combined to better respond to country-specific circumstances.

**Table 12.3: Types of Safety and Security Models**

| Model | Description | Shortcomings |
|---|---|---|
| **Management Line** | Responsibility for safety and security lies with the line management together with other general management responsibilities, such as personnel, finance and program management. A number of NGOs employ this model. | Lack of time and sometimes of sufficient competence |
| **Specialist Security Officer** | Responsibility for safety and security lies with the specialist security officer outside of, and subordinated to, the line management. This is the predominant model within the UN. NGOs deploy specialist security officers in high risk operations. | Line managers may ignore or override the security officer |
| **Security Advisor** | Combines the above models. Responsibility for safety and security lies with the line management, but he or she is advised by one or more security advisors. This back-up can include responsibility for policy development and training, quality control of security plans and other forms of security advice. | Security advisors have littler or no management authority, but their advice can carry weight. |
| **Security Focal Points** | Responsibility for safety and security lies with the line management, but a security focal point is nominated to play the back-stopping role of a security adviser, while having other substantial management responsibilities. Security focal points may also be nominated in addition to specialist security officers or security advisors may accumulate the function of a security focal point. | Difficult for security focal points to fulfill expectations considering other responsibilities |

*Source:* Van Brabant, Koenraad*, Mainstreaming the Organizational Management of Safety and Security – A review of aid agency practices and a guide for management*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 9, Overseas Development Institute, March 2001, 19-20 p.

### The Security Triangle Concept

The security triangle concept provides important elements for devising security strategies in transitions. Each one of its elements – acceptance, protection and deterrence – offers advantages and disadvantages. These must be flexibly considered in light of the transition environment in which the organization works.

### *Diagram 12.1: The Security Triangle Concept*




- **Acceptance** occurs when the community in which the organization is working accepts and supports its presence. Out of this acceptance grows security, which is based on the goodwill of the local population. Acceptance requires efforts on the part of the organization concerned to constantly interact with the local people by explaining roles and objectives and taking time to listen to what local people have to say. Box 12.6 shows some of the elements of acceptance.

**Box 12.6: Main Elements of Acceptance**

- The belligerent parties/combatants or the official or de facto authorities in the organization's area of work give their consent to the organization's activities.
- The community has a stake in the program and participates actively. It has been involved in the assessment, design and evaluation of the program.
- The organization's mission is transparent and broadly communicated.
- The organization's activities are perceived as impartial.
- The organization's staff and presence are culturally and politically sensitive.
- The organization's program reflects local priorities.
- The organization has development good working relationships with the local governmental authorities, including the police and military where appropriate.
- The organization's programs reflect basic development concepts and a willingness to invest the time and effort to involve the community in every facet of project cycle.

*Source:* Adapted from Martin, Randolph, "NGO Field Security", *Forced Migration Review*, April 1999, 4, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR04/fmr401.pdf.

- **Protection** presupposes the adoption of protection measures. It is the element that is most commonly associated with security. The lower the level of acceptance of the local people towards the organization, the higher the degree of protection that may be necessary. Thus, protection needs to be enhanced when security conditions deteriorate. Box 12.7 describes the main elements of protection.

### Box 12.7: Main Elements of Protection

- **Protection devices:** the materials and equipment needed to provide adequate security, such as: communications equipment; reliable vehicles and maintenance facilities; perimeter security devices including walls, barbed wire and alarm systems; flak jackets and helmets; use (or non-use) of emblems (or other symbols).
- **Operational policies and procedures:** the institutional mechanisms which enhance security, such as: clear and equitable national staff personnel policies – including grievance procedures – which are communicated to staff and implemented consistently (incidents involving disgruntled staff are one of the most common causes of security infractions for NGOs); clear financial policies and procedures, including division of responsibility in accounting, and prudent cash transfer procedures; clear vehicle operations policies and strict discipline regarding vehicle operations; curfews and no-go zones where appropriate; development of and/or participation in a 'warden system' or communications pyramid for conveying emergency messages; communications protocol, training and disciplined radio usage; security orientation for incoming staff and routine security briefings for staff, including personal security training; convoy operations protocol; visitor screening protocol; clear and consistent discipline for infractions of security policy, including the inclusion of security compliance in routine performance reviews.
- **Coordinated operations:** the activities which organizations are able to carry out together, thereby creating a 'strength in numbers' strategy, such as: active membership in coordinating bodies; active relationship and coordination with the United Nations; collaborative convoy operations; integrated communications; collaborative monitoring, community policing, etc.

*Source:* Adapted from Martin, Randolph, "NGO Field Security", *Forced Migration Review*, April 1999, 4, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR04/fmr401.pdf.

- **Deterrence** depends on posing a counter threat. Development aid agencies are not large and powerful enough to pose a credible counter threat when acting on their own. They should thus focus their deterrence strategies in building relationships with large and more powerful organizations. Box 12.8 shows the main elements of deterrence.

### Box 12.8: Main Elements of Deterrence

- **Diplomatic deterrence:** this is the product of an organization's relationship to larger international actors who can exert diplomatic pressure on its behalf, influencing local authorities and actors who either pose security threats themselves or who are well placed to promote the security interests of the organizations supporting transitions. Diplomatic deterrence depends on (i) the quality of the relationship between the organization and key diplomatic missions; (ii) the quality of the relationship with the United Nations; and (iii) the quality of the organization's participation in coordinating bodies which are capable of presenting a unified front.
- **Guards:** the use of guards is a common deterrent strategy around the world. Oddly, there are very few instances where organizations have developed strong professional guidelines for this. Uniforms, basic training, incident briefing and provision of basic equipment (ranging from a night stick and flashlight to VHF radios) are among the cornerstones. Coordinated interagency monitoring greatly strengthens the effect of guards.
- **Military deterrence:** the least common form of deterrent strategy, which usually takes place when a peace-support operation is deployed and mandated to provide military security to all those humanitarian and development agencies working in the transition country. Military deterrent strategies are less than ideal and should only be pursued when the other elements of the security triangle are clearly insufficient.

*Source:* Adapted from Martin, Randolph, "NGO Field Security", *Forced Migration Review*, April 1999, 4, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR04/fmr401.pdf.

Some efforts in the name of "peace" have the opposite effect; they reinforce in local communities the sense that force is the only option. Arguably, arms, even if used "safely", reinforce reliance on the threat of overt violence from which protection is sought. Clearly, providing transition assistance is dangerous, but without a thorough examination of the implicit messages that might be transmitted by the use of certain methods, the opposite might sometimes be achieved.

Policies complementary to straightforward protection measures can go a long way toward supporting staff safety and security. For example, working toward a strong local base, through local partners, and diversifying networks of contacts to increase the acceptability of assistance is an important step. In addition, the diligent work of thorough analysis, described in chapter 10, is vital and needs to be constantly updated in order to understand as best as possible the context in which one works. Lastly, working to combat the adverse effects of competition among assistance agencies can also help mitigate negative (and dangerous) perceptions. It is crucial that the assistance agency devise a positive image of what it represents and develops messages and a communication policy that will not be perceived as patronizing.

## Main Safety and Security Documents

Agencies operating in transition environments usually prepare the safety and security documents described below. Measures to minimize the risk to safety and health should be considered during the initial planning and programming stages. Field practitioners should take the time to familiarize themselves with these documents.

- **Safety and Security Policy:** a safety and security policy outlines the organization's overall approach to cope with safety and security threats. See box 12.9 below.
- **Safety and Security Plan:** a safety and security plan establishes the rules and procedures applicable to the location where staff are stationed. Safety and security plans should therefore be adapted to the local conditions, respond to the findings of the local safety and security assessment and should be reviewed as often as necessary. The safety and security plan should be distributed to all staff, who should keep it with them and refer to it regularly.
- **Safety and Security Manual:** a safety and security manual provides staff with easy-to-read and use information on rules, procedures, measures and advice. Such a manual does not replace briefing and training.

**Box 12.9: Safety and Security Policy – Issues to Consider**

- Division of responsibility in the field of safety and security between headquarters and field offices.
- Organizational management of safety and security: security model, security strategy and preparation of security policy and manual.
- How to ensure efficient and effective information gathering: importance of having competent security staff who are knowledgeable and capable of networking with other organizations, preferably with military/police background.
- Security training for field staff prior to deployment. Making training available to headquarters personnel to familiarize them with security issues at the field level and facilitate the adoption of appropriate security measures within the organization.
- Stress management factor in dealing with security. Implementing higher security measures may impose stressful working and living conditions on personnel.
- Psychological support and other measures helping to ease the burden of responsibility for the manager.
- Insurance and welfare for both international and local staff working in the field.

## Other Management Tools

The following safety and security management tools are commonly used:

- Regular meetings
- Safety and security assessments and reviews
- Risk awareness campaigns
- Active monitoring of the environment (including by consulting key internal actors)
- Crisis preparedness

- Incident reporting and analysis
- Armed protection
- Quality control mechanisms.

### Direct Safety and Security Measures

Agency staff members can do much to protect themselves from safety and security threats in volatile environments. Even before leaving home, medical check-ups, insurance arrangements, a clearly organized health record, preparation of power of attorney and will documents, a list of key addresses and phone numbers etc. ease the stress in-country. Sensitivity, openness and sharpened perception and awareness will help identify threats. Precautionary measures of safety and security will put one's mind at ease. For example, selecting a secure neighborhood in which staff will live is a good security measure in many circumstances. Making one's home safe, through awareness of one's surroundings, locks, alarms, and possibly guards, and by planning escape routes can make quite a difference. In addition, safe deposit boxes and procedures that help manage large amounts of cash that cannot be deposited with local banks are standard safety measures that every agency should employ.

Office security should include policies that screen visitors, ensure sharp objects that may become weapons are not accessible, ensure confidential documents are safely filed daily and ensure confidentiality of sensitive staff information. Many of these measures are common-sense. A training manual with many more practical suggestions for field staff safety and security used by all UN staff can be downloaded at http://www.unops.ch/security.

## 12.2.3 Safety and Security Collaboration

Establishing relations with other agencies and organizations also operating in the field during transitions can help enhance safety and security. These relations can help further:

- Information sharing on safety and security matters
- The adoption of common positions on matters of principle and practice
- Joint safety and security training
- Agreement on sharing assets, such as radio networks and the services of a security advisor.

***Good Practices in Safety and Security Management***

- ✓ ***Ensure that authority and responsibility*** *for safety and security are clearly vested in line managers.*
- ✓ *Prevent field delegation from resulting in* ***abdication of responsibility by managers****.*
- ✓ *Ensure that* ***staff feel comfortable reporting security incidents****, highly difficult working conditions or stress problems, and that they do not hold back for fear of such complaints jeopardizing future assignments.*
- ✓ ***Adopt an overall safety and security strategy*** *that combines a mix of models depending on the threats and risks of a particular context.*
- ✓ ***Develop and implement*** *a safety and security* ***policy*** *that clearly displays corporate responsibility.*
- ✓ *Approve safety and security plans that are* ***adapted to local situations****.*
- ✓ ***Contract comprehensive insurance****, including war risks and malicious acts insurance.*
- ✓ ***Adopt*** *clear security* ***rules and disciplinary action*** *in case of inobservance.*
- ✓ ***Ensure equal treatment*** *for national and international staff.*
- ✓ *Approve* ***codes of personal behavior****.*
- ✓ ***Ensure*** *with headquarters* ***that funds are available*** *for staff security. Furthermore, staff security projects should be excluded from any budgetary restrictions.*

***Good Practices for Field Practitioners***

- ✓ ***Take responsibility*** *for your own safety and security and encourage your colleagues to do the same.*
- ✓ ***Become familiar with*** *your agency's safety and security* ***documents****.*
- ✓ ***Identify sources of information*** *on safety and security as soon as posted in the field (existence of safety and security information centers managed by the UN, other international organizations, UN peace operations, foreign embassies, NGOs).*
- ✓ ***Check safety and security updates*** *issued by these centers and organizations regularly.*
- ✓ ***Attend safety and security meetings*** *regularly.*
- ✓ ***Register at Embassy or Mission*** *as well as with the manager/designated official responsible for your safety and security.*
- ✓ ***Ensure you have adequate insurance coverage*** *to work in transition environments.*

## *General Lessons on Coordination and Staff Safety and Security*

- ✓ Coordination is vital among external actors, including the coordination of an overall vision and reconstruction goals, financial resource mobilization, disbursement procedures, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and emphasis given to local partners and community organizations.
- ✓ The record of coordination in transition situations is not good. In the immediate phase after the signing of a peace agreement, there often is a high level of political engagement so that there is competition for projects, and coordination is ineffective. Worse, the response might not only be wasteful but may also fuel greed and grievances. Strong leadership through the UN is important, but each external actor needs to commit to support coordinated action.
- ✓ The failure to provide effective, comprehensive safety and security carries a high price in lost productivity and health problems, and essentially leads to ineffective programming. Security costs money, but staff are an organization's most valuable asset.
- ✓ Procedures for safety and security are of limited use if staff do not possess the good judgment and experience to make them work. Thus training staff is vital. It should also be recognized, however, that this places a large burden on field managers. They, as well as specialized security personnel and the staff at large, must therefore feel comfortable with and accountable for the measures they take to protect themselves and others.
- ✓ Decisions as to whether or not staff will be placed in jeopardy, despite known security risks, are extremely serious. It is crucial, therefore, that agencies recognize the psychological burden this places on managers and devise adequate support systems. critical
- ✓ Measures that minimize risks to safety and health and associated training should be considered in the initial planning and programming stages.

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# *Annex 12.1: Security Incidents: Prevention and Reaction*

(Source: ECHO, *Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organizations, 2004, A 28, p. 107-110).*

Managers should ensure that their staff are properly prepared, both to minimise security risks and to respond to incidents. Below are listed some suggested ways of reducing the risk of different types of incident, and of reacting to incidents if they occur. The points below will not apply in all situations: the best response will depend on the particular circumstances. But they may serve as helpful suggestions, to be adapted as appropriate.

Security incidents and some health and safety incidents are included in the same list, for ease of reference.

**Accidents**

**Vehicle accidents**
In many cases, driving is the most dangerous activity that humanitarian staff do. While accidents are not strictly a security issue, they are mentioned in this Guide because of the large number of humanitarian staff killed and injured while driving. Great effort should be made to ensure safe driving, and well-maintained vehicles, so that accidents are avoided as far as possible.

Once an accident has happened:

- Stop quickly and safely. Pull off the road if it is safe to do so. Note: in some cultures it is not safe to stop if you have just been involved in an accident, since onlookers are likely to beat or even kill the occupants of any vehicle they think has caused the accident. In these cases it is normal to drive on, even if there have been casualties, and seek help from the police or other responsible authority. But in many cultures it is imperative to stop immediately, indeed is a criminal offence not to do so. This underlines the importance of good local knowledge, and briefing for new staff.
- Prevent further danger. It is vital to prevent further danger to passengers, onlookers and other road users, after an accident has happened. This may involve:
  - Removing from vehicles any passengers who are in imminent danger
  - Putting out warning signs. Warning triangles should be placed far in front of the accident, facing towards oncoming traffic in both directions. If a warning triangle is not available, improvise an alternative (e.g. place a person there to signal to traffic, or use a warning known to local people, such as twigs and leaves on the road).
  - Putting out a fire, or preventing a fire if one is likely (e.g. if there has been a fuel spill)
  - Directing traffic past the accident, if necessary
  - Directing pedestrians and any onlookers out of the way of traffic and other hazards
- Give first aid to any who need it
- Call an ambulance if necessary, or if an ambulance is not available, make other arrangements to take casualties to the nearest emergency medical facility, perhaps using your own vehicle
- Call the police
- Take the names and addresses of any witnesses
- Exchange contact details with any other parties involved in the accident
- If you have a camera, take photographs of the positions of the vehicles after the accident, and any other relevant items, if doing so will not antagonise bystanders
- On the arrival of the police, cooperate fully with them
- Show courtesy and respect to all parties. If anyone has been injured in the accident, even if the fault was not yours, consider visiting them and/or their family, bringing a small present if appropriate. This helps to build local goodwill and can therefore be helpful to your security.
- After the incident, make a detailed record of it. Identify any lessons to learn, and ensure that any necessary changes in procedures are made. If disciplinary action is appropriate, ensure that it is taken swiftly and fairly. Proper accountability is particularly important relating to road accidents, because of the large numbers of deaths and injuries they cause to humanitarian staff.
- Record the incident in the organisation's accident book

**Non-vehicle accidents**
Humanitarian staff are at risk of a variety of hazards not involving vehicles. Examples include:

- Electric shock
- Natural hazards such as rock falls or mudslides, floods or earthquakes
- Tripping, slipping or falling
- Drowning
- Burns

Managers should ensure that staff exposure to these hazards is minimised and that appropriate measures are in place to limit the impact of such incidents or to speed recovery from them.

It is good practice for all field locations to maintain an accident book. All accidents should be reported to managers and recorded in the accident book. 'Near misses', i.e. cases where an accident was only narrowly averted, should be recorded in the same way. The book should be inspected regularly by senior managers in order to ensure that any necessary lessons are learned.

In industrialised countries, it is estimated that 70% of workplace accidents could be prevented if employers put proper safety control measures in place.[69] A full discussion of health and safety measures is beyond the scope of this document, but it is clear that good security management which fails to take account of non-security hazards amounts to an unbalanced approach to staff safety.

**Air attack**

There are several kinds of air attack including:

- Bombing
- Gunfire
- Missiles

As with all other threats, it is vital to *assess* the threat of air attack. In particular:

- Is an air attack likely?
- If there is an air attack, is it likely to be aimed at you?
- What are the likely targets of an air attack? Are any of them near to you?
- If there is an air attack, what kind is it likely to be?
- In view of all the above, what security measures should you put in place? What kind of shelter do you need? If the risk of air attack is high, should you even be present in the area?

For information on shelters, see Annex 33.

In the event of an air attack, the correct action will depend on the type of attack and your location. The following procedures may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances:

- Drop instantly to the ground. Lie completely flat.
- If it is possible to roll or crawl into a ditch, into a building or behind a wall without raising your profile, do so. This may give you some protection. Otherwise, remain still. Most blast and shrapnel fly upwards from the site of the explosion in a cone shape, so your best defence is to stay as low as possible. In this way it is often possible to survive explosions that are very close by.
- Observe what is happening
- Do not move until you are confident that the attack has finished. Beware: it may appear to have finished when in fact a second wave of attacks may be about to start. If there is a security officer for the humanitarian organisations, he or she may be able to announce the "all clear" by radio – but often this is not possible. You may therefore have to wait a long time before you can be reasonably confident that no more attacks are coming.
- If you are in a building, drop to the ground and move away from windows. Many injuries and deaths are caused by shattering glass. If it is safe to do so, move into the pre-designated shelter, without raising your profile.
- As with all incidents, do not use the radio unless it is absolutely necessary. Do not call your colleagues to check if they are safe: if they need help, they will call you. Keep the radio channels clear so that those who have emergency needs can use them.
- Report the incident as appropriate

**Air crash**

Although aircraft crashes are usually seen as a health and safety rather than a security issue, they have accounted for a significant number of humanitarian staff deaths in recent years. For this reason the topic is included in this Guide.

Humanitarian managers are able to reduce the risk of air crash in some respects, including:

[69] See RoSPA website at http://www.rospa.com/CMS/index.asp.

- The choice of airline or air charter company
- Avoiding higher-risk routes
- Keeping up to date with the security situation at both ends of a flight route, and along its path

Humanitarian organisations should decide which companies to avoid, and which routes to avoid, and stick to this decision.

If an air crash does happen, involving a member of staff, local authorities are likely to organise search and rescue efforts. The relevant manager should ensure that the staff member's Next of Kin are immediately informed, and kept up to date with the situation. See Annex 22 for a suggested procedure for informing Next of Kin.

**Ambush**

The best defence against ambushes is to avoid them. Good security assessments, combined with mature and careful decision-making, will lead to decisions not to travel in areas where ambushes are likely.

While one can reduce the chances of meeting an ambush, one cannot eliminate the possibility without stopping all travel. In some circumstances, stopping all travel, at least for a time, may be the best decision. In other circumstances humanitarian managers may decide that, if for example the risk of ambush is very low and travel is essential in order to save many lives, travel is justified. This is a matter for case-by-case decision by experienced and competent managers.

Armoured vehicles can be a further protection against ambush, appropriate in some circumstances. They require drivers who are familiar with the different handling qualities of these vehicles. They are expensive to buy and maintain. They do not protect against all types of weapon. They can also give an unfortunate impression to local people that you wish to fortify your organisation.

If staff are ambushed, there are methods of reacting which can increase the chances of survival. While there have been many unfortunate cases of people being killed and injured in ambushes, there have also been cases of people surviving unhurt.

The best action to take will depend on many factors, including the nature of the road, the terrain, whether staff are on foot or in a vehicle, the type of vehicle, the number of people travelling, the level of training of those travelling, the goals of the ambushers, the number of ambushers and their level of training, the kind of weapons used, etc. If the staff travelling are knowledgeable about as many of these factors as possible, their ability to make good decisions will be increased.

There follow some possible procedures for reacting to some types of ambush. They may be advisable in some circumstances but may not be appropriate, or may even be dangerous, in others.

Good judgement and training are required, to enable a good decision to be made at the critical moment. These procedures are provided to staff to help them think through their possible responses in advance. It is vital that procedures suggested here are selected and adapted as appropriate to the local situation.

**Scenario one: ambush using a roadblock**
You round a corner and see a roadblock (or even simply a checkpoint) ahead. Your knowledge of the area tells you that this is not a normal checkpoint, but could be an ambush.

- You will have to assess very fast whether it is simply a checkpoint, with no hostile intent, or whether it may have hostile intent against you

- If you assess that it may be violent, stop immediately if you can. Then reverse back round the corner. Once round the corner, if the road is wide enough, turn round and drive away. If it is not wide enough, continue reversing. Send an immediate incident report.

- If the roadblock is so close that stopping and reversing is likely to result in being attacked, an instant decision is necessary, as follows:

  - If you assess that the intention of the roadblock may be to kill or injure you or your passengers:

    - Drive fairly fast through the roadblock if it physically possible. This may include ramming an obstacle in order to knock it out of the way. Do not drive so fast that you may lose control. Do not zigzag, since you are likely to roll the vehicle. Once through the roadblock, keep driving at a safe speed, even if you are being shot at, and send an immediate incident report as soon as you can. Your passengers should lie down throughout, or keep as low a profile as possible.

    - If it is not possible to drive through the roadblock (perhaps because the obstacle is too big), consider reversing back round the corner even if it will

attract shooting. Then send an immediate incident report.

- If it is neither possible to reverse round the corner, nor to drive through the roadblock, you have at least two further options:

  - Slow to a halt, 5 metres or so in front of the roadblock, just as if you were at a normal checkpoint. Comply calmly with any demands made of you. It may be that the attackers do not wish to kill you: they may only want your vehicle and possessions, for example. If appropriate, negotiate with them and persuade them not to harm anyone. Send an immediate incident report as soon as possible, but do not do this within the sight or hearing of the attackers.

  - Or, particularly if you are certain that you will be killed if caught, you may decide to drive off the road and escape across country. If it is not possible to drive off the road, stop abruptly and tell all passengers to run. This is obviously very risky, but it may save some or all of your lives, in which case it is better than everyone being killed. It may be wiser for each person to run in a different direction, so that if some are caught, others may escape. Send an immediate incident report as soon as possible – so it is helpful if you can keep a radio with you as you flee.

- If you are confident that the intention of the roadblock is **not** to kill or injure:

  - Slow to a halt, 5 metres or so in front of the roadblock, as if you were at a normal checkpoint. Comply calmly with any demands made of you. Remember that losing a vehicle or other possessions is not important, compared to saving a life. Hand over anything demanded, swiftly and calmly. If the attackers then leave, make no sudden movements until they are out of sight. Then send an immediate incident report, if possible, and move all staff to a safe location.

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